Uniswap DAO Principles

This onchain vote confirms a set of principles (the Principles) for the Uniswap DAO. The draft Principles were written by Atis (independent delegate) and Erik (Avantgarde Finance). We gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions from many other Uniswap DAO delegates and community members.

On executing the proposal, the Principles will be published onchain using the setText function of ENS Public Resolver contract for the uniswap.eth node.

Uniswap DAO Principles

The delegates agree to recognize the following principles and let them guide their decision-making in Uniswap DAO governance.

Processual Principles

Scope. The purpose of the Uniswap DAO is to govern the Uniswap protocol [1]. This includes protocol parameters adjustments and fund allocation to foster the growth of the Uniswap protocol [2].
Process. The Uniswap DAO follows the governance process [3] as outlined in the Uniswap Docs and on the Uniswap Governance Forum.
Onchain Focus. The operations of the DAO should focus on on-chain assets, and key decisions should be recorded onchain to preserve transparency at both operational and governance levels [4]. This includes maintaining on-chain voting as part of the governance process, as is currently done, and using on-chain transactions to transfer funds.

Conduct-Related Principles

Disclosure. Conflicts of interest should be disclosed clearly on the delegate description page and, whenever relevant, in forum discussions and in the voting rationale. Severe conflicts of interest that could undermine the integrity of governance must be avoided. If a proposal includes specific actions, such as requiring delegates with conflicts of interest to abstain, these directives must be followed. In cases of doubt, delegates should err on the side of transparency and openness [5].
Security. Given the systemic importance of the Uniswap protocol to DeFi and the size of the DAO treasury, delegates must carefully consider security when making decisions. They should follow established processes to securely and effectively deliver products to the ecosystem, and vote against proposals that expose the protocol or treasury to risks. In ambiguous cases, the proposer must demonstrate the proposal is safe. However, delegates are not accountable for failing to anticipate all indirect consequences of a proposal.
Legibility. To maintain the integrity of the governance process, rationales for votes should be published in a manner that is understandable to the broader community. Proposals and their reasoning should be clear to outsiders, even those unfamiliar with the history of DAO votes or without access to side-channel communication between delegates. Concrete data and empirical evidence should be included to back decision-making when available.
Good Faith. Delegates should act with honesty and integrity when participating in governance, and vote in accordance with what they believe is in the best interest of the Uniswap protocol.
Due Care. Delegates should conduct a professional review of each proposal prior to voting, and are advised to abstain from voting when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand a given proposal
Public Feedback. Delegates should inform the community if they consider that a proposal is superficial, light, unclear or unsubstantiated and needs to be improved or deepened before it is submitted to a vote.

Structural Principles

Decentralization. Decision-making in the DAO should remain decentralized in all forms, with the aim of keeping the DAO credibly neutral, censorship-resistant and resilient against capture by any single group of aligned actors, whether internal or external [6]. Delegates must prevent the formation of cartels and ensure that the protocol is protected from any proposals driven by personal motives that do not align with the protocol’s best interests.
Representation. Delegates primarily represent UNI token holders, however, delegates should make a reasonable effort to understand the arguments from all potentially affected stakeholders when making decisions and be respectful of differing viewpoints.
Accountability. Delegates are accountable to the Uniswap community and should show a willingness to communicate with affected stakeholders, remain open to scrutiny, and, where possible, communicate key rationales to maintain trust through transparent decision-making processes. The terms “should” and “must” in the text are expected to be interpreted following the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) guidelines [7].

References

[1] Uniswap Overview: Protocol, Interface, Labs. https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/overview

[2] Introducing UNI. https://blog.uniswap.org/uni#community-treasury

[3] Devin Walsh. Community Governance Process Update [Jan 2023]. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/community-governance-process-update-jan-2023/19976

[4] The Law Commission (United Kingdom). Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs): A Scoping Paper. Section “Common Philosophical Goals of DAOs.” https://cloud-platform-e218f50a4812967ba1215eaecede923f.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/sites/30/2024/07/DAOs-scoping-paper-110724.pdf

[5] [RFC] Delegate Code of Conduct. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-delegate-code-of-conduct/20913

[6] J Austgen, A Fábrega, S Allen, K Babel, M Kelkar, A Juels. DAO Decentralization: Voting-Bloc Entropy, Bribery, and Dark DAOs. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.03530

[7] S. Bradner. Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. RFC 2119, IETF. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2119

Uniswap DAO Principles

On executing the proposal, the Principles will be published onchain using the setText function of ENS Public Resolver contract for the uniswap.eth node.

