Onchain vote here:
https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/83
https://vote.uniswapfoundation.org/proposals/83
Voting closes 4 am EST on March 19 2025
March 13: To calculate the amount of UNI we requested, we used the open price - $5.93 - on the day the proposal was posted, March 11, 2025.
An analysis of the onchain impact of this proposal can be found in the actions tab of our seatbelt repo: https://github.com/uniswapfoundation/governance-seatbelt/actions/runs/13834152988. If you log in to Github, you can download the Uniswap artifact at the bottom of that page and review the reports.
March 6: Based on feedback we have received over the last several weeks, we are excited to explore ways to tighten feedback loops between the UF and Uniswap delegates.
We are working with the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) to define key characteristics of a forum for this feedback — including core outputs, participants, meeting cadence, and topics. Our goal is to create a council of stakeholders external to the UF who are privy to the ongoings of the DAO, aiming to increase accountability and transparency between the UF and the DAO. We are kicking off scoping meetings next week (week of March 10) to determine how this council will be structured, and we'll jointly update the community on the output of this effort during the April 8 governance community call. We aim to hold our first UF <> Council meeting by May 8.
The Uniswap Accountability Committee was first established to help guide prospective new chains as they deployed Uniswap contracts. Since then, it has become the DAO-led accountability team that helps manage and oversee various initiatives. The team is focused on effective coordination of multiple DAO initiatives, including oversight, payment and accounting for DAO-approved programs. This also includes deployment and incentives allocation across chains for Uniswap v3 (v4 in the workings), and coordination of community-driven communications. UAC members have a close grasp of the DAO’s ongoing responsibilities and are therefore strong candidates for interfacing with the UF to design a stronger accountability interface. You can read their most recent report here.
Snapshot here: https://snapshot.box/#/s:uniswapgovernance.eth/proposal/0x424f821d0378b7152e02cbcfedf12c1c3aa2af5fe50b0476cdadfc4269892b4b
Voting closes March 2, 2025
[Feb 16: additions to ‘Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities’ and ‘Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations’ charts, described here]
The Uniswap community is entering 2025 with the momentum of three positive catalysts: a more collaborative regulatory environment, the launch of Uniswap v4, and the debut of Unichain. As we look to the months and years ahead, we see the potential for Uniswap Protocol and Unichain to cement themselves as foundational infrastructure for digital value transfer.
The Uniswap community has always pioneered—but pioneers don’t stay ahead by standing still. Achieving this vision will require more than just technological innovation; it demands strengthening network effects and evolving our governance system to fund, sustain, and grow the Protocol independently over time. We call for action, and for the broader community to work alongside us as we evolve Uniswap to its next era.
In the following proposal, we define four strategic priorities for the years ahead:
In the following proposal, we discuss not only these priorities but also how we expect to achieve them alongside the community and how we, the UF, will measure our success. We also discuss our budget request to achieve these goals. Today we are also posting a request for incentives to support the growth of Uniswap v4 and Unichain. If approved, these funds would be managed, within pre-set parameters and onchain, by Gauntlet, while having control maintained by Uniswap Governance.
In this proposal, we are requesting an investment of $95.4M into the UF grants budget, and $25.1M to fund operations, for the next 2 years to fund these priorities. In a separate incentives proposal posted today, we request a $45M budget to support liquidity incentives.
We recognize and appreciate the size of this request. It reflects an investment into the success of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, and into value for the Uniswap community. Founded in 2022 with a singular focus on Uniswap v3, the UF now leads the growth of the developer ecosystem for a true developer platform in Uniswap v4, and an L2, Unichain. In addition, we are levelling up Governance to support long term sustainability with the creation of a Core Contributor program, new tooling like Conditional Funding markets, and more.
This proposal is an investment into the future of the Uniswap community. It is designed to match the scale of our mission while being backstopped by best-in-industry transparency reporting and an unrelenting drive to create value.
Over the last year, we have worked hand in hand with our grantees, developers, delegates, and other supporters to lay a strong foundation to support us on the road ahead. As a result of that work, today we have achieved:
Along the way, the Foundation has evolved to a team of 16 individuals, working across Growth, Protocol & Engineering, Governance, Legal, and Operations.
You can read more about our community’s accomplishments in 2024 in our Community Impact Report.
The long term successes of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain are tied not only to their network effects, but also the governance system which can sustain and evolve them.
For the Protocol to become the world’s infrastructure for digital value transfer, we must strengthen these network effects while equipping Uniswap Governance with more tools to interact with offchain entities and make effective funding decisions. If we are successful, we not only grow the Protocol and Unichain in the short term, but we create a mechanism by which Governance can continue to develop them over time and independently.
To grow network effects, we’re focused on cultivating both supply – liquidity infrastructure for both the Protocol and Unichain – and demand – developers, integrators, and interfaces. As with all network effects, the cultivation of one side drives the growth of the other, building a self-reinforcing loop.
Over a medium to long term timeframe, however, network effects can be disrupted by competitors. Uniswap Governance, with its control over the Treasury, must evolve to ensure the Protocol remains competitive. We are focused on equipping Governance with the tooling to make adaptive, high-ROI funding decisions without reliance upon any one entity over a long time horizon.
