We voted AGAINST GFX Labs’ proposal to create Community Factory Proposals (CFP).

Currently, it is already possible to create proposal drafts on Tally. These drafts can be created without any governance power, and shared for others to review. The key feature is that delegates can not only signal support, but also submit these drafts on-chain. This support is recorded on-chain and displayed directly in Tally’s interface.

In this sense, @Tally already functions similarly to a CFP: individuals without voting power can have their proposals submitted to on-chain governance through delegates who have enough delegated voting power.

However, drafts currently need to be sent directly to a specific delegate. There is no interface in Tally where delegates can browse drafts, express support, and choose to submit them on-chain if they wish.

Since Tally is already a Uniswap Service Provider, we suggest that this feature be implemented and integrated directly by Tally, if the community believes it would be beneficial for the DAO. This would reduce development costs and provide the same outcome within a tool that delegates already use in Uniswap governance.

Additionally, as noted by other delegates, Uniswap currently struggles more with quorum than with a lack of people interested in submitting proposals. We believe our focus should be on addressing this issue first, as it has a direct impact on the security and functioning of the protocol.

I like the Uniswap Community Proposal Factory as a mechanism, as it would allow proposals to enter into the main voting rounds without needing a delegate sponsor.

But $75k is too high for this given the lower priority. Where will people go to see and vote on these CPF proposals? As @blockful suggests, this product may be better suited built into the Tally interface. That would reduce development costs and avoid creating a new place where people have to go and track proposals.

Also 20M is too high of a delegation to vote in the direction of passing CPF proposals. With a 10M quorum, doesn’t that mean that a minimum of 5M+1 “Yes” votes could activate the 20M? Most top delegates only have 2.5M to 5M in voting power.

I would say it should start off as a 2.5M delegate with a 2.5M quorum. That would be enough to serve the purpose of the community “rallying together” and acting as it’s own delegate. Otherwise larger delegates would likely have to join in the CPF rounds as @kaereste said.

We voted AGAINST GFX Labs’ proposal to create Community Factory Proposals (CFP).

Currently, it is already possible to create proposal drafts on Tally. These drafts can be created without any governance power, and shared for others to review. The key feature is that delegates can not only signal support, but also submit these drafts on-chain. This support is recorded on-chain and displayed directly in Tally’s interface.

In this sense, @Tally already functions similarly to a CFP: individuals without voting power can have their proposals submitted to on-chain governance through delegates who have enough delegated voting power.

However, drafts currently need to be sent directly to a specific delegate. There is no interface in Tally where delegates can browse drafts, express support, and choose to submit them on-chain if they wish.

Since Tally is already a Uniswap Service Provider, we suggest that this feature be implemented and integrated directly by Tally, if the community believes it would be beneficial for the DAO. This would reduce development costs and provide the same outcome within a tool that delegates already use in Uniswap governance.

Additionally, as noted by other delegates, Uniswap currently struggles more with quorum than with a lack of people interested in submitting proposals. We believe our focus should be on addressing this issue first, as it has a direct impact on the security and functioning of the protocol.

I like the Uniswap Community Proposal Factory as a mechanism, as it would allow proposals to enter into the main voting rounds without needing a delegate sponsor.

But $75k is too high for this given the lower priority. Where will people go to see and vote on these CPF proposals? As @blockful suggests, this product may be better suited built into the Tally interface. That would reduce development costs and avoid creating a new place where people have to go and track proposals.

Also 20M is too high of a delegation to vote in the direction of passing CPF proposals. With a 10M quorum, doesn’t that mean that a minimum of 5M+1 “Yes” votes could activate the 20M? Most top delegates only have 2.5M to 5M in voting power.

I would say it should start off as a 2.5M delegate with a 2.5M quorum. That would be enough to serve the purpose of the community “rallying together” and acting as it’s own delegate. Otherwise larger delegates would likely have to join in the CPF rounds as @kaereste said.

Thank you to everyone for their feedback. We want to provide a final reply to some of these points.

Most questions can be answered by reading the proposal carefully, which many delegates may have forgotten to do.

