Thanks for engaging @Tane - that seems the most reasonable to do if we need to ratify an updated version. We did discuss using "Uniswap ecosystem" over "protocol" in the principles to address this, but choose not to as there's some regulatory concerns around the use of the ecosystem term. Eventually when these things become clearer, the Principles could also evolve into a constitution.

Thanks for engaging @Tane - that seems the most reasonable to do if we need to ratify an updated version. We did discuss using "Uniswap ecosystem" over "protocol" in the principles to address this, but choose not to as there's some regulatory concerns around the use of the ecosystem term. Eventually when these things become clearer, the Principles could also evolve into a constitution.

What mechanisms are in place to adhere/enforce principles?

I can point to many high-sounding desires (sustainable Dev goals or COP) and the failure to actually implement.

From a design point of view, separating the what and how into aspirational vs codes of conduct allows for a shorter (more easily parseable) list whilst having flexible guidelines which are context specific (eg when delegates are co-opted into adjudication/investtigation panels).

What mechanisms are in place to adhere/enforce principles?

I can point to many high-sounding desires (sustainable Dev goals or COP) and the failure to actually implement.

From a design point of view, separating the what and how into aspirational vs codes of conduct allows for a shorter (more easily parseable) list whilst having flexible guidelines which are context specific (eg when delegates are co-opted into adjudication/investtigation panels).

We support this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:

Blockworks Advisory is voting FOR this proposal.

We have observed similar proposals in other DAOs and believe this initiative will add value to the community. It establishes a code of ethics for delegates, serving as a guiding principle much like a north star aligns delegates with shared objectives. However, we would like to stress the importance of incorporating some form of binding or enforcement mechanism for these principles in the future. Without such measures, their impact may remain limited. That said, introducing enforceable elements would require significant expansion and clearer definition of the framework.

While these principles are intended to occupy a space between a full constitution and a code of conduct, we question the need for this cautious approach. What’s the point of having a set of ethics that delegates can simply choose to opt into? Such an arrangement feels inherently counterintuitive.

While I agree that principles are essential for delegate participation, they cannot and will not be enforceable at the DAO level.

We can establish a code of conduct for the forum (applying to general participants) and define principles for the delegates program (aligned with its incentivization model). However, passing a vote and expecting everyone to uphold these values is unrealistic.

Humans aren’t perfect and can be influenced or corrupted—that’s just the reality. The mantra should remain: Don’t trust, verify — always.

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We unfortunately missed the voting deadline and were unable to cast our vote. Nevertheless, we wanted to comment to still signal our support for putting forward some principles that participants in the DAO are expected to adhere to.

As others have already pointed out, enforcement of such principles might be hard in practice, but in our eyes, it's more of a social agreement that sets some expectations - and that's enough.

We support this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:

Blockworks Advisory is voting FOR this proposal.

We have observed similar proposals in other DAOs and believe this initiative will add value to the community. It establishes a code of ethics for delegates, serving as a guiding principle much like a north star aligns delegates with shared objectives. However, we would like to stress the importance of incorporating some form of binding or enforcement mechanism for these principles in the future. Without such measures, their impact may remain limited. That said, introducing enforceable elements would require significant expansion and clearer definition of the framework.

While these principles are intended to occupy a space between a full constitution and a code of conduct, we question the need for this cautious approach. What’s the point of having a set of ethics that delegates can simply choose to opt into? Such an arrangement feels inherently counterintuitive.

While I agree that principles are essential for delegate participation, they cannot and will not be enforceable at the DAO level.

We can establish a code of conduct for the forum (applying to general participants) and define principles for the delegates program (aligned with its incentivization model). However, passing a vote and expecting everyone to uphold these values is unrealistic.

Humans aren’t perfect and can be influenced or corrupted—that’s just the reality. The mantra should remain: Don’t trust, verify — always.

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We unfortunately missed the voting deadline and were unable to cast our vote. Nevertheless, we wanted to comment to still signal our support for putting forward some principles that participants in the DAO are expected to adhere to.

As others have already pointed out, enforcement of such principles might be hard in practice, but in our eyes, it's more of a social agreement that sets some expectations - and that's enough.

Hello all,

There was a brief pause before moving forward with the Temperature Check vote. This was because we want to use Uniday @ Devcon as an opportunity to discuss the principles in person and address any remaining concerns and feedback. Both Erik and I will be there.

One idea I keep coming back to is whether we can somehow incorporate "responsibility towards Uniswap's reputation and brand" as one of the principles, without placing too much burden on the delegates and while considering that the brand is owned by the Labs, not the DAO. I’d love to hear your thoughts on this, either here or in person @ Devcon.

If that's the case, let's reframe the current proposal as "Policies for DAO Actors" (rather than "Principles") or something along those lines.

With this reframing in mind, there are still aspects that cannot reasonably be expected of all DAO actors—and that's completely fine:

• Representation: DAO actors should not be expected to represent every single entity in the DAO equally. Delegates owe their representation to the tokenholders who delegate to them, not to the entire DAO community.

• On-chain Focus: On-chain activity is foundational to a DAO; any critical actions must originate and be validated on-chain. Beyond that initial involvement, off-chain transparency should hold equal value as on-chain transparency—it’s simply another method of communication. We should avoid signaling for unnecessary bureaucracy.

• Decentralization: I would rework this term to focus on anti-cartelarization. Decentralization is already a foundational assumption in the DAO world.

• Security: We cannot punish potential DAO actors for their participation due to a lack of understanding of third-order effects, as long as their actions are conducted in good faith and with due care.

