In production since 2018 (as the xDai Chain), the rebranded Gnosis Chain is rapidly evolving with a new focus and mission. Gnosis Chain (GC) provides a real-world value chain that closely mirrors the Ethereum 2.0 ecosystem. This includes a beacon chain framework, rollups, and other vital functionality. GC will serve in a front-running capacity for important Ethereum 2.0 updates,
Tuned parameters on the Gnosis Chain enable faster blocks and epochs, low-cost stable transactions, and the opportunity to construct trustless bridges and conduct seamless transfers between GC and the Ethereum 2.0 mainnet.
The Gnosis Chain team is committed to ecosystem development, adoption, and growth as the Eth2.0 landscape comes into focus. With a mission to “accelerate Ethereum,” Gnosis Chain is poised for expansion. With this in mind, we propose a Uniswap v3 deployment to the Gnosis Chain. We believe there are many benefits for both Uniswap Labs and Uniswap users, some of which include:
A DeFi ecosystem primed for growth. Once deployed, Uniswap would become a cornerstone DeFi engine for protocols using and interacting within the ecosystem. Perpetual Protocol is a flagship protocol on GC that relies on Uniswap v3. This deployment will enable Perpetual to continue to flourish on the Gnosis Chain. Additional bluechip deployments with growing TVL include Curve, Sushiswap, and Tornado, with many new and promising DeFi projects choosing Gnosis Chain as their homebase. A list of current projects is available at https://gnosischain.world/
An iterative environment. Uniswap Labs can experiment with new functionality and front-run new features in a real-value environment (which differs from a test environment in that users behave differently with value on the line, token supply is limited, real adversaries exist, etc). Uniswap can spot and remediate any final potential issues stemming from important Ethereum updates prior to mainnet activation and take advantage of optimized slot and epoch times for faster iteration.
Tight Ethereum compatibility. Tools, resources, projects, and protocols supported by Ethereum are already supported by the Gnosis Chain, with more onboarding regularly. Gnosis Safe is facilitating daily operations for many existing projects. A trustless bridge architecture designed to connect Ethereum and Gnosis Chain is in the works. The Gnosis Beacon Chain validator set is expanding rapidly bringing massive decentralization to the chain.
The primary differences separating the GBC from the Ethereum Beacon chain include 5-second blocks and < 2-minute epochs, stable transactions with a max target of $.01 per 100K gas, an economically and geographically diverse validator set, and a lower-stakes, lower-TVL environment.
Unique chain characteristics. Stable, low-cost transactions provide unique opportunities for Uniswap users. When gas costs are known and have a low impact on trade decisions, new strategies and approaches emerge which are currently untenable on the Ethereum mainnet or other chains with wide-ranging fee variability.
User incentives. A large directive for the Gnosis Chain is to increase the user base and on-chain activity by strategically allocating funds from the GnosisDAO treasury to promote adoption. An ecosystem fund has been created for this purpose, and we propose to use a portion of these funds to promote Uniswap v3 on Gnosis Chain. We propose providing up to $10M for a tailored liquidity mining program. The Gnosis Chain is preparing for substantial growth in the coming year. We have implemented an aggressive infrastructure grants program including large grants to Nethermind, Lighthouse and Erigon client teams to support base-layer functionality and security. The ecosystem fund will bring in many new projects, and we feel Uniswap v3 is an essential component that will serve as a foundational layer for this growth.
We welcome any questions and comments and are happy to provide any clarifications as needed. We are excited to submit this proposal to the Uniswap community and look forward to your feedback! Thank you.
In production since 2018 (as the xDai Chain), the rebranded Gnosis Chain is rapidly evolving with a new focus and mission. Gnosis Chain (GC) provides a real-world value chain that closely mirrors the Ethereum 2.0 ecosystem. This includes a beacon chain framework, rollups, and other vital functionality. GC will serve in a front-running capacity for important Ethereum 2.0 updates,
Tuned parameters on the Gnosis Chain enable faster blocks and epochs, low-cost stable transactions, and the opportunity to construct trustless bridges and conduct seamless transfers between GC and the Ethereum 2.0 mainnet.
The Gnosis Chain team is committed to ecosystem development, adoption, and growth as the Eth2.0 landscape comes into focus. With a mission to “accelerate Ethereum,” Gnosis Chain is poised for expansion. With this in mind, we propose a Uniswap v3 deployment to the Gnosis Chain. We believe there are many benefits for both Uniswap Labs and Uniswap users, some of which include:
A DeFi ecosystem primed for growth. Once deployed, Uniswap would become a cornerstone DeFi engine for protocols using and interacting within the ecosystem. Perpetual Protocol is a flagship protocol on GC that relies on Uniswap v3. This deployment will enable Perpetual to continue to flourish on the Gnosis Chain. Additional bluechip deployments with growing TVL include Curve, Sushiswap, and Tornado, with many new and promising DeFi projects choosing Gnosis Chain as their homebase. A list of current projects is available at https://gnosischain.world/
An iterative environment. Uniswap Labs can experiment with new functionality and front-run new features in a real-value environment (which differs from a test environment in that users behave differently with value on the line, token supply is limited, real adversaries exist, etc). Uniswap can spot and remediate any final potential issues stemming from important Ethereum updates prior to mainnet activation and take advantage of optimized slot and epoch times for faster iteration.
Tight Ethereum compatibility. Tools, resources, projects, and protocols supported by Ethereum are already supported by the Gnosis Chain, with more onboarding regularly. Gnosis Safe is facilitating daily operations for many existing projects. A trustless bridge architecture designed to connect Ethereum and Gnosis Chain is in the works. The Gnosis Beacon Chain validator set is expanding rapidly bringing massive decentralization to the chain.
The primary differences separating the GBC from the Ethereum Beacon chain include 5-second blocks and < 2-minute epochs, stable transactions with a max target of $.01 per 100K gas, an economically and geographically diverse validator set, and a lower-stakes, lower-TVL environment.
Unique chain characteristics. Stable, low-cost transactions provide unique opportunities for Uniswap users. When gas costs are known and have a low impact on trade decisions, new strategies and approaches emerge which are currently untenable on the Ethereum mainnet or other chains with wide-ranging fee variability.
User incentives. A large directive for the Gnosis Chain is to increase the user base and on-chain activity by strategically allocating funds from the GnosisDAO treasury to promote adoption. An ecosystem fund has been created for this purpose, and we propose to use a portion of these funds to promote Uniswap v3 on Gnosis Chain. We propose providing up to $10M for a tailored liquidity mining program. The Gnosis Chain is preparing for substantial growth in the coming year. We have implemented an aggressive infrastructure grants program including large grants to Nethermind, Lighthouse and Erigon client teams to support base-layer functionality and security. The ecosystem fund will bring in many new projects, and we feel Uniswap v3 is an essential component that will serve as a foundational layer for this growth.
We welcome any questions and comments and are happy to provide any clarifications as needed. We are excited to submit this proposal to the Uniswap community and look forward to your feedback! Thank you.
uygun olabılır sankı
uygun olabılır sankı
I'd like to introduce a new model for DCRN's rewards.
In the initial model, the initiative for rewards comes from Contributors.
In the new model, Reviewers propose a method to reward Contributors and then execute it with DCRN's approval. DCRN's governance decides if a particular type of contribution should be rewarded and to what extent.
I'd like to introduce a new model for DCRN's rewards.
In the initial model, the initiative for rewards comes from Contributors.
In the new model, Reviewers propose a method to reward Contributors and then execute it with DCRN's approval. DCRN's governance decides if a particular type of contribution should be rewarded and to what extent.
Here's the list of major changes and some reasoning behind them.
The main problem with the application model is that it creates an entry barrier to DCRN: Contributors have to 'invite themselves' to the Network and assess themselves.
A much more viable model, in my opinion, would be the one where Reviewers Network invites Contributors to join DCRN by assigning rewards to them.
The less effort is required from Contributors, the larger and more decentralized the Network can be.
With the new model, Contributors' activity as part of DCRN mostly comes down to voting on important strategic decisions:
With the application model, input Reviewers Network has to assess can get quite heterogeneous. In practice, it would mean that the quality of reviews would suffer.
An alternative approach to application-first is method-first.
This way, Reviewers begin with developing a method to assess a particular type of contribution. And only DCRN's approval of the method unlocks the Reviewers Network's ability to use it.
Abandoning the application model allows for much more flexibility when it comes to different types of contributions.
Instead of combining all contributions into one metric, it occurs to be better to develop various programs with different reward criteria and allocate a set budget for each of them.
In the initial model, DCRN was an open network, and the Reviewers Network was invitational. In the new model, these roles reverse.
Anyone can become a Reviewer now, propose a method, and execute it.
And by doing so, the Reviewer helps to reward Contributors and invites new voting power to the DCRN.
In the initial model, Reviewers were similar to the jury. And the Reviewers Network had the power to assign both the rewards and the voting power.
In the new model, all strategic decisions are made by DCRN.
This means that Reviewers are now functioning more as: a) Recruiters. They provide a method and execute it, bringing new members to the Network. b) Mediators between DCRN and rewarded contributors. DCRN decides which group of contributors to reward, and the Reviewers Network provides the expertise to do it appropriately.
The idea behind monthly voting power resets in the initial model was to mitigate the disproportional weight early network participants would get if DCRN would start from scratch, with a low number of participants.
As there seems to be a way to bootstrap DCRN as a decentralized entity with a higher number of participants from day 1, this mechanic is no longer needed.