This year we have defined four strategic priorities to strengthen network effects and empower Governance to execute on high impact, long term decisions to keep the Uniswap community at the forefront of DeFi.
First we address supply, or how we will support the development of liquid markets across Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, respectively.
Priority 1: Provide most capital efficiency across active EVM chains
Uniswap v4 and Unichain, both recently launched, stand to significantly expand their respective market share through offering innovative AMM functionality and novel infrastructure. However, this won’t happen on its own. Today the UF has posted a proposal with longtime collaborators at Gauntlet to fund $45M in incentive programs. In that post, we also lay out the strategic rationale and tactical execution of those programs in detail.
Unichain and v4 have launched into a market in which there is intense competition for liquidity. For instance, some competing AMMs and chains spend upwards of $50M per month in native tokens to support liquidity. We take these factors into account in the design of our program.
Our long-term goal is not to put in place or encourage perpetual incentivization. Rather, lasting impact will come from strengthened organic demand to sustain liquidity. This brings us to our next focus, the demand side of the equation, our plans to support and grow our developer community.
Priority 2: Create premier DeFi developer platforms
Uniswap v4 has reduced the friction for anyone to innovate upon digital asset market structures. Thus far, our programs have directly taught 1,000+ developers to learn how to build hundreds of hooks. Unichain is similarly optimized for DeFi development, and allows for experimentation at all levels of the stack.
Our planned initiatives include funding programs, infrastructure, and education to support developers through the hook development lifecycle, as illustrated below. These programs benefit developers across all Uniswap v4 deployments.
We are excited to lead ecosystem development efforts for Unichain – a chain designed with DeFi in mind. Some of the Unichain specific programs we have designed include Developer Growth Programs (Infinite Hackathon, Retro Grants Program, and the Unichain Builder Open Call), a Unichain Infrastructure Allocation, a Unichain DeFi Partner Allocation, and an upcoming Unigames competition. We also support a global program of Developer Ambassadors and a full-time Developer Support team.
Success in this priority means increasing the percentage of volume flowing to hooks on v4, growing the number of revenue-generating hook developers and integrators, and expanding Unichain’s builder ecosystem. Developer success would in turn not only sustain but grow demand for underlying liquidity, reinforcing our network effects.
However, sustainable growth also requires unlocking revenue and enabling Governance with the tools to ensure continued innovation and development. To solidify the Uniswap community’s place at the forefront of DeFi, we must also explore ways to empower and evolve our Governance system to align incentives, adapt to change, and sustain growth.
Priority 3: Activate revenue
We recently announced that 65% of Unichain net chain revenue would be earned by UVN validators and stakers, upon the launch of the UVN. The UF plans to develop and support the UVN validator and staker network, and explore supporting the development of UVN extensions later this year as well.
In addition to this step, the UF is also validating whether the creation of a legal entity (e.g., a DUNA), would be appropriate for Uniswap Governance. A legal entity may offer benefits to Governance including clarity on legal status, the ability to contract with other entities (like development teams), and more. If our vetting is successful and we believe the creation of a legal entity for Uniswap Governance is in its best interest, we would propose to Governance to implement a legal entity structure. If adopted, this step would pave the way for the potential introduction (or re-introduction) of a governance proposal for delegators to earn Protocol revenue. We could then create similar governance proposals for either select or all deployments of Uniswap.
Success here sets up the community up well for working alongside the UF in our last strategic priority.
Priority 4: Onboard new Protocol Core Contributors
To sustain itself over the long term, we must equip Uniswap Governance with the tools to fund and incentivize development teams and other initiatives to drive innovation and growth for the long term. To enable this, we are exploring the creation of a new community driven initiative – Core Contributors. While final details will be refined with delegates, our goal is to establish long-term, incentive aligned development teams responsible for advancing the Uniswap infrastructure.
In this proposal, we are requesting an investment of $95.4M into the UF grants budget, and $25.1M to fund operations, for the next 2 years to fund these priorities. These figures are net of cash on hand. As mentioned above, we recognize and appreciate the size of this request. It reflects an investment into the success of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, and into value for the Uniswap community, and will be backstopped by best-in-industry transparency reporting and an unrelenting drive to create value.
Our program also demonstrates strong capital allocation efficiency. In 2024, our operational and grants expenditure ratio aligned closely with industry standards for leading foundations, at approximately 39% for operations and 61% for grants. Looking ahead, we project this ratio will improve even further, reaching an all-time ratio of 29% for operations and 71% for grants by 2026. These figures demonstrate a focus on maximizing resources for impactful initiatives while maintaining operational sustainability. Additional details can be found in the appendix.
Our projected grants budgets for 2025 and 2026 are $57.9M and $41.5M respectively, totalling $99.4M.
Our projected operational budget in cash for 2025 and 2026 is $24.8M. Projected UNI compensation over that time period is 1.5M UNI (or $13.8M USD at Feb 11 opening rate of $9.45).
Our grant program, including each of the grants programs listed above, are focused on driving the success of and value for the Uniswap community.
Each grant includes clear performance targets that grantees must hit to unlock funding at key milestones. These targets include: notional TVL, notional volume, % market share of volume, number of developers onboarded, number of integrations unlocked, and more. If a grant fails to deliver its intended impact, we have the ability to terminate it early, and reallocate funds to other initiatives.
