Hey @papiporn, off topic from this thread but to directly answer your question about UIs and contracts for liquidity mining Uniswap v3 LP NFTs, we have what I believe is the first full suite front end at Frax Finance. For example, you can check out our Uni V3 farming pair UI and contracts here: app .frax .finance/staking#Uniswap_V3_FRAX_USDC

We also allow locking the NFT LP for an additional boost to increase stickiness of the LP program. The farming contract also allows setting of range/ticks that are incentivized instead of generalized. The contract itself can be found here: etherscan .io/ address/0x3EF26504dbc8Dd7B7aa3E97Bc9f3813a9FC0B4B0

I think the other protocol that might have full Uni v3 farming infrastructure other than FRAX is Gelato's G UNI system. Maker is using them to manage their PSM module. I think they also are expanding it to generalized farming for end-users right now as well.

Hope that helps :)

See, this is the problem with liquidity mining. It's all fun and games in the beginning when nobody knows about the protocol, we attract liquidity (of course we do, we're giving LPs free "money").

But then how quickly it becomes a slippery slope. Like a drug, basically. We have no choice but to keep distributing rewards and incentives because if we stop, a competitor will come in who will and liquidity is going to migrate to them. Our LPs are addicted. It's already the case with SushiSwap and others on other chains. And more protocols will be created in the future because everything is open source and forkable and despite what we might think liquidity has very little network effects. Liquidity in DeFi is a mercenary, it will go where it'll make the most money because there is no switching cost.

All this at the detriment, of course, of UNI holders. Case in point, the CRV token, where they are basically printing an unlimited amount of rewards just to try to keep liquidity there. As a consequence the price of CRV just keeps tanking and this despite basically CRV being completely useless outside of staking which is another artificial mechanism created to try to keep people from dumping it. Liquidity providers there are slowly realizing that they are being paid rewards in a token whose value keeps declining so they're incentivized to sell it as soon as they receive it, which puts further sell pressure on price. It's a vicious circle.

Liquidity mining was never anything more than a financial hack. Perhaps, in the very early days of a protocol, it has value in attracting capital. But it cannot be used all the time. When does it stop? There is no proof that liquidity mining attracts long term capital. At best, it attracts capital while rewards are running and most of that capital will flee elsewhere when the rewards stop.

We need a better strategy. We need to think long term. Liquidity mining is very short term thinking. Synthetix lives on liquidity mining and today exists as little more than a zombie protocol. They have an average of 42 trades per day over the past 30 days (!). Can you believe it? See for yourself on their stats site. The fact that they are valued at $1.8B is nothing more than financial hackery that is common in crypto (Cardano, anyone?). They have still not found product-market fit.

Uniswap, on the other hand, probably has. We don't need financial hackery schemes. It dilutes UNI holders but most of all it dilutes the brand and arguably the brand is one of the only sustainable competitive advantages we have against up and coming protocols.

If LPs aren't migrating organically from v2 to v3, then there's a deeper problem that a few UNI rewards won't solve, at least not in the long run. Perhaps they don't want to actively manage their liquidity, which they'll have to do in v3. Perhaps the solution then would be to create liquidity management tools to help them do that. Rewards are not the solution.

I am disappointed in this proposal. It highlights the major problem of protocol governance more generally. Short term solutions will sometimes prevail at the detriment of longer term sustainable solutions. This is not a problem we'd have if governance was in the hands of a small founding team who think about Uniswap 24/7. Arguably given the amount of votes Hayden & co control, it still is, which is a good thing, in which case what we have is simply the illusion of governance.

Food for thought.

Hey @papiporn, off topic from this thread but to directly answer your question about UIs and contracts for liquidity mining Uniswap v3 LP NFTs, we have what I believe is the first full suite front end at Frax Finance. For example, you can check out our Uni V3 farming pair UI and contracts here: app .frax .finance/staking#Uniswap_V3_FRAX_USDC

We also allow locking the NFT LP for an additional boost to increase stickiness of the LP program. The farming contract also allows setting of range/ticks that are incentivized instead of generalized. The contract itself can be found here: etherscan .io/ address/0x3EF26504dbc8Dd7B7aa3E97Bc9f3813a9FC0B4B0

I think the other protocol that might have full Uni v3 farming infrastructure other than FRAX is Gelato's G UNI system. Maker is using them to manage their PSM module. I think they also are expanding it to generalized farming for end-users right now as well.