In the cumulative voting power model, all the voting power participants get over time sums up. This model still incentivizes continuous participation but doesn't disenfranchise past contributors.
It also makes sense to deviate from the model where the voting power is tied 1:1 with the UNI contributors receive. So that DCRN could assign the UNI reward and the voting power that comes with it separately. This could be handy with grant distributions when the Network wants to reward Contributors with more UNI than voting power.
Another thing DCRN could do is to invite potentially valuable Contributors who are known as good actors by sharing voting power with them. And then to reward these Contributors as they provide the expertise the Network lacks. A good example of this practice would be to invite people from Ethereum Foundation.
When there is no set reward amount, DCRN can decide it by voting, when all the Network participants enter the amount they find appropriate.
A good example of that would be a vote to reward the Reviewers' labor or retroactive rewards in general.
Using median results of this type of vote instead of average results seems more promising.
When we use an average of the numbers suggested, votes for extreme results gain more weight. Using the median allows everyone to vote for the preferred outcome without additional considerations.
The most efficient way of bootstrapping DCRN I can currently think of is through the Uniswap Governance forum. I will expand on it later.
Cheers.
I'd like to introduce a new model for DCRN's rewards.
In the initial model, the initiative for rewards comes from Contributors.
In the new model, Reviewers propose a method to reward Contributors and then execute it with DCRN's approval. DCRN's governance decides if a particular type of contribution should be rewarded and to what extent.
I'd like to introduce a new model for DCRN's rewards.
In the initial model, the initiative for rewards comes from Contributors.
In the new model, Reviewers propose a method to reward Contributors and then execute it with DCRN's approval. DCRN's governance decides if a particular type of contribution should be rewarded and to what extent.
Here's the list of major changes and some reasoning behind them.
The main problem with the application model is that it creates an entry barrier to DCRN: Contributors have to 'invite themselves' to the Network and assess themselves.
A much more viable model, in my opinion, would be the one where Reviewers Network invites Contributors to join DCRN by assigning rewards to them.
The less effort is required from Contributors, the larger and more decentralized the Network can be.
With the new model, Contributors' activity as part of DCRN mostly comes down to voting on important strategic decisions:
With the application model, input Reviewers Network has to assess can get quite heterogeneous. In practice, it would mean that the quality of reviews would suffer.
An alternative approach to application-first is method-first.
This way, Reviewers begin with developing a method to assess a particular type of contribution. And only DCRN's approval of the method unlocks the Reviewers Network's ability to use it.
Abandoning the application model allows for much more flexibility when it comes to different types of contributions.
Instead of combining all contributions into one metric, it occurs to be better to develop various programs with different reward criteria and allocate a set budget for each of them.
In the initial model, DCRN was an open network, and the Reviewers Network was invitational. In the new model, these roles reverse.
Anyone can become a Reviewer now, propose a method, and execute it.
And by doing so, the Reviewer helps to reward Contributors and invites new voting power to the DCRN.
In the initial model, Reviewers were similar to the jury. And the Reviewers Network had the power to assign both the rewards and the voting power.
In the new model, all strategic decisions are made by DCRN.
This means that Reviewers are now functioning more as: a) Recruiters. They provide a method and execute it, bringing new members to the Network. b) Mediators between DCRN and rewarded contributors. DCRN decides which group of contributors to reward, and the Reviewers Network provides the expertise to do it appropriately.
The idea behind monthly voting power resets in the initial model was to mitigate the disproportional weight early network participants would get if DCRN would start from scratch, with a low number of participants.
As there seems to be a way to bootstrap DCRN as a decentralized entity with a higher number of participants from day 1, this mechanic is no longer needed.
In the cumulative voting power model, all the voting power participants get over time sums up. This model still incentivizes continuous participation but doesn't disenfranchise past contributors.
It also makes sense to deviate from the model where the voting power is tied 1:1 with the UNI contributors receive. So that DCRN could assign the UNI reward and the voting power that comes with it separately. This could be handy with grant distributions when the Network wants to reward Contributors with more UNI than voting power.
Another thing DCRN could do is to invite potentially valuable Contributors who are known as good actors by sharing voting power with them. And then to reward these Contributors as they provide the expertise the Network lacks. A good example of this practice would be to invite people from Ethereum Foundation.
When there is no set reward amount, DCRN can decide it by voting, when all the Network participants enter the amount they find appropriate.
A good example of that would be a vote to reward the Reviewers' labor or retroactive rewards in general.
Using median results of this type of vote instead of average results seems more promising.
When we use an average of the numbers suggested, votes for extreme results gain more weight. Using the median allows everyone to vote for the preferred outcome without additional considerations.
The most efficient way of bootstrapping DCRN I can currently think of is through the Uniswap Governance forum. I will expand on it later.
Cheers.
