Simple Summary
This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote (Snapshot) will be a weighted voting where each voter may spread voting power across any number of choices to help to assess three blockchain for Forse to analyze.
Motivation
In February 2024, the Uniswap DAO introduced the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, which incentivizes users to participate in current and new deployments of Uniswap on different networks within the L2 space. The initial onboarding packages of this program cost the Uniswap DAO at least $3.5M worth of assets.
We propose that Uniswap DAO engage with Forse, our DAO intelligence and analytics platform, to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth program and assess if the current approach drives real growth.
By assessing the impacts of the Revitalization and Growth Program, the Uniswap DAO will have valuable insights to improve further iterations of the Revitalization and Growth Program or other incentive programs. Armed with this information, Uniswap DAO will be able to understand what was the most relevant user groups, and their acquisition cost, and evaluate if the Revitalization and Growth program effectively modified user behavior and led to increased stickiness of users, and therefore TVL and other top-level protocol metrics.
Recently, StableLab supported the Arbitrum DAO as the Program Manager for the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program, and we delivered a comprehensive analysis of the STIP to the Arbitrium DAO.
With Uniswap allocating over $3.5M worth of assets for the purpose of growing Uniswap’s market share, it is essential to ensure that the DAO analyses and reviews the impact of these incentives on an ongoing basis.
What is Forse?
Forse is a data and intelligence platform built by StableLab helping DAOs analyze the impact of governance decisions in protocol growth, top-line metrics, and governance operations, including its cost and effort structures. StableLab is the leading provider of governance products and solutions for decentralized protocols. We work with various projects, from the ones just starting their journey to decentralization to the most prominent DeFi protocols.
This service provider engagement grants the Uniswap DAO access to the services of the entire StableLab team. Specifically, three StableLab team members will be the primary points of contact.
Team
Christian Ziegler is the Tech Lead at StableLab. Previously, he worked as researcher at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), where he wrote his doctoral thesis on DAOs. In 2018, he co-founded Blockcurators GmbH. Christian has several published scientific articles, including: a Taxonomy of DAOs; scoring methodologies for DAOs; network analysis of DAOS; classification of DAO proposals using LLMs; among others.
Johannes Loewe is the Data Lead at StableLab, where he focuses on all stages of AI and ML development, from experimentation to deployment. Before joining StableLab, he was a Freelance AI & Blockchain Software Engineer. He also has experience with DAOs, being a founding member of PretzelDAO in Munich. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Radboud University in the Netherlands and a Master's degree in Machine Learning from NUI-Galway in Ireland.
Marcos Miranda is the Head of Product at StableLab. With over 5 years of experience in Product Management, with focus on Web3 and Analytics products, he is also experienced in building DeFi protocols, having previously worked for other protocols in the space.
Specification
By analyzing the impact of these incentives, Forse by StableLab hopes to identify the following:
To see Forse in action, explore our interactive dashboard showcasing the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program. This provides a great example of what our output could be for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program.
Budget Request
The proposal requests $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, with 3 months of additional maintenance support and updates to analytics modules utilized in the live dashboard.
Three Blockchains Chosen by the Uniswap DAO
We believe it will be better for Uniswap to better understand the impacts of the Incentive program for protocols that are at least sizable. So the options will compose the top 6 blockchains by TVL.
| Blockchains | TVL |
|---|---|
| Arbitrum | $2.596b |
| Base | $1.35b |
| Blast | $838.46m |
| Scroll | $601.14m |
| Linea | $519.15m |
| Mantle | $440.09m |
| Zksync | $77.19m |
| Sei | $70.62m |
| Manta | $39.74m |
| Moonbeam | $31.45m |
| Polygon zkEVM | $13.2m |
| Taiko | $13.29m |
Next Steps
Launching Snapshot vote to decide the top 3 blockchains as well as regarding whether to proceed with this proposal
Proceed to Onchain Vote if the snapshot vote passes
Simple Summary
This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote (Snapshot) will be a weighted voting where each voter may spread voting power across any number of choices to help to assess three blockchain for Forse to analyze.
Motivation
In February 2024, the Uniswap DAO introduced the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, which incentivizes users to participate in current and new deployments of Uniswap on different networks within the L2 space. The initial onboarding packages of this program cost the Uniswap DAO at least $3.5M worth of assets.
We propose that Uniswap DAO engage with Forse, our DAO intelligence and analytics platform, to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth program and assess if the current approach drives real growth.
By assessing the impacts of the Revitalization and Growth Program, the Uniswap DAO will have valuable insights to improve further iterations of the Revitalization and Growth Program or other incentive programs. Armed with this information, Uniswap DAO will be able to understand what was the most relevant user groups, and their acquisition cost, and evaluate if the Revitalization and Growth program effectively modified user behavior and led to increased stickiness of users, and therefore TVL and other top-level protocol metrics.
Recently, StableLab supported the Arbitrum DAO as the Program Manager for the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program, and we delivered a comprehensive analysis of the STIP to the Arbitrium DAO.
With Uniswap allocating over $3.5M worth of assets for the purpose of growing Uniswap’s market share, it is essential to ensure that the DAO analyses and reviews the impact of these incentives on an ongoing basis.
What is Forse?
Forse is a data and intelligence platform built by StableLab helping DAOs analyze the impact of governance decisions in protocol growth, top-line metrics, and governance operations, including its cost and effort structures. StableLab is the leading provider of governance products and solutions for decentralized protocols. We work with various projects, from the ones just starting their journey to decentralization to the most prominent DeFi protocols.
This service provider engagement grants the Uniswap DAO access to the services of the entire StableLab team. Specifically, three StableLab team members will be the primary points of contact.
Team
Christian Ziegler is the Tech Lead at StableLab. Previously, he worked as researcher at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), where he wrote his doctoral thesis on DAOs. In 2018, he co-founded Blockcurators GmbH. Christian has several published scientific articles, including: a Taxonomy of DAOs; scoring methodologies for DAOs; network analysis of DAOS; classification of DAO proposals using LLMs; among others.
Johannes Loewe is the Data Lead at StableLab, where he focuses on all stages of AI and ML development, from experimentation to deployment. Before joining StableLab, he was a Freelance AI & Blockchain Software Engineer. He also has experience with DAOs, being a founding member of PretzelDAO in Munich. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Radboud University in the Netherlands and a Master's degree in Machine Learning from NUI-Galway in Ireland.
Marcos Miranda is the Head of Product at StableLab. With over 5 years of experience in Product Management, with focus on Web3 and Analytics products, he is also experienced in building DeFi protocols, having previously worked for other protocols in the space.
Specification
By analyzing the impact of these incentives, Forse by StableLab hopes to identify the following:
To see Forse in action, explore our interactive dashboard showcasing the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program. This provides a great example of what our output could be for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program.
Budget Request
The proposal requests $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, with 3 months of additional maintenance support and updates to analytics modules utilized in the live dashboard.
Three Blockchains Chosen by the Uniswap DAO
We believe it will be better for Uniswap to better understand the impacts of the Incentive program for protocols that are at least sizable. So the options will compose the top 6 blockchains by TVL.
| Blockchains | TVL |
|---|---|
| Arbitrum | $2.596b |
| Base | $1.35b |
| Blast | $838.46m |
| Scroll | $601.14m |
| Linea | $519.15m |
| Mantle | $440.09m |
| Zksync | $77.19m |
| Sei | $70.62m |
| Manta | $39.74m |
| Moonbeam | $31.45m |
| Polygon zkEVM | $13.2m |
| Taiko | $13.29m |
Next Steps
Launching Snapshot vote to decide the top 3 blockchains as well as regarding whether to proceed with this proposal
Proceed to Onchain Vote if the snapshot vote passes
While we agree with the proposal's merit, $70K is too large for the analysis being performed. See the forum for more info.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-forse-analytics-for-uniswap-revitalization-and-growth-program/24373/11
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/atiselsts-eth-delegate-platform/22270/10?u=kfx
We voted against our own proposal as in case if the vote doesn't enough support, it will fail by default
While we agree with the proposal's merit, $70K is too large for the analysis being performed. See the forum for more info.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-forse-analytics-for-uniswap-revitalization-and-growth-program/24373/11
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/atiselsts-eth-delegate-platform/22270/10?u=kfx
We voted against our own proposal as in case if the vote doesn't enough support, it will fail by default
Hi @drllau_LexDAO,
Our Data Team produced further analysis specifically regarding point (a):
Hi @drllau_LexDAO,
Our Data Team produced further analysis specifically regarding point (a):
We’ve successfully developed a preliminary predictive model leveraging historical incentive campaign data. Although still limited by the available dataset, early results demonstrate a promising ability to estimate the likelihood of success of individual incentive campaigns. With additional data, we expect the accuracy and usefulness of this predictive capability to improve significantly.
In conclusion, this proof-of-concept highlights clear opportunities to leverage existing incentive data to better inform future decisions for Uniswap’s incentive strategies. Should the DAO find value in exploring this further, we’re open to discussing how we might support the community in enhancing these predictive insights, potentially as part of future analytics engagements.
Regarding (b), as mentioned earlier, you can already review migration trends directly in the newly released terminal on the Forse Platform.
As for (c), our opinion remains the same—while adjusting for macroeconomic factors such as CPI or total crypto market cap is feasible, current data limitations—specially in newer chains—mean these adjustments would likely provide limited insights at this time.
Thanks again for your questions, and let us know if there’s anything else we can clarify!
This doc presents the results of a proof of concept run by Forse to predict the performance of incentivization campaigns on Uniswap pools. Our goal was to identify patterns in the pre-campaign data of liquidity pools that could help predict the effectiveness of launching an incentivization campaign on those pools.
We created a model that predicts the likelihood of success for incentivization campaigns on a per-pool basis, using Machine Learning.
We assess the success of a campaign by measuring the post-campaign TVL compared to pre-campaign: if the TVL growth of an incentivized pool significantly outpaces the TVL growth of the Uniswap protocol, we consider the campaign as successful.
The amount of training data used is very limited, the model would require additional training inputs to guarantee high accuracy and performance. Nevertheless, this proof-of-concept demonstrates that there are opportunities to leverage existing campaign data to increase the success of future UNI campaigns.
Post-campaign TVL split by model predictions
By comparing the pool-by-pool TVL change after the campaign vs before the campaign, we can see that although some top performers are missed, it performs well to anticipate which pools will yield good post-campaign results.
Hi @drllau_LexDAO,
Our Data Team produced further analysis specifically regarding point (a):
Hi @drllau_LexDAO,
Our Data Team produced further analysis specifically regarding point (a):
We’ve successfully developed a preliminary predictive model leveraging historical incentive campaign data. Although still limited by the available dataset, early results demonstrate a promising ability to estimate the likelihood of success of individual incentive campaigns. With additional data, we expect the accuracy and usefulness of this predictive capability to improve significantly.
In conclusion, this proof-of-concept highlights clear opportunities to leverage existing incentive data to better inform future decisions for Uniswap’s incentive strategies. Should the DAO find value in exploring this further, we’re open to discussing how we might support the community in enhancing these predictive insights, potentially as part of future analytics engagements.