By holding grantees accountable to measurable outcomes, we ensure that every dollar spent strengthens protocol network effects or supports our goals of empowering Governance.
Hires
Our team is currently made up of 16 individuals, focused on Growth, Operations, Legal, Governance, and our Developer Platform. You can take a look at our current team makeup here.
Over the next year, we plan to make at least 12 hires in order to support our achievement of the goals we have laid out. As mentioned above, our increase in team size reflects the increase in the investment we are making to grow and strengthen the Protocol and community.
To provide one example, our Governance team (currently 1 person) initially focused on Uniswap v3 governance. Looking into 2025, its scope will expand (or in some cases has already expanded) to include Optimism governance, Conditional Funding Markets, the Core Contributor Program, as governance activities related to Uniswap v4 and Unichain. Our hiring to build our Governance team reflects that.
As part of the Foundation’s commitment to transparency and accountability, we provide regular reporting on funding, impact, and financials, with recurring community and delegate IRL and virtual events.
In 2025, alongside a successful funding proposal, we will initiate a set of regular sessions with a small group of representative delegates to review and discuss the UF’s strategic direction and execution.
2024 Bi-Annual Impact Reports:
2024 Quarterly Financial Reports:
2024 Allocation Memos & Grant Announcements
Community Resources:
Delegate Events:
Who is on the current team?
Our current team makeup is below.
What is your liquidation and treasury management strategy?
Our liquidation and treasury management strategy is designed to balance operational needs, market impact minimization, and a demonstration of long-term commitment to the community. We plan to gradually liquidate a portion of our holdings for operations and grant expenses with the goal of protecting against downside risk while maintaining upside potential. This approach will be implemented through vetted experienced organizations to ensure optimal execution.
To minimize our impact on the market and demonstrate our long-term commitment, we plan to hold ~50% of requested funds requested in UNI in the near term. This of course may change over time, however we do aim to maintain a portion of our treasury in UNI long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.
How does the Unichain Growth Reserve, mentioned in your recent UVN blog post, intersect with these plans?
When the UVN launches, 65% of Unichain net chain revenue will be earned by UVN validators and stakers for their work. Until the UVN launches, the UF will direct this chain revenue to support Unichain growth efforts through a Unichain Growth Reserve. Specifically, the UF will allocate these funds, net of applicable taxes, towards our Unichain growth programs. This may include our liquidity incentive program and our developer growth initiatives. Reporting on Unichain Growth Reserve inflow and expenditure will be provided in the Uniswap Foundation’s regular Quarterly Reports, and posted to the Uniswap Governance Forum.
What happened with the Unistaker governance vote last year?
While we were initially optimistic we would be able to pass the Unistaker upgrade proposal, various concerns emerged relating to liability, tax, and securities concerns as we continued our diligence and discussions. It might be possible to mitigate those concerns using different mechanisms than were initially contemplated such as the creation of, upon a successful governance vote, one or more legal entities for Governance. We are currently exploring and plan to publicly report on the potential benefits and risks of legal entity formation by Uniswap Governance.
What is the Router Incentives subsidy?
Our Routing Subsidy program is designed to incentivize swap routers, including solvers and fillers, to send order flow to hooked pools over a period of 9 months. If a router sends trades via hooked pool(s), it will be eligible to rebate up to 80% of transaction fees incurred on that trade.
Can you tell me more about the Foundation's capital efficiency?
More financial data related to our capital efficiency is below.
Our capital efficiency today is comparable to that of other leading Foundations.
Sources: Linux Foundation, Arbitrum Foundation, Mozilla Foundation
How has the Uniswap Foundation engaged in the changing regulatory landscape?
In 2024, the UF engaged informally with staffers of Congress members, the administration, and regulatory agencies, and crypto lobbying groups to advocate for DeFi to push for regulatory clarity, governance certainty, and builder protections. Recognizing the pivot from enforcement to dialogue, UF has engaged with the SEC Crypto Task Force, CFTC, and key Congressional committees to help shape DeFi policy. The UF is well-positioned to expand these efforts and excited to explore opportunities here in the next year.
Onchain vote here:
https://www.tally.xyz/gov/uniswap/proposal/83
https://vote.uniswapfoundation.org/proposals/83
Voting closes 4 am EST on March 19 2025
March 13: To calculate the amount of UNI we requested, we used the open price - $5.93 - on the day the proposal was posted, March 11, 2025.
An analysis of the onchain impact of this proposal can be found in the actions tab of our seatbelt repo: https://github.com/uniswapfoundation/governance-seatbelt/actions/runs/13834152988. If you log in to Github, you can download the Uniswap artifact at the bottom of that page and review the reports.
March 6: Based on feedback we have received over the last several weeks, we are excited to explore ways to tighten feedback loops between the UF and Uniswap delegates.
We are working with the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) to define key characteristics of a forum for this feedback — including core outputs, participants, meeting cadence, and topics. Our goal is to create a council of stakeholders external to the UF who are privy to the ongoings of the DAO, aiming to increase accountability and transparency between the UF and the DAO. We are kicking off scoping meetings next week (week of March 10) to determine how this council will be structured, and we'll jointly update the community on the output of this effort during the April 8 governance community call. We aim to hold our first UF <> Council meeting by May 8.