Hope that helps :)

See, this is the problem with liquidity mining. It's all fun and games in the beginning when nobody knows about the protocol, we attract liquidity (of course we do, we're giving LPs free "money").

But then how quickly it becomes a slippery slope. Like a drug, basically. We have no choice but to keep distributing rewards and incentives because if we stop, a competitor will come in who will and liquidity is going to migrate to them. Our LPs are addicted. It's already the case with SushiSwap and others on other chains. And more protocols will be created in the future because everything is open source and forkable and despite what we might think liquidity has very little network effects. Liquidity in DeFi is a mercenary, it will go where it'll make the most money because there is no switching cost.

All this at the detriment, of course, of UNI holders. Case in point, the CRV token, where they are basically printing an unlimited amount of rewards just to try to keep liquidity there. As a consequence the price of CRV just keeps tanking and this despite basically CRV being completely useless outside of staking which is another artificial mechanism created to try to keep people from dumping it. Liquidity providers there are slowly realizing that they are being paid rewards in a token whose value keeps declining so they're incentivized to sell it as soon as they receive it, which puts further sell pressure on price. It's a vicious circle.

Liquidity mining was never anything more than a financial hack. Perhaps, in the very early days of a protocol, it has value in attracting capital. But it cannot be used all the time. When does it stop? There is no proof that liquidity mining attracts long term capital. At best, it attracts capital while rewards are running and most of that capital will flee elsewhere when the rewards stop.

We need a better strategy. We need to think long term. Liquidity mining is very short term thinking. Synthetix lives on liquidity mining and today exists as little more than a zombie protocol. They have an average of 42 trades per day over the past 30 days (!). Can you believe it? See for yourself on their stats site. The fact that they are valued at $1.8B is nothing more than financial hackery that is common in crypto (Cardano, anyone?). They have still not found product-market fit.

Uniswap, on the other hand, probably has. We don't need financial hackery schemes. It dilutes UNI holders but most of all it dilutes the brand and arguably the brand is one of the only sustainable competitive advantages we have against up and coming protocols.

If LPs aren't migrating organically from v2 to v3, then there's a deeper problem that a few UNI rewards won't solve, at least not in the long run. Perhaps they don't want to actively manage their liquidity, which they'll have to do in v3. Perhaps the solution then would be to create liquidity management tools to help them do that. Rewards are not the solution.

I am disappointed in this proposal. It highlights the major problem of protocol governance more generally. Short term solutions will sometimes prevail at the detriment of longer term sustainable solutions. This is not a problem we'd have if governance was in the hands of a small founding team who think about Uniswap 24/7. Arguably given the amount of votes Hayden & co control, it still is, which is a good thing, in which case what we have is simply the illusion of governance.

Food for thought.

Thanks for the feedback! I’m Austin from Llama.

Llama is a collection of builders across the crypto industry with a diverse set of backgrounds. We don’t have a token and exist to be an independent voice on treasury management for protocol communities.

I agree that we should watch Uniswap adoption on L2s closely. The focus of this proposal is incentivizing liquidity migration from v2 to v3, but we should be willing to evaluate the expansion of ULP as those ecosystems mature.

Thanks for the feedback! I’m Austin from Llama.

Llama is a collection of builders across the crypto industry with a diverse set of backgrounds. We don’t have a token and exist to be an independent voice on treasury management for protocol communities.

I agree that we should watch Uniswap adoption on L2s closely. The focus of this proposal is incentivizing liquidity migration from v2 to v3, but we should be willing to evaluate the expansion of ULP as those ecosystems mature.

Great in-depth answer. But perhaps the question I meant to ask was:

Why LlamaDAO?