Regarding (b), as mentioned earlier, you can already review migration trends directly in the newly released terminal on the Forse Platform.
As for (c), our opinion remains the same—while adjusting for macroeconomic factors such as CPI or total crypto market cap is feasible, current data limitations—specially in newer chains—mean these adjustments would likely provide limited insights at this time.
Thanks again for your questions, and let us know if there’s anything else we can clarify!
This doc presents the results of a proof of concept run by Forse to predict the performance of incentivization campaigns on Uniswap pools. Our goal was to identify patterns in the pre-campaign data of liquidity pools that could help predict the effectiveness of launching an incentivization campaign on those pools.
We created a model that predicts the likelihood of success for incentivization campaigns on a per-pool basis, using Machine Learning.
We assess the success of a campaign by measuring the post-campaign TVL compared to pre-campaign: if the TVL growth of an incentivized pool significantly outpaces the TVL growth of the Uniswap protocol, we consider the campaign as successful.
The amount of training data used is very limited, the model would require additional training inputs to guarantee high accuracy and performance. Nevertheless, this proof-of-concept demonstrates that there are opportunities to leverage existing campaign data to increase the success of future UNI campaigns.
Post-campaign TVL split by model predictions
By comparing the pool-by-pool TVL change after the campaign vs before the campaign, we can see that although some top performers are missed, it performs well to anticipate which pools will yield good post-campaign results.
Yesterday, we shared our initial analysis of Uniswap’s incentive program on Base, diving into how it impacted liquidity, volume, and long-term LP retention. The discussion brought valuable feedback from the community, and we’re already exploring ways to integrate it into our ongoing analysis.
Yesterday, we shared our initial analysis of Uniswap’s incentive program on Base, diving into how it impacted liquidity, volume, and long-term LP retention. The discussion brought valuable feedback from the community, and we’re already exploring ways to integrate it into our ongoing analysis.
During the campaign period, incentivized pools on Base saw an average daily TVL increase of $6M+, demonstrating a strong initial response.
| Pool name | Change in avg daily volume 90 days after the campaign |
|---|---|
| WETH/USDC 0.05% | -31% |
| USDC/USDT 0.01% | -39% |
| WETH/USDT 0.05% | -83% |
| cbETH/WETH 0.05% | -83% |
However, once incentives ended, most pools experienced a sharp LP exodus. The data suggests that post-incentive volume sustainability is critical for LP retention, with pools that maintained strong volume (e.g., WETH/USDC) keeping more LPs engaged.
We analyzed how much TVL growth was generated per UNI spent:
| Total UNI spent per day | 692 |
|---|---|
| Average UNI price over the incentives period | $9.20 |
| Average daily TVL increase per UNI spent | $8,718 |
| Average daily TVL increase per USD spent | $948 |
| Average daily TVL increase attributed to incentives | $ 6,032,729 |
One key takeaway from our extended analysis is how incentives influenced Uniswap’s overall volume share within the Base ecosystem.
This suggests that while incentives temporarily boost trading activity, they also contribute to some residual stickiness in Uniswap’s volume share.
One of the main concerns was whether LPs simply moved to Uniswap’s biggest competitor on Base, Aerodrome. The data suggests a more nuanced picture:
This suggests that user attrition is not just about LPs chasing better incentives elsewhere—there are underlying factors affecting retention that need deeper exploration.
We received great feedback during the presentation, including:
We’re refining our analysis and want to ensure it delivers the most relevant insights for the Uniswap community.
We’ve moved further with the analysis, focusing on evaluating key dimensions like TVL growth, activity volume, user retention, and LP behavior across the four target chains (Arbitrum, Base, Scroll, and Blast). This includes working on a comparative analysis of incentivized versus non-incentivized pools and behavioral insights to understand how LPs respond to incentives.
We’ve started the wireframing process for the terminal. Leveraging our experience, we are designing a Terminal focusing on usability and clarity.
We are simultaneously ensuring we have access to relevant data on all chains and prototyping the analysis on one chain to be transferred to other chains later.
In anticipation of our presentation to the Uniswap community in the next month, we are gathering and ordering information into viewable slides. We are hoping to gather valuable feedback from everyone involved. We invite you to join us on the 11.02.2025 for the community call.
To make sure the analysis meets Uniswap’s needs, we’d appreciate your thoughts on the following:
The dashboard itself will be ready by the end of Q1 of 2025, but we are happy to share a quick update on the progress we’ve made since the approval of our proposal to analyze the Revitalization and Growth Program. We’ve been working hard to set the stage for impactful analysis, and we’re grateful for the opportunity to contribute to Uniswap’s ecosystem.
The dashboard itself will be ready by the end of Q1 of 2025, but we are happy to share a quick update on the progress we’ve made since the approval of our proposal to analyze the Revitalization and Growth Program. We’ve been working hard to set the stage for impactful analysis, and we’re grateful for the opportunity to contribute to Uniswap’s ecosystem.
We’re committed to delivering an analysis that helps the Uniswap evaluate the program’s impact and drive better decisions for future initiatives. We will continue to publish bi-weekly updates of our progress in this thread.
Hi @drllau_LexDAO,
Thank you for your comment!
Hi @drllau_LexDAO,
Thank you for your comment!
a) We can use all the data we have to build a predictive model that estimates the likelihood of success of an incentive program on any given pool. However, we want to clarify that our current scope does not include this, especially not for UniChain. We can consider expanding to include UniChain and wider scopes in the future if the DAO provides such direction for Forse.
b) We can estimate which defectors leave the chain or the protocol by looking at bridging activity and balances. We can already see the trends between protocol and chain exodus post-campaign from competitor comparisons that we showed in the presentation. DAO members will soon be able to interact with the dashboard to examine these trends.
c) This is something we can do; adjusting values for CPI and/or total crypto market cap can provide additional insights. However, all chains apart from Arbitrum are very young, and most pools there are less than 1 year old, so the insights gained from such adjustments might be limited.
As presented in the last Uniswap Community Call, we are sharing below insights on the performance and on what happened post-incentives analysis of Uniswap’s incentive program across Arbitrum, Base, Scroll, and Blast.
Analyzing incremental TVL per USD spent, we found that pools with low impermanent loss consistently delivered the best ROI during the campaign.
As presented in the last Uniswap Community Call, we are sharing below insights on the performance and on what happened post-incentives analysis of Uniswap’s incentive program across Arbitrum, Base, Scroll, and Blast.
Analyzing incremental TVL per USD spent, we found that pools with low impermanent loss consistently delivered the best ROI during the campaign.
Our analysis comparing TVL gains vs. volume gains per USD spent reveals distinct patterns among pool types.
Adjusting for market conditions, we analyzed how TVL evolved after incentives ended across scoped chains.
Main insights:
If we split the incentivized pools between Stable (e.g. USDC/USDT), Pseudo-stable (e.g. wstETH/ETH) and Volatile (e.g. USDC/WETH), we notice that the only sticky TVL is on volatile pools. The additional TVL gained by incentivizing safer pools is the one with the most short-lived post campaign impact.
Main insights:
cbETH/ETH 0.05% in favor of cbETH/ETH 0.01% and WETH/USDT 0.05%We notice the same trends than Arbitrum with regards to the post-campaign impacts split by pool type.
Both Scroll and Blast faced challenges in sustaining TVL post-campaign, with declines influenced by broader market dynamics.
We’re excited to announce that the Uniswap Impact Terminal is almost ready. Development is wrapping up, and we’ll be launching the interactive data terminal next week. This will provide the community with deep insights into the impact of analyzed incentives.
We want to ensure our analysis provides the most valuable insights to the Uniswap community. Drop your feedback below—we’d love to refine our work based on community insights! 🚀
Yesterday, we shared our initial analysis of Uniswap’s incentive program on Base, diving into how it impacted liquidity, volume, and long-term LP retention. The discussion brought valuable feedback from the community, and we’re already exploring ways to integrate it into our ongoing analysis.
Yesterday, we shared our initial analysis of Uniswap’s incentive program on Base, diving into how it impacted liquidity, volume, and long-term LP retention. The discussion brought valuable feedback from the community, and we’re already exploring ways to integrate it into our ongoing analysis.
During the campaign period, incentivized pools on Base saw an average daily TVL increase of $6M+, demonstrating a strong initial response.
| Pool name | Change in avg daily volume 90 days after the campaign |
|---|---|
| WETH/USDC 0.05% | -31% |
| USDC/USDT 0.01% | -39% |
| WETH/USDT 0.05% | -83% |
| cbETH/WETH 0.05% | -83% |
However, once incentives ended, most pools experienced a sharp LP exodus. The data suggests that post-incentive volume sustainability is critical for LP retention, with pools that maintained strong volume (e.g., WETH/USDC) keeping more LPs engaged.
We analyzed how much TVL growth was generated per UNI spent:
| Total UNI spent per day | 692 |
|---|---|
| Average UNI price over the incentives period | $9.20 |
| Average daily TVL increase per UNI spent | $8,718 |
| Average daily TVL increase per USD spent | $948 |
| Average daily TVL increase attributed to incentives | $ 6,032,729 |
One key takeaway from our extended analysis is how incentives influenced Uniswap’s overall volume share within the Base ecosystem.
This suggests that while incentives temporarily boost trading activity, they also contribute to some residual stickiness in Uniswap’s volume share.
One of the main concerns was whether LPs simply moved to Uniswap’s biggest competitor on Base, Aerodrome. The data suggests a more nuanced picture:
This suggests that user attrition is not just about LPs chasing better incentives elsewhere—there are underlying factors affecting retention that need deeper exploration.
We received great feedback during the presentation, including:
We’re refining our analysis and want to ensure it delivers the most relevant insights for the Uniswap community.
We’ve moved further with the analysis, focusing on evaluating key dimensions like TVL growth, activity volume, user retention, and LP behavior across the four target chains (Arbitrum, Base, Scroll, and Blast). This includes working on a comparative analysis of incentivized versus non-incentivized pools and behavioral insights to understand how LPs respond to incentives.
We’ve started the wireframing process for the terminal. Leveraging our experience, we are designing a Terminal focusing on usability and clarity.
We are simultaneously ensuring we have access to relevant data on all chains and prototyping the analysis on one chain to be transferred to other chains later.
In anticipation of our presentation to the Uniswap community in the next month, we are gathering and ordering information into viewable slides. We are hoping to gather valuable feedback from everyone involved. We invite you to join us on the 11.02.2025 for the community call.
To make sure the analysis meets Uniswap’s needs, we’d appreciate your thoughts on the following:
The dashboard itself will be ready by the end of Q1 of 2025, but we are happy to share a quick update on the progress we’ve made since the approval of our proposal to analyze the Revitalization and Growth Program. We’ve been working hard to set the stage for impactful analysis, and we’re grateful for the opportunity to contribute to Uniswap’s ecosystem.