This answer (this makes it easier to hit quorum) can be found here:

This answer (it’s not a committee - it’s the exact same voter set as we have now for all other votes) can be found here:

This answer (that one of the core purposes is to avoid having to beg a large delegate to post a proposal) can be found here:

FranklinDAO has decided to vote against the proposal for a few reasons. First, we recognize and appreciate the effort into making proposals and the governance process as a whole more accessible to newer delegates or those who do not have the voting power to do so.

However, as many other delegates have already stated, we have seen that the biggest issue within the governance is community is the lack of voting/participation rather than a lack of new proposals being put forward.

Additionally, in its current state, we feel that the proposal does not specify what the 20M UNI will be used for in the CPF or specify how the proposed $75K to GFX will be implemented. The suggested funding to GFX here would need a much more detailed outline of the use of said funds.

This would be to reimburse for past development expenses if the DAO found our work worth using:

While the 20m is a placeholder number, it's a delegation of 20m UNI. This would enable the CPF (a smart contract with delegation) to then propose and vote in favor of its own proposal:

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

First of all, we appreciate the intent. Lowering the barrier to surface ideas and pooling community votes fits the spirit of open governance. A factory that helps smaller holders coordinate could be helpful if it is designed and operated with strong safeguards.

Our concern is that this tries to solve a social participation problem with a technical mechanism. Uniswap already has many delegates who can sponsor proposals, and reaching 10M votes inside a factory would still require support from large delegates in practice (that might help submitting proposals in the first place). That means the real work remains outreach, coalition building, and transparent deliberation. A factory alone will not fix low engagement.

The request to delegate 20MUNI to the factory is hard to accept without clearer ownership, rules, and accountability. The proposal leaves open who will deploy and steward the system, and it requests funding before demonstrating that the model increases high-quality participation.

For now, we plan to vote against. We like the direction, but we need neutral custody and governance of the factory, a clear operating policy for the delegated votes, and evidence that the model improves participation quality before committing treasury voting power and development funds. When those pieces are in place, we will be open to revisiting this idea.

Hi @GFXlabs!

At first glance, our view is similar to that @Doo_StableLab: this proposal could generate unnecessary spam by setting such a low threshold of 100 UNI (currently worth less than $800). We also wonder whether this system might introduce more bureaucracy and complexity, given that any proposal submitted through this mechanism would require two votes: one via the CPF module and one in the regular governance vote.

That being said, we would like to ask you a few questions to gain a better understanding of the proposal:

• Does adding and deploying the CPF module to the current governance contracts require any modification to the existing governance contract? We are concerned about the potential risks this could bring.
• Why delegate 20M UNI to the CPF when the proposed quorum is 10M?
• Why did you set the amount at 100 UNI (currently around $750) for anyone to activate the mechanism and make a CPF proposal? Don't you think that's too low a threshold to activate the governance system, which could lead to a lot of spam proposals?

Thank you to everyone for their feedback. We want to provide a final reply to some of these points.

Most questions can be answered by reading the proposal carefully, which many delegates may have forgotten to do.

This answer (this makes it easier to hit quorum) can be found here:

This answer (it’s not a committee - it’s the exact same voter set as we have now for all other votes) can be found here:

This answer (that one of the core purposes is to avoid having to beg a large delegate to post a proposal) can be found here:

FranklinDAO has decided to vote against the proposal for a few reasons. First, we recognize and appreciate the effort into making proposals and the governance process as a whole more accessible to newer delegates or those who do not have the voting power to do so.

However, as many other delegates have already stated, we have seen that the biggest issue within the governance is community is the lack of voting/participation rather than a lack of new proposals being put forward.

Additionally, in its current state, we feel that the proposal does not specify what the 20M UNI will be used for in the CPF or specify how the proposed $75K to GFX will be implemented. The suggested funding to GFX here would need a much more detailed outline of the use of said funds.

This would be to reimburse for past development expenses if the DAO found our work worth using:

While the 20m is a placeholder number, it's a delegation of 20m UNI. This would enable the CPF (a smart contract with delegation) to then propose and vote in favor of its own proposal:

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

First of all, we appreciate the intent. Lowering the barrier to surface ideas and pooling community votes fits the spirit of open governance. A factory that helps smaller holders coordinate could be helpful if it is designed and operated with strong safeguards.