Seems like there could be a conflict of interest with everyone on this team coming from one organization. What’s to stop you all from agreeing that your $LLAMA tokens (or whatever, I’m guessing) shouldn’t be strongly incentivized over other tokens?

RE: Optimism/Arbitrum being early days. That’s exactly why I believe that any liquidity incentive programs should be targeted there. If there are new users to onboard out there, an L2 launch will be the time to attract them.

Thank you for the thoughtful response! I'm Austin, one of the core committee members from Llama.

This proposal is very much the beginning of the Uniswap Liquidity Program (v0.1). We want to ensure the community starts with a strong foundation and is able to adapt as we see the market response through a data-driven lens. Migrating liquidity is just one of the stated goals of our proposal. We also aim to encourage new participants to experiment with LPing and further diversify the UNI token holder base. We believe that incentivizing stablecoin pairs will be a big driver for the latter two goals.

Given the experience of the committee and the unique skill set required to implement a comprehensive liquidity program, we believe $150/hr is quite a fair rate. I’m sure most of the committee members are used to being paid much more for their work. The 30 hour aggregate weekly limit means the community will only be paying a max of $4,500 a week for all the manual effort required to help the community manage a liquidity program. Pair selection is a subjective process that cannot be easily automated: any action requires close monitoring and frequent reporting to the Uniswap community. We take this job seriously and are committed to providing weekly updates to ensure the committee is more than justifying the cost of their work.

UNI holders are already highly incentivized to expedite the migration of liquidity to v3, so we figure it will be a better use of funds to start with these pairs.

We’re happy to hear that you share the same goals as us. This proposal is just the beginning of what the Uniswap liquidity program can be. As the program evolves, there is the potential to have a process to add new pairs to this list. Uniswap is a rapidly growing protocol and we think beginning with these selected pairs will maximize our chances to grow with it.

Appreciate your candid response. Most Llama members are actively part of other DAOs, it was important to us that we represent a number of different interests across the space. The committee members proposed here have shown a broad knowledge of the space, actively participate in other projects, and overall share a strong desire for the advancement of the DeFi ecosystem.

I was around for initial Uni Liquidity mining and also minted one of the first 500 v3 positions. I remember each time with excitement and trepidation and believe that a renewed liquidity mining program on v3 would not only accomplish the stated goals of bringing increased v3 liquidity, but also bring new users to the protocol.

As for the pairs mentioned, we can certainly explore the inclusion of SNX in the initial program if there is support from the Uni community for it. If it doesn't make it in the first round it can also be part of our phased approach and be incentivized later if the Uni community deems the program to be effective

I am in support of this proposal. It makes sense to have a research based DAO to help with informing the community on key pairs to be focused on to keep Uniswap competitive with other AMM's and itself (v1 & v2).

I few concerns I have is that the treasury has mostly been spent so far on proposals that increase supply of UNI into the market, such as: UGP winners selling UNI to market, DeFi Education Fund selling $10 million usd worth of UNI. If this proposal passes we will mostly see participants who are coming for the APY in UNI rather than an interest in governance, which again will be more selling into a fragile market.

I overall am in support of this proposal, but I do think a UI should be built to encourage more governance participation in what pools are selected for further liquidity programs (supplemented by research done by Llama DAO), and a mindful awareness that UNI token itself losses all value as a governance, and treasury if it has little value.

Surprised SNX is left out here, I would think to gain the support of some members of the Synthetix community it would have been included in the mid-tail pair list.

I think many Defi users would prefer UNI incentives directed at pairs on Optimism since managing the liquidity positions becomes indiscriminately feasible. This proposal is missing that piece as well.

Overall I dont think Uniswap in particular benefits from a Committee to manage liquidity incentives, but would perhaps give it more thought if the group was diversified a little better. I'm not sure a committee made up of mainly LlamaDAO members can adequately represent the Greater DeFi Ecosystem, and the exemption of SNX among the selected Defi gov tokens is an example of that.

I have no issue with the LlamaDAO members individually, however this proposal misses the mark for me in its current form.