The dashboard itself will be ready by the end of Q1 of 2025, but we are happy to share a quick update on the progress we’ve made since the approval of our proposal to analyze the Revitalization and Growth Program. We’ve been working hard to set the stage for impactful analysis, and we’re grateful for the opportunity to contribute to Uniswap’s ecosystem.
We’re committed to delivering an analysis that helps the Uniswap evaluate the program’s impact and drive better decisions for future initiatives. We will continue to publish bi-weekly updates of our progress in this thread.
Hi @drllau_LexDAO,
Thank you for your comment!
Hi @drllau_LexDAO,
Thank you for your comment!
a) We can use all the data we have to build a predictive model that estimates the likelihood of success of an incentive program on any given pool. However, we want to clarify that our current scope does not include this, especially not for UniChain. We can consider expanding to include UniChain and wider scopes in the future if the DAO provides such direction for Forse.
b) We can estimate which defectors leave the chain or the protocol by looking at bridging activity and balances. We can already see the trends between protocol and chain exodus post-campaign from competitor comparisons that we showed in the presentation. DAO members will soon be able to interact with the dashboard to examine these trends.
c) This is something we can do; adjusting values for CPI and/or total crypto market cap can provide additional insights. However, all chains apart from Arbitrum are very young, and most pools there are less than 1 year old, so the insights gained from such adjustments might be limited.
As presented in the last Uniswap Community Call, we are sharing below insights on the performance and on what happened post-incentives analysis of Uniswap’s incentive program across Arbitrum, Base, Scroll, and Blast.
Analyzing incremental TVL per USD spent, we found that pools with low impermanent loss consistently delivered the best ROI during the campaign.
As presented in the last Uniswap Community Call, we are sharing below insights on the performance and on what happened post-incentives analysis of Uniswap’s incentive program across Arbitrum, Base, Scroll, and Blast.
Analyzing incremental TVL per USD spent, we found that pools with low impermanent loss consistently delivered the best ROI during the campaign.
Our analysis comparing TVL gains vs. volume gains per USD spent reveals distinct patterns among pool types.
Adjusting for market conditions, we analyzed how TVL evolved after incentives ended across scoped chains.
Main insights:
If we split the incentivized pools between Stable (e.g. USDC/USDT), Pseudo-stable (e.g. wstETH/ETH) and Volatile (e.g. USDC/WETH), we notice that the only sticky TVL is on volatile pools. The additional TVL gained by incentivizing safer pools is the one with the most short-lived post campaign impact.
Main insights:
cbETH/ETH 0.05% in favor of cbETH/ETH 0.01% and WETH/USDT 0.05%We notice the same trends than Arbitrum with regards to the post-campaign impacts split by pool type.
Both Scroll and Blast faced challenges in sustaining TVL post-campaign, with declines influenced by broader market dynamics.
We’re excited to announce that the Uniswap Impact Terminal is almost ready. Development is wrapping up, and we’ll be launching the interactive data terminal next week. This will provide the community with deep insights into the impact of analyzed incentives.
We want to ensure our analysis provides the most valuable insights to the Uniswap community. Drop your feedback below—we’d love to refine our work based on community insights! 🚀
Congrats on delivering the results and updating the DAO (I wish more of the UF grantees were as diligent) ...
Given your extensive analytics, are you a) able to predict the uptake of UniChain, or at least identify early if incentive is likely to fail and terminate operations on that pool; b) postulate metrics or indicators that detect migration away from existing chains rather than new pools (eg use of bridges or intermediate wallets of yield farmers) c) using data to adjust for inflation, eg constant 2020 dollars (or other fiat) to figure out how AMMs respond to macro supply/demand shocks
Congrats on delivering the results and updating the DAO (I wish more of the UF grantees were as diligent) ...
Given your extensive analytics, are you a) able to predict the uptake of UniChain, or at least identify early if incentive is likely to fail and terminate operations on that pool; b) postulate metrics or indicators that detect migration away from existing chains rather than new pools (eg use of bridges or intermediate wallets of yield farmers) c) using data to adjust for inflation, eg constant 2020 dollars (or other fiat) to figure out how AMMs respond to macro supply/demand shocks
Even better. UNI holders should not payout on this proposal. Is there another vote? Who decides this?
This is wandering into MuskRat territory. Assuming a contract was formed (paperwork?) then performance is required on both sides
Even better. UNI holders should not payout on this proposal. Is there another vote? Who decides this?
This is wandering into MuskRat territory. Assuming a contract was formed (paperwork?) then performance is required on both sides
These are all basic project contract management ... the delegates can play a key role in whistle-blowing (in which case can incentivise by give a portion of clawback).
We've centuries of experience to codify into smart contracts ...
... unless you get the supreme court to grant absolute immunity for lawlessness.
We are aiming to share it by Q1 of 2025
Oh, I didnt realize it was stated in the onchain vote that the deilverable would be 5-6 months later... (it wasnt). But rather on the forum here after several months of silence.
Oh, I didnt realize it was stated in the onchain vote that the deilverable would be 5-6 months later... (it wasnt). But rather on the forum here after several months of silence.
Even better. UNI holders should not payout on this proposal. Is there another vote? Who decides this?
Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can’t the same queries be used afterward?
Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can’t the same queries be used afterward?
Data collection and analysis teams have been funded by the Uniswap Foundation in the past without much success. Many of those tools either do not work or the sites are no longer active. Why will this be different?
I would like to reiterate my earlier concerns before this proposal was passed. It has now been over five months since Forse Analytics received $60k UNI from the DAO, yet the data provided so far has been very limited—information that could have easily been obtained through Dune for free. Additionally, these slow check-ins seem to be more of an attempt to delay progress rather than provide meaningful updates.
Uniswap holders did not fund Forse Analytics to "expand their data team," "improve their platform," or "reform the scope of analysis." They paid for a quick turnaround of data to enable informed decision-making moving forward.
At what point do these types of passed proposals lead to a clawback of funds? We already know the incentive program has failed, as reflected by its retention rate and the competition from other protocols (e.g., Aerodrome, Fluid, etc.). By the time we receive the full dashboard of data across ALL chains, the information will be irrelevant since we will already have the data we need.
Gm, gm! :sparkles:
The results are in for the [Updated] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Uniswap stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1475
https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/governance/glossary
To establish such rules, it would need consensus from the DAO as a whole.
Gm, gm! :sparkles:
The results are in for the Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Uniswap stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1387
It is fortunate that this proposal did not pass. A few changes should be made to governance and delegate responsibilities:
A code of conduct should be established for delegates in the delegate program. This will help reduce conflicts of interest and ensure adherence to the votes cast during temperature checks.
@Doo_StableLab abstained during the temperature check and should have also abstained during the on-chain vote, as this proposal directly benefits @Doo_StableLab .
Quorum needs to be raised. This vote was much too close for not following due process, and the number of abstentions rather than outright rejections is concerning.
An open call for service provider proposals. i.e. payment proposals related to providing data for the success of the L2 incentive program.
Rules should be established to prevent service providers from applying for committee positions. Uniswap DAO is already facing conflict of interest issues in this regard.
Even better. UNI holders should not payout on this proposal. Is there another vote? Who decides this?
This is wandering into MuskRat territory. Assuming a contract was formed (paperwork?) then performance is required on both sides
Even better. UNI holders should not payout on this proposal. Is there another vote? Who decides this?
This is wandering into MuskRat territory. Assuming a contract was formed (paperwork?) then performance is required on both sides
These are all basic project contract management ... the delegates can play a key role in whistle-blowing (in which case can incentivise by give a portion of clawback).
We've centuries of experience to codify into smart contracts ...
... unless you get the supreme court to grant absolute immunity for lawlessness.
We are aiming to share it by Q1 of 2025
Oh, I didnt realize it was stated in the onchain vote that the deilverable would be 5-6 months later... (it wasnt). But rather on the forum here after several months of silence.
Oh, I didnt realize it was stated in the onchain vote that the deilverable would be 5-6 months later... (it wasnt). But rather on the forum here after several months of silence.
Even better. UNI holders should not payout on this proposal. Is there another vote? Who decides this?
Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can’t the same queries be used afterward?
Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can’t the same queries be used afterward?
Data collection and analysis teams have been funded by the Uniswap Foundation in the past without much success. Many of those tools either do not work or the sites are no longer active. Why will this be different?
I would like to reiterate my earlier concerns before this proposal was passed. It has now been over five months since Forse Analytics received $60k UNI from the DAO, yet the data provided so far has been very limited—information that could have easily been obtained through Dune for free. Additionally, these slow check-ins seem to be more of an attempt to delay progress rather than provide meaningful updates.
Uniswap holders did not fund Forse Analytics to "expand their data team," "improve their platform," or "reform the scope of analysis." They paid for a quick turnaround of data to enable informed decision-making moving forward.
At what point do these types of passed proposals lead to a clawback of funds? We already know the incentive program has failed, as reflected by its retention rate and the competition from other protocols (e.g., Aerodrome, Fluid, etc.). By the time we receive the full dashboard of data across ALL chains, the information will be irrelevant since we will already have the data we need.
Gm, gm! :sparkles:
The results are in for the [Updated] Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Uniswap stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1475
https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/governance/glossary
To establish such rules, it would need consensus from the DAO as a whole.
Gm, gm! :sparkles:
The results are in for the Forse Analytics for Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program on-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Uniswap stats: https://dhive.io/proposal/1387
It is fortunate that this proposal did not pass. A few changes should be made to governance and delegate responsibilities:
A code of conduct should be established for delegates in the delegate program. This will help reduce conflicts of interest and ensure adherence to the votes cast during temperature checks.
@Doo_StableLab abstained during the temperature check and should have also abstained during the on-chain vote, as this proposal directly benefits @Doo_StableLab .
Quorum needs to be raised. This vote was much too close for not following due process, and the number of abstentions rather than outright rejections is concerning.
An open call for service provider proposals. i.e. payment proposals related to providing data for the success of the L2 incentive program.
Rules should be established to prevent service providers from applying for committee positions. Uniswap DAO is already facing conflict of interest issues in this regard.
https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/governance/glossary
To establish such rules, it would need consensus from the DAO as a whole.
Established rules should have been contingent on the delegate reward program proposal being passed. It seemed to be rushed after the protocol fee switch proposal was floated. There is now very little oversight to how delegates are operating between DAO's and within proposals themselves, as seen here.
It is fortunate that this proposal did not pass. A few changes should be made to governance and delegate responsibilities:
A code of conduct should be established for delegates in the delegate program. This will help reduce conflicts of interest and ensure adherence to the votes cast during temperature checks.
@Doo_StableLab abstained during the temperature check and should have also abstained during the on-chain vote, as this proposal directly benefits @Doo_StableLab .
Quorum needs to be raised. This vote was much too close for not following due process, and the number of abstentions rather than outright rejections is concerning.
An open call for service provider proposals. i.e. payment proposals related to providing data for the success of the L2 incentive program.
Rules should be established to prevent service providers from applying for committee positions. Uniswap DAO is already facing conflict of interest issues in this regard.
