Former UNI LP here:

With the new DUNI structure, it seems the foundation has entrenched itself as a dependency for UNI holders. How exactly is accountability managed when it comes to the underperformance of its employees? At what point can UNI holders request a change in leadership, particularly those with close ties to Uniswap’s leadership (e.g., the blacklisting of Gauntlet)?

I raise this point because it’s now been several years of the same leadership and similar results from the Uniswap Foundation. Meanwhile, we have competitors like Aerodrome and Fluid nipping at Uniswap’s heels in terms of volume and market share. Protocols like Hyperliquid and other perpetuals are on the verge of becoming the go-to platforms for liquidity providers across the broader ecosystem.

Meanwhile, Uniswap Labs takes fees from the frontend with one hand, while dumping UNI tokens with the other. At the same time, users are shifting to alternative frontends to avoid those fees (which will likely happen with liquidity providers once the fee switch is implemented). If this trend continues, UNI risks being viewed as a marketing gimmick or meme coin, and the entire Uniswap brand could end up becoming the “MySpace” of the crypto space.

It’s also becoming clear that the UVN is being delayed due to the failure of the Unichain and its incentive campaign, which was managed by Gauntlet.

Will the UVN be another 5 year push back like the fee switch? Again waiting for vibes/marketing/expenditures to come back for a dead L2?

The “fee switch” isn’t going to solve any of the issues mentioned above. It won’t even rescue governance, which has essentially been taken over by insiders. If anything, it will only accelerate the rise of another DEX that knows how to effectively run a business.

UNI/ETH:

At what point do we need to consider new leadership for the Uniswap Foundation? What are the key performance indicators (KPIs) that would trigger a full replacement or transition? What is the process to do this? The foundation needs business developers and developers who can actually deliver, not just hand out grants to analytics teams that disappear a month after launching failed products. @devinwalsh @eek637

Thanks for answering my questions,

Your former exit liquidity

P.S Have a great soccer tournament with your buddies. UNI holders enjoy paying for your good time.

Yes, the DUNI has already been approved by Uniswap Governance and established. You can find more information about the Uniswap DUNI on the UF website.

As for the Fee Switch proposal, currently ongoing dependencies include:

• Final legal due diligence around the fee mechanism
• Smart contract audits

Additionally, as mentioned in the post, these are the key highlights of the work being done related to the Uniswap DUNI:

• The Uniswap Foundation, in its role as Ministerial Agent, together with Cowrie (the DUNI’s administrator responsible for regulatory, tax, and compliance matters), is actively overseeing the outreach process to the IRS to ensure compliance with any potential historic tax obligation as outlined in the proposal.
• As a result of Uniswap DAO adopting DUNI, popular DAO voting platforms Agora and Tally will be updated to provide additional transparency to community members.
• The DUNI legal structure is expected to alleviate some of the legal risks previously associated with active governance participation. The UF is reaching out to firms they believe to be large token holders to discuss DUNI and its implications on governance, as well as the opportunities it opens for their participation. Those conversations are ongoing.

FFG Meeting #3 Summary (September 2025)

This third FFG report provides updates on key initiatives, including the protocol fee switch, Unichain growth, and the expansion of Uniswap v4 through hooks. The summary below is a composite of meeting notes and post-meeting thoughts by FFG members and the UAC.

TL;DR

Key highlights that emerged during the third FFG meeting are:

• The Uniswap Foundation is working on the next steps for DUNI, including growing active participation in governance by larger token holders.

• The UF is expecting a Fee Switch proposal to be published by the end of the year.

• The v4 liquidity mining campaign has been expanded across chains, specifically targeting key pairs where Uniswap has a lower market share.

• The work to support hook teams in their journey is continuing. This includes taking steps to improve hook audits and security, as well as to optimise hook infrastructure (eg. routing and gas efficiency). The aim is for hooks to have a positive impact on v4 adoption and to counter competition from new types of DEXs.

DUNA and Fee Switch

Following the successful outcome of the “Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA” proposal, Uniswap governance has adopted the DUNI framework.

The Uniswap Foundation plans to publish a forum post outlining the updated proposal process under DUNI. In the meantime, below are key highlights of the work currently being done on this front:

• The Uniswap Foundation, in its role as Ministerial Agent, together with Cowrie (the DUNI’s administrator responsible for regulatory, tax, and compliance matters), is actively overseeing the outreach process to the IRS to ensure compliance with any potential historic tax obligation as outlined in the proposal.

• As a result of Uniswap DAO adopting DUNI, popular DAO voting platforms Agora and Tally will be updated to provide additional transparency to community members.

• The DUNI legal structure is expected to alleviate some of the legal risks previously associated with active governance participation. The UF is reaching out to firms they believe to be large token holders to discuss DUNI and its implications on governance, as well as the opportunities it opens for their participation. Those conversations are ongoing.

Although out of scope for the FFG meeting, the UAC received questions directed at a16z and Variant on their feedback regarding the DUNI adoption and related governance activities. They both responded with a positive sentiment towards the Uniswap DUNI, highlighting how it removes the majority of concerns they previously had with participating in governance and their hope for other investors to see it the same way. They added DUNI opens up options for what governance can do, particularly in regards to actions that could result in taxable income for the DAO.

Outstanding dependencies for the Fee Switch proposal:

As the DUNA establishment was the last and major regulatory blocker, the Uniswap Foundation is expecting a Fee Switch proposal to be published by the end of the year. Outstanding, currently ongoing dependencies for the Fee Switch proposal include:

• Final legal due diligence around the fee mechanism

• Smart contract audits

Unichain, UVN and Uniswap v4

A second topic of discussion during the FFG meeting was Unichain, UVN and Uniswap v4. Once again, we looked into the evolving Liquidity Mining programs across chains, as well as the infrastructure and ecosystem being developed around Uniswap v4 hooks.

Liquidity mining and supporting hook projects:

At the beginning of July, the UF set some growth goals for Q3 that focused on increasing Unichain DEX volume as well as volume across Base, Arbitrum and Mainnet, and on growing volume routed through hooks.

The first two goals were successfully achieved. Uniswap v4 processed $183+ Billion since inception, with 57% of volume settled on Layer 2s. More v4 metrics are available here. Incentives have begun to expand outside of Unichain, specifically reaching key pairs on Ethereum Mainnet, Base and Arbitrum. Part of this strategic deployment of incentives is designed to grow pairs where the protocol has a lower market share.

Growing volume routed through hook pools has been a challenge, with the two main identified issues being routing support and gas efficiency. The former is being addressed through collaborations with DEX aggregators, improvements to the Uniswap Labs interface and more efficient tooling to help solvers settle on hook pools. Solutions are being explored for the latter problem as well, aiming at improving the gas efficiency of hook pools.

The Hook Design Lab served as a great learning experience to identify these issues and understand what is needed to make hook projects successful. Despite these challenges, some hooks are showing growing adoption (eg. KyberSwap on Base)—incentives and other ways to further support this growth are being explored.

Hooks represent an excellent way to counter potential competition from new types of DEXs as they enable the implementation of similar functionalities directly built on top of Uniswap v4. Collaborations with leading DeFi projects to build hook pools for specific use-cases are in the works.

Security of hook projects:

Following the Bunni attack, security concerns emerged regarding hook-based protocols, especially those built with custom logic. The UF is actively improving the audit process for hooks they directly support.

The solutions currently being implemented include:

• Reiterating the next phase of the Uniswap Foundation Security Fund.

• Leveraging AI auditing tools that are being added to the Areta Audits Marketplace.

• Collaborations with auditors who are developing specific expertise with hook design and its most risky aspects. Projects will be prompted to audit with them.

• Adding a “hooks audit module” in the Hooks Academy.

• Adding subsidised audits for the winners of the Atrium Academy Hookathon.

• Looking into additional tooling that can help with identifying early attacks happening.