• SNX Ambassador

100% agree that ecosystem growth, & more particularly, focusing on protocols/tokens that serve as public goods to Ethereum is a key goal (+ proposal's stated goals could be updated to better reflect this). We aimed to select the starting set of pairs with this in mind.

As the program evolves, it has the potential to add an additional mandate of incentivizing emerging public goods that fall within the initiatives - new stablecoins, additional receipt tokens, etc. Considering & proposing pairs like these to select as additions would be part of Llama's mandate.

We made the decision to start the proposal out with limited scope on this particular set & let it prove success first, but the flexibility of the committee structure means that this idea could definitely be within scope over the longer term.

Great in-depth answer. But perhaps the question I meant to ask was:

Why LlamaDAO?

Seems like there could be a conflict of interest with everyone on this team coming from one organization. What’s to stop you all from agreeing that your $LLAMA tokens (or whatever, I’m guessing) shouldn’t be strongly incentivized over other tokens?

RE: Optimism/Arbitrum being early days. That’s exactly why I believe that any liquidity incentive programs should be targeted there. If there are new users to onboard out there, an L2 launch will be the time to attract them.

Thank you for the thoughtful response! I'm Austin, one of the core committee members from Llama.

This proposal is very much the beginning of the Uniswap Liquidity Program (v0.1). We want to ensure the community starts with a strong foundation and is able to adapt as we see the market response through a data-driven lens. Migrating liquidity is just one of the stated goals of our proposal. We also aim to encourage new participants to experiment with LPing and further diversify the UNI token holder base. We believe that incentivizing stablecoin pairs will be a big driver for the latter two goals.

Given the experience of the committee and the unique skill set required to implement a comprehensive liquidity program, we believe $150/hr is quite a fair rate. I’m sure most of the committee members are used to being paid much more for their work. The 30 hour aggregate weekly limit means the community will only be paying a max of $4,500 a week for all the manual effort required to help the community manage a liquidity program. Pair selection is a subjective process that cannot be easily automated: any action requires close monitoring and frequent reporting to the Uniswap community. We take this job seriously and are committed to providing weekly updates to ensure the committee is more than justifying the cost of their work.

UNI holders are already highly incentivized to expedite the migration of liquidity to v3, so we figure it will be a better use of funds to start with these pairs.

We’re happy to hear that you share the same goals as us. This proposal is just the beginning of what the Uniswap liquidity program can be. As the program evolves, there is the potential to have a process to add new pairs to this list. Uniswap is a rapidly growing protocol and we think beginning with these selected pairs will maximize our chances to grow with it.

Appreciate your candid response. Most Llama members are actively part of other DAOs, it was important to us that we represent a number of different interests across the space. The committee members proposed here have shown a broad knowledge of the space, actively participate in other projects, and overall share a strong desire for the advancement of the DeFi ecosystem.

I was around for initial Uni Liquidity mining and also minted one of the first 500 v3 positions. I remember each time with excitement and trepidation and believe that a renewed liquidity mining program on v3 would not only accomplish the stated goals of bringing increased v3 liquidity, but also bring new users to the protocol.

As for the pairs mentioned, we can certainly explore the inclusion of SNX in the initial program if there is support from the Uni community for it. If it doesn't make it in the first round it can also be part of our phased approach and be incentivized later if the Uni community deems the program to be effective

I am in support of this proposal. It makes sense to have a research based DAO to help with informing the community on key pairs to be focused on to keep Uniswap competitive with other AMM's and itself (v1 & v2).

I few concerns I have is that the treasury has mostly been spent so far on proposals that increase supply of UNI into the market, such as: UGP winners selling UNI to market, DeFi Education Fund selling $10 million usd worth of UNI. If this proposal passes we will mostly see participants who are coming for the APY in UNI rather than an interest in governance, which again will be more selling into a fragile market.

I overall am in support of this proposal, but I do think a UI should be built to encourage more governance participation in what pools are selected for further liquidity programs (supplemented by research done by Llama DAO), and a mindful awareness that UNI token itself losses all value as a governance, and treasury if it has little value.