Service provider voted against at temp check:
Service Provider voted for onchain:
Thank you for the response. I interpret the Gauntlet data differently, as they proposed encompassing deliverables as part of an experiment. For example, they suggested conducting a thorough report on whether UNI incentives are successful for specific pools.
I view this proposal as something between what the Uniswap Foundation would fund as a grant to a data analytics startup and a separate analysis proposal needed for this L2 incentive work. The structure of this proposal seems to be: "A door was opened with the L2 incentives proposal, but now we want money for a preliminary analysis using our analytics service to determine the success or failure of this program."
Thank you for the response. I interpret the Gauntlet data differently, as they proposed encompassing deliverables as part of an experiment. For example, they suggested conducting a thorough report on whether UNI incentives are successful for specific pools.
I view this proposal as something between what the Uniswap Foundation would fund as a grant to a data analytics startup and a separate analysis proposal needed for this L2 incentive work. The structure of this proposal seems to be: "A door was opened with the L2 incentives proposal, but now we want money for a preliminary analysis using our analytics service to determine the success or failure of this program."
The initial proposal should have included a requirement for those providing the data to conduct an "end-of-program" analysis of its success. It doesn't seem right for a proposal to pass only for the UNI DAO to then become hooked on an introductory offer to an analytics program.
Regarding delegate alignment, this is a genuine risk for the future, especially as delegates become more social with each other at events, workshops, proposal discussions, and collaborations. I'm not saying this is happening now, but for some proposals, I see a lot of likes from delegates who do not engage in the proposal discussions.
Why can't this data be analyzed using Dune Analytics?
Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can't the same queries be used afterward?
Why can't this data be analyzed using Dune Analytics?
Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can't the same queries be used afterward?
Data collection and analysis teams have been funded by the Uniswap Foundation in the past without much success. Many of those tools either do not work or the sites are no longer active. Why will this be different?
I am concerned about the direction where large delegates support other delegate projects to avoid upsetting potential votes on their own projects in the future. Uniswap holders need to be very careful about delegate collusion and self-dealing on projects they are affiliated with. While I’m not saying this is happening here, I am seeing very little critical feedback on many other proposals and programs. As more programs are rolled out, it can be very easy to lose track of where the money is going and how it is being spent.
https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/governance/glossary
To establish such rules, it would need consensus from the DAO as a whole.
Established rules should have been contingent on the delegate reward program proposal being passed. It seemed to be rushed after the protocol fee switch proposal was floated. There is now very little oversight to how delegates are operating between DAO's and within proposals themselves, as seen here.
It is fortunate that this proposal did not pass. A few changes should be made to governance and delegate responsibilities:
A code of conduct should be established for delegates in the delegate program. This will help reduce conflicts of interest and ensure adherence to the votes cast during temperature checks.
@Doo_StableLab abstained during the temperature check and should have also abstained during the on-chain vote, as this proposal directly benefits @Doo_StableLab .
Quorum needs to be raised. This vote was much too close for not following due process, and the number of abstentions rather than outright rejections is concerning.
An open call for service provider proposals. i.e. payment proposals related to providing data for the success of the L2 incentive program.
Rules should be established to prevent service providers from applying for committee positions. Uniswap DAO is already facing conflict of interest issues in this regard.
Service provider voted against at temp check:
Service Provider voted for onchain:
Thank you for the response. I interpret the Gauntlet data differently, as they proposed encompassing deliverables as part of an experiment. For example, they suggested conducting a thorough report on whether UNI incentives are successful for specific pools.
I view this proposal as something between what the Uniswap Foundation would fund as a grant to a data analytics startup and a separate analysis proposal needed for this L2 incentive work. The structure of this proposal seems to be: "A door was opened with the L2 incentives proposal, but now we want money for a preliminary analysis using our analytics service to determine the success or failure of this program."
Thank you for the response. I interpret the Gauntlet data differently, as they proposed encompassing deliverables as part of an experiment. For example, they suggested conducting a thorough report on whether UNI incentives are successful for specific pools.
I view this proposal as something between what the Uniswap Foundation would fund as a grant to a data analytics startup and a separate analysis proposal needed for this L2 incentive work. The structure of this proposal seems to be: "A door was opened with the L2 incentives proposal, but now we want money for a preliminary analysis using our analytics service to determine the success or failure of this program."
The initial proposal should have included a requirement for those providing the data to conduct an "end-of-program" analysis of its success. It doesn't seem right for a proposal to pass only for the UNI DAO to then become hooked on an introductory offer to an analytics program.
Regarding delegate alignment, this is a genuine risk for the future, especially as delegates become more social with each other at events, workshops, proposal discussions, and collaborations. I'm not saying this is happening now, but for some proposals, I see a lot of likes from delegates who do not engage in the proposal discussions.
Why can't this data be analyzed using Dune Analytics?
Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can't the same queries be used afterward?
Why can't this data be analyzed using Dune Analytics?
Why are Uniswap holders spending $70k for this very limited query? Pre-incentive data for all targeted chains was provided before the incentive proposal was accepted. Why can't the same queries be used afterward?
Data collection and analysis teams have been funded by the Uniswap Foundation in the past without much success. Many of those tools either do not work or the sites are no longer active. Why will this be different?
I am concerned about the direction where large delegates support other delegate projects to avoid upsetting potential votes on their own projects in the future. Uniswap holders need to be very careful about delegate collusion and self-dealing on projects they are affiliated with. While I’m not saying this is happening here, I am seeing very little critical feedback on many other proposals and programs. As more programs are rolled out, it can be very easy to lose track of where the money is going and how it is being spent.
We can use all the data we have to build a predictive model that estimates the likelihood of success of an incentive program on any given pool. However, we want to clarify that our current scope does not include this, especially not for UniChain. We can consider expanding to include UniChain and wider scopes in the future if the DAO provides such direction for Forse.
We can use all the data we have to build a predictive model that estimates the likelihood of success of an incentive program on any given pool. However, we want to clarify that our current scope does not include this, especially not for UniChain. We can consider expanding to include UniChain and wider scopes in the future if the DAO provides such direction for Forse.
Our understanding is that @Gauntlet has already designed incentive campaigns that are currently approved for Uniswap v4 (including Unichain) based on a similar analysis. Instead, we see a potential expansion of Forse's work within this scope if additional multi-million dollar incentives are to be deployed to other chains.
We can use all the data we have to build a predictive model that estimates the likelihood of success of an incentive program on any given pool. However, we want to clarify that our current scope does not include this, especially not for UniChain. We can consider expanding to include UniChain and wider scopes in the future if the DAO provides such direction for Forse.
We can use all the data we have to build a predictive model that estimates the likelihood of success of an incentive program on any given pool. However, we want to clarify that our current scope does not include this, especially not for UniChain. We can consider expanding to include UniChain and wider scopes in the future if the DAO provides such direction for Forse.
Our understanding is that @Gauntlet has already designed incentive campaigns that are currently approved for Uniswap v4 (including Unichain) based on a similar analysis. Instead, we see a potential expansion of Forse's work within this scope if additional multi-million dollar incentives are to be deployed to other chains.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The previous proposal, which we had voted in favor of, didn’t pass because it failed to meet quorum. The new proposal also incorporates feedback from delegates which makes us even more comfortable voting for the proposal than before.
It was an issue with Agora, the team updated it now to show the correct outcome: https://vote.uniswapfoundation.org/proposals/71
We are aiming to share it by Q1 of 2025
What's the status here?
The truth is on-chain.
https://etherscan.io/address/0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3#readProxyContract
From the governance contract source code, state 3 means "Defeated":
Simple Summary
Simple Summary
This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote was passed in early August of this year, and for a month, we have discussed with various Uniswap DAO participants to incorporate their feedback. The onchain vote however didn’t hit the quorum by less than a million UNI. Therefore, we have incorporated further feedback received and will retry the onchain vote.
Feedback Incorporated
1. Accountability and Completion Based
The budget once the onchain vote passes will first go to the Uniswap Accountability Committee. Once the Committee confirms that the work has been completed, StableLab can claim the budget.
2. Budget and Scope
Initially, the RFC requested $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO; this was expanded to 4 blockchains for offchain vote following the feedback. Following the feedback, the Analytics will cover 4 blockchains but at a reduced cost of $60,000, effectively reducing the cost by $10,000 and also increasing the number of blockchains covered compared to the original RFC.
3. Preventing Redundancy
There have been questions that the work on Arbitrum especially might overlap with Gauntlet’s research on incentive programs on Arbitrum. We are in talks with the Gauntlet team and will also ensure the focus of the work doesn’t overlap with Gauntlet’s domains.
Motivation
In February 2024, the Uniswap DAO introduced the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, which incentivizes users to participate in current and new deployments of Uniswap on different networks within the L2 space. The initial onboarding packages of this program cost the Uniswap DAO at least $3.5M worth of assets.
We propose that Uniswap DAO engage with Forse, our DAO intelligence and analytics platform, to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth program and assess if the current approach drives real growth.
By assessing the impacts of the Revitalization and Growth Program, the Uniswap DAO will have valuable insights to improve further iterations of the program and/or other incentive programs. With this information, Uniswap DAO will be able to understand who are the most relevant user groups, their acquisition cost, and evaluate if the program itself was effective in influencing user behavior leading to increased stickiness of users, and therefore TVL and other top-level protocol metrics.
Recently, StableLab supported the Arbitrum DAO as the Program Manager for the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program, and we delivered a comprehensive analysis of the STIP to the Arbitrium DAO.
With Uniswap allocating over $3.5M worth of assets for the purpose of growing Uniswap’s market share, it is essential to ensure that the DAO analyses and reviews the impact of these incentives on an ongoing basis.
What is Forse?
Forse is a data and intelligence platform built by StableLab helping DAOs analyze the impact of governance decisions in protocol growth, top-line metrics, and governance operations, including its cost and effort structures. StableLab is the leading provider of governance products and solutions for decentralized protocols. We work with various projects, from the ones just starting their journey to decentralization to the most prominent DeFi protocols.
We are currently working with:
Figure: Example of Onchain Impact Analaysis - Arb STIP Analysis
Figure: Example of User Segmentation Analysis - Arb STIP Analysis
This service provider engagement grants the Uniswap DAO access to the services of the entire StableLab team. Specifically, three StableLab team members will be the primary points of contact.
Team
Christian Ziegler is the CTO at StableLab. Previously, he worked as a researcher at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), where he wrote his doctoral thesis on DAOs. In 2018, he co-founded Blockcurators GmbH. Christian has several published scientific articles, including a Taxonomy of DAOs; scoring methodologies for DAOs; network analysis of DAOS; and classification of DAO proposals using LLMs; among others.
Johannes Loewe is the Data Lead at StableLab, where he focuses on all stages of AI and ML development, from experimentation to deployment. Before joining StableLab, he was a Freelance AI & Blockchain Software Engineer. He also has experience with DAOs, being a founding member of PretzelDAO in Munich. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Radboud University in the Netherlands and a Master's degree in Machine Learning from NUI-Galway in Ireland.
Marcos Miranda is the Head of Product at StableLab. With over 5 years of experience in Product Management, focusing on Web3 and Analytics products, he is also experienced in building DeFi protocols, having previously worked for other protocols in the space.
Methods
Specification
By analyzing the impact of these incentives, Forse by StableLab hopes to identify the following:
To see Forse in action, explore our interactive dashboard showcasing the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program. This provides a great example of what our output could be for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program. Our Deliverable would be an interactive dashboard hosted on dashboard.forse.io on at least the metrics stated above.
Budget Request
The proposal requests $60,000 worth of UNI, which is 7,500 UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 4 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, with 3 months of additional maintenance support and updates to analytics modules utilized in the live dashboard.
Four Blockchains Among Chosen by the Uniswap DAO
| Blockchains | TVL |
|---|---|
| Arbitrum | $3.07b |
| Base | $2.68b |
| Scroll | $1.01b |
| Blast | $731.18m |
Thanks everyone for participating and also giving feedback. We will indeed take time to reflect and also consider such feedback in the future.
Hi guys, we’ve reviewed the vote and noticed a discrepancy between different voting platforms. On Uniswap’s Tally portal, it seems the proposal didn’t reach quorum, while the Agora interface shows a different outcome. We understand the quorum requirement is 40M UNI, but we’re uncertain if it includes only the “For” votes or all votes (For, Against, and Abstain). Typically, quorum counts all votes, but we’re unsure if that’s the case here.
Simple Summary
This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote was passed in early August of this year, and for a month, we have discussed with various Uniswap DAO participants to incorporate their feedback.
Feedback Incorporated
1. Accountability and Completion Based
As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.
Thank you for the response to our question. We agree with the stance stated by @SEEDGov, specifically the part quoted below, and will therefore being voting against as well.
We know that the consequences of this are not serious in themselves... the issue here is that the DAO’s decision has been violated and not respected, which could set a very serious and dangerous precedent in other votes with greater impact.
It has now been over five months since Forse Analytics received $60k UNI from the DAO
I think that's a good reason to read the proposal as Forse has't received the funds as it hasn't been delivered as that was the requirement.
Delivery date is still of end of Q1 2025 which was communicated to delegates and community.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The previous proposal, which we had voted in favor of, didn’t pass because it failed to meet quorum. The new proposal also incorporates feedback from delegates which makes us even more comfortable voting for the proposal than before.
It was an issue with Agora, the team updated it now to show the correct outcome: https://vote.uniswapfoundation.org/proposals/71
We are aiming to share it by Q1 of 2025
What's the status here?
The truth is on-chain.
https://etherscan.io/address/0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3#readProxyContract
From the governance contract source code, state 3 means "Defeated":
Simple Summary
Simple Summary
This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote was passed in early August of this year, and for a month, we have discussed with various Uniswap DAO participants to incorporate their feedback. The onchain vote however didn’t hit the quorum by less than a million UNI. Therefore, we have incorporated further feedback received and will retry the onchain vote.
Feedback Incorporated
1. Accountability and Completion Based
The budget once the onchain vote passes will first go to the Uniswap Accountability Committee. Once the Committee confirms that the work has been completed, StableLab can claim the budget.
2. Budget and Scope
Initially, the RFC requested $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO; this was expanded to 4 blockchains for offchain vote following the feedback. Following the feedback, the Analytics will cover 4 blockchains but at a reduced cost of $60,000, effectively reducing the cost by $10,000 and also increasing the number of blockchains covered compared to the original RFC.
3. Preventing Redundancy
There have been questions that the work on Arbitrum especially might overlap with Gauntlet’s research on incentive programs on Arbitrum. We are in talks with the Gauntlet team and will also ensure the focus of the work doesn’t overlap with Gauntlet’s domains.
Motivation
In February 2024, the Uniswap DAO introduced the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, which incentivizes users to participate in current and new deployments of Uniswap on different networks within the L2 space. The initial onboarding packages of this program cost the Uniswap DAO at least $3.5M worth of assets.
We propose that Uniswap DAO engage with Forse, our DAO intelligence and analytics platform, to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth program and assess if the current approach drives real growth.
By assessing the impacts of the Revitalization and Growth Program, the Uniswap DAO will have valuable insights to improve further iterations of the program and/or other incentive programs. With this information, Uniswap DAO will be able to understand who are the most relevant user groups, their acquisition cost, and evaluate if the program itself was effective in influencing user behavior leading to increased stickiness of users, and therefore TVL and other top-level protocol metrics.
Recently, StableLab supported the Arbitrum DAO as the Program Manager for the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program, and we delivered a comprehensive analysis of the STIP to the Arbitrium DAO.
With Uniswap allocating over $3.5M worth of assets for the purpose of growing Uniswap’s market share, it is essential to ensure that the DAO analyses and reviews the impact of these incentives on an ongoing basis.
What is Forse?
Forse is a data and intelligence platform built by StableLab helping DAOs analyze the impact of governance decisions in protocol growth, top-line metrics, and governance operations, including its cost and effort structures. StableLab is the leading provider of governance products and solutions for decentralized protocols. We work with various projects, from the ones just starting their journey to decentralization to the most prominent DeFi protocols.
We are currently working with:
Figure: Example of Onchain Impact Analaysis - Arb STIP Analysis
Figure: Example of User Segmentation Analysis - Arb STIP Analysis
This service provider engagement grants the Uniswap DAO access to the services of the entire StableLab team. Specifically, three StableLab team members will be the primary points of contact.
Team
Christian Ziegler is the CTO at StableLab. Previously, he worked as a researcher at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), where he wrote his doctoral thesis on DAOs. In 2018, he co-founded Blockcurators GmbH. Christian has several published scientific articles, including a Taxonomy of DAOs; scoring methodologies for DAOs; network analysis of DAOS; and classification of DAO proposals using LLMs; among others.
Johannes Loewe is the Data Lead at StableLab, where he focuses on all stages of AI and ML development, from experimentation to deployment. Before joining StableLab, he was a Freelance AI & Blockchain Software Engineer. He also has experience with DAOs, being a founding member of PretzelDAO in Munich. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Radboud University in the Netherlands and a Master's degree in Machine Learning from NUI-Galway in Ireland.
Marcos Miranda is the Head of Product at StableLab. With over 5 years of experience in Product Management, focusing on Web3 and Analytics products, he is also experienced in building DeFi protocols, having previously worked for other protocols in the space.
Methods
Specification
By analyzing the impact of these incentives, Forse by StableLab hopes to identify the following:
To see Forse in action, explore our interactive dashboard showcasing the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program. This provides a great example of what our output could be for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program. Our Deliverable would be an interactive dashboard hosted on dashboard.forse.io on at least the metrics stated above.
Budget Request
The proposal requests $60,000 worth of UNI, which is 7,500 UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 4 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, with 3 months of additional maintenance support and updates to analytics modules utilized in the live dashboard.
Four Blockchains Among Chosen by the Uniswap DAO
| Blockchains | TVL |
|---|---|
| Arbitrum | $3.07b |
| Base | $2.68b |
| Scroll | $1.01b |
| Blast | $731.18m |
Thanks everyone for participating and also giving feedback. We will indeed take time to reflect and also consider such feedback in the future.
Hi guys, we’ve reviewed the vote and noticed a discrepancy between different voting platforms. On Uniswap’s Tally portal, it seems the proposal didn’t reach quorum, while the Agora interface shows a different outcome. We understand the quorum requirement is 40M UNI, but we’re uncertain if it includes only the “For” votes or all votes (For, Against, and Abstain). Typically, quorum counts all votes, but we’re unsure if that’s the case here.
Simple Summary
This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote was passed in early August of this year, and for a month, we have discussed with various Uniswap DAO participants to incorporate their feedback.
Feedback Incorporated
1. Accountability and Completion Based
As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.
Thank you for the response to our question. We agree with the stance stated by @SEEDGov, specifically the part quoted below, and will therefore being voting against as well.
We know that the consequences of this are not serious in themselves... the issue here is that the DAO’s decision has been violated and not respected, which could set a very serious and dangerous precedent in other votes with greater impact.
It has now been over five months since Forse Analytics received $60k UNI from the DAO
I think that's a good reason to read the proposal as Forse has't received the funds as it hasn't been delivered as that was the requirement.
Delivery date is still of end of Q1 2025 which was communicated to delegates and community.
Hi guys, we’ve reviewed the vote and noticed a discrepancy between different voting platforms. On Uniswap’s Tally portal, it seems the proposal didn’t reach quorum, while the Agora interface shows a different outcome. We understand the quorum requirement is 40M UNI, but we’re uncertain if it includes only the “For” votes or all votes (For, Against, and Abstain). Typically, quorum counts all votes, but we’re unsure if that’s the case here.
We've observed that the handling of service providers applying for committee positions varies across DAOs. Some DAOs allow service providers to apply, while others do not. In DAOs that permit this, service providers are typically required to disclose any potential conflicts of interest and abstain from voting on proposals that would benefit them. To establish such rules, it would need consensus from the DAO as a whole.
Simple Summary
This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote was passed in early August of this year, and for a month, we have discussed with various Uniswap DAO participants to incorporate their feedback.
Feedback Incorporated
1. Accountability and Completion Based
-The budget once the onchain vote passes will first go to the Uniswap Accountability Committee. Once the Committee confirms that the work has been completed, StableLab can claim the budget. If a StableLab member is on the Committee, one will not interfere and leave the decision to other Committee members.
2. Budget and Scope Changes
-Initially, the RFC requested $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, this was expanded to 4 blockchains for offchain vote following the feedback. However, there were more suggestions for reduced scope and lower budget. Thus, the Analytics will cover 3 blockchains but at a reduced cost of $60,000, effectively reducing the cost by $10,000 compared to the original proposal.
3. Preventing Redundancy
-There have been concerns that the work on Arbitrum especially might overlap with Gauntlet’s research on incentive programs on Arbitrum. We are in active talks with the Gauntlet team and will also ensure the work doesn’t overlap with Gauntlet’s domains.
Motivation
In February 2024, the Uniswap DAO introduced the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, which incentivizes users to participate in current and new deployments of Uniswap on different networks within the L2 space. The initial onboarding packages of this program cost the Uniswap DAO at least $3.5M worth of assets.
We propose that Uniswap DAO engage with Forse, our DAO intelligence and analytics platform, to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth program and assess if the current approach drives real growth.
By assessing the impacts of the Revitalization and Growth Program, the Uniswap DAO will have valuable insights to improve further iterations of the Revitalization and Growth Program or other incentive programs. Armed with this information, Uniswap DAO will be able to understand what was the most relevant user groups, and their acquisition cost, and evaluate if the Revitalization and Growth program effectively modified user behavior and led to increased stickiness of users, and therefore TVL and other top-level protocol metrics.