Conditional Funding Markets:

The Uniswap Foundation posted a summary of the experiments conducted with Conditional Funding Markets. A key learning was that participation by participating protocols had more potential influence than anticipated, which raised questions about credible neutrality. Additionally, forecasting complexity (TVL projections) limited participation and confidence among forecasters, which will be improved for future iterations.

This first round of experimentation used a budget of $120k (out of the $1M earmarked budget). Active participation has been paused for now, and the Butter team is currently developing new markets, which will serve as additional learning when revisiting this in the future.

UVN:

The UF is currently prioritising the Fee Switch proposal, with UVN having a lower priority. A specific timeline for the implementation of UVN was not given.

The UAC will continue monitoring the progress of these initiatives and will provide the next update following the November FFG meeting. We welcome feedback from the DAO and broader community.

In preparation for the Foundation Feedback Group (FFG) meeting #3 happening at the end of the month, here is a Google form for you to share questions & topics you’d like the FFG to discuss with the UF.

As we're midway through the FFG initiative, there's a two-question survey at the beginning of the form to check in on delegates' thoughts around the initiative.

Please share your feedback and questions so we can continue improving the FFG and make communications between the DAO and the UF more effective.

I mostly agree with the concerns raised above by the community members in the replies. Transparency is key, and while it seems like the Foundation is taking some steps toward that, we need to see real action.

We need to bring back the actual UNI community and get all UNI holders involved in governance. Right now, Discord is practically dead. Most messages come from bots, and UF’s presence there is almost nonexistent. We need active community managers and moderators helping out, answering questions, and keeping engagement alive.

Information is scattered across too many forums and channels. Proposals, governance conversations, snapshots, and updates should be actively shared on Discord, and we should see real time discussions happening there to revive the space.

The fee switch must go live and when it does, there should be major marketing around it. We increase staking, attract more contributors, make people care and also participate in governance later on. We need more real voices — actual UNI holders with skin in the game.

To the community: stop delegating to people who aren't engaged or helping grow the ecosystem. Delegate to those who are present, active, AND community aligned!

I fully support the Foundation and the team — they’ve done great work. But the focus lately seems too zoomed in on big picture strategy while the grassroots community is being overlooked. Now that Unichain is live, that balance needs to shift. Let’s value UNI holders and the community more than ever.

Look at communities like Moonwell, Aerodrome, or Base. when you ask a question in Discord or on X, you get a thoughtful response from a team member, founder, or moderator almost instantly. I mention these not as comparisons, but as examples of what effective community presence and support look like in practice. So, please don't get me wrong. I want to be productive. That kind of responsiveness builds trust and drives participation. It would be great to see that level of engagement here too.

FFG Meeting #2 Summary (July 2025)

This second FFG report provides updates on key initiatives, including the DUNA (Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) structure, protocol fee switch, Unichain growth, and the expansion of Uniswap v4 through hooks. The summary below is a composite of meeting notes and post-meeting thoughts by FFG members and the UAC.

TL;DR

The second FFG meeting was structured across two separate calls: one dedicated to discussing the DUNA (Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) and the other focused on a broader discussion around the DAO, Unichain, and Uniswap v4. Key highlights that emerged are:

• The DUNA proposal is live on the forum, with a target of Q3 2025 for an onchain vote. The Fee Switch proposal is expected to follow closely after, although the timeline has been slightly pushed since our last FFG update in May.

• There is the expectation that, if approved, the DUNA structure will lead to a change in the governance turnout, with increased voter participation.

• The Uniswap Foundation reconfirmed outperformance over the initial goals set for the Unichain liquidity mining campaign.

• While the liquidity mining campaign is expected to contribute to the initial growth, liquidity retention is highly dependent on the hooks and projects being built and used. The Uniswap Foundation is working on supporting hook teams for their long-term success, with priority given to hooks offering innovative use cases and/or strong distribution channels. The goal is to cultivate this ecosystem on Unichain and eventually replicate the learnings on other chains.

DUNA and Fee Switch

The July FFG meeting included a call to discuss the upcoming proposal to implement the DUNA structure, along with a line-by-line review of the DUNI Association Agreement.

With the DUNA proposal, Uniswap DAO is setting a precedent as the largest and most high-profile DUNA launched in the US. Due to the sensitive nature of this topic, we’ll hold back from providing a summary of this part and reference the UF’s proposal to the community instead. The UF confirmed a target of Q3 2025 for such a proposal to move to an onchain vote, with the Fee Switch proposal expected to follow closely after.

Outstanding Dependencies:

Outstanding dependencies for the adoption of the DUNA structure and further discussion on the Fee Switch proposal include:

• The technical development for the Fee Switch activation is currently underway. A change to the initial design caused delays on the initial timeline. This change enables support for hook-generated fees within the overall fee switch architecture. This streamlines the process of collecting fees from hook projects. One of the commitments that the UF made was exploring revenue-share agreements with grantees/partners in their latest renewal. The diverse environment of hooks, especially those with a custom accounting framework, provides Uniswap with an assortment of potential revenue streams. In order to incorporate hook-related fees into the broader “fee switch architecture," the DUNA and fee proposals will be conducted separately, with fees being instituted at a later date this year.

Broader Implications:

While there are other DUNA-powered DAOs, Uniswap is the most advanced DAO to adopt such a legal structure. For this reason, the way the Uniswap DUNA (called “DUNI”) is structured is specifically tailored to Uniswap and its particular needs and challenges.

While the Fee Switch is a core function unlocked by the DUNA, the structure enables much more than revenue activation. For example, the DUNA enables the DAO to more effectively interact with the offchain world. The DUNA framework introduces a clear and legally recognized system for appointing agents and administrators to act on behalf of the DAO, without transferring decision-making authority away from governance.

Agents, such as the Ministerial Agent, are empowered to carry out non-discretionary, non-managerial, governance-approved actions that require legal or operational execution in the offchain world. This can include executing contracts, hiring service providers, transmitting payments, or filing regulatory documents, tasks that the DAO cannot perform directly through smart contracts.

Administrators are appointed to perform specialized functions, such as tax compliance, financial reporting, or operational management. Their authority is strictly limited to the scope defined by governance and can be modified or revoked at any time.

By formalizing these roles, the DUNA structure allows Uniswap Governance to engage in essential offchain operations, such as contracting with law firms, treasury managers, or auditors, while preserving onchain governance as the sole source of policy, budgetary, and strategic decisions.

UNI Delegation and DAO Voting

As detailed in the Governance Logistics Improvement forum post, token-denominated voter turnout has steadily declined from an average of nearly 60 million UNI in its early years to approximately 45 million UNI today. As a result, the second major topic discussed in the second FFG meeting is the state of UNI delegation and DAO voting.

A16z, a participant of the FFG, clarified that the token delegations they retracted in June are due to internal structural changes. Whether the retracted voting power will be redelegated or not is still unclear, and no timeline for potential redelegation was provided.

If the DUNA is established, the Uniswap Foundation expects it will lead to a change in the governance structure, with a shift in delegation trends. There are currently legal challenges to DAO participation, which affect token holders’ voting behaviour. As a reference point, there are currently approximately 190 million delegated tokens, but only approximately 45 million are regularly used for voting. Direct voting participation and/or delegation from previously reluctant token holders might increase as a result of the DUNA due to enhanced legal protection.

Unichain and Uniswap v4

Finally, a third topic of discussion during the FFG meeting was Unichain and Uniswap v4. Once again, we looked into the evolving Liquidity Mining programs on Unichain and Ethereum, as well as the infrastructure and ecosystem being developed around Uniswap v4 hooks.

Liquidity Mining and Liquidity Retention:

The Uniswap Foundation reconfirmed outperformance over the initial adoption goals set for Unichain. Considering volumes as the most important metric, the program achieved $13.3 billion by the third month of the campaign. The Gauntlet team summarises additional metrics here.