Surprised SNX is left out here, I would think to gain the support of some members of the Synthetix community it would have been included in the mid-tail pair list.

I think many Defi users would prefer UNI incentives directed at pairs on Optimism since managing the liquidity positions becomes indiscriminately feasible. This proposal is missing that piece as well.

Overall I dont think Uniswap in particular benefits from a Committee to manage liquidity incentives, but would perhaps give it more thought if the group was diversified a little better. I'm not sure a committee made up of mainly LlamaDAO members can adequately represent the Greater DeFi Ecosystem, and the exemption of SNX among the selected Defi gov tokens is an example of that.

I have no issue with the LlamaDAO members individually, however this proposal misses the mark for me in its current form.

• SNX Ambassador

100% agree that ecosystem growth, & more particularly, focusing on protocols/tokens that serve as public goods to Ethereum is a key goal (+ proposal's stated goals could be updated to better reflect this). We aimed to select the starting set of pairs with this in mind.

As the program evolves, it has the potential to add an additional mandate of incentivizing emerging public goods that fall within the initiatives - new stablecoins, additional receipt tokens, etc. Considering & proposing pairs like these to select as additions would be part of Llama's mandate.

We made the decision to start the proposal out with limited scope on this particular set & let it prove success first, but the flexibility of the committee structure means that this idea could definitely be within scope over the longer term.

Hi, yeah good points on what the right model is. I'm Michael from Llama, working on dashboards for tracking the liquidity program.

Our primary motivation for migrating liquidity to v3 is that concentrated liquidity should provide better pricing for swappers, which leads to a better swapper experience. While I definitely agree that there’s a set of users (including me) who would prefer a “set it and forget it” LP model, there’s a challenge of how to balance the best LP experience with the best swapper experience. We’ll be monitoring performance of incentivized pairs to learn if these incentives are creating a better swapper experience or not.

For “set it and forget it” options, LPs could provide an ~infinite range on v3 today, but that might not generate reasonable revenue or improve the swapper experience. They could also explore automated managers, who should be able to both generate fees and provide better trade pricing. We’d hope that anyone building to improve the LP experience should benefit from the extra incentives.

On mid-tail pairs, we started with what we (subjectively) perceived to have a high impact for v3, rather than incentivizing every mid-tail pair, but definitely let us know if you have suggested additions. Also, it’s worth noting that this is the initial program, so it could expand over time if the community sees enough benefit to.

So, I would say that the point of the proposal is not necessarily to incentivise adoption but to incentivise migration. More V3 liquidity will unlock better user experience through much lower price impact. I would say that automated LP strategies, if they are good, would actually benefit from the program.

We will also monitor things like "additional swap volume vs. competition" using Dune and can adjust the parameters of the program based on the data.

Would agree that $100mm might be too deep. The goal is to use analytics as much as possible to support the parameters and decision making here. If we see that the pool is not getting utilised up to its potential, we can consider adjusting the rewards and targeting a smaller pool. I am tempted to try and get deeper pools and see if they attract different kinds of trades / unlock different user behaviours.

Thank you for this good proposal.

It's about time that the massive Uni treasury is effectively put to use. I personally hope this proposal will soon be further adjusted, voted on and be implemented - incl. varying incentives for Optimism experimentation.

A few comments

In our opinion, a liquidity mining campaign for a DEX should mainly achieve

• additional swap volume vs. competition (focus especially on trades routed towards Uniswap, not directly on Uniswap)

• knowledge increase (e.g. experiment with 2-6 week incentive cycles)

• Marketing exposure (e.g. co-campaigns with DeFi protocols, Optimism, etc.)

Encouragement of new token buyers and LPs was well done at the start and is an effective way to bootstrap a network. At this stage, there are better options to broaden the investor base and to educate newcomers about LPing (Guides, Videos, Test Environment/Competition). In fact, the liquidity mining campaign on majors will rather lead to more concentration since pros will farm with disproportionally more funds than newcomers. The LP base will broaden with 3rd party projects offering automated LP vaults - another interesting option for Uni treasury investment.