The Uniswap Accountability Committee was first established to help guide prospective new chains as they deployed Uniswap contracts. Since then, it has become the DAO-led accountability team that helps manage and oversee various initiatives. The team is focused on effective coordination of multiple DAO initiatives, including oversight, payment and accounting for DAO-approved programs. This also includes deployment and incentives allocation across chains for Uniswap v3 (v4 in the workings), and coordination of community-driven communications. UAC members have a close grasp of the DAO’s ongoing responsibilities and are therefore strong candidates for interfacing with the UF to design a stronger accountability interface. You can read their most recent report here.
Snapshot here: https://snapshot.box/#/s:uniswapgovernance.eth/proposal/0x424f821d0378b7152e02cbcfedf12c1c3aa2af5fe50b0476cdadfc4269892b4b
Voting closes March 2, 2025
[Feb 16: additions to ‘Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities’ and ‘Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations’ charts, described here]
The Uniswap community is entering 2025 with the momentum of three positive catalysts: a more collaborative regulatory environment, the launch of Uniswap v4, and the debut of Unichain. As we look to the months and years ahead, we see the potential for Uniswap Protocol and Unichain to cement themselves as foundational infrastructure for digital value transfer.
The Uniswap community has always pioneered—but pioneers don’t stay ahead by standing still. Achieving this vision will require more than just technological innovation; it demands strengthening network effects and evolving our governance system to fund, sustain, and grow the Protocol independently over time. We call for action, and for the broader community to work alongside us as we evolve Uniswap to its next era.
In the following proposal, we define four strategic priorities for the years ahead:
In the following proposal, we discuss not only these priorities but also how we expect to achieve them alongside the community and how we, the UF, will measure our success. We also discuss our budget request to achieve these goals. Today we are also posting a request for incentives to support the growth of Uniswap v4 and Unichain. If approved, these funds would be managed, within pre-set parameters and onchain, by Gauntlet, while having control maintained by Uniswap Governance.
In this proposal, we are requesting an investment of $95.4M into the UF grants budget, and $25.1M to fund operations, for the next 2 years to fund these priorities. In a separate incentives proposal posted today, we request a $45M budget to support liquidity incentives.
We recognize and appreciate the size of this request. It reflects an investment into the success of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, and into value for the Uniswap community. Founded in 2022 with a singular focus on Uniswap v3, the UF now leads the growth of the developer ecosystem for a true developer platform in Uniswap v4, and an L2, Unichain. In addition, we are levelling up Governance to support long term sustainability with the creation of a Core Contributor program, new tooling like Conditional Funding markets, and more.
This proposal is an investment into the future of the Uniswap community. It is designed to match the scale of our mission while being backstopped by best-in-industry transparency reporting and an unrelenting drive to create value.
Over the last year, we have worked hand in hand with our grantees, developers, delegates, and other supporters to lay a strong foundation to support us on the road ahead. As a result of that work, today we have achieved:
Along the way, the Foundation has evolved to a team of 16 individuals, working across Growth, Protocol & Engineering, Governance, Legal, and Operations.
You can read more about our community’s accomplishments in 2024 in our Community Impact Report.
The long term successes of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain are tied not only to their network effects, but also the governance system which can sustain and evolve them.
For the Protocol to become the world’s infrastructure for digital value transfer, we must strengthen these network effects while equipping Uniswap Governance with more tools to interact with offchain entities and make effective funding decisions. If we are successful, we not only grow the Protocol and Unichain in the short term, but we create a mechanism by which Governance can continue to develop them over time and independently.
To grow network effects, we’re focused on cultivating both supply – liquidity infrastructure for both the Protocol and Unichain – and demand – developers, integrators, and interfaces. As with all network effects, the cultivation of one side drives the growth of the other, building a self-reinforcing loop.
Over a medium to long term timeframe, however, network effects can be disrupted by competitors. Uniswap Governance, with its control over the Treasury, must evolve to ensure the Protocol remains competitive. We are focused on equipping Governance with the tooling to make adaptive, high-ROI funding decisions without reliance upon any one entity over a long time horizon.
This year we have defined four strategic priorities to strengthen network effects and empower Governance to execute on high impact, long term decisions to keep the Uniswap community at the forefront of DeFi.
First we address supply, or how we will support the development of liquid markets across Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, respectively.
Priority 1: Provide most capital efficiency across active EVM chains
Uniswap v4 and Unichain, both recently launched, stand to significantly expand their respective market share through offering innovative AMM functionality and novel infrastructure. However, this won’t happen on its own. Today the UF has posted a proposal with longtime collaborators at Gauntlet to fund $45M in incentive programs. In that post, we also lay out the strategic rationale and tactical execution of those programs in detail.
Unichain and v4 have launched into a market in which there is intense competition for liquidity. For instance, some competing AMMs and chains spend upwards of $50M per month in native tokens to support liquidity. We take these factors into account in the design of our program.
Our long-term goal is not to put in place or encourage perpetual incentivization. Rather, lasting impact will come from strengthened organic demand to sustain liquidity. This brings us to our next focus, the demand side of the equation, our plans to support and grow our developer community.