The liquidity mining campaign is set to kick off the flywheel for both Unichain and Uniswap v4, with the primary goal of cultivating sticky liquidity and a healthy financial ecosystem. The UF is actively working with Gauntlet on incentives for vanilla and hooked pools, constantly adjusting to optimize results. Following the initial three months, the campaign's focus has shifted more towards hooks to reduce mercenary capital even further. While the liquidity mining campaign is expected to contribute to the initial growth, liquidity retention is highly dependent on the hooks and projects being built and used.

More broadly, the UF is working on supporting hook teams for their long-term success, prioritising hooks offering innovative use-cases and/or strong distribution channels (e.g. Euler). As part of this, they are dedicating resources towards building the infrastructure required to make hook teams successful. Because of hooks’ unique nature, using off-the-shelf solutions isn’t always possible; instead, tailored tools are needed to accommodate each hook. Examples include custom incentive distribution systems and hook-specific analytics tools to track routing correctly.

So far, the primary focus has been on Unichain. The key reason for this is that the UF’s vision is to build a playbook on supporting hook builders. Since this is a trial-and-error process, it is a funds-optimisation strategy to implement the playbook on Unichain first rather than simultaneously testing across multiple chain deployments. The UF plans to expand the growth strategy among other large chains once the playbook is strong enough to enable an efficient and effective use of funds.

Revenue Sharing Between Hooks and Uniswap:

The UF believes that if DAO funds are leveraged to support a hook project, a benefit needs to be returned to the DAO. Accordingly, the Foundation signed a revenue-sharing agreement with the hook-project Bunni and is open to repeating this with other hook projects.

For technical reasons, projects might build their own custom accounting instead of leveraging the default system. From a design perspective, this enables greater flexibility for their hook. However, custom accounting hooks are not subject to v4’s internal protocol fee. Through its partnerships, the UF aims to guarantee that a fee element is included in the custom accounting implementation so that hook-generated fees can be collected and reused as incentives or directed to the fee switch function.

The UAC will continue monitoring the progress of these initiatives and will provide the next update following the September FFG meeting. We welcome feedback from the DAO and broader community.

Thanks for raising these points, @Userisky.

I agree that the DAO should strive for broad and meaningful representation. That said, active participation from UNI holders remains a broader challenge across the DAO space—not just at Uniswap. We're seeing similar discussions emerge in places like Arbitrum DAO, and solutions for Uniswap DAO are being actively explored, such as Unistaker. However, the Foundation Feedback Group (FFG) was not designed to solve DAO-wide apathy or increase direct UNI holder participation in governance. Its primary role is to improve communication and accountability between the UF and the broader DAO.

That said, both the UF and UAC spent significant time discussing how to ensure the group includes a range of perspectives—balancing subject-matter expertise, protocol usage, and community context. Regarding UNI holders specifically, I’d note that while they are undeniably a key part of the ecosystem, their interests and incentives can vary greatly. There's no requirement for long-term alignment with the protocol, transparency about holdings (including in competitors), or safeguards against insider activity. That doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be involved—but it does mean we need to be thoughtful about how.

Personally, I believe the FFG includes several individuals and entities who not only hold UNI but are also meaningfully engaged in the ecosystem and well-positioned to represent a diversity of DAO views. That includes, but is not limited to, a16z and Variant, two of the largest UNI token holders.

Completely agree—liquidity providers are essential to the health of the protocol. That’s exactly why entities like Keyrock and Arrakis, which have deep operational knowledge and relationships with LPs, were brought into the group.

I hope this brings additional context. Overall, appreciate the feedback—it’s through this kind of discussion that the DAO can continue to evolve and strengthen.

Thank you for the thoughtful response. Yes, my more recent comments come from a place of discontent, but also from a deep admiration for Uniswap as a protocol. What concerns me most is that the DAO structure seems to be replicating many of the same failures found in the traditional financial system.

The initial excitement I felt when using Uniswap for the first time came from its open access to code, its financial permissionlessness, and its potential to drive innovation capable of competing with the walled gardens of Wall Street. That’s why I’ve been so vocal about the optics surrounding the Uniswap Foundation, Uniswap Labs, and their relationship to the protocol.

There's also the troubling fact that Flashbots and affiliated/unaffilliated block builders have profited enormously from MEV inefficiencies within Uniswap’s liquidity pools. This system has become extractive for anyone who is not a founder or developer.

The separation between Universal Navigation and the Uniswap protocol feels no different from the “accredited investor” barrier that limits access to financial opportunities. In some ways, it’s even worse—users who gave the protocol its value through usage and belief are now being treated like a piggy bank for expenses via the UNI token, while simultaneously serving as a revenue stream for Uniswap Labs.

Meanwhile, over the past few years, the Uniswap Foundation has wasted a significant amount of grant money on analytics tools and data platforms that virtually no one uses. Yet the same individuals remain in charge, now actively designing a foundation board system with minimal DAO input.

I hope the UAC and UF understand that users are not just trading—they are also the ones providing exit liquidity for your funds through liquidity pools. No matter how much UNI is used to cover expenses, if those pools dry up, the marginal utility of UNI—as a piggy bank—will continue to vanish.

My frustration stems from watching a once-promising pink gem of innovation and opportunity gradually be reshaped into a version of traditional finance even more flawed than the one many of us turned to crypto to escape.

Former UNI LP here:

With the new DUNI structure, it seems the foundation has entrenched itself as a dependency for UNI holders. How exactly is accountability managed when it comes to the underperformance of its employees? At what point can UNI holders request a change in leadership, particularly those with close ties to Uniswap’s leadership (e.g., the blacklisting of Gauntlet)?

I raise this point because it’s now been several years of the same leadership and similar results from the Uniswap Foundation. Meanwhile, we have competitors like Aerodrome and Fluid nipping at Uniswap’s heels in terms of volume and market share. Protocols like Hyperliquid and other perpetuals are on the verge of becoming the go-to platforms for liquidity providers across the broader ecosystem.

Meanwhile, Uniswap Labs takes fees from the frontend with one hand, while dumping UNI tokens with the other. At the same time, users are shifting to alternative frontends to avoid those fees (which will likely happen with liquidity providers once the fee switch is implemented). If this trend continues, UNI risks being viewed as a marketing gimmick or meme coin, and the entire Uniswap brand could end up becoming the “MySpace” of the crypto space.

It’s also becoming clear that the UVN is being delayed due to the failure of the Unichain and its incentive campaign, which was managed by Gauntlet.

Will the UVN be another 5 year push back like the fee switch? Again waiting for vibes/marketing/expenditures to come back for a dead L2?

The “fee switch” isn’t going to solve any of the issues mentioned above. It won’t even rescue governance, which has essentially been taken over by insiders. If anything, it will only accelerate the rise of another DEX that knows how to effectively run a business.

UNI/ETH:

At what point do we need to consider new leadership for the Uniswap Foundation? What are the key performance indicators (KPIs) that would trigger a full replacement or transition? What is the process to do this? The foundation needs business developers and developers who can actually deliver, not just hand out grants to analytics teams that disappear a month after launching failed products. @devinwalsh @eek637

Thanks for answering my questions,

Your former exit liquidity

P.S Have a great soccer tournament with your buddies. UNI holders enjoy paying for your good time.

Yes, the DUNI has already been approved by Uniswap Governance and established. You can find more information about the Uniswap DUNI on the UF website.

As for the Fee Switch proposal, currently ongoing dependencies include:

• Final legal due diligence around the fee mechanism
• Smart contract audits

Additionally, as mentioned in the post, these are the key highlights of the work being done related to the Uniswap DUNI:

• The Uniswap Foundation, in its role as Ministerial Agent, together with Cowrie (the DUNI’s administrator responsible for regulatory, tax, and compliance matters), is actively overseeing the outreach process to the IRS to ensure compliance with any potential historic tax obligation as outlined in the proposal.
• As a result of Uniswap DAO adopting DUNI, popular DAO voting platforms Agora and Tally will be updated to provide additional transparency to community members.
• The DUNI legal structure is expected to alleviate some of the legal risks previously associated with active governance participation. The UF is reaching out to firms they believe to be large token holders to discuss DUNI and its implications on governance, as well as the opportunities it opens for their participation. Those conversations are ongoing.