Agreed, these target pairs are most interesting for V3. I am especially curious on cToken and aToken liquidity and opening up more use cases - is a collaboration with Compound/Aave being discussed?

Targeting $100m in each of the DeFi-ETH pools seems excessive. I have serious doubts about swaps requiring such deep liquidity pools but would be happy proven otherwise.

Commitee setup looks very strong and compensation fair. I do believe long-term investors from Paradigm and core developers should also have a seat at the table as they have most certainly thought a lot about important pairs and pair incentivization.

Again, thanks for the good proposal.

@uba.eth I think extending the program to include Optimism is an excellent idea, and definitely one of the directions we're hoping to include as the program evolves.

Like you mention, the Optimism ecosystem is quite young, so I agree it's best to let it & Uniswap on Optimism grow naturally before adding liquidity incentives.

In the meantime, we think the proposal is great opportunity to help build Uniswap V3 adoption & liquidity on L1, which remains quite important even as Uniswap extends to L2.

Hello, I think it is a very good idea. I think we are all aware that it is important to migrate from V1 and V2 to V3. At the moment we are competing with each other and that is good when the competition is yourself, but at the rate that the projects move, we cannot stand still.

On the other hand, after almost 10 months since the launch of UNI, the creation of this liquidity program, sure that it helps to increase the number of users who obtain these rewards and, it will increase the deposits in all the groups.

In these months a lot of work has been done and, from my point of view, very well. I think it's a good time for this release. We are at the gates of the first year of UNI and we have to place our project in the TOP 5.

Thanks and greetings to all

Hi, yeah good points on what the right model is. I'm Michael from Llama, working on dashboards for tracking the liquidity program.

Our primary motivation for migrating liquidity to v3 is that concentrated liquidity should provide better pricing for swappers, which leads to a better swapper experience. While I definitely agree that there’s a set of users (including me) who would prefer a “set it and forget it” LP model, there’s a challenge of how to balance the best LP experience with the best swapper experience. We’ll be monitoring performance of incentivized pairs to learn if these incentives are creating a better swapper experience or not.

For “set it and forget it” options, LPs could provide an ~infinite range on v3 today, but that might not generate reasonable revenue or improve the swapper experience. They could also explore automated managers, who should be able to both generate fees and provide better trade pricing. We’d hope that anyone building to improve the LP experience should benefit from the extra incentives.

On mid-tail pairs, we started with what we (subjectively) perceived to have a high impact for v3, rather than incentivizing every mid-tail pair, but definitely let us know if you have suggested additions. Also, it’s worth noting that this is the initial program, so it could expand over time if the community sees enough benefit to.

So, I would say that the point of the proposal is not necessarily to incentivise adoption but to incentivise migration. More V3 liquidity will unlock better user experience through much lower price impact. I would say that automated LP strategies, if they are good, would actually benefit from the program.

We will also monitor things like "additional swap volume vs. competition" using Dune and can adjust the parameters of the program based on the data.

Would agree that $100mm might be too deep. The goal is to use analytics as much as possible to support the parameters and decision making here. If we see that the pool is not getting utilised up to its potential, we can consider adjusting the rewards and targeting a smaller pool. I am tempted to try and get deeper pools and see if they attract different kinds of trades / unlock different user behaviours.

Thank you for this good proposal.

It's about time that the massive Uni treasury is effectively put to use. I personally hope this proposal will soon be further adjusted, voted on and be implemented - incl. varying incentives for Optimism experimentation.

A few comments

In our opinion, a liquidity mining campaign for a DEX should mainly achieve

• additional swap volume vs. competition (focus especially on trades routed towards Uniswap, not directly on Uniswap)

• knowledge increase (e.g. experiment with 2-6 week incentive cycles)

• Marketing exposure (e.g. co-campaigns with DeFi protocols, Optimism, etc.)

Encouragement of new token buyers and LPs was well done at the start and is an effective way to bootstrap a network. At this stage, there are better options to broaden the investor base and to educate newcomers about LPing (Guides, Videos, Test Environment/Competition). In fact, the liquidity mining campaign on majors will rather lead to more concentration since pros will farm with disproportionally more funds than newcomers. The LP base will broaden with 3rd party projects offering automated LP vaults - another interesting option for Uni treasury investment.

Agreed, these target pairs are most interesting for V3. I am especially curious on cToken and aToken liquidity and opening up more use cases - is a collaboration with Compound/Aave being discussed?

Targeting $100m in each of the DeFi-ETH pools seems excessive. I have serious doubts about swaps requiring such deep liquidity pools but would be happy proven otherwise.

Commitee setup looks very strong and compensation fair. I do believe long-term investors from Paradigm and core developers should also have a seat at the table as they have most certainly thought a lot about important pairs and pair incentivization.

Again, thanks for the good proposal.

@uba.eth I think extending the program to include Optimism is an excellent idea, and definitely one of the directions we're hoping to include as the program evolves.

Like you mention, the Optimism ecosystem is quite young, so I agree it's best to let it & Uniswap on Optimism grow naturally before adding liquidity incentives.

In the meantime, we think the proposal is great opportunity to help build Uniswap V3 adoption & liquidity on L1, which remains quite important even as Uniswap extends to L2.

Hello, I think it is a very good idea. I think we are all aware that it is important to migrate from V1 and V2 to V3. At the moment we are competing with each other and that is good when the competition is yourself, but at the rate that the projects move, we cannot stand still.

On the other hand, after almost 10 months since the launch of UNI, the creation of this liquidity program, sure that it helps to increase the number of users who obtain these rewards and, it will increase the deposits in all the groups.

In these months a lot of work has been done and, from my point of view, very well. I think it's a good time for this release. We are at the gates of the first year of UNI and we have to place our project in the TOP 5.

Thanks and greetings to all

So yet another proposal which introduces more dilution for the UNI token holders? Tell me, how would this proposal benefit the token holders? It is the prevailing opinion that the initial farming of the UNI token was a net negative for the holders in general. We saw the price of the UNI token drop significantly while the farmers farmed and then dumped the token and moved on. Who´s to say it wont happen again??

The only effective migration from V2 to V3 is by turning on the fee switch on V2.

This whole proposal feels incredibly redundant to be honest.

So yet another proposal which introduces more dilution for the UNI token holders? Tell me, how would this proposal benefit the token holders? It is the prevailing opinion that the initial farming of the UNI token was a net negative for the holders in general. We saw the price of the UNI token drop significantly while the farmers farmed and then dumped the token and moved on. Who´s to say it wont happen again??

The only effective migration from V2 to V3 is by turning on the fee switch on V2.

This whole proposal feels incredibly redundant to be honest.

This is correct for all three tokens.

The only solution I can think of is wrapping but that creates a lot of headaches and I think is detrimental to the main goal (i.e. "pools may serve as an effective alternative distribution channel for yield-generating platforms."). Wrapping would be better for the LPs but much worse for the people swapping.

So I think the current suggested approach is best. At least for PoolTogether it will provide a meaningfully better experience vs. depositing directly (saves 100k gas). The LPs miss out on the Aave / COMP / POOL tokens but are compensated by getting the UNI tokens. And the Uniswap protocol gets to pilot demand for direct swapping into protocol tokens rather than using protocol UIs.... which I think is a really good strategy for Uniswap.

This is correct for all three tokens.

The only solution I can think of is wrapping but that creates a lot of headaches and I think is detrimental to the main goal (i.e. "pools may serve as an effective alternative distribution channel for yield-generating platforms."). Wrapping would be better for the LPs but much worse for the people swapping.

So I think the current suggested approach is best. At least for PoolTogether it will provide a meaningfully better experience vs. depositing directly (saves 100k gas). The LPs miss out on the Aave / COMP / POOL tokens but are compensated by getting the UNI tokens. And the Uniswap protocol gets to pilot demand for direct swapping into protocol tokens rather than using protocol UIs.... which I think is a really good strategy for Uniswap.