Priority 2: Create premier DeFi developer platforms
Uniswap v4 has reduced the friction for anyone to innovate upon digital asset market structures. Thus far, our programs have directly taught 1,000+ developers to learn how to build hundreds of hooks. Unichain is similarly optimized for DeFi development, and allows for experimentation at all levels of the stack.
Our planned initiatives include funding programs, infrastructure, and education to support developers through the hook development lifecycle, as illustrated below. These programs benefit developers across all Uniswap v4 deployments.
We are excited to lead ecosystem development efforts for Unichain – a chain designed with DeFi in mind. Some of the Unichain specific programs we have designed include Developer Growth Programs (Infinite Hackathon, Retro Grants Program, and the Unichain Builder Open Call), a Unichain Infrastructure Allocation, a Unichain DeFi Partner Allocation, and an upcoming Unigames competition. We also support a global program of Developer Ambassadors and a full-time Developer Support team.
Success in this priority means increasing the percentage of volume flowing to hooks on v4, growing the number of revenue-generating hook developers and integrators, and expanding Unichain’s builder ecosystem. Developer success would in turn not only sustain but grow demand for underlying liquidity, reinforcing our network effects.
However, sustainable growth also requires unlocking revenue and enabling Governance with the tools to ensure continued innovation and development. To solidify the Uniswap community’s place at the forefront of DeFi, we must also explore ways to empower and evolve our Governance system to align incentives, adapt to change, and sustain growth.
Priority 3: Activate revenue
We recently announced that 65% of Unichain net chain revenue would be earned by UVN validators and stakers, upon the launch of the UVN. The UF plans to develop and support the UVN validator and staker network, and explore supporting the development of UVN extensions later this year as well.
In addition to this step, the UF is also validating whether the creation of a legal entity (e.g., a DUNA), would be appropriate for Uniswap Governance. A legal entity may offer benefits to Governance including clarity on legal status, the ability to contract with other entities (like development teams), and more. If our vetting is successful and we believe the creation of a legal entity for Uniswap Governance is in its best interest, we would propose to Governance to implement a legal entity structure. If adopted, this step would pave the way for the potential introduction (or re-introduction) of a governance proposal for delegators to earn Protocol revenue. We could then create similar governance proposals for either select or all deployments of Uniswap.
Success here sets up the community up well for working alongside the UF in our last strategic priority.
Priority 4: Onboard new Protocol Core Contributors
To sustain itself over the long term, we must equip Uniswap Governance with the tools to fund and incentivize development teams and other initiatives to drive innovation and growth for the long term. To enable this, we are exploring the creation of a new community driven initiative – Core Contributors. While final details will be refined with delegates, our goal is to establish long-term, incentive aligned development teams responsible for advancing the Uniswap infrastructure.
In this proposal, we are requesting an investment of $95.4M into the UF grants budget, and $25.1M to fund operations, for the next 2 years to fund these priorities. These figures are net of cash on hand. As mentioned above, we recognize and appreciate the size of this request. It reflects an investment into the success of the Uniswap Protocol and Unichain, and into value for the Uniswap community, and will be backstopped by best-in-industry transparency reporting and an unrelenting drive to create value.
Our program also demonstrates strong capital allocation efficiency. In 2024, our operational and grants expenditure ratio aligned closely with industry standards for leading foundations, at approximately 39% for operations and 61% for grants. Looking ahead, we project this ratio will improve even further, reaching an all-time ratio of 29% for operations and 71% for grants by 2026. These figures demonstrate a focus on maximizing resources for impactful initiatives while maintaining operational sustainability. Additional details can be found in the appendix.
Our projected grants budgets for 2025 and 2026 are $57.9M and $41.5M respectively, totalling $99.4M.
Our projected operational budget in cash for 2025 and 2026 is $24.8M. Projected UNI compensation over that time period is 1.5M UNI (or $13.8M USD at Feb 11 opening rate of $9.45).
Our grant program, including each of the grants programs listed above, are focused on driving the success of and value for the Uniswap community.
Each grant includes clear performance targets that grantees must hit to unlock funding at key milestones. These targets include: notional TVL, notional volume, % market share of volume, number of developers onboarded, number of integrations unlocked, and more. If a grant fails to deliver its intended impact, we have the ability to terminate it early, and reallocate funds to other initiatives.
By holding grantees accountable to measurable outcomes, we ensure that every dollar spent strengthens protocol network effects or supports our goals of empowering Governance.
Hires
Our team is currently made up of 16 individuals, focused on Growth, Operations, Legal, Governance, and our Developer Platform. You can take a look at our current team makeup here.
Over the next year, we plan to make at least 12 hires in order to support our achievement of the goals we have laid out. As mentioned above, our increase in team size reflects the increase in the investment we are making to grow and strengthen the Protocol and community.
To provide one example, our Governance team (currently 1 person) initially focused on Uniswap v3 governance. Looking into 2025, its scope will expand (or in some cases has already expanded) to include Optimism governance, Conditional Funding Markets, the Core Contributor Program, as governance activities related to Uniswap v4 and Unichain. Our hiring to build our Governance team reflects that.
As part of the Foundation’s commitment to transparency and accountability, we provide regular reporting on funding, impact, and financials, with recurring community and delegate IRL and virtual events.
In 2025, alongside a successful funding proposal, we will initiate a set of regular sessions with a small group of representative delegates to review and discuss the UF’s strategic direction and execution.
