AlphaGrowth, stewards of the Uniswap Growth Program, proposes accelerating the execution of co-incentive campaigns. Leveraging some of the UAC’s surplus budget, we can capitalize on high-impact, time-sensitive opportunities without needing any additional funding from the DAO. While many of these opportunities are not yet able to be discussed publicly (pending negotiations), currently there is an opportunity with EtherFi to match $250k in incentives.
This EtherFi-sponsored campaign would deepen onchain liquidity of specific EtherFi assets (particularly weETH) on Uniswap. Our incentives would be matched 1-to-1 by EtherFi with ETHFI tokens, and additionally would be co-marketed by their protocol.
Since the kickoff of the Uniswap Growth Program, we’ve activated numerous relationships with new chains and opportunities for the Uniswap protocol. Many of these opportunities are standard, and we will continue to help push these through governance, and co-incentivize deployments via the Onboarding Package. As we have quickly found, however, some of these opportunities require more of a tailor-made co-incentivization structure.
Uniswap’s governance process is designed to ensure transparency and thorough deliberation. However, with the current process, activating a co-incentive campaign requires an RFC, Snapshot, and on-chain proposal—a process that can take a minimum of 4 weeks. While this process is effective for specific initiatives, the time required can lead to missed opportunities, particularly for high-impact initiatives that require quick execution.
The UAC currently has a sizable budget (in the form of UNI tokens) for incentivization. This budget is now at a surplus due to the recent increase in the price of UNI. Different DAO-based initiatives are bucketed into their respective accounts. The largest account on the UAC books is currently the Incentive Package Budget, which accounts for funds that are meant to be distributed as incentives to target chains, along with contracting costs to facilitate deployments (e.g., Oku and Merkl). At a price of $16/UNI, the dollar-based surplus for this account sits at $2,936,333. In other words, there are nearly $3M extra sitting in the UAC multisig.
| Incentive Package Balance | UNI | USD |
|---|---|---|
| Current Balance | 227,688 | $ 706,667 |
| Current Adjusted Balance | $ 3,643,000 | |
| Surplus/Deficit | $ 2,936,333 |
We propose authorizing the UAC to use some of these surplus funds to enable high-value co-incentivization campaigns spearheaded by the Uniswap Growth Program. These surplus funds would be issued by an internal UAC vote on a case-by-case basis, ensuring the campaigns align with the goals of the Uniswap DAO and enabling the Uniswap Growth Program to act quickly on high-value opportunities. This reduces the time requirement from ~4 weeks to a few days (pending an internal UAC approval vote) and uses funds previously allocated to the UAC multisig. To set limits to the spending, we will only be able to draw capital from the surplus while the surplus is at least 50% higher than the Current Balance. In the above case, with the current balance sitting at $706,667, we would only be able to utilize the surplus if it surpasses $1,060,000. This leaves a 1.5x buffer for the price to fluctuate and not cut into the payables associated with the balance. Furthermore, only incentive programs with $250k worth of funds or less can be used discretionarily.
This accelerated decision making process will ensure that Uniswap remains front and center as we dive head-first into the bull market. The UAC will report the details of the discretionary spending on the forums upon their execution, ensuring transparency and accountability.
This Snapshot will run between Dec 19 - Dec 23, requiring 40M Yes votes to pass
Note: Since there will be no onchain execution present, we propose solely requiring a Snapshot vote. Including the onchain vote would prolong the process by about 10 days, which would disqualify Uniswap from attaining the $250k match from EtherFi. If the Snapshot passes with the onchain quorum threshold, it in effect represents the same sentiment that an onchain would reflect.
AlphaGrowth, stewards of the Uniswap Growth Program, proposes accelerating the execution of co-incentive campaigns. Leveraging some of the UAC’s surplus budget, we can capitalize on high-impact, time-sensitive opportunities without needing any additional funding from the DAO. While many of these opportunities are not yet able to be discussed publicly (pending negotiations), currently there is an opportunity with EtherFi to match $250k in incentives.