Uniswap DAO Principles

The delegates agree to recognize the following principles and let them guide their decision-making in Uniswap DAO governance.

Processual Principles

Scope. The purpose of the Uniswap DAO is to govern the Uniswap protocol [1]. This includes protocol parameters adjustments and fund allocation to foster the growth of the Uniswap protocol [2].
Process. The Uniswap DAO follows the governance process [3] as outlined in the Uniswap Docs and on the Uniswap Governance Forum.
Onchain Focus. The operations of the DAO should focus on on-chain assets, and key decisions should be recorded onchain to preserve transparency at both operational and governance levels [4]. This includes maintaining on-chain voting as part of the governance process, as is currently done, and using on-chain transactions to transfer funds.

Conduct-Related Principles

Disclosure. Conflicts of interest should be disclosed clearly on the delegate description page and, whenever relevant, in forum discussions and in the voting rationale. Severe conflicts of interest that could undermine the integrity of governance must be avoided. If a proposal includes specific actions, such as requiring delegates with conflicts of interest to abstain, these directives must be followed. In cases of doubt, delegates should err on the side of transparency and openness [5].
Security. Given the systemic importance of the Uniswap protocol to DeFi and the size of the DAO treasury, delegates must carefully consider security when making decisions. They should follow established processes to securely and effectively deliver products to the ecosystem, and vote against proposals that expose the protocol or treasury to risks. In ambiguous cases, the proposer must demonstrate the proposal is safe. However, delegates are not accountable for failing to anticipate all indirect consequences of a proposal.
Legibility. To maintain the integrity of the governance process, rationales for votes should be published in a manner that is understandable to the broader community. Proposals and their reasoning should be clear to outsiders, even those unfamiliar with the history of DAO votes or without access to side-channel communication between delegates. Concrete data and empirical evidence should be included to back decision-making when available.
Good Faith. Delegates should act with honesty and integrity when participating in governance, and vote in accordance with what they believe is in the best interest of the Uniswap protocol.
Due Care. Delegates should conduct a professional review of each proposal prior to voting, and are advised to abstain from voting when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand a given proposal
Public Feedback. Delegates should inform the community if they consider that a proposal is superficial, light, unclear or unsubstantiated and needs to be improved or deepened before it is submitted to a vote.

Structural Principles

Decentralization. Decision-making in the DAO should remain decentralized in all forms, with the aim of keeping the DAO credibly neutral, censorship-resistant and resilient against capture by any single group of aligned actors, whether internal or external [6]. Delegates must prevent the formation of cartels and ensure that the protocol is protected from any proposals driven by personal motives that do not align with the protocol’s best interests.
Representation. Delegates primarily represent UNI token holders, however, delegates should make a reasonable effort to understand the arguments from all potentially affected stakeholders when making decisions and be respectful of differing viewpoints.
Accountability. Delegates are accountable to the Uniswap community and should show a willingness to communicate with affected stakeholders, remain open to scrutiny, and, where possible, communicate key rationales to maintain trust through transparent decision-making processes. The terms “should” and “must” in the text are expected to be interpreted following the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) guidelines [7].

References

[1] Uniswap Overview: Protocol, Interface, Labs. https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/overview

[2] Introducing UNI. https://blog.uniswap.org/uni#community-treasury

[3] Devin Walsh. Community Governance Process Update [Jan 2023]. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/community-governance-process-update-jan-2023/19976

[5] [RFC] Delegate Code of Conduct. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-delegate-code-of-conduct/20913

[6] J Austgen, A Fábrega, S Allen, K Babel, M Kelkar, A Juels. DAO Decentralization: Voting-Bloc Entropy, Bribery, and Dark DAOs. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.03530

[7] S. Bradner. Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. RFC 2119, IETF. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2119

Uniswap DAO Principles

On executing the proposal, the Principles will be published onchain using the setText function of ENS Public Resolver contract for the uniswap.eth node.

Uniswap DAO Principles

The delegates agree to recognize the following principles and let them guide their decision-making in Uniswap DAO governance.

Processual Principles

Scope. The purpose of the Uniswap DAO is to govern the Uniswap protocol [1]. This includes protocol parameters adjustments and fund allocation to foster the growth of the Uniswap protocol [2].
Process. The Uniswap DAO follows the governance process [3] as outlined in the Uniswap Docs and on the Uniswap Governance Forum.
Onchain Focus. The operations of the DAO should focus on on-chain assets, and key decisions should be recorded onchain to preserve transparency at both operational and governance levels [4]. This includes maintaining on-chain voting as part of the governance process, as is currently done, and using on-chain transactions to transfer funds.

Conduct-Related Principles

Disclosure. Conflicts of interest should be disclosed clearly on the delegate description page and, whenever relevant, in forum discussions and in the voting rationale. Severe conflicts of interest that could undermine the integrity of governance must be avoided. If a proposal includes specific actions, such as requiring delegates with conflicts of interest to abstain, these directives must be followed. In cases of doubt, delegates should err on the side of transparency and openness [5].
Security. Given the systemic importance of the Uniswap protocol to DeFi and the size of the DAO treasury, delegates must carefully consider security when making decisions. They should follow established processes to securely and effectively deliver products to the ecosystem, and vote against proposals that expose the protocol or treasury to risks. In ambiguous cases, the proposer must demonstrate the proposal is safe. However, delegates are not accountable for failing to anticipate all indirect consequences of a proposal.
Legibility. To maintain the integrity of the governance process, rationales for votes should be published in a manner that is understandable to the broader community. Proposals and their reasoning should be clear to outsiders, even those unfamiliar with the history of DAO votes or without access to side-channel communication between delegates. Concrete data and empirical evidence should be included to back decision-making when available.
Good Faith. Delegates should act with honesty and integrity when participating in governance, and vote in accordance with what they believe is in the best interest of the Uniswap protocol.
Due Care. Delegates should conduct a professional review of each proposal prior to voting, and are advised to abstain from voting when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand a given proposal
Public Feedback. Delegates should inform the community if they consider that a proposal is superficial, light, unclear or unsubstantiated and needs to be improved or deepened before it is submitted to a vote.

Structural Principles

Decentralization. Decision-making in the DAO should remain decentralized in all forms, with the aim of keeping the DAO credibly neutral, censorship-resistant and resilient against capture by any single group of aligned actors, whether internal or external [6]. Delegates must prevent the formation of cartels and ensure that the protocol is protected from any proposals driven by personal motives that do not align with the protocol’s best interests.
Representation. Delegates primarily represent UNI token holders, however, delegates should make a reasonable effort to understand the arguments from all potentially affected stakeholders when making decisions and be respectful of differing viewpoints.
Accountability. Delegates are accountable to the Uniswap community and should show a willingness to communicate with affected stakeholders, remain open to scrutiny, and, where possible, communicate key rationales to maintain trust through transparent decision-making processes. The terms “should” and “must” in the text are expected to be interpreted following the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) guidelines [7].

References

[1] Uniswap Overview: Protocol, Interface, Labs. https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/overview

[2] Introducing UNI. https://blog.uniswap.org/uni#community-treasury

[3] Devin Walsh. Community Governance Process Update [Jan 2023]. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/community-governance-process-update-jan-2023/19976

[5] [RFC] Delegate Code of Conduct. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-delegate-code-of-conduct/20913

[6] J Austgen, A Fábrega, S Allen, K Babel, M Kelkar, A Juels. DAO Decentralization: Voting-Bloc Entropy, Bribery, and Dark DAOs. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.03530

[7] S. Bradner. Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. RFC 2119, IETF. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2119

Uniswap DAO Principles

On executing the proposal, the Principles will be published onchain using the setText function of ENS Public Resolver contract for the uniswap.eth node.

Uniswap DAO Principles

The delegates agree to recognize the following principles and let them guide their decision-making in Uniswap DAO governance.