2024 Bi-Annual Impact Reports:
2024 Quarterly Financial Reports:
2024 Allocation Memos & Grant Announcements
Community Resources:
Delegate Events:
Who is on the current team?
Our current team makeup is below.
What is your liquidation and treasury management strategy?
Our liquidation and treasury management strategy is designed to balance operational needs, market impact minimization, and a demonstration of long-term commitment to the community. We plan to gradually liquidate a portion of our holdings for operations and grant expenses with the goal of protecting against downside risk while maintaining upside potential. This approach will be implemented through vetted experienced organizations to ensure optimal execution.
To minimize our impact on the market and demonstrate our long-term commitment, we plan to hold ~50% of requested funds requested in UNI in the near term. This of course may change over time, however we do aim to maintain a portion of our treasury in UNI long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.
How does the Unichain Growth Reserve, mentioned in your recent UVN blog post, intersect with these plans?
When the UVN launches, 65% of Unichain net chain revenue will be earned by UVN validators and stakers for their work. Until the UVN launches, the UF will direct this chain revenue to support Unichain growth efforts through a Unichain Growth Reserve. Specifically, the UF will allocate these funds, net of applicable taxes, towards our Unichain growth programs. This may include our liquidity incentive program and our developer growth initiatives. Reporting on Unichain Growth Reserve inflow and expenditure will be provided in the Uniswap Foundation’s regular Quarterly Reports, and posted to the Uniswap Governance Forum.
What happened with the Unistaker governance vote last year?
While we were initially optimistic we would be able to pass the Unistaker upgrade proposal, various concerns emerged relating to liability, tax, and securities concerns as we continued our diligence and discussions. It might be possible to mitigate those concerns using different mechanisms than were initially contemplated such as the creation of, upon a successful governance vote, one or more legal entities for Governance. We are currently exploring and plan to publicly report on the potential benefits and risks of legal entity formation by Uniswap Governance.
What is the Router Incentives subsidy?
Our Routing Subsidy program is designed to incentivize swap routers, including solvers and fillers, to send order flow to hooked pools over a period of 9 months. If a router sends trades via hooked pool(s), it will be eligible to rebate up to 80% of transaction fees incurred on that trade.
Can you tell me more about the Foundation's capital efficiency?
More financial data related to our capital efficiency is below.
Our capital efficiency today is comparable to that of other leading Foundations.
Sources: Linux Foundation, Arbitrum Foundation, Mozilla Foundation
How has the Uniswap Foundation engaged in the changing regulatory landscape?
In 2024, the UF engaged informally with staffers of Congress members, the administration, and regulatory agencies, and crypto lobbying groups to advocate for DeFi to push for regulatory clarity, governance certainty, and builder protections. Recognizing the pivot from enforcement to dialogue, UF has engaged with the SEC Crypto Task Force, CFTC, and key Congressional committees to help shape DeFi policy. The UF is well-positioned to expand these efforts and excited to explore opportunities here in the next year.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/pepo-delegate-platform/24896/15?u=pepo
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/pepo-delegate-platform/24896/15?u=pepo
$95M is a high grants budget, but Uniswap Foundation has shown it's done a good job on growing the # of devs and hooks during 2024. Grants should be focused on kicking off venture-backable hook projects, DeFi partnerships to grow Uniswap, etc. Events should be larger and attract more people to keep Uniswap's mindshare as a product across all the chains it's deployed on.
We strongly recommend the Uniswap Foundation to reconsider how it wants to move forward with grants. One approach could be for the Foundation to present a monthly or quarterly list of grants for DAO approval, with comments explaining the recommendations. Alternatively, a more narrow list and budget for grants might be considered. Traditionally, Uniswap Governance utilizes Snapshot (offchain voting) for sentiment, allowing onchain proposals to incorporate more details or edits as needed. We voted to abstain at this time, anticipating that the outlined concerns will be addressed in future iterations. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-unleashed/25251?u=doo_stablelab
Given current legal/regulatory constraints, I think there's no way that we can get around having some sort of trustful relationship between Uniswap DAO and UF / Labs respectively. The good news is that UF has proven itself to be a good steward of capital with strong values alignment, and same can be said for Labs (they have continued to work on projects that largely benefit UNI, the protocol, and DAO without any strict legal requirement to do so). Transparency and community engagement are positive, but I think its also important to let them cook.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-unleashed/25251/23?u=gfxlabs
$95M is a high grants budget, but Uniswap Foundation has shown it's done a good job on growing the # of devs and hooks during 2024. Grants should be focused on kicking off venture-backable hook projects, DeFi partnerships to grow Uniswap, etc. Events should be larger and attract more people to keep Uniswap's mindshare as a product across all the chains it's deployed on.
We strongly recommend the Uniswap Foundation to reconsider how it wants to move forward with grants. One approach could be for the Foundation to present a monthly or quarterly list of grants for DAO approval, with comments explaining the recommendations. Alternatively, a more narrow list and budget for grants might be considered. Traditionally, Uniswap Governance utilizes Snapshot (offchain voting) for sentiment, allowing onchain proposals to incorporate more details or edits as needed. We voted to abstain at this time, anticipating that the outlined concerns will be addressed in future iterations. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-unleashed/25251?u=doo_stablelab
Given current legal/regulatory constraints, I think there's no way that we can get around having some sort of trustful relationship between Uniswap DAO and UF / Labs respectively. The good news is that UF has proven itself to be a good steward of capital with strong values alignment, and same can be said for Labs (they have continued to work on projects that largely benefit UNI, the protocol, and DAO without any strict legal requirement to do so). Transparency and community engagement are positive, but I think its also important to let them cook.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-unleashed/25251/23?u=gfxlabs
Blockchain at Berkeley voted to ABSTAIN. Voting justification here: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/calblockchain-blockchain-at-berkeley-delegate-platform/25378/4?u=calblockchain
Having worked closely with UF in running some of these programs, we've seen first-hand their professionalism and commitment to protecting and expanding Uniswap’s market-leading position. With significant growth opportunities ahead, particularly with Unichain and Hooks, it feels like now is the time to double down on this type of initiative. We feel added confidence with this request given the transparency and level of detail outlined in UF’s Community Impact Report; this emphasis on reporting back to the community aligns with our priorities at Areta.
For us, a key focus is on increasing visibility for builder activity in Hooks, which we see as the focal point of Uniswap v4. It is critical to build a support funnel for hooks development from inception to growth to make sure the level of demand for liquidity consistently increases. The UF has already taken the right steps in this regard; Atrium Academy’s Hooks Incubator is a great initiative to drive hooks development and adoption forward, while we see the UFSF as a core support pillar for all hooks builders. Further filling out this support funnel through Routing Subsidies, the Public Good and Chain-Optimised Hook Allocations, etc., will only help hooks mature faster and ensure that the demand side of the equation is fulfilled.
Having worked closely with UF in running some of these programs, we've seen first-hand their professionalism and commitment to protecting and expanding Uniswap’s market-leading position. With significant growth opportunities ahead, particularly with Unichain and Hooks, it feels like now is the time to double down on this type of initiative. We feel added confidence with this request given the transparency and level of detail outlined in UF’s Community Impact Report; this emphasis on reporting back to the community aligns with our priorities at Areta.
For us, a key focus is on increasing visibility for builder activity in Hooks, which we see as the focal point of Uniswap v4. It is critical to build a support funnel for hooks development from inception to growth to make sure the level of demand for liquidity consistently increases. The UF has already taken the right steps in this regard; Atrium Academy’s Hooks Incubator is a great initiative to drive hooks development and adoption forward, while we see the UFSF as a core support pillar for all hooks builders. Further filling out this support funnel through Routing Subsidies, the Public Good and Chain-Optimised Hook Allocations, etc., will only help hooks mature faster and ensure that the demand side of the equation is fulfilled.
Regarding Unichain, we see its growth as crucial to consolidating Uniswap’s market-leading position. We agree with @AbdullahUmar - the DAO isn’t meant to operate strictly to generate profit for itself, but rather is meant to support and steward the Uniswap ecosystem while providing value to tokenholders. One of the core ways for the DAO to support tokenholders at this time is by supporting Unichain growth and activity and increasing the UVN fees it accrues. As such, we think the initiatives outlined to generate core demand on Unichain are strong. We also agree with Abdullah’s points that there is some work that needs to be done to ensure equitable investment and fee splits between Labs and the DAO. We’re glad that efforts to ensure greater collaboration and communication between the UF, delegates, and core contributors have already begun.
All in all, we’re supportive of this proposal and see it as a strong signal for the future of Uniswap.
Separately, @drllau_LexDAO, thanks for the question.
The Cooley and Placeholdr legal exercise you mentioned was funded through a UAGP grant, so we’re happy to provide an update here. Broadly, the remit of the grant is to analyse the potential regulatory, civil, and tax liabilities of participants in the Uniswap ecosystem.
Ultimately, the grant will culminate in a blueprint, suggesting various practical and structuring recommendations that should minimise/mitigate participants’ potential liability. The outcomes of this legal exercise are still being finalised and will be shared with the DAO once prepared. Further, these findings will be complementary to the existing legal efforts outlined in this discussion thread.
I hope this helps clarify your questions and obviously we can provide more details when the exercise wraps up!
Hi all, for those of you who do not know me, I am Brian Nistler, the General Counsel of the Uniswap Foundation. While I do not typically post in the forum, I felt it important to make an exception to address the comments regarding the UF’s Board of Directors. I want to note and remind everyone that as the GC of the Foundation, none of the below should be taken as legal advice to any particular delegate or to Uniswap Governance as a whole but is an overview of my concerns regarding the Board comments.
Having Uniswap Governance elect the Board of Directors (referred to as the legal board in some comments) is, from a corporate governance, legal, and regulatory lens, a potentially huge risk for Uniswap Governance, Uniswap delegates, and the Uniswap Foundation that should not be taken lightly.
Hi all, for those of you who do not know me, I am Brian Nistler, the General Counsel of the Uniswap Foundation. While I do not typically post in the forum, I felt it important to make an exception to address the comments regarding the UF’s Board of Directors. I want to note and remind everyone that as the GC of the Foundation, none of the below should be taken as legal advice to any particular delegate or to Uniswap Governance as a whole but is an overview of my concerns regarding the Board comments.