This EtherFi-sponsored campaign would deepen onchain liquidity of specific EtherFi assets (particularly weETH) on Uniswap. Our incentives would be matched 1-to-1 by EtherFi with ETHFI tokens, and additionally would be co-marketed by their protocol.
Since the kickoff of the Uniswap Growth Program, we’ve activated numerous relationships with new chains and opportunities for the Uniswap protocol. Many of these opportunities are standard, and we will continue to help push these through governance, and co-incentivize deployments via the Onboarding Package. As we have quickly found, however, some of these opportunities require more of a tailor-made co-incentivization structure.
Uniswap’s governance process is designed to ensure transparency and thorough deliberation. However, with the current process, activating a co-incentive campaign requires an RFC, Snapshot, and on-chain proposal—a process that can take a minimum of 4 weeks. While this process is effective for specific initiatives, the time required can lead to missed opportunities, particularly for high-impact initiatives that require quick execution.
The UAC currently has a sizable budget (in the form of UNI tokens) for incentivization. This budget is now at a surplus due to the recent increase in the price of UNI. Different DAO-based initiatives are bucketed into their respective accounts. The largest account on the UAC books is currently the Incentive Package Budget, which accounts for funds that are meant to be distributed as incentives to target chains, along with contracting costs to facilitate deployments (e.g., Oku and Merkl). At a price of $16/UNI, the dollar-based surplus for this account sits at $2,936,333. In other words, there are nearly $3M extra sitting in the UAC multisig.
| Incentive Package Balance | UNI | USD |
|---|---|---|
| Current Balance | 227,688 | $ 706,667 |
| Current Adjusted Balance | $ 3,643,000 | |
| Surplus/Deficit | $ 2,936,333 |
We propose authorizing the UAC to use some of these surplus funds to enable high-value co-incentivization campaigns spearheaded by the Uniswap Growth Program. These surplus funds would be issued by an internal UAC vote on a case-by-case basis, ensuring the campaigns align with the goals of the Uniswap DAO and enabling the Uniswap Growth Program to act quickly on high-value opportunities. This reduces the time requirement from ~4 weeks to a few days (pending an internal UAC approval vote) and uses funds previously allocated to the UAC multisig. To set limits to the spending, we will only be able to draw capital from the surplus while the surplus is at least 50% higher than the Current Balance. In the above case, with the current balance sitting at $706,667, we would only be able to utilize the surplus if it surpasses $1,060,000. This leaves a 1.5x buffer for the price to fluctuate and not cut into the payables associated with the balance. Furthermore, only incentive programs with $250k worth of funds or less can be used discretionarily.
This accelerated decision making process will ensure that Uniswap remains front and center as we dive head-first into the bull market. The UAC will report the details of the discretionary spending on the forums upon their execution, ensuring transparency and accountability.
This Snapshot will run between Dec 19 - Dec 23, requiring 40M Yes votes to pass
Note: Since there will be no onchain execution present, we propose solely requiring a Snapshot vote. Including the onchain vote would prolong the process by about 10 days, which would disqualify Uniswap from attaining the $250k match from EtherFi. If the Snapshot passes with the onchain quorum threshold, it in effect represents the same sentiment that an onchain would reflect.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-discretionary-budget-from-uac-for-co-incentive-campaigns/25019/12
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-discretionary-budget-from-uac-for-co-incentive-campaigns/25019/7?u=blockworksresearch
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-discretionary-budget-from-uac-for-co-incentive-campaigns/25019/12
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-discretionary-budget-from-uac-for-co-incentive-campaigns/25019/7?u=blockworksresearch
Additional budget for co-marketing makes sense, this vote shall function for making it effective for EtherFi campaign but we should be looking at properly proposing this on-chain with a formal program with expectations
Additional budget for co-marketing makes sense, this vote shall function for making it effective for EtherFi campaign but we should be looking at properly proposing this on-chain with a formal program with expectations
Using the surplus budget for co-incentive campaigns is a good move to boost Uniswap’s liquidity and market presence. That being said, it's important to ensure that the budget isn't overused and that there's still enough reserve for future needs. But yes, I voted For on Snapshot
Using the surplus budget for co-incentive campaigns is a good move to boost Uniswap’s liquidity and market presence. That being said, it's important to ensure that the budget isn't overused and that there's still enough reserve for future needs. But yes, I voted For on Snapshot
Hey @GFXlabs this specific co-incentive campaign on the table would be around 100-200k in UNI, and matched by EtherFi
Hey folks, just a small actual voter here but this proposal is something I'd be in support of.
I do however question if we have the legitimacy to request spending from the UAC via a snapshot vote. Is that something we can do? Is that something we should do? Obviously the opportunity is time sensitive, but maybe we want to enshrine a "petty cash" fund?
I'll be voting FOR
Hey @GFXlabs this specific co-incentive campaign on the table would be around 100-200k in UNI, and matched by EtherFi
Hey folks, just a small actual voter here but this proposal is something I'd be in support of.
I do however question if we have the legitimacy to request spending from the UAC via a snapshot vote. Is that something we can do? Is that something we should do? Obviously the opportunity is time sensitive, but maybe we want to enshrine a "petty cash" fund?
I'll be voting FOR
hey @SEEDGov this feedback is greatly appreciated. We’ll strive to notify the DAO as soon as possible, providing clear reasoning and an opportunity for feedback before proceeding, barring any significant objections. While some situations may require urgency or confidentiality to secure the best outcomes, we'll remain committed to transparency and timely communication.
As for reporting, we'll ensuring reports are shared within one week of funds being sent, ideally on the same day. We’re happy to refine this further based on your input.
hey @SEEDGov this feedback is greatly appreciated. We’ll strive to notify the DAO as soon as possible, providing clear reasoning and an opportunity for feedback before proceeding, barring any significant objections. While some situations may require urgency or confidentiality to secure the best outcomes, we'll remain committed to transparency and timely communication.
As for reporting, we'll ensuring reports are shared within one week of funds being sent, ideally on the same day. We’re happy to refine this further based on your input.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The UAC has done a very good job in terms of communication and transparency, so we feel comfortable enabling them with a little more discretion regarding the funds’ usage so we don’t miss out on opportunities.
Taking advantage of the price appreciation of UNI and allocating the surplus budget in pursuit of co-incentive campaigns seems sensible.
I have voted FOR this proposal, you can read my rationale in my delegation thread:
After reviewing the AlphaGrowth’s proposal and the feedback from other delegates, I am voting FOR the proposal.
I have voted FOR this proposal, you can read my rationale in my delegation thread:
After reviewing the AlphaGrowth’s proposal and the feedback from other delegates, I am voting FOR the proposal.
This is a vote of confidence in the Uniswap Growth Program led by AlphaGrowth. To enable meaningful growth, we need to allow for greater flexibility in the program’s approach.
That said, I expect AlphaGrowth and its co-authors to uphold the transparency standards required by the DAO, along with maintaining high levels of accountability and detailed reporting. This will ensure the DAO can effectively assess the impact of these special programs. If these expectations are not met, the DAO should act quickly to revoke this capability.
How much does EtherFi want (ballpark is okay), and how will the funds be allocated?
The problem statement here is spot on. We should do something to address that. Perhaps eliminating the onchain proposal necessity and a shortened RFC would be sufficient. Or even allow a snapshot to go up immediately.
Blockworks Advisory will be voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
From our perspective, the Alphagrowth team has excelled in Uniswap and Compound, and so we expect responsible decisions from them and the rest of the Uniswap Growth program; though, we do think that the DAO should have some means of intervention here just in case. These are surplus funds that are being spent on more immediate campaigns, which means that the risk of ill-distribution can rise.
We have voted in favour of this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:
We have voted in favour of this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:
We caution that the discretionary use of funds is not an ideal situation, but should be done as an exception, and therefore we encourage the proponents and future executors @alphagrowth @PGov @AranaDigital to be extremely prudent in the use of this faculty, and to respect the commitment made by @alphagrowth in response to our concerns, to notify the DAO as soon as possible, even in advance if possible to allow for constructive feedback, and that once a discretionary expenditure has been made, to report to the DAO immediately to allow for control and tracking.
We think it makes sense here for all discretionary vote spends to have to be decided by a super majority of the UAC (4/5 minimum), ideally aiming for unanimous. If a vote/ decision doesn't end up being unanimous, we'll make it a high priority on the UAC to explain any dissenting opinions/concerns and ultimate reasoning as soon as possible.
The UAC will report the details of the discretionary spending on the forums upon their execution, ensuring transparency and accountability.
Don't see why not as long as there is transparency on how the funds are spent and the DAO is given a heads up on upcoming target chains/campaigns to also allow for potential feedback. Assuming this would be the case, you'll have Avantgarde's support.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The UAC has done a very good job in terms of communication and transparency, so we feel comfortable enabling them with a little more discretion regarding the funds’ usage so we don’t miss out on opportunities.
Taking advantage of the price appreciation of UNI and allocating the surplus budget in pursuit of co-incentive campaigns seems sensible.
I have voted FOR this proposal, you can read my rationale in my delegation thread:
After reviewing the AlphaGrowth’s proposal and the feedback from other delegates, I am voting FOR the proposal.
I have voted FOR this proposal, you can read my rationale in my delegation thread:
After reviewing the AlphaGrowth’s proposal and the feedback from other delegates, I am voting FOR the proposal.
This is a vote of confidence in the Uniswap Growth Program led by AlphaGrowth. To enable meaningful growth, we need to allow for greater flexibility in the program’s approach.
That said, I expect AlphaGrowth and its co-authors to uphold the transparency standards required by the DAO, along with maintaining high levels of accountability and detailed reporting. This will ensure the DAO can effectively assess the impact of these special programs. If these expectations are not met, the DAO should act quickly to revoke this capability.
How much does EtherFi want (ballpark is okay), and how will the funds be allocated?
The problem statement here is spot on. We should do something to address that. Perhaps eliminating the onchain proposal necessity and a shortened RFC would be sufficient. Or even allow a snapshot to go up immediately.
Blockworks Advisory will be voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
From our perspective, the Alphagrowth team has excelled in Uniswap and Compound, and so we expect responsible decisions from them and the rest of the Uniswap Growth program; though, we do think that the DAO should have some means of intervention here just in case. These are surplus funds that are being spent on more immediate campaigns, which means that the risk of ill-distribution can rise.
We have voted in favour of this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:
We have voted in favour of this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:
We caution that the discretionary use of funds is not an ideal situation, but should be done as an exception, and therefore we encourage the proponents and future executors @alphagrowth @PGov @AranaDigital to be extremely prudent in the use of this faculty, and to respect the commitment made by @alphagrowth in response to our concerns, to notify the DAO as soon as possible, even in advance if possible to allow for constructive feedback, and that once a discretionary expenditure has been made, to report to the DAO immediately to allow for control and tracking.
We think it makes sense here for all discretionary vote spends to have to be decided by a super majority of the UAC (4/5 minimum), ideally aiming for unanimous. If a vote/ decision doesn't end up being unanimous, we'll make it a high priority on the UAC to explain any dissenting opinions/concerns and ultimate reasoning as soon as possible.
The UAC will report the details of the discretionary spending on the forums upon their execution, ensuring transparency and accountability.
Don't see why not as long as there is transparency on how the funds are spent and the DAO is given a heads up on upcoming target chains/campaigns to also allow for potential feedback. Assuming this would be the case, you'll have Avantgarde's support.
The UAC will report the details of the discretionary spending on the forums upon their execution, ensuring transparency and accountability.
Given that this is discretionary spending of DAO funds, we would like to see more detail in the proposal on what transparency, control and monitoring measures are proposed, including deadlines for reporting. We would also like to see clarification that, wherever possible, the DAO should be consulted or informed in advance of expenditure to allow for constructive feedback.
The UAC will report the details of the discretionary spending on the forums upon their execution, ensuring transparency and accountability.
Given that this is discretionary spending of DAO funds, we would like to see more detail in the proposal on what transparency, control and monitoring measures are proposed, including deadlines for reporting. We would also like to see clarification that, wherever possible, the DAO should be consulted or informed in advance of expenditure to allow for constructive feedback.