Recently, StableLab supported the Arbitrum DAO as the Program Manager for the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program, and we delivered a comprehensive analysis of the STIP to the Arbitrium DAO.
With Uniswap allocating over $3.5M worth of assets for the purpose of growing Uniswap’s market share, it is essential to ensure that the DAO analyses and reviews the impact of these incentives on an ongoing basis.
What is Forse?
Forse is a data and intelligence platform built by StableLab helping DAOs analyze the impact of governance decisions in protocol growth, top-line metrics, and governance operations, including its cost and effort structures. StableLab is the leading provider of governance products and solutions for decentralized protocols. We work with various projects, from the ones just starting their journey to decentralization to the most prominent DeFi protocols.
This service provider engagement grants the Uniswap DAO access to the services of the entire StableLab team. Specifically, three StableLab team members will be the primary points of contact.
Team
Christian Ziegler is the Tech Lead at StableLab. Previously, he worked as a researcher at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), where he wrote his doctoral thesis on DAOs. In 2018, he co-founded Blockcurators GmbH. Christian has several published scientific articles, including a Taxonomy of DAOs; scoring methodologies for DAOs; network analysis of DAOS; and classification of DAO proposals using LLMs; among others.
Johannes Loewe is the Data Lead at StableLab, where he focuses on all stages of AI and ML development, from experimentation to deployment. Before joining StableLab, he was a Freelance AI & Blockchain Software Engineer. He also has experience with DAOs, being a founding member of PretzelDAO in Munich. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Radboud University in the Netherlands and a Master's degree in Machine Learning from NUI-Galway in Ireland.
Marcos Miranda is the Head of Product at StableLab. With over 5 years of experience in Product Management, focusing on Web3 and Analytics products, he is also experienced in building DeFi protocols, having previously worked for other protocols in the space.
Specification
By analyzing the impact of these incentives, Forse by StableLab hopes to identify the following:
To see Forse in action, explore our interactive dashboard showcasing the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program. This provides a great example of what our output could be for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program.
Budget Request
The proposal requests $60,000 worth of UNI, which is 8700 UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, with 3 months of additional maintenance support and updates to analytics modules utilized in the live dashboard.
Three Blockchains Among Chosen by the Uniswap DAO
| Blockchains | TVL |
|---|---|
| Arbitrum | $2.596b |
| Base | $1.35b |
| Blast | $838.46m |
As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.
This is a fair point that we will consider.
Data collection and analysis teams have been funded by the Uniswap Foundation in the past without much success. Many of those tools either do not work or the sites are no longer active. Why will this be different?
I am concerned about the direction where large delegates support other delegate projects to avoid upsetting potential votes on their own projects in the future.
We voted against this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:
Vote: Against
Rationale: The proposal expressly stated:
We voted against this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:
Vote: Against
Rationale: The proposal expressly stated:
The proposal requests $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO
and
and
In other words, it was clearly proposed that the DAO should decide whether to proceed with the proposal, and if so, it would be the DAO that would decide on which 3 blockchains the dashboards would be made.
In the temp check submitted to a vote, the DAO decided to proceed with the proposal and chose 3 blockchains: Base supported by 1,665,046.46 UNU, Arbitrum with 10,438,561.17 UNI and third Scroll with 1,171,901.87 UNI, followed closely by Blast with 1,171,615.9 UNI. In other words, the third place was very hard fought and the difference was very close, but the DAO chose Scroll over Blast.
Contrary to this, in the onchain voting, the proponent included Base, Arbitrum and Blast, i.e. the fourth blockchain chosen by the DAO, and not the third. When asked why this was the case, he expressly replied:
The proposal then stated that the 3 blockchains would be chosen by the Uniswap DAO, but we are faced with an onchain proposal that includes 3 blockchains, one of them chosen by the proponent contrary to what the DAO decided.
In principle, and without this being important for our analysis, it should be noted that the TVL of the blockchains today are not those reported in the proposal of Blast $838.46m and Scroll $601.14m, but that today Scroll with $771.92m has more TVL than Blast with $766.41m, so that taking the criteria of the proponent to decide by TVL, Scroll should have been chosen. Source: DefiLllama.
But beyond that, we understand that what has happened is very serious and dangerous, the DAO chose Scroll in third place, so the onchain vote should have included Scroll, the proposer by choosing Blast using his own criteria, did not respect and violated what was decided by the DAO.
We know that the consequences of this are not serious in themselves, since a dashboard will be made analysing Blast instead of Scroll, but we understand that the impact of the vote or the importance of what is being voted in this specific case is secondary, the issue here is that the DAO’s decision has been violated and not respected, which could set a very serious and dangerous precedent in other votes with greater impact.
Consequently, we vote against and request the proposer to cancel this onchain vote and submit a new one that respects the DAO’s decision.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
During temp-check, we suggested that the focus be kept on two chains to analyze and monitor (Arbitrum and Base), which would serve as proof of concept. Although the onchain proposal is for three chains, the cost has also been reduced by $10,000, which we find to be a fair compromise.
Something that wasn’t addressed in the feedback incorporated in the proposal, which we also brought up previously, is that we’d ideally see someone take ownership of acting on the data collected through Forse when and where it makes sense to do so. Although it’s not a deal-breaker, we’d like to further discuss this going forward.
Thanks. Based on feedback (of course caveat that there were many feedback including some that are mutually exclusive), we have chosen Blast as it has higher tvl than Scroll. Of course difficult to satisfy all the different request. But based on it, we have chosen 3 instead of 4 but at a lower budget compared to initial proposal.
:wave: on "Three Blockchains Among Chosen by the Uniswap DAO", the Snapshot vote showed Scroll receiving slightly higher votes than Blast. Why this discrepancy? Also, given the significant difference in votes for Base + Arbitrum vs Blast/Scroll, it seems more logical to either do just Base + Arbitrum, or to include all 4 chains.
We're planning to vote against the onchain vote given the discrepency, but wanted to pose the question here to the authors, in case they had any comments.
Hi everyone, thanks for the suggestions and votings, we will take a good amount of time to incorporate feedbacks and ensure the concerns are addressed.
While we do believe an analysis needs to be performed for each chain, the proposed solution is expensive. For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours to complete the analysis of four chains. To justify such a cost in our eyes, either the scope of the study would need to expand, or the deliverable by Forse needs to be better detailed so we can assess the potential value of the report.
As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.
While we do believe an analysis needs to be performed for each chain, the proposed solution is expensive. For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours to complete the analysis of four chains. To justify such a cost in our eyes, either the scope of the study would need to expand, or the deliverable by Forse needs to be better detailed so we can assess the potential value of the report.
As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.
As we discuss analyzing the rewards program, we should revisit that the core goal of the URGP was to increase Uniswap's market share by deploying to emerging chains so that Uniswap could secure a strong market position in the event the chain scaled. In some cases, the DAO also invested in existing deployments such as BSC, zkSync, and Base to boost our existing market position.
The success of individual chain deployments has less to do with Uniswap and more to do with the overall success of the chain. Our assumption with the program was that two or three of the chains would go on to become major deployments for the DAO and, post fee-switch, generate significant revenues for the DAO.
Where the DAO would benefit from analysis is when making decisions regarding follow-on incentives for chains. However, with everything we have learned over the last several months, we would be against follow-on incentives (today) unless the chain pledged to match the incentives or made an attractive proposal for the DAO to consider.
Lastly, we could add a section to the Uniswap reports that Oku has been writing focusing on the deployments with rewards if delegates would find that helpful.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal while opting to select only Arbitrum and Base as the chains to analyze and monitor. We believe that focusing on the two chains with the highest TVL will be a good ‘proof of concept’.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal while opting to select only Arbitrum and Base as the chains to analyze and monitor. We believe that focusing on the two chains with the highest TVL will be a good ‘proof of concept’.
Given that, we’d like to see an updated proposal before the on-chain vote to reflect the lower cost of analyzing and monitoring 2 chains -as opposed to the originally proposed 3, which was later amended to 4.
More importantly, however, we’d like to better understand the potential outcomes of such an analysis and Forse’s ultimate purpose in the DAO. Ideally, we’d like to see some sort of ‘ownership’ of the task of acting on the data collected and the insights from them. That could come from StableLabs or another party in the DAO (e.g., the Deployments Accountability Committee).
Firstly, someone does need to conduct a retrospective analysis on the efficacy of these incentive programs, especially if we wish to renew incentives or alter them in some capacity. So I'm directionally in favor of this proposal.
There will be a review conducted on the efficacy of the incentive programs that the DAO’s running. The process for this and who will conduct it is still tbd. Most of these programs are either in the middle of being administered or have yet to start. The Base incentives were deployed on April 25 and will conclude on July 25.
Firstly, someone does need to conduct a retrospective analysis on the efficacy of these incentive programs, especially if we wish to renew incentives or alter them in some capacity. So I'm directionally in favor of this proposal.
There will be a review conducted on the efficacy of the incentive programs that the DAO’s running. The process for this and who will conduct it is still tbd. Most of these programs are either in the middle of being administered or have yet to start. The Base incentives were deployed on April 25 and will conclude on July 25.
As per the above, not all of the programs have been terminated yet. Looks like Base is currently leading the race, which is good since those incentives have come to a conclusion. For anyone interested, here's a more detailed overview of the Base program:
^Note: analysis will only be available for campaigns that have concluded. Those that are still live will require some wait time.
Correct--the BSC incentives haven't been deployed yet since we are trying to finalize some of the bridging issues. This is the only campaign set that hasn't begun yet. The Accountability Committee will keep you all posted.
Additionally, it’s not clear why it proposes to analyze Arbitrum, where URGP funds were not deployed.
Gauntlet tends to follow a 98/1/1 breakdown (with 98 going to fees and the other 2 equally given to the other parameters). For the incentive programs being managed by the Accountability Committee, slightly different gauges have been selected, with both 60/20/20 and 40/30/30 structures having been implemented. The duration of Gauntlet incentives are also 2 weeks. The AC, however, usually distributes on a 3-month basis. This means that Gauntlet is involved in active management, constantly looking at data points from each previous campaign, factoring in current market conditions, and consequently selecting the best pools to deploy incentives to.
This proposal therefore isn't limited to the URGP. Since there's overwhelming support for Arbitrum right now, the DAO should note that this analysis will be reviewing Gauntlet's distribution, which is far more sophisticated than the URGP method for distribution. It could be beneficial to contrast the two methods, however. We may see that a simple, heuristics-based approach being used for the URGP isn't effective enough (or it could reveal the contrary).
I'm also interested in seeing the efficacy of incentive programs on EVMs that Uniswap is less dominant on. We already see a degree of success on Arbitrum and Base--but the majority of the URGP incentives actually go to new or less active EVMs. We are therefore voting for Scroll, Blast, and Base. Scroll incentives were deployed nearly a year after its mainnet launched. Blast incentives were deployed early-on, when Blast just went live. This would show how much benefit an early mover advantage yields. And Base would be a good case for studying how tied incentives are to a chain that is directionally doing well due to narratives like memecoins.