Thank you very much for your detailed feedback and we respect the discrepancies you raise, which sound very reasonable!

We agree with your suggestion.

Although it could be understood that it is covered in the two points you mention, we understand that it would be appropriate to include it explicitly as this is a very malicious and misaligned behaviour. It could be included in the "Decentralization" point, we have no objection to that.

Hello all,

I will reply to some of the points raised in the comments by @_JoJo @jengajojo @SEEDGov . @justErik will have some of his own comments later.

1. The big picture view.

To clarify, the intention of these principles was to fall somewhere in-between a full constitution and a Code of Conduct (CoC).

A constitution would be binding for all delegates, while the principles are opt-in, and so can be more flexible. I know that there’s some hesitation to formalize a constitution of Uniswap DAO at this point. For one, the regulatory environment is still very unclear.

As for CoC, it typically is a kind of bare minimum. There is an already existing Delegate Code of Conduct, which is an opt-in. Our intention was not to fully replace it. (Although seeing there's quite a bit of overlap, so it can be debated.) Additionally, the governance forum already has some means of flagging and remove spam messages or personal insults. The principles are meant to be something more thought-provoking and specific to the DAO, not just “don’t spam in the forum”, which goes without saying.

2. Specific additions.

I’m of the view that it’s important not to ask too much from the delegates. (We're open to removing points from the proposed list of principles as well, if that wasn't clear!) If we put too many “nice to have” things in there, not only the principles will be harder to understand, remember, and follow. There will be low compliance, which means that any enforcement will be selective at best. I have seen something like that happening in one of my professional affiliations. Selective enforcement (where no-one is fully complying, but only a few are called out for it) is worse than no enforcement.

Proposed additions one by one:

• Delegates should analyse each proposal professionally, without falling into superficial analysis or voting according to majority sentiment, and in this regard should provide constructive feedback to third party proposals, asking questions to resolve unclear or doubtful questions.

  • Would not support, as it’s hard to define what professional analysis means, and not every proposal is within the expertise of every delegate. It’s also not an established practice for every delegate to leave feedback on every third party proposal.

• Delegates should inform the community if they consider that a proposal is superficial, light, unclear or unsubstantiated and needs to be improved or deepened before it is submitted to a vote.

  • Don’t disagree! This could be named something like “Public Feedback” and added to the list.

• Delegates must not become cartelised and must protect the protocol from other delegates who make proposals only for personal gain but which do not serve the protocol.

  • I feel this is already somewhat covered by the “Decentralization” and “Disclosure” principles - maybe you can propose changes in those instead of introducing a new one?

• Delegates should answer questions and queries that may be raised about their own proposals as fully as possible in a clear and reasoned manner, and be prepared to improve, expand or modify them in response to feedback or questions received, without becoming defensive or offensive in response to questions or queries that may arise.

  • This partially overlaps with Representation, Accountability and Legibility principles. Additionally, I think it should not be a requirement that the delegates improve, expand or modify their proposals based on feedback. If a proposal is not satisfactory, the other delegates can simply vote against it. I’d suggest adding something like “should answer questions and queries that may be raised about their own proposals as fully as possible in a clear and reasoned manner” to an existing principle.

• Delegates should always show respect for others, accept opposing views and avoid personal attacks.

  • This is already covered by the existing CoC and seems more like a politeness thing.

• Delegates should commit to continuous learning about the protocol, its developments, and the wider blockchain ecosystem. They should stay up to date on relevant technological, legal, and economic trends that could impact governance decisions.

  • This may be too much to ask especially if we want broad and robust participation in the governance. While it would be great if every delegate was an expert in the protocol and topics surrounding it, it’s important to attract not just the professional delegates, but also aligned actors (like developers, LPs, researchers). The latter may not be full-time delegates, but can still make the governance more robust against malicious proposals.

• Delegates should prioritize the long-term sustainability of the protocol over short-term gains.

  • This was one of the principles that was in the initial list but did not make the final cut. The reason was that it's hard to quantify what long-term focus means. That said, I do like this principle and if there’s more support, I'm open to reintroducing it.

• Delegates should aim to work collaboratively with other delegates, even when disagreeing on specific issues.

  • Don’t agree that this should be a requirement. What if there are two delegates with two different plans? Should the DAO force them to compromise and collaborate? Moreover, what if someone believes another delegate is malicious, and collaborating with them would be bad for the DAO?

Please keep the comments coming!

I generally support having these types of documents to provide clarity for delegates and the community at large. I understand that enforcement is beyond the scope of this post, however, I would like to urge the authors to restrict further developments about enforcement in a way which minimizes admin overhead. Two concrete ways to do this is to divide the enforcement into two categories:

a. Enforcement via the free market for delegation: This should include 'must'/'should' statements which delegates must follow and do not need admins to calculate or debate over if a delegate is abiding by them or not.

b. Enforcement by platform admins: This should include abusive language or imagery and general behaviour which can be constituted as 'spam'. Admins of such communication channels such as telegram, discord, discourse should be given the authority to remove such posts and in sever cases delegates who demonstrate such behaviour.

I'd also advice thinking about consequence such as temporary or permanent bans from communication channels for repeated or sever violations.

Further, the authors can consider the following points:

• Delegates should commit to continuous learning about the protocol, its developments, and the wider blockchain ecosystem. They should stay up to date on relevant technological, legal, and economic trends that could impact governance decisions.
• Delegates should prioritize the long-term sustainability of the protocol over short-term gains.
• Delegates should aim to work collaboratively with other delegates, even when disagreeing on specific issues.

I also support inclusion of these points: