current Uniswap governance system make it vulnerable to a lot of risks and possible attacks. This why I am proposing a new governance system similar to CRV governance in which your weight in governance depend on 2 factors: 1- how many UNI tokens you have 2- the length of the vesting period of your tokens... This means that UNI governance will be controlled by long term UNI holders and will protect governance from flash loans attacks and malicious borrowers.
with flash loans attacks, the attacker can borrow almost unlimited amount of UNI and make a bad proposal and pay back the loan in one block... this kind of attacks could be very difficult to stop or reverse
also another possible attack is a whale or multiple whales borrow tens of millions of UNI from platforms like Compound, Aave and Cream and make a malicious proposal (like looting the treasury), this will probably cause UNI price to tank so this will let the attackers make money from looting the treasury + shorting UNI
Current governance design offer big incentives for attackers especially with the growing treasury (170m UNI in the 1st year)
so a new governance design that make the voting power depends on 2 factors 1- number of tokens, 2- vesting period... will make these attacks impossible and will give the governance to long term holders who have the most interest is Uniswap success
current Uniswap governance system make it vulnerable to a lot of risks and possible attacks. This why I am proposing a new governance system similar to CRV governance in which your weight in governance depend on 2 factors: 1- how many UNI tokens you have 2- the length of the vesting period of your tokens... This means that UNI governance will be controlled by long term UNI holders and will protect governance from flash loans attacks and malicious borrowers.
with flash loans attacks, the attacker can borrow almost unlimited amount of UNI and make a bad proposal and pay back the loan in one block... this kind of attacks could be very difficult to stop or reverse
also another possible attack is a whale or multiple whales borrow tens of millions of UNI from platforms like Compound, Aave and Cream and make a malicious proposal (like looting the treasury), this will probably cause UNI price to tank so this will let the attackers make money from looting the treasury + shorting UNI
Current governance design offer big incentives for attackers especially with the growing treasury (170m UNI in the 1st year)
so a new governance design that make the voting power depends on 2 factors 1- number of tokens, 2- vesting period... will make these attacks impossible and will give the governance to long term holders who have the most interest is Uniswap success
@mmoossttaaffaa :fist_right: :fist_left: This proposal would make smaller lp's feel like they're apart of the community!
@mmoossttaaffaa :fist_right: :fist_left: This proposal would make smaller lp's feel like they're apart of the community!
Certain addresses would need to be blacklisted from voting (in my opinion).
How do we prevent malicious attacks from Binance, Huobi and other exchanges? (they have high balance of UNI tokens for a long time)
I support this idea.
It makes A LOT of sense to take into account both the period UNI was held by a wallet as well as the size of UNI. I'd like to see governance 'in hands of' the long-term supporters that want the best for Uniswap. Rather than someone purchasing/borrrowing a lot of UNI short-term to simply vote on a specific proposal this person has an interest in.
Totally agree with this should be a locking mechanism to vote otherwise people could just continue to make proposals that affect price just to dump tokens a locking mechanism shows you have long term interests in the platform. Maybe not something quite as long as curves but a year would be a good duration as eventually if uni gets any sort of rewards I think locking uni for governance would be easier and more helpful for retention
As far as I'm aware, and you can correct me if I'm wrong if a user submits a proposal with 10 million (flash loaned or Borrowed Uni) and does not hold the 10 million unis for the duration of the proposal (One week) then anyone can cancel this proposal.
Certain addresses would need to be blacklisted from voting (in my opinion).
How do we prevent malicious attacks from Binance, Huobi and other exchanges? (they have high balance of UNI tokens for a long time)
I support this idea.
It makes A LOT of sense to take into account both the period UNI was held by a wallet as well as the size of UNI. I'd like to see governance 'in hands of' the long-term supporters that want the best for Uniswap. Rather than someone purchasing/borrrowing a lot of UNI short-term to simply vote on a specific proposal this person has an interest in.
Totally agree with this should be a locking mechanism to vote otherwise people could just continue to make proposals that affect price just to dump tokens a locking mechanism shows you have long term interests in the platform. Maybe not something quite as long as curves but a year would be a good duration as eventually if uni gets any sort of rewards I think locking uni for governance would be easier and more helpful for retention
As far as I'm aware, and you can correct me if I'm wrong if a user submits a proposal with 10 million (flash loaned or Borrowed Uni) and does not hold the 10 million unis for the duration of the proposal (One week) then anyone can cancel this proposal.
The fact that someone potentially can borrow large amount of UNI for 10 minutes and become significant actor in the voting process is something which should be changed as soon as possible IMO.
The fact that someone potentially can borrow large amount of UNI for 10 minutes and become significant actor in the voting process is something which should be changed as soon as possible IMO.
The issues you address, as well as many other issues with the voting system, can be addressed easily by changing one number in the code: the voting delay.
By introducing the preparation period with it, all the attacks become harder to execute, as it gives time for UNI holders to mobilize their voting power.
The issues you address, as well as many other issues with the voting system, can be addressed easily by changing one number in the code: the voting delay.
By introducing the preparation period with it, all the attacks become harder to execute, as it gives time for UNI holders to mobilize their voting power.
And the outcome of the attacks and the cost of them become much less predictable for attackers. When it comes to lending platforms, mobilizing UNI means that lenders have to pay bigger interest.
In any case, as long as there's time to respond for the Uniswap community, I don't think these attacks would happen in the first place. The only way you can make a malicious proposal to work while bypassing the governance procedures - is if you have the 'effective' majority of the voting power. If you do have it though, it doesn't make sense for your direct financial interests to make such a proposal go through.
The issues you address, as well as many other issues with the voting system, can be addressed easily by changing one number in the code: the voting delay.
By introducing the preparation period with it, all the attacks become harder to execute, as it gives time for UNI holders to mobilize their voting power.
The issues you address, as well as many other issues with the voting system, can be addressed easily by changing one number in the code: the voting delay.
By introducing the preparation period with it, all the attacks become harder to execute, as it gives time for UNI holders to mobilize their voting power.
And the outcome of the attacks and the cost of them become much less predictable for attackers. When it comes to lending platforms, mobilizing UNI means that lenders have to pay bigger interest.
In any case, as long as there's time to respond for the Uniswap community, I don't think these attacks would happen in the first place. The only way you can make a malicious proposal to work while bypassing the governance procedures - is if you have the 'effective' majority of the voting power. If you do have it though, it doesn't make sense for your direct financial interests to make such a proposal go through.