Gauntlet has voted in favor of Base and Arbitrum (50/50), given that the chains represent the highest TVL and most strategic current Uniswap deployments.
However, before an onchain vote, Gauntlet would prefer to see greater detail regarding the exact data deliverables the dashboards will display as they relate to Uniswap’s growth strategy and transparency around the data methodologies the Stablelab team intends to deploy.
We have chose Arbitrum and Base due to their dominant positioning and large user presence - if incentives are going to be researched for optimization on any blockchains it should be done on these first.
Arbitrum, as a leading Layer 2 solution, offers a well-established ecosystem with a diverse and active user base, making it an ideal platform to study the scalability and cost-efficiency of Uniswap's deployment. Its maturity and innovation in the Layer 2 space provide valuable insights into how Uniswap can optimize its operations in a high-performance environment. Base, backed by Coinbase, represents a promising new blockchain with the potential to tap into a broader and more diverse user demographic.
I have voted against the temp check, explanation here:
For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours
we’d like to see the proposal expanded to at least 4 blockchains (3 seems a little low for $70k).
Thanks for the proposal @Doo_StableLab
There seems to be no discussion around this proposal from other delegates (in the RFC), potentially indicating a lack of demand. Nonetheless, we think this proposal could be useful for the DAO but for us to be supportive we'd like to see the proposal expanded to at least 4 blockchains (3 seems a little low for $70k). Could you also please clarify if there will be a report delivered to the DAO with notable findings and recommendations or is it solely the dashboard? If it's the latter, we'd like to see the former incorporated into the proposal!
We voted on the snapshot as below:
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/tane-delegate-platform/24164/5?u=tane
One question, why isn't BSC a part of chains to be analyzed on? In our understanding, the DAO has decided to distribute the maximum amount ($1M) on an on-chain proposal but it wasn't deployed yet?
In SEEDGov we voted:
Here our full rationale.
Hi guys, we’ve reviewed the vote and noticed a discrepancy between different voting platforms. On Uniswap’s Tally portal, it seems the proposal didn’t reach quorum, while the Agora interface shows a different outcome. We understand the quorum requirement is 40M UNI, but we’re uncertain if it includes only the “For” votes or all votes (For, Against, and Abstain). Typically, quorum counts all votes, but we’re unsure if that’s the case here.
We've observed that the handling of service providers applying for committee positions varies across DAOs. Some DAOs allow service providers to apply, while others do not. In DAOs that permit this, service providers are typically required to disclose any potential conflicts of interest and abstain from voting on proposals that would benefit them. To establish such rules, it would need consensus from the DAO as a whole.
Simple Summary
This proposal seeks to onboard Forse by StableLab as a data service provider, helping analyze the effectiveness of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. The offchain vote was passed in early August of this year, and for a month, we have discussed with various Uniswap DAO participants to incorporate their feedback.
Feedback Incorporated
1. Accountability and Completion Based
-The budget once the onchain vote passes will first go to the Uniswap Accountability Committee. Once the Committee confirms that the work has been completed, StableLab can claim the budget. If a StableLab member is on the Committee, one will not interfere and leave the decision to other Committee members.
2. Budget and Scope Changes
-Initially, the RFC requested $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, this was expanded to 4 blockchains for offchain vote following the feedback. However, there were more suggestions for reduced scope and lower budget. Thus, the Analytics will cover 3 blockchains but at a reduced cost of $60,000, effectively reducing the cost by $10,000 compared to the original proposal.
3. Preventing Redundancy
-There have been concerns that the work on Arbitrum especially might overlap with Gauntlet’s research on incentive programs on Arbitrum. We are in active talks with the Gauntlet team and will also ensure the work doesn’t overlap with Gauntlet’s domains.
Motivation
In February 2024, the Uniswap DAO introduced the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, which incentivizes users to participate in current and new deployments of Uniswap on different networks within the L2 space. The initial onboarding packages of this program cost the Uniswap DAO at least $3.5M worth of assets.
We propose that Uniswap DAO engage with Forse, our DAO intelligence and analytics platform, to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth program and assess if the current approach drives real growth.
By assessing the impacts of the Revitalization and Growth Program, the Uniswap DAO will have valuable insights to improve further iterations of the Revitalization and Growth Program or other incentive programs. Armed with this information, Uniswap DAO will be able to understand what was the most relevant user groups, and their acquisition cost, and evaluate if the Revitalization and Growth program effectively modified user behavior and led to increased stickiness of users, and therefore TVL and other top-level protocol metrics.
Recently, StableLab supported the Arbitrum DAO as the Program Manager for the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program, and we delivered a comprehensive analysis of the STIP to the Arbitrium DAO.
With Uniswap allocating over $3.5M worth of assets for the purpose of growing Uniswap’s market share, it is essential to ensure that the DAO analyses and reviews the impact of these incentives on an ongoing basis.
What is Forse?
Forse is a data and intelligence platform built by StableLab helping DAOs analyze the impact of governance decisions in protocol growth, top-line metrics, and governance operations, including its cost and effort structures. StableLab is the leading provider of governance products and solutions for decentralized protocols. We work with various projects, from the ones just starting their journey to decentralization to the most prominent DeFi protocols.
This service provider engagement grants the Uniswap DAO access to the services of the entire StableLab team. Specifically, three StableLab team members will be the primary points of contact.
Team
Christian Ziegler is the Tech Lead at StableLab. Previously, he worked as a researcher at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), where he wrote his doctoral thesis on DAOs. In 2018, he co-founded Blockcurators GmbH. Christian has several published scientific articles, including a Taxonomy of DAOs; scoring methodologies for DAOs; network analysis of DAOS; and classification of DAO proposals using LLMs; among others.
Johannes Loewe is the Data Lead at StableLab, where he focuses on all stages of AI and ML development, from experimentation to deployment. Before joining StableLab, he was a Freelance AI & Blockchain Software Engineer. He also has experience with DAOs, being a founding member of PretzelDAO in Munich. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Radboud University in the Netherlands and a Master's degree in Machine Learning from NUI-Galway in Ireland.
Marcos Miranda is the Head of Product at StableLab. With over 5 years of experience in Product Management, focusing on Web3 and Analytics products, he is also experienced in building DeFi protocols, having previously worked for other protocols in the space.
Specification
By analyzing the impact of these incentives, Forse by StableLab hopes to identify the following:
To see Forse in action, explore our interactive dashboard showcasing the Arbitrum Short-Term Incentives Program. This provides a great example of what our output could be for Uniswap’s Revitalization and Growth Program.
Budget Request
The proposal requests $60,000 worth of UNI, which is 8700 UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO, with 3 months of additional maintenance support and updates to analytics modules utilized in the live dashboard.
Three Blockchains Among Chosen by the Uniswap DAO
| Blockchains | TVL |
|---|---|
| Arbitrum | $2.596b |
| Base | $1.35b |
| Blast | $838.46m |
As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.
This is a fair point that we will consider.
Data collection and analysis teams have been funded by the Uniswap Foundation in the past without much success. Many of those tools either do not work or the sites are no longer active. Why will this be different?
I am concerned about the direction where large delegates support other delegate projects to avoid upsetting potential votes on their own projects in the future.
We voted against this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:
Vote: Against
Rationale: The proposal expressly stated:
We voted against this proposal, you can read our rationale in our delegation thread:
Vote: Against
Rationale: The proposal expressly stated:
The proposal requests $70,000 worth of UNI to analyze the impact of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program so far for 3 blockchains chosen by the Uniswap DAO
and
and
In other words, it was clearly proposed that the DAO should decide whether to proceed with the proposal, and if so, it would be the DAO that would decide on which 3 blockchains the dashboards would be made.
In the temp check submitted to a vote, the DAO decided to proceed with the proposal and chose 3 blockchains: Base supported by 1,665,046.46 UNU, Arbitrum with 10,438,561.17 UNI and third Scroll with 1,171,901.87 UNI, followed closely by Blast with 1,171,615.9 UNI. In other words, the third place was very hard fought and the difference was very close, but the DAO chose Scroll over Blast.
Contrary to this, in the onchain voting, the proponent included Base, Arbitrum and Blast, i.e. the fourth blockchain chosen by the DAO, and not the third. When asked why this was the case, he expressly replied:
The proposal then stated that the 3 blockchains would be chosen by the Uniswap DAO, but we are faced with an onchain proposal that includes 3 blockchains, one of them chosen by the proponent contrary to what the DAO decided.
In principle, and without this being important for our analysis, it should be noted that the TVL of the blockchains today are not those reported in the proposal of Blast $838.46m and Scroll $601.14m, but that today Scroll with $771.92m has more TVL than Blast with $766.41m, so that taking the criteria of the proponent to decide by TVL, Scroll should have been chosen. Source: DefiLllama.
But beyond that, we understand that what has happened is very serious and dangerous, the DAO chose Scroll in third place, so the onchain vote should have included Scroll, the proposer by choosing Blast using his own criteria, did not respect and violated what was decided by the DAO.
We know that the consequences of this are not serious in themselves, since a dashboard will be made analysing Blast instead of Scroll, but we understand that the impact of the vote or the importance of what is being voted in this specific case is secondary, the issue here is that the DAO’s decision has been violated and not respected, which could set a very serious and dangerous precedent in other votes with greater impact.
Consequently, we vote against and request the proposer to cancel this onchain vote and submit a new one that respects the DAO’s decision.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal.
During temp-check, we suggested that the focus be kept on two chains to analyze and monitor (Arbitrum and Base), which would serve as proof of concept. Although the onchain proposal is for three chains, the cost has also been reduced by $10,000, which we find to be a fair compromise.
Something that wasn’t addressed in the feedback incorporated in the proposal, which we also brought up previously, is that we’d ideally see someone take ownership of acting on the data collected through Forse when and where it makes sense to do so. Although it’s not a deal-breaker, we’d like to further discuss this going forward.
Thanks. Based on feedback (of course caveat that there were many feedback including some that are mutually exclusive), we have chosen Blast as it has higher tvl than Scroll. Of course difficult to satisfy all the different request. But based on it, we have chosen 3 instead of 4 but at a lower budget compared to initial proposal.
:wave: on "Three Blockchains Among Chosen by the Uniswap DAO", the Snapshot vote showed Scroll receiving slightly higher votes than Blast. Why this discrepancy? Also, given the significant difference in votes for Base + Arbitrum vs Blast/Scroll, it seems more logical to either do just Base + Arbitrum, or to include all 4 chains.
We're planning to vote against the onchain vote given the discrepency, but wanted to pose the question here to the authors, in case they had any comments.
Hi everyone, thanks for the suggestions and votings, we will take a good amount of time to incorporate feedbacks and ensure the concerns are addressed.
While we do believe an analysis needs to be performed for each chain, the proposed solution is expensive. For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours to complete the analysis of four chains. To justify such a cost in our eyes, either the scope of the study would need to expand, or the deliverable by Forse needs to be better detailed so we can assess the potential value of the report.
As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.