FFG Meeting #3 Summary (September 2025)

This third FFG report provides updates on key initiatives, including the protocol fee switch, Unichain growth, and the expansion of Uniswap v4 through hooks. The summary below is a composite of meeting notes and post-meeting thoughts by FFG members and the UAC.

TL;DR

Key highlights that emerged during the third FFG meeting are:

• The Uniswap Foundation is working on the next steps for DUNI, including growing active participation in governance by larger token holders.

• The UF is expecting a Fee Switch proposal to be published by the end of the year.

• The v4 liquidity mining campaign has been expanded across chains, specifically targeting key pairs where Uniswap has a lower market share.

• The work to support hook teams in their journey is continuing. This includes taking steps to improve hook audits and security, as well as to optimise hook infrastructure (eg. routing and gas efficiency). The aim is for hooks to have a positive impact on v4 adoption and to counter competition from new types of DEXs.

DUNA and Fee Switch

Following the successful outcome of the “Establish Uniswap Governance as “DUNI,” a Wyoming DUNA” proposal, Uniswap governance has adopted the DUNI framework.

The Uniswap Foundation plans to publish a forum post outlining the updated proposal process under DUNI. In the meantime, below are key highlights of the work currently being done on this front:

• The Uniswap Foundation, in its role as Ministerial Agent, together with Cowrie (the DUNI’s administrator responsible for regulatory, tax, and compliance matters), is actively overseeing the outreach process to the IRS to ensure compliance with any potential historic tax obligation as outlined in the proposal.

• As a result of Uniswap DAO adopting DUNI, popular DAO voting platforms Agora and Tally will be updated to provide additional transparency to community members.

• The DUNI legal structure is expected to alleviate some of the legal risks previously associated with active governance participation. The UF is reaching out to firms they believe to be large token holders to discuss DUNI and its implications on governance, as well as the opportunities it opens for their participation. Those conversations are ongoing.

Although out of scope for the FFG meeting, the UAC received questions directed at a16z and Variant on their feedback regarding the DUNI adoption and related governance activities. They both responded with a positive sentiment towards the Uniswap DUNI, highlighting how it removes the majority of concerns they previously had with participating in governance and their hope for other investors to see it the same way. They added DUNI opens up options for what governance can do, particularly in regards to actions that could result in taxable income for the DAO.

Outstanding dependencies for the Fee Switch proposal:

As the DUNA establishment was the last and major regulatory blocker, the Uniswap Foundation is expecting a Fee Switch proposal to be published by the end of the year. Outstanding, currently ongoing dependencies for the Fee Switch proposal include:

• Final legal due diligence around the fee mechanism

• Smart contract audits

Unichain, UVN and Uniswap v4

A second topic of discussion during the FFG meeting was Unichain, UVN and Uniswap v4. Once again, we looked into the evolving Liquidity Mining programs across chains, as well as the infrastructure and ecosystem being developed around Uniswap v4 hooks.

Liquidity mining and supporting hook projects:

At the beginning of July, the UF set some growth goals for Q3 that focused on increasing Unichain DEX volume as well as volume across Base, Arbitrum and Mainnet, and on growing volume routed through hooks.

The first two goals were successfully achieved. Uniswap v4 processed $183+ Billion since inception, with 57% of volume settled on Layer 2s. More v4 metrics are available here. Incentives have begun to expand outside of Unichain, specifically reaching key pairs on Ethereum Mainnet, Base and Arbitrum. Part of this strategic deployment of incentives is designed to grow pairs where the protocol has a lower market share.

Growing volume routed through hook pools has been a challenge, with the two main identified issues being routing support and gas efficiency. The former is being addressed through collaborations with DEX aggregators, improvements to the Uniswap Labs interface and more efficient tooling to help solvers settle on hook pools. Solutions are being explored for the latter problem as well, aiming at improving the gas efficiency of hook pools.

The Hook Design Lab served as a great learning experience to identify these issues and understand what is needed to make hook projects successful. Despite these challenges, some hooks are showing growing adoption (eg. KyberSwap on Base)—incentives and other ways to further support this growth are being explored.

Hooks represent an excellent way to counter potential competition from new types of DEXs as they enable the implementation of similar functionalities directly built on top of Uniswap v4. Collaborations with leading DeFi projects to build hook pools for specific use-cases are in the works.

Security of hook projects:

Following the Bunni attack, security concerns emerged regarding hook-based protocols, especially those built with custom logic. The UF is actively improving the audit process for hooks they directly support.

The solutions currently being implemented include:

• Reiterating the next phase of the Uniswap Foundation Security Fund.

• Leveraging AI auditing tools that are being added to the Areta Audits Marketplace.

• Collaborations with auditors who are developing specific expertise with hook design and its most risky aspects. Projects will be prompted to audit with them.

• Adding a “hooks audit module” in the Hooks Academy.

• Adding subsidised audits for the winners of the Atrium Academy Hookathon.

• Looking into additional tooling that can help with identifying early attacks happening.

Conditional Funding Markets:

The Uniswap Foundation posted a summary of the experiments conducted with Conditional Funding Markets. A key learning was that participation by participating protocols had more potential influence than anticipated, which raised questions about credible neutrality. Additionally, forecasting complexity (TVL projections) limited participation and confidence among forecasters, which will be improved for future iterations.

This first round of experimentation used a budget of $120k (out of the $1M earmarked budget). Active participation has been paused for now, and the Butter team is currently developing new markets, which will serve as additional learning when revisiting this in the future.

UVN:

The UF is currently prioritising the Fee Switch proposal, with UVN having a lower priority. A specific timeline for the implementation of UVN was not given.

The UAC will continue monitoring the progress of these initiatives and will provide the next update following the November FFG meeting. We welcome feedback from the DAO and broader community.

In preparation for the Foundation Feedback Group (FFG) meeting #3 happening at the end of the month, here is a Google form for you to share questions & topics you’d like the FFG to discuss with the UF.

As we're midway through the FFG initiative, there's a two-question survey at the beginning of the form to check in on delegates' thoughts around the initiative.

Please share your feedback and questions so we can continue improving the FFG and make communications between the DAO and the UF more effective.

I mostly agree with the concerns raised above by the community members in the replies. Transparency is key, and while it seems like the Foundation is taking some steps toward that, we need to see real action.

We need to bring back the actual UNI community and get all UNI holders involved in governance. Right now, Discord is practically dead. Most messages come from bots, and UF’s presence there is almost nonexistent. We need active community managers and moderators helping out, answering questions, and keeping engagement alive.

Information is scattered across too many forums and channels. Proposals, governance conversations, snapshots, and updates should be actively shared on Discord, and we should see real time discussions happening there to revive the space.

The fee switch must go live and when it does, there should be major marketing around it. We increase staking, attract more contributors, make people care and also participate in governance later on. We need more real voices — actual UNI holders with skin in the game.

To the community: stop delegating to people who aren't engaged or helping grow the ecosystem. Delegate to those who are present, active, AND community aligned!

I fully support the Foundation and the team — they’ve done great work. But the focus lately seems too zoomed in on big picture strategy while the grassroots community is being overlooked. Now that Unichain is live, that balance needs to shift. Let’s value UNI holders and the community more than ever.

Look at communities like Moonwell, Aerodrome, or Base. when you ask a question in Discord or on X, you get a thoughtful response from a team member, founder, or moderator almost instantly. I mention these not as comparisons, but as examples of what effective community presence and support look like in practice. So, please don't get me wrong. I want to be productive. That kind of responsiveness builds trust and drives participation. It would be great to see that level of engagement here too.

FFG Meeting #2 Summary (July 2025)

This second FFG report provides updates on key initiatives, including the DUNA (Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) structure, protocol fee switch, Unichain growth, and the expansion of Uniswap v4 through hooks. The summary below is a composite of meeting notes and post-meeting thoughts by FFG members and the UAC.

TL;DR

The second FFG meeting was structured across two separate calls: one dedicated to discussing the DUNA (Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) and the other focused on a broader discussion around the DAO, Unichain, and Uniswap v4. Key highlights that emerged are:

• The DUNA proposal is live on the forum, with a target of Q3 2025 for an onchain vote. The Fee Switch proposal is expected to follow closely after, although the timeline has been slightly pushed since our last FFG update in May.

• There is the expectation that, if approved, the DUNA structure will lead to a change in the governance turnout, with increased voter participation.

• The Uniswap Foundation reconfirmed outperformance over the initial goals set for the Unichain liquidity mining campaign.

• While the liquidity mining campaign is expected to contribute to the initial growth, liquidity retention is highly dependent on the hooks and projects being built and used. The Uniswap Foundation is working on supporting hook teams for their long-term success, with priority given to hooks offering innovative use cases and/or strong distribution channels. The goal is to cultivate this ecosystem on Unichain and eventually replicate the learnings on other chains.

DUNA and Fee Switch

The July FFG meeting included a call to discuss the upcoming proposal to implement the DUNA structure, along with a line-by-line review of the DUNI Association Agreement.

With the DUNA proposal, Uniswap DAO is setting a precedent as the largest and most high-profile DUNA launched in the US. Due to the sensitive nature of this topic, we’ll hold back from providing a summary of this part and reference the UF’s proposal to the community instead. The UF confirmed a target of Q3 2025 for such a proposal to move to an onchain vote, with the Fee Switch proposal expected to follow closely after.

Outstanding Dependencies:

Outstanding dependencies for the adoption of the DUNA structure and further discussion on the Fee Switch proposal include:

• The technical development for the Fee Switch activation is currently underway. A change to the initial design caused delays on the initial timeline. This change enables support for hook-generated fees within the overall fee switch architecture. This streamlines the process of collecting fees from hook projects. One of the commitments that the UF made was exploring revenue-share agreements with grantees/partners in their latest renewal. The diverse environment of hooks, especially those with a custom accounting framework, provides Uniswap with an assortment of potential revenue streams. In order to incorporate hook-related fees into the broader “fee switch architecture," the DUNA and fee proposals will be conducted separately, with fees being instituted at a later date this year.

Broader Implications:

While there are other DUNA-powered DAOs, Uniswap is the most advanced DAO to adopt such a legal structure. For this reason, the way the Uniswap DUNA (called “DUNI”) is structured is specifically tailored to Uniswap and its particular needs and challenges.

While the Fee Switch is a core function unlocked by the DUNA, the structure enables much more than revenue activation. For example, the DUNA enables the DAO to more effectively interact with the offchain world. The DUNA framework introduces a clear and legally recognized system for appointing agents and administrators to act on behalf of the DAO, without transferring decision-making authority away from governance.

Agents, such as the Ministerial Agent, are empowered to carry out non-discretionary, non-managerial, governance-approved actions that require legal or operational execution in the offchain world. This can include executing contracts, hiring service providers, transmitting payments, or filing regulatory documents, tasks that the DAO cannot perform directly through smart contracts.

Administrators are appointed to perform specialized functions, such as tax compliance, financial reporting, or operational management. Their authority is strictly limited to the scope defined by governance and can be modified or revoked at any time.

By formalizing these roles, the DUNA structure allows Uniswap Governance to engage in essential offchain operations, such as contracting with law firms, treasury managers, or auditors, while preserving onchain governance as the sole source of policy, budgetary, and strategic decisions.

UNI Delegation and DAO Voting

As detailed in the Governance Logistics Improvement forum post, token-denominated voter turnout has steadily declined from an average of nearly 60 million UNI in its early years to approximately 45 million UNI today. As a result, the second major topic discussed in the second FFG meeting is the state of UNI delegation and DAO voting.

A16z, a participant of the FFG, clarified that the token delegations they retracted in June are due to internal structural changes. Whether the retracted voting power will be redelegated or not is still unclear, and no timeline for potential redelegation was provided.

If the DUNA is established, the Uniswap Foundation expects it will lead to a change in the governance structure, with a shift in delegation trends. There are currently legal challenges to DAO participation, which affect token holders’ voting behaviour. As a reference point, there are currently approximately 190 million delegated tokens, but only approximately 45 million are regularly used for voting. Direct voting participation and/or delegation from previously reluctant token holders might increase as a result of the DUNA due to enhanced legal protection.

Unichain and Uniswap v4

Finally, a third topic of discussion during the FFG meeting was Unichain and Uniswap v4. Once again, we looked into the evolving Liquidity Mining programs on Unichain and Ethereum, as well as the infrastructure and ecosystem being developed around Uniswap v4 hooks.

Liquidity Mining and Liquidity Retention:

The Uniswap Foundation reconfirmed outperformance over the initial adoption goals set for Unichain. Considering volumes as the most important metric, the program achieved $13.3 billion by the third month of the campaign. The Gauntlet team summarises additional metrics here.

The liquidity mining campaign is set to kick off the flywheel for both Unichain and Uniswap v4, with the primary goal of cultivating sticky liquidity and a healthy financial ecosystem. The UF is actively working with Gauntlet on incentives for vanilla and hooked pools, constantly adjusting to optimize results. Following the initial three months, the campaign's focus has shifted more towards hooks to reduce mercenary capital even further. While the liquidity mining campaign is expected to contribute to the initial growth, liquidity retention is highly dependent on the hooks and projects being built and used.

More broadly, the UF is working on supporting hook teams for their long-term success, prioritising hooks offering innovative use-cases and/or strong distribution channels (e.g. Euler). As part of this, they are dedicating resources towards building the infrastructure required to make hook teams successful. Because of hooks’ unique nature, using off-the-shelf solutions isn’t always possible; instead, tailored tools are needed to accommodate each hook. Examples include custom incentive distribution systems and hook-specific analytics tools to track routing correctly.

So far, the primary focus has been on Unichain. The key reason for this is that the UF’s vision is to build a playbook on supporting hook builders. Since this is a trial-and-error process, it is a funds-optimisation strategy to implement the playbook on Unichain first rather than simultaneously testing across multiple chain deployments. The UF plans to expand the growth strategy among other large chains once the playbook is strong enough to enable an efficient and effective use of funds.

Revenue Sharing Between Hooks and Uniswap:

The UF believes that if DAO funds are leveraged to support a hook project, a benefit needs to be returned to the DAO. Accordingly, the Foundation signed a revenue-sharing agreement with the hook-project Bunni and is open to repeating this with other hook projects.

For technical reasons, projects might build their own custom accounting instead of leveraging the default system. From a design perspective, this enables greater flexibility for their hook. However, custom accounting hooks are not subject to v4’s internal protocol fee. Through its partnerships, the UF aims to guarantee that a fee element is included in the custom accounting implementation so that hook-generated fees can be collected and reused as incentives or directed to the fee switch function.

The UAC will continue monitoring the progress of these initiatives and will provide the next update following the September FFG meeting. We welcome feedback from the DAO and broader community.

Thanks for raising these points, @Userisky.

I agree that the DAO should strive for broad and meaningful representation. That said, active participation from UNI holders remains a broader challenge across the DAO space—not just at Uniswap. We're seeing similar discussions emerge in places like Arbitrum DAO, and solutions for Uniswap DAO are being actively explored, such as Unistaker. However, the Foundation Feedback Group (FFG) was not designed to solve DAO-wide apathy or increase direct UNI holder participation in governance. Its primary role is to improve communication and accountability between the UF and the broader DAO.

That said, both the UF and UAC spent significant time discussing how to ensure the group includes a range of perspectives—balancing subject-matter expertise, protocol usage, and community context. Regarding UNI holders specifically, I’d note that while they are undeniably a key part of the ecosystem, their interests and incentives can vary greatly. There's no requirement for long-term alignment with the protocol, transparency about holdings (including in competitors), or safeguards against insider activity. That doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be involved—but it does mean we need to be thoughtful about how.

Personally, I believe the FFG includes several individuals and entities who not only hold UNI but are also meaningfully engaged in the ecosystem and well-positioned to represent a diversity of DAO views. That includes, but is not limited to, a16z and Variant, two of the largest UNI token holders.

Completely agree—liquidity providers are essential to the health of the protocol. That’s exactly why entities like Keyrock and Arrakis, which have deep operational knowledge and relationships with LPs, were brought into the group.

I hope this brings additional context. Overall, appreciate the feedback—it’s through this kind of discussion that the DAO can continue to evolve and strengthen.

Thank you for the thoughtful response. Yes, my more recent comments come from a place of discontent, but also from a deep admiration for Uniswap as a protocol. What concerns me most is that the DAO structure seems to be replicating many of the same failures found in the traditional financial system.

The initial excitement I felt when using Uniswap for the first time came from its open access to code, its financial permissionlessness, and its potential to drive innovation capable of competing with the walled gardens of Wall Street. That’s why I’ve been so vocal about the optics surrounding the Uniswap Foundation, Uniswap Labs, and their relationship to the protocol.

There's also the troubling fact that Flashbots and affiliated/unaffilliated block builders have profited enormously from MEV inefficiencies within Uniswap’s liquidity pools. This system has become extractive for anyone who is not a founder or developer.

The separation between Universal Navigation and the Uniswap protocol feels no different from the “accredited investor” barrier that limits access to financial opportunities. In some ways, it’s even worse—users who gave the protocol its value through usage and belief are now being treated like a piggy bank for expenses via the UNI token, while simultaneously serving as a revenue stream for Uniswap Labs.

Meanwhile, over the past few years, the Uniswap Foundation has wasted a significant amount of grant money on analytics tools and data platforms that virtually no one uses. Yet the same individuals remain in charge, now actively designing a foundation board system with minimal DAO input.

I hope the UAC and UF understand that users are not just trading—they are also the ones providing exit liquidity for your funds through liquidity pools. No matter how much UNI is used to cover expenses, if those pools dry up, the marginal utility of UNI—as a piggy bank—will continue to vanish.

My frustration stems from watching a once-promising pink gem of innovation and opportunity gradually be reshaped into a version of traditional finance even more flawed than the one many of us turned to crypto to escape.

Let me get this straight.

We have the Uniswap Foundation (UF), which is funded by a group of delegates—many of whom know each other through private Telegram groups and in-person events. One group, the UAC, essentially greenlights UF’s funding by herding familiar delegates behind the scenes. Meanwhile, the UF dangles the idea of a protocol fee switch as a carrot to the community.

Then, when delegates push back with, “We want to be paid too!”—because, let’s be honest, most don’t actually own UNI personally— @Doo_StableLab rallies the top VC-backed delegates to secure compensation in UNI. The justification? The fee switch is supposedly imminent.

But surprise: the fee switch isn’t happening.

And yet, somehow, we’re still moving forward with paying delegates in UNI—for what, exactly? Button pressing?

This is governance theatre.

The UAC rarely challenges its own delegates. Being critical risks bad vibes—and worse, it might jeopardize the flow of funds.

Here’s some feedback:

We need more voices from actual UNI holders—people who bought the token and have real skin in the game. We need rotation in positions of power. We need value-driven contributors who are here to make meaningful changes, not coast for the next decade on six-figure salaries as UF board members.

Yes, we get it—you’re all friends with Hayden and the team. But can we please start taking DAOs seriously?

Let’s implement mechanism designs that prioritize users. Let’s challenge the entrenched structures. Because right now, it feels like user voices don’t stand a chance against the insiders already in place.

Also, I love how this post has 8 likes, but no one else has provided feedback. Everyone giving you a pat on the back for the nice post, good job. What are the value metrics to UAC doing its job, and UF? Can anyone actually lose a job here or be fired? Who keeps the accountable, accountable? The community/users/actual holders that have been silenced.

Let me get this straight.

We have the Uniswap Foundation (UF), which is funded by a group of delegates—many of whom know each other through private Telegram groups and in-person events. One group, the UAC, essentially greenlights UF’s funding by herding familiar delegates behind the scenes. Meanwhile, the UF dangles the idea of a protocol fee switch as a carrot to the community.

Then, when delegates push back with, “We want to be paid too!”—because, let’s be honest, most don’t actually own UNI personally— @Doo_StableLab rallies the top VC-backed delegates to secure compensation in UNI. The justification? The fee switch is supposedly imminent.

But surprise: the fee switch isn’t happening.

And yet, somehow, we’re still moving forward with paying delegates in UNI—for what, exactly? Button pressing?

This is governance theatre.

The UAC rarely challenges its own delegates. Being critical risks bad vibes—and worse, it might jeopardize the flow of funds.

Here’s some feedback:

We need more voices from actual UNI holders—people who bought the token and have real skin in the game. We need rotation in positions of power. We need value-driven contributors who are here to make meaningful changes, not coast for the next decade on six-figure salaries as UF board members.

Yes, we get it—you’re all friends with Hayden and the team. But can we please start taking DAOs seriously?

Let’s implement mechanism designs that prioritize users. Let’s challenge the entrenched structures. Because right now, it feels like user voices don’t stand a chance against the insiders already in place.

Also, I love how this post has 8 likes, but no one else has provided feedback. Everyone giving you a pat on the back for the nice post, good job. What are the value metrics to UAC doing its job, and UF? Can anyone actually lose a job here or be fired? Who keeps the accountable, accountable? The community/users/actual holders that have been silenced.

FFG Meeting #1 Summary (May 2025)

This first FFG report provides updates on key initiatives including the DUNA (Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) structure, protocol fee switch, Unichain development, UVN, and the expansion of Uniswap v4 through hooks. The below summary is a composite of meeting notes and post-meeting thoughts by FFG members and the UAC.

TLDR:

The first FFG meeting demonstrated meaningful progress across the UF’s major initiatives, with clear momentum on the DUNA structure, Fee Switch readiness, and Unichain ecosystem development. Legal, technical, and strategic groundwork for DUNA and protocol fees seems nearly complete, with a likely mid-2025 proposal that, if successful, could mark the beginning of protocol revenue. However, activating fees on v3 without a coordinated v4 migration path could lead to LP attrition. FFG members strongly encouraged the Foundation to align v4 incentives accordingly. Unichain's liquidity mining campaigns and hook-focused innovation strategy show early promise, but long-term defensibility remains uncertain, especially given the competitive L2 landscape. UVN activation, targeted for Q3/Q4, will layer in sequencer revenue as well. Overall, we left the meeting optimistic and hopeful for genuine developments in the coming summer months.

DUNA and Fee Switch

A significant portion of the first FFG meeting centered on the upcoming proposal(s) to implement the DUNA structure and activate the long-discussed Fee Switch. The UF indicated a target of mid-summer 2025 for publishing the DUNA proposal, with the Fee Switch expected to follow closely after or potentially be included in the same proposal.

Outstanding dependencies for implementation of the DUNA structure and Fee Switch include:

Final Legal and Tax Clarity: Specifically, retroactive tax liability, DAO wrapping implications, and future liability for the DAO are being concluded.

Protocol Fee Rollout Structure: The UF will suggest a similar rollout strategy to their proposal last year, running several governance votes to turn on protocol fees in a subset of pools. Additionally, a new version of v3FactoryOwner (currently under audit) will enable a flatFee parameter. If Governance votes to enable the flat fee, it would set that parameter to a valid protocol fee level (e.g. 10%, 12.5%, etc…). At that point, anyone would be able to turn on fees in any pool that has not yet been adjusted by Governance to that level. Governance will be able to adjust the fee in pools that have been turned on via the flat fee mechanism. Any pool that has been adjusted by Governance is not subject to being adjusted by the flat fee.

Strategic Pairing of Fees and v4 Growth: Widespread pool activation brings the potential for high degrees of immediate LP attrition. Much of this can be reduced if the initial subset of activated pools voted in by governance is systematically selected, with less impactful pools being activated more permissionlessly via the flat fee setup. Regardless, carefully coordinating incentives on v4 as a destination for LPs who may exit v3 once protocol fees are implemented is important. The rationale is not merely to retain TVL, but to channel it toward v4, where Uniswap can potentially deliver superior capital efficiency, customizable hooks, and enhanced fee structures that may, over time, offset the effects of a take rate.

This migration strategy could be supported through coordinated campaigns that align v3 fee activation with targeted v4 incentive programs, ideally timed to avoid net liquidity loss and ensure continuity of user experience. The UF has already funded tools such as ChainHopper, which streamline the migration of LP positions from v3 to v4, laying the groundwork for a smoother transition.

The end goal is to retain liquidity in the Uniswap ecosystem; protocol-level monetization must be paired with ecosystem-level capital retention strategies. When the Fee Switch discussion was transpiring last year, activation of fees could not be supplemented with liquidity retention in the broader Uniswap ecosystem. V4 can solve this problem.

Starting with Mainnet v3: Importantly, the current Fee Switch implementation exploration is limited to Uniswap v3 on Eth Mainnet. Fee activation on v3 deployments across other chains will require the development of additional infrastructure, as will fee activation on other versions of the protocol (v2, UniswapX, etc.) This work is underway but not yet finalized.

Combination of Initiatives: An open question discussed in the meeting was whether the DUNA and Fee Switch proposals should be combined into a single governance proposal. Combining them would significantly reduce governance friction and may provide a more comprehensive rationale for tokenholder support. The feedback from FFG participants was broadly supportive of bundling both proposals for the sake of efficiency. Final due diligence is being conducted to ensure that combining both actions does not introduce additional liability.

Broader Implications: While the Fee Switch is a core function unlocked by the DUNA, the structure enables much more than revenue activation. We’d like to emphasize that the UF provides a comprehensive overview of the DUNA’s unlocks for the DAO and protocol. From the conversation, we understand that the DUNA would provide the DAO with the operational capacity to pursue strategic partnerships, manage treasury assets, and engage in contractual relationships with service providers. These broader capabilities give Uniswap Governance the ability to operate more like a traditional organization without compromising its decentralized nature. A good example of this is the recent proposal from the Aave team to enable v4 LP positions to be used as collateral on Aave. Such partnerships cannot be structured in a sophisticated enough manner until the DUNA is ready.

Unichain, UVN, and v4

The second major topic addressed was the status and trajectory of Unichain and UVN. The discussion offered a detailed look into the evolving Liquidity Mining program on Unichain, the infrastructure and ecosystem being developed around Uniswap v4 hooks, and the longer-term goal of activating the UVN.

Unichain’s initial LM campaign launched earlier this year and has so far exceeded expectations in terms of depth and breadth of participation, but concerns remain around long-term liquidity retention and the extent to which current activity is driven by short-term yield farming rather than sustainable, organic use.

The Uniswap Foundation aims to build long-term organic activity on Unichain through:

• Support for hook pools and teams building hooks. Support for hook pools on Unichain is expected for June 2025, with hook-based projects already lined up.
• Hook Design Lab. This program funds key hook infrastructure, with four DeFi partners included in the first cohort. The first cohort will launch imminently, and focuses on three strategic primitives: Just-In-Time (JIT) liquidity, dynamic fees, and rehypothecation. A second cohort is planned shortly after the completion of the first initiative. The scope of the program is to provide 360 support for v4 teams and work closely with them to build a playbook that shows how hook teams can be successful on Uniswap v4. The largest grant commitments since Uniswap Unleashed passed has been for HDL.
• Unichain partners. Collaborations with three well-established DeFi lending platforms are launching soon. Grants related to this will be reflected in the Q2 2025 Financials shared by the UF.
• Additionally, the UF closed a multi-year deal with a major infrastructure provider that was critical for the launch of Unichain. This agreement is structured to evolve over the course of several years with future disbursements contingent on milestones tied to Unichain’s growth. This type of partnership was used as evidence for why the UF requested multi-year funding without additional provisions like a clawback. Partnerships are tougher to sustain if the source of funding is uncertain/can be pulled by the DAO in a premature manner.

The UF reiterated that their view for Unichain’s success depends on it being the best L2 for DeFi. They have begun executing on the roadmap they laid out in their funding proposal, bootstrapping liquidity supply via liquidity mining, while growing demand for that liquidity through the development of protocols enabled in large part by v4 hooks. Whereas most L2s are unable to materially differentiate themselves, Unichain has the potential to create a moat around its deep, hook-enabled pools, granting users access to a swath of creative financial features. It will be important to continue monitoring hook adoption as the UF begins instating incentives for v4 pools.

With regard to the UVN, the UF reaffirmed its intent to formally activate the mechanism in Q3/Q4 2025. The UVN is positioned as a complementary revenue source to protocol fees, with value flowing from sequencer-based profits generated through blockspace demand. Given that protocol fee activation is targeted for the summer, positioning UVN launch in Q3/Q4 allows for a more staggered rollout of Uniswap’s financial flywheel, first demonstrating fee activation at the protocol level, then layering in blockspace monetization via UVN.

The UF also cited that Unichain will be one of the earliest rollups to support Superchain-native interoperable assets, giving it a first-mover advantage in hosting liquidity and applications built atop shared OP Stack infrastructure. Ensuring that Unichain TVL from the get-go is deep enough is important for achieving this objective. It’s still unclear how the Superchain interoperability mechanisms will work or when they will be live. Too much of a delay between Unichain incentives and Superchain interoperability may cause Unichain to be in an unfavorable position, where liquidity is already migrating away from Unichain. But if interoperability goes live during Unichain’s growth phase, liquidity may be more sticky.

As for focusing on a particular sector, the UF has indicated a generally agnostic approach—for now. The FFG, for instance, asked whether there was a strategy around capitalizing on strong current narratives like tokenized equities or debt. While there is no overt sectoral focus at this stage, the UF is actively building the foundational hook infrastructure required to support a wide variety of use cases, including more specialized or vertical-specific applications. Conversations are already underway with teams exploring hooks for sectors such as RWAs, and a more robust and diverse ecosystem of hooks is expected to grow atop the initial set funded through programs like the Hook Design Lab.

The UAC will continue monitoring the progress of these initiatives and will provide the next update following the July FFG meeting. We welcome feedback from the DAO and broader community.

FFG Meeting #1 Summary (May 2025)

This first FFG report provides updates on key initiatives including the DUNA (Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) structure, protocol fee switch, Unichain development, UVN, and the expansion of Uniswap v4 through hooks. The below summary is a composite of meeting notes and post-meeting thoughts by FFG members and the UAC.

TLDR:

The first FFG meeting demonstrated meaningful progress across the UF’s major initiatives, with clear momentum on the DUNA structure, Fee Switch readiness, and Unichain ecosystem development. Legal, technical, and strategic groundwork for DUNA and protocol fees seems nearly complete, with a likely mid-2025 proposal that, if successful, could mark the beginning of protocol revenue. However, activating fees on v3 without a coordinated v4 migration path could lead to LP attrition. FFG members strongly encouraged the Foundation to align v4 incentives accordingly. Unichain's liquidity mining campaigns and hook-focused innovation strategy show early promise, but long-term defensibility remains uncertain, especially given the competitive L2 landscape. UVN activation, targeted for Q3/Q4, will layer in sequencer revenue as well. Overall, we left the meeting optimistic and hopeful for genuine developments in the coming summer months.