Our concern is that this tries to solve a social participation problem with a technical mechanism. Uniswap already has many delegates who can sponsor proposals, and reaching 10M votes inside a factory would still require support from large delegates in practice (that might help submitting proposals in the first place). That means the real work remains outreach, coalition building, and transparent deliberation. A factory alone will not fix low engagement.

The request to delegate 20MUNI to the factory is hard to accept without clearer ownership, rules, and accountability. The proposal leaves open who will deploy and steward the system, and it requests funding before demonstrating that the model increases high-quality participation.

For now, we plan to vote against. We like the direction, but we need neutral custody and governance of the factory, a clear operating policy for the delegated votes, and evidence that the model improves participation quality before committing treasury voting power and development funds. When those pieces are in place, we will be open to revisiting this idea.

Hi @GFXlabs!

At first glance, our view is similar to that @Doo_StableLab: this proposal could generate unnecessary spam by setting such a low threshold of 100 UNI (currently worth less than $800). We also wonder whether this system might introduce more bureaucracy and complexity, given that any proposal submitted through this mechanism would require two votes: one via the CPF module and one in the regular governance vote.

That being said, we would like to ask you a few questions to gain a better understanding of the proposal:

• Does adding and deploying the CPF module to the current governance contracts require any modification to the existing governance contract? We are concerned about the potential risks this could bring.
• Why delegate 20M UNI to the CPF when the proposed quorum is 10M?
• Why did you set the amount at 100 UNI (currently around $750) for anyone to activate the mechanism and make a CPF proposal? Don't you think that's too low a threshold to activate the governance system, which could lead to a lot of spam proposals?

We appreciate the effort that went into this proposal and see the value in lowering barriers for smaller token holders to participate more directly in governance.

That said, we believe the timing may not be right. The DAO is currently facing a more pressing challenge with quorum, and resolving that should take priority before introducing new governance layers.

While it is true that smaller delegates cannot technically open proposals on their own, in practice, the DAO has developed an effective workaround: larger delegates often sponsor proposals from smaller ones. This dynamic has enabled important initiatives to move forward. For example, as kpk we were able to successfully introduce and pass the Onboarding Package for Gnosis Chain proposal with the sponsorship of PGov.

For these reasons, while we see merit in the Community Proposal Factory, we encourage addressing quorum and governance participation at the broader level before introducing additional mechanisms.

We would beg to differ. Over the last year, the Uniswap DAO has only passed 16 proposals. Many of which have been authored by a recurring small population of delegates. The Uniswap DAO has a fundamental issue. The barrier to proposing an idea and having it reach a governance decision is an extremely high threshold, which has had a long-term effect of discouraging proposals, leading to the stagnation of ideas and, consequently, the progress that UNI token holders are witnessing.

While this proposal will not resolve the issue of voter engagement, it can effectively enhance ideation and the exchange of new ideas within the DAO. That alone could bring about higher voter engagement.

This is a low-risk, high-reward initiative.

We appreciate the effort that went into this proposal and see the value in lowering barriers for smaller token holders to participate more directly in governance.

That said, we believe the timing may not be right. The DAO is currently facing a more pressing challenge with quorum, and resolving that should take priority before introducing new governance layers.

While it is true that smaller delegates cannot technically open proposals on their own, in practice, the DAO has developed an effective workaround: larger delegates often sponsor proposals from smaller ones. This dynamic has enabled important initiatives to move forward. For example, as kpk we were able to successfully introduce and pass the Onboarding Package for Gnosis Chain proposal with the sponsorship of PGov.

For these reasons, while we see merit in the Community Proposal Factory, we encourage addressing quorum and governance participation at the broader level before introducing additional mechanisms.

We would beg to differ. Over the last year, the Uniswap DAO has only passed 16 proposals. Many of which have been authored by a recurring small population of delegates. The Uniswap DAO has a fundamental issue. The barrier to proposing an idea and having it reach a governance decision is an extremely high threshold, which has had a long-term effect of discouraging proposals, leading to the stagnation of ideas and, consequently, the progress that UNI token holders are witnessing.

While this proposal will not resolve the issue of voter engagement, it can effectively enhance ideation and the exchange of new ideas within the DAO. That alone could bring about higher voter engagement.

This is a low-risk, high-reward initiative.