While we do believe an analysis needs to be performed for each chain, the proposed solution is expensive. For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours to complete the analysis of four chains. To justify such a cost in our eyes, either the scope of the study would need to expand, or the deliverable by Forse needs to be better detailed so we can assess the potential value of the report.
As others have pointed out, only a handful of the programs have finished. Once the rewards cease, we likely need to wait one or two months before we can analyze how the rewards performed and their lasting effect. It would be preferable to create a standard report that can be completed post-rewards, and then Forse could be the entity that puts the reports together.
As we discuss analyzing the rewards program, we should revisit that the core goal of the URGP was to increase Uniswap's market share by deploying to emerging chains so that Uniswap could secure a strong market position in the event the chain scaled. In some cases, the DAO also invested in existing deployments such as BSC, zkSync, and Base to boost our existing market position.
The success of individual chain deployments has less to do with Uniswap and more to do with the overall success of the chain. Our assumption with the program was that two or three of the chains would go on to become major deployments for the DAO and, post fee-switch, generate significant revenues for the DAO.
Where the DAO would benefit from analysis is when making decisions regarding follow-on incentives for chains. However, with everything we have learned over the last several months, we would be against follow-on incentives (today) unless the chain pledged to match the incentives or made an attractive proposal for the DAO to consider.
Lastly, we could add a section to the Uniswap reports that Oku has been writing focusing on the deployments with rewards if delegates would find that helpful.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal while opting to select only Arbitrum and Base as the chains to analyze and monitor. We believe that focusing on the two chains with the highest TVL will be a good ‘proof of concept’.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’ll be voting FOR this proposal while opting to select only Arbitrum and Base as the chains to analyze and monitor. We believe that focusing on the two chains with the highest TVL will be a good ‘proof of concept’.
Given that, we’d like to see an updated proposal before the on-chain vote to reflect the lower cost of analyzing and monitoring 2 chains -as opposed to the originally proposed 3, which was later amended to 4.
More importantly, however, we’d like to better understand the potential outcomes of such an analysis and Forse’s ultimate purpose in the DAO. Ideally, we’d like to see some sort of ‘ownership’ of the task of acting on the data collected and the insights from them. That could come from StableLabs or another party in the DAO (e.g., the Deployments Accountability Committee).
Firstly, someone does need to conduct a retrospective analysis on the efficacy of these incentive programs, especially if we wish to renew incentives or alter them in some capacity. So I'm directionally in favor of this proposal.
There will be a review conducted on the efficacy of the incentive programs that the DAO’s running. The process for this and who will conduct it is still tbd. Most of these programs are either in the middle of being administered or have yet to start. The Base incentives were deployed on April 25 and will conclude on July 25.
Firstly, someone does need to conduct a retrospective analysis on the efficacy of these incentive programs, especially if we wish to renew incentives or alter them in some capacity. So I'm directionally in favor of this proposal.
There will be a review conducted on the efficacy of the incentive programs that the DAO’s running. The process for this and who will conduct it is still tbd. Most of these programs are either in the middle of being administered or have yet to start. The Base incentives were deployed on April 25 and will conclude on July 25.
As per the above, not all of the programs have been terminated yet. Looks like Base is currently leading the race, which is good since those incentives have come to a conclusion. For anyone interested, here's a more detailed overview of the Base program:
^Note: analysis will only be available for campaigns that have concluded. Those that are still live will require some wait time.
Correct--the BSC incentives haven't been deployed yet since we are trying to finalize some of the bridging issues. This is the only campaign set that hasn't begun yet. The Accountability Committee will keep you all posted.
Additionally, it’s not clear why it proposes to analyze Arbitrum, where URGP funds were not deployed.
Gauntlet tends to follow a 98/1/1 breakdown (with 98 going to fees and the other 2 equally given to the other parameters). For the incentive programs being managed by the Accountability Committee, slightly different gauges have been selected, with both 60/20/20 and 40/30/30 structures having been implemented. The duration of Gauntlet incentives are also 2 weeks. The AC, however, usually distributes on a 3-month basis. This means that Gauntlet is involved in active management, constantly looking at data points from each previous campaign, factoring in current market conditions, and consequently selecting the best pools to deploy incentives to.
This proposal therefore isn't limited to the URGP. Since there's overwhelming support for Arbitrum right now, the DAO should note that this analysis will be reviewing Gauntlet's distribution, which is far more sophisticated than the URGP method for distribution. It could be beneficial to contrast the two methods, however. We may see that a simple, heuristics-based approach being used for the URGP isn't effective enough (or it could reveal the contrary).
I'm also interested in seeing the efficacy of incentive programs on EVMs that Uniswap is less dominant on. We already see a degree of success on Arbitrum and Base--but the majority of the URGP incentives actually go to new or less active EVMs. We are therefore voting for Scroll, Blast, and Base. Scroll incentives were deployed nearly a year after its mainnet launched. Blast incentives were deployed early-on, when Blast just went live. This would show how much benefit an early mover advantage yields. And Base would be a good case for studying how tied incentives are to a chain that is directionally doing well due to narratives like memecoins.
Gauntlet has voted in favor of Base and Arbitrum (50/50), given that the chains represent the highest TVL and most strategic current Uniswap deployments.
However, before an onchain vote, Gauntlet would prefer to see greater detail regarding the exact data deliverables the dashboards will display as they relate to Uniswap’s growth strategy and transparency around the data methodologies the Stablelab team intends to deploy.
We have chose Arbitrum and Base due to their dominant positioning and large user presence - if incentives are going to be researched for optimization on any blockchains it should be done on these first.
Arbitrum, as a leading Layer 2 solution, offers a well-established ecosystem with a diverse and active user base, making it an ideal platform to study the scalability and cost-efficiency of Uniswap's deployment. Its maturity and innovation in the Layer 2 space provide valuable insights into how Uniswap can optimize its operations in a high-performance environment. Base, backed by Coinbase, represents a promising new blockchain with the potential to tap into a broader and more diverse user demographic.
I have voted against the temp check, explanation here:
For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours
we’d like to see the proposal expanded to at least 4 blockchains (3 seems a little low for $70k).
Thanks for the proposal @Doo_StableLab
There seems to be no discussion around this proposal from other delegates (in the RFC), potentially indicating a lack of demand. Nonetheless, we think this proposal could be useful for the DAO but for us to be supportive we'd like to see the proposal expanded to at least 4 blockchains (3 seems a little low for $70k). Could you also please clarify if there will be a report delivered to the DAO with notable findings and recommendations or is it solely the dashboard? If it's the latter, we'd like to see the former incorporated into the proposal!
We voted on the snapshot as below:
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/tane-delegate-platform/24164/5?u=tane
One question, why isn't BSC a part of chains to be analyzed on? In our understanding, the DAO has decided to distribute the maximum amount ($1M) on an on-chain proposal but it wasn't deployed yet?
In SEEDGov we voted:
Here our full rationale.
I have voted against the temp check, explanation here:
The Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program has been a significant expense for the DAO so far and, if positively evaluated, will continue to be so in the future as new chains continue to emerge. It should be carefully analyzed, and its results should be reported. This could create valuable knowledge not just for Uniswap’s community but for the entire web3 space, where liquidity mining campaigns remain a contentious topic.
In my opinion, this task is too important to be rushed. In its current state, the StableLabs proposal is not convincing enough, and it’s unclear whether the metrics it plans to evaluate (such as user retention) are the most relevant to the program's objectives (gaining market share for Uniswap on newer chains). Additionally, it’s not clear why it proposes to analyze Arbitrum, where URGP funds were not deployed. The LM campaigns on Arbitrum have different objectives, a different operator, different distribution weights, and a different approach to pool selection, so bundling the analysis together doesn’t seem to be a good idea.
I would accept the proposal if it were improved, but a better approach might be for either the UF or the DAO to define the metrics to be evaluated, outline the expected outcomes, create a call for proposals, and allow service providers to submit competitive bids.
For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours
233 hours might sound a lot but for four analysts and product team members to work on it, it would be 58.2 hours per person, which divide into 3 months, would be 19.4 hours per month. And divide further by the 4 chains, that's 4.8 hours per chain per month.
For example, GFX charges $45k for the initial integration for one chain which using the same logic would be 150 hours for one chain. But in reality, several members work on it over months so it would be reasonable.
we’d like to see the proposal expanded to at least 4 blockchains (3 seems a little low for $70k).
Hi team, we usually would ask for an increased in budget in such case but as we are interested in working in good will, we will indeed expand to 4, which will be reflected in onchain vote if the vote passes.
Could you also please clarify if there will be a report delivered to the DAO with notable findings and recommendations or is it solely the dashboard?
In SEEDGov we voted:
Here our full rationale.
However, before an onchain vote, Gauntlet would prefer to see greater detail regarding the exact data deliverables the dashboards will display as they relate to Uniswap’s growth strategy and transparency around the data methodologies the Stablelab team intends to deploy.
We share this concern.
I have voted against the temp check, explanation here:
The Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program has been a significant expense for the DAO so far and, if positively evaluated, will continue to be so in the future as new chains continue to emerge. It should be carefully analyzed, and its results should be reported. This could create valuable knowledge not just for Uniswap’s community but for the entire web3 space, where liquidity mining campaigns remain a contentious topic.
In my opinion, this task is too important to be rushed. In its current state, the StableLabs proposal is not convincing enough, and it’s unclear whether the metrics it plans to evaluate (such as user retention) are the most relevant to the program's objectives (gaining market share for Uniswap on newer chains). Additionally, it’s not clear why it proposes to analyze Arbitrum, where URGP funds were not deployed. The LM campaigns on Arbitrum have different objectives, a different operator, different distribution weights, and a different approach to pool selection, so bundling the analysis together doesn’t seem to be a good idea.
I would accept the proposal if it were improved, but a better approach might be for either the UF or the DAO to define the metrics to be evaluated, outline the expected outcomes, create a call for proposals, and allow service providers to submit competitive bids.
For $70K, and assuming a generous $300/hr, the DAO would be paying for 233 hours
233 hours might sound a lot but for four analysts and product team members to work on it, it would be 58.2 hours per person, which divide into 3 months, would be 19.4 hours per month. And divide further by the 4 chains, that's 4.8 hours per chain per month.
For example, GFX charges $45k for the initial integration for one chain which using the same logic would be 150 hours for one chain. But in reality, several members work on it over months so it would be reasonable.
we’d like to see the proposal expanded to at least 4 blockchains (3 seems a little low for $70k).
Hi team, we usually would ask for an increased in budget in such case but as we are interested in working in good will, we will indeed expand to 4, which will be reflected in onchain vote if the vote passes.
Could you also please clarify if there will be a report delivered to the DAO with notable findings and recommendations or is it solely the dashboard?
In SEEDGov we voted:
Here our full rationale.
However, before an onchain vote, Gauntlet would prefer to see greater detail regarding the exact data deliverables the dashboards will display as they relate to Uniswap’s growth strategy and transparency around the data methodologies the Stablelab team intends to deploy.
We share this concern.