Processual Principles

Scope. The purpose of the Uniswap DAO is to govern the Uniswap protocol [1]. This includes protocol parameters adjustments and fund allocation to foster the growth of the Uniswap protocol [2].
Process. The Uniswap DAO follows the governance process [3] as outlined in the Uniswap Docs and on the Uniswap Governance Forum.
Onchain Focus. The operations of the DAO should focus on on-chain assets, and key decisions should be recorded onchain to preserve transparency at both operational and governance levels [4]. This includes maintaining on-chain voting as part of the governance process, as is currently done, and using on-chain transactions to transfer funds.

Conduct-Related Principles

Disclosure. Conflicts of interest should be disclosed clearly on the delegate description page and, whenever relevant, in forum discussions and in the voting rationale. Severe conflicts of interest that could undermine the integrity of governance must be avoided. If a proposal includes specific actions, such as requiring delegates with conflicts of interest to abstain, these directives must be followed. In cases of doubt, delegates should err on the side of transparency and openness [5].
Security. Given the systemic importance of the Uniswap protocol to DeFi and the size of the DAO treasury, delegates must carefully consider security when making decisions. They should follow established processes to securely and effectively deliver products to the ecosystem, and vote against proposals that expose the protocol or treasury to risks. In ambiguous cases, the proposer must demonstrate the proposal is safe. However, delegates are not accountable for failing to anticipate all indirect consequences of a proposal.
Legibility. To maintain the integrity of the governance process, rationales for votes should be published in a manner that is understandable to the broader community. Proposals and their reasoning should be clear to outsiders, even those unfamiliar with the history of DAO votes or without access to side-channel communication between delegates. Concrete data and empirical evidence should be included to back decision-making when available.
Good Faith. Delegates should act with honesty and integrity when participating in governance, and vote in accordance with what they believe is in the best interest of the Uniswap protocol.
Due Care. Delegates should conduct a professional review of each proposal prior to voting, and are advised to abstain from voting when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand a given proposal
Public Feedback. Delegates should inform the community if they consider that a proposal is superficial, light, unclear or unsubstantiated and needs to be improved or deepened before it is submitted to a vote.

Structural Principles

Decentralization. Decision-making in the DAO should remain decentralized in all forms, with the aim of keeping the DAO credibly neutral, censorship-resistant and resilient against capture by any single group of aligned actors, whether internal or external [6]. Delegates must prevent the formation of cartels and ensure that the protocol is protected from any proposals driven by personal motives that do not align with the protocol’s best interests.
Representation. Delegates primarily represent UNI token holders, however, delegates should make a reasonable effort to understand the arguments from all potentially affected stakeholders when making decisions and be respectful of differing viewpoints.
Accountability. Delegates are accountable to the Uniswap community and should show a willingness to communicate with affected stakeholders, remain open to scrutiny, and, where possible, communicate key rationales to maintain trust through transparent decision-making processes. The terms “should” and “must” in the text are expected to be interpreted following the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) guidelines [7].

References

[1] Uniswap Overview: Protocol, Interface, Labs. https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/overview

[2] Introducing UNI. https://blog.uniswap.org/uni#community-treasury

[3] Devin Walsh. Community Governance Process Update [Jan 2023]. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/community-governance-process-update-jan-2023/19976

[5] [RFC] Delegate Code of Conduct. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-delegate-code-of-conduct/20913

[6] J Austgen, A Fábrega, S Allen, K Babel, M Kelkar, A Juels. DAO Decentralization: Voting-Bloc Entropy, Bribery, and Dark DAOs. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.03530

[7] S. Bradner. Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. RFC 2119, IETF. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2119

Echoing @kfx here, why not just focus on a grant to improve uni.vote and integrate it within Tally. This seems like a more long term sustainable solution.

Also as @Doo_StableLab said, the working group is currently working on a delegate reward (Rebates included) so I suggest waiting for that report too.

Echoing @kfx here, why not just focus on a grant to improve uni.vote and integrate it within Tally. This seems like a more long term sustainable solution.

Also as @Doo_StableLab said, the working group is currently working on a delegate reward (Rebates included) so I suggest waiting for that report too.