DUNA and Fee Switch

A significant portion of the first FFG meeting centered on the upcoming proposal(s) to implement the DUNA structure and activate the long-discussed Fee Switch. The UF indicated a target of mid-summer 2025 for publishing the DUNA proposal, with the Fee Switch expected to follow closely after or potentially be included in the same proposal.

Outstanding dependencies for implementation of the DUNA structure and Fee Switch include:

Final Legal and Tax Clarity: Specifically, retroactive tax liability, DAO wrapping implications, and future liability for the DAO are being concluded.

Protocol Fee Rollout Structure: The UF will suggest a similar rollout strategy to their proposal last year, running several governance votes to turn on protocol fees in a subset of pools. Additionally, a new version of v3FactoryOwner (currently under audit) will enable a flatFee parameter. If Governance votes to enable the flat fee, it would set that parameter to a valid protocol fee level (e.g. 10%, 12.5%, etc…). At that point, anyone would be able to turn on fees in any pool that has not yet been adjusted by Governance to that level. Governance will be able to adjust the fee in pools that have been turned on via the flat fee mechanism. Any pool that has been adjusted by Governance is not subject to being adjusted by the flat fee.

Strategic Pairing of Fees and v4 Growth: Widespread pool activation brings the potential for high degrees of immediate LP attrition. Much of this can be reduced if the initial subset of activated pools voted in by governance is systematically selected, with less impactful pools being activated more permissionlessly via the flat fee setup. Regardless, carefully coordinating incentives on v4 as a destination for LPs who may exit v3 once protocol fees are implemented is important. The rationale is not merely to retain TVL, but to channel it toward v4, where Uniswap can potentially deliver superior capital efficiency, customizable hooks, and enhanced fee structures that may, over time, offset the effects of a take rate.

This migration strategy could be supported through coordinated campaigns that align v3 fee activation with targeted v4 incentive programs, ideally timed to avoid net liquidity loss and ensure continuity of user experience. The UF has already funded tools such as ChainHopper, which streamline the migration of LP positions from v3 to v4, laying the groundwork for a smoother transition.

The end goal is to retain liquidity in the Uniswap ecosystem; protocol-level monetization must be paired with ecosystem-level capital retention strategies. When the Fee Switch discussion was transpiring last year, activation of fees could not be supplemented with liquidity retention in the broader Uniswap ecosystem. V4 can solve this problem.

Starting with Mainnet v3: Importantly, the current Fee Switch implementation exploration is limited to Uniswap v3 on Eth Mainnet. Fee activation on v3 deployments across other chains will require the development of additional infrastructure, as will fee activation on other versions of the protocol (v2, UniswapX, etc.) This work is underway but not yet finalized.

Combination of Initiatives: An open question discussed in the meeting was whether the DUNA and Fee Switch proposals should be combined into a single governance proposal. Combining them would significantly reduce governance friction and may provide a more comprehensive rationale for tokenholder support. The feedback from FFG participants was broadly supportive of bundling both proposals for the sake of efficiency. Final due diligence is being conducted to ensure that combining both actions does not introduce additional liability.

Broader Implications: While the Fee Switch is a core function unlocked by the DUNA, the structure enables much more than revenue activation. We’d like to emphasize that the UF provides a comprehensive overview of the DUNA’s unlocks for the DAO and protocol. From the conversation, we understand that the DUNA would provide the DAO with the operational capacity to pursue strategic partnerships, manage treasury assets, and engage in contractual relationships with service providers. These broader capabilities give Uniswap Governance the ability to operate more like a traditional organization without compromising its decentralized nature. A good example of this is the recent proposal from the Aave team to enable v4 LP positions to be used as collateral on Aave. Such partnerships cannot be structured in a sophisticated enough manner until the DUNA is ready.

Unichain, UVN, and v4

The second major topic addressed was the status and trajectory of Unichain and UVN. The discussion offered a detailed look into the evolving Liquidity Mining program on Unichain, the infrastructure and ecosystem being developed around Uniswap v4 hooks, and the longer-term goal of activating the UVN.

Unichain’s initial LM campaign launched earlier this year and has so far exceeded expectations in terms of depth and breadth of participation, but concerns remain around long-term liquidity retention and the extent to which current activity is driven by short-term yield farming rather than sustainable, organic use.

The Uniswap Foundation aims to build long-term organic activity on Unichain through:

• Support for hook pools and teams building hooks. Support for hook pools on Unichain is expected for June 2025, with hook-based projects already lined up.
• Hook Design Lab. This program funds key hook infrastructure, with four DeFi partners included in the first cohort. The first cohort will launch imminently, and focuses on three strategic primitives: Just-In-Time (JIT) liquidity, dynamic fees, and rehypothecation. A second cohort is planned shortly after the completion of the first initiative. The scope of the program is to provide 360 support for v4 teams and work closely with them to build a playbook that shows how hook teams can be successful on Uniswap v4. The largest grant commitments since Uniswap Unleashed passed has been for HDL.
• Unichain partners. Collaborations with three well-established DeFi lending platforms are launching soon. Grants related to this will be reflected in the Q2 2025 Financials shared by the UF.
• Additionally, the UF closed a multi-year deal with a major infrastructure provider that was critical for the launch of Unichain. This agreement is structured to evolve over the course of several years with future disbursements contingent on milestones tied to Unichain’s growth. This type of partnership was used as evidence for why the UF requested multi-year funding without additional provisions like a clawback. Partnerships are tougher to sustain if the source of funding is uncertain/can be pulled by the DAO in a premature manner.

The UF reiterated that their view for Unichain’s success depends on it being the best L2 for DeFi. They have begun executing on the roadmap they laid out in their funding proposal, bootstrapping liquidity supply via liquidity mining, while growing demand for that liquidity through the development of protocols enabled in large part by v4 hooks. Whereas most L2s are unable to materially differentiate themselves, Unichain has the potential to create a moat around its deep, hook-enabled pools, granting users access to a swath of creative financial features. It will be important to continue monitoring hook adoption as the UF begins instating incentives for v4 pools.

With regard to the UVN, the UF reaffirmed its intent to formally activate the mechanism in Q3/Q4 2025. The UVN is positioned as a complementary revenue source to protocol fees, with value flowing from sequencer-based profits generated through blockspace demand. Given that protocol fee activation is targeted for the summer, positioning UVN launch in Q3/Q4 allows for a more staggered rollout of Uniswap’s financial flywheel, first demonstrating fee activation at the protocol level, then layering in blockspace monetization via UVN.

The UF also cited that Unichain will be one of the earliest rollups to support Superchain-native interoperable assets, giving it a first-mover advantage in hosting liquidity and applications built atop shared OP Stack infrastructure. Ensuring that Unichain TVL from the get-go is deep enough is important for achieving this objective. It’s still unclear how the Superchain interoperability mechanisms will work or when they will be live. Too much of a delay between Unichain incentives and Superchain interoperability may cause Unichain to be in an unfavorable position, where liquidity is already migrating away from Unichain. But if interoperability goes live during Unichain’s growth phase, liquidity may be more sticky.

As for focusing on a particular sector, the UF has indicated a generally agnostic approach—for now. The FFG, for instance, asked whether there was a strategy around capitalizing on strong current narratives like tokenized equities or debt. While there is no overt sectoral focus at this stage, the UF is actively building the foundational hook infrastructure required to support a wide variety of use cases, including more specialized or vertical-specific applications. Conversations are already underway with teams exploring hooks for sectors such as RWAs, and a more robust and diverse ecosystem of hooks is expected to grow atop the initial set funded through programs like the Hook Design Lab.

The UAC will continue monitoring the progress of these initiatives and will provide the next update following the July FFG meeting. We welcome feedback from the DAO and broader community.