Having Uniswap Governance elect the Board of Directors (referred to as the legal board in some comments) is, from a corporate governance, legal, and regulatory lens, a potentially huge risk for Uniswap Governance, Uniswap delegates, and the Uniswap Foundation that should not be taken lightly.
As you all know, the Uniswap Foundation is distinct and separate from Uniswap Governance. Uniswap Foundation is ultimately accountable to the DAO via our fund request process. Further, as the above proposal outlines we are ensuring that the Uniswap Foundation continues to maintain alignment with the success of the protocol via our committed holdings and employee vesting denominated in UNI. That said, it is imperative that the Uniswap Foundation maintain legal and operational independence, as is typical for similar foundations to maintain from their donors.
If Uniswap Governance were to control the election of the Board of the Uniswap Foundation, this independence and separation would be jeopardized. Plaintiffs’ firms could attempt to exploit some perceived non-independence and hold the DAO liable for the acts of the Uniswap Foundation or vice versa. In several recent private plaintiff litigations in our space, we have seen firms lump all ecosystem participants together to argue a common enterprise (e.g., ongoing class actions regarding Lido and Compound) and use novel and untested theories of liability, securities law, and other state claims to hold DAOs and their respective treasuries liable for certain actions. Implementing the proposal to have Governance elect the Board may make it easier for those firms to make these arguments and place the Uniswap Foundation, delegates, token holders, and other community participants at increased risk.
A federal or state entity could make a similar argument and group Uniswap Foundation and Uniswap Governance together in a regulatory investigation or action. While we have seen a dramatic shift from parts of the new federal administration, we should still tread carefully and continue to be thoughtful in how these proposals will affect the potential expansion of an attack surface for those who wish to take advantage of Governance or the Uniswap Treasury. Several states are still hostile to our industry.
I wanted this post to come directly from me, given the negative legal impact that Governance electing a Board may have. I know that Devin will follow up with her thoughts on how we can ensure the Uniswap Foundation continues to maintain a high level of transparency and input from Uniswap Governance. The Uniswap Foundation clearly understands Governance's desire for increased involvement and is working through ideas to make that happen.
Blockchain at Berkeley voted to ABSTAIN. Voting justification here: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/calblockchain-blockchain-at-berkeley-delegate-platform/25378/4?u=calblockchain
Having worked closely with UF in running some of these programs, we've seen first-hand their professionalism and commitment to protecting and expanding Uniswap’s market-leading position. With significant growth opportunities ahead, particularly with Unichain and Hooks, it feels like now is the time to double down on this type of initiative. We feel added confidence with this request given the transparency and level of detail outlined in UF’s Community Impact Report; this emphasis on reporting back to the community aligns with our priorities at Areta.
For us, a key focus is on increasing visibility for builder activity in Hooks, which we see as the focal point of Uniswap v4. It is critical to build a support funnel for hooks development from inception to growth to make sure the level of demand for liquidity consistently increases. The UF has already taken the right steps in this regard; Atrium Academy’s Hooks Incubator is a great initiative to drive hooks development and adoption forward, while we see the UFSF as a core support pillar for all hooks builders. Further filling out this support funnel through Routing Subsidies, the Public Good and Chain-Optimised Hook Allocations, etc., will only help hooks mature faster and ensure that the demand side of the equation is fulfilled.
Having worked closely with UF in running some of these programs, we've seen first-hand their professionalism and commitment to protecting and expanding Uniswap’s market-leading position. With significant growth opportunities ahead, particularly with Unichain and Hooks, it feels like now is the time to double down on this type of initiative. We feel added confidence with this request given the transparency and level of detail outlined in UF’s Community Impact Report; this emphasis on reporting back to the community aligns with our priorities at Areta.
For us, a key focus is on increasing visibility for builder activity in Hooks, which we see as the focal point of Uniswap v4. It is critical to build a support funnel for hooks development from inception to growth to make sure the level of demand for liquidity consistently increases. The UF has already taken the right steps in this regard; Atrium Academy’s Hooks Incubator is a great initiative to drive hooks development and adoption forward, while we see the UFSF as a core support pillar for all hooks builders. Further filling out this support funnel through Routing Subsidies, the Public Good and Chain-Optimised Hook Allocations, etc., will only help hooks mature faster and ensure that the demand side of the equation is fulfilled.
Regarding Unichain, we see its growth as crucial to consolidating Uniswap’s market-leading position. We agree with @AbdullahUmar - the DAO isn’t meant to operate strictly to generate profit for itself, but rather is meant to support and steward the Uniswap ecosystem while providing value to tokenholders. One of the core ways for the DAO to support tokenholders at this time is by supporting Unichain growth and activity and increasing the UVN fees it accrues. As such, we think the initiatives outlined to generate core demand on Unichain are strong. We also agree with Abdullah’s points that there is some work that needs to be done to ensure equitable investment and fee splits between Labs and the DAO. We’re glad that efforts to ensure greater collaboration and communication between the UF, delegates, and core contributors have already begun.
All in all, we’re supportive of this proposal and see it as a strong signal for the future of Uniswap.
Separately, @drllau_LexDAO, thanks for the question.
The Cooley and Placeholdr legal exercise you mentioned was funded through a UAGP grant, so we’re happy to provide an update here. Broadly, the