Finally, UMA (myself) proposed a similar solution, but it was much cheaper as we didn’t charge the additional service fee of $20k that Tally is charging. Our program also encourages continuous participation, whereas this doesn’t. Saying that, we decided to combine our proposal with Doo’s proposal hence the formation of the working group.

Appreciate the feedback from all! Happy to move forward with this proposal if there is interest now or later from the DAO - please keep in mind this would take about 2 weeks to initially implement. Responding to a few points:

Is there a reason why the signature approach cannot be adopted vs the solution proposed here? - @Userisky

Like uni.vote, Tally's relayer solution actually does use a signature approach.

Can you check your demo link, I got access denied when trying to open it? - @kfx

Here is a fixed demo: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c8C3E7tHV5QsWW1LXT4K-CkblCHKf1tz/view?usp=sharing

could you describe the technical solution you’d be using to enable gasless voting? - @eek637

Our solution would work very similarly to uni.vote, but on Tally. To implement gasless voting, we would use a relayer and signature-based system.

Voters sign their vote offchain using their private key, creating a secure signature that represents their voting choice for a specific proposal. This signed message is then sent to a relayer. The relayer submits the vote to the blockchain on the voter's behalf, covering the gas fees. We can do this in batches to make it cheaper, as well. A smart contract verifies the signature to ensure it’s valid and records the vote.

Echoing @kfx here, why not just focus on a grant to improve uni.vote and integrate it within Tally. This seems like a more long term sustainable solution.

Also as @Doo_StableLab said, the working group is currently working on a delegate reward (Rebates included) so I suggest waiting for that report too.

Echoing @kfx here, why not just focus on a grant to improve uni.vote and integrate it within Tally. This seems like a more long term sustainable solution.

Also as @Doo_StableLab said, the working group is currently working on a delegate reward (Rebates included) so I suggest waiting for that report too.

Is there a reason why the signature approach cannot be adopted vs the solution proposed here? - @Userisky

Like uni.vote, Tally's relayer solution actually does use a signature approach.

Can you check your demo link, I got access denied when trying to open it? - @kfx

Here is a fixed demo: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c8C3E7tHV5QsWW1LXT4K-CkblCHKf1tz/view?usp=sharing

could you describe the technical solution you’d be using to enable gasless voting? - @eek637

Our solution would work very similarly to uni.vote, but on Tally. To implement gasless voting, we would use a relayer and signature-based system.

Gasless voting is already possible with signatures via uniswap vote. It does seem like it is not used much considering the data you provided.

Is there a reason why the signature approach cannot be adopted vs the solution proposed here?

Also, could this be sybiled attacked? I.e. many accounts funded with 10 UNI vote when gas prices are very high with intent to drain funding.

Gasless voting is already possible with signatures via uniswap vote. It does seem like it is not used much considering the data you provided.

Is there a reason why the signature approach cannot be adopted vs the solution proposed here?

Also, could this be sybiled attacked? I.e. many accounts funded with 10 UNI vote when gas prices are very high with intent to drain funding.

It's a cool intitiave but it's actually considered as part of Delegate Reward plan as gas fee affects active voters (who are mostly delegates) the most. And the reward for delegates which will be based on certain metrics will help to cover their gas cost

I want to express my opinion.

After upgrading the Ethereum network and its L2 solutions, gas costs have noticeably decreased.
If someone wants to vote, but cannot afford it, that is what delegation is for. We need to find a delegate who meets your ideals.

hey @coolhorsegirl, thanks for this prop! could you describe the technical solution you'd be using to enable gasless voting?

I would support improving uni.vote, and perhaps integrating it in Tally. It seems a more cost-efficient and sustainable option compared with the budget proposed here.

Can you check your demo link, I got access denied when trying to open it?

I want to express my opinion.

After upgrading the Ethereum network and its L2 solutions, gas costs have noticeably decreased.
If someone wants to vote, but cannot afford it, that is what delegation is for. We need to find a delegate who meets your ideals.

hey @coolhorsegirl, thanks for this prop! could you describe the technical solution you'd be using to enable gasless voting?

I would support improving uni.vote, and perhaps integrating it in Tally. It seems a more cost-efficient and sustainable option compared with the budget proposed here.

Can you check your demo link, I got access denied when trying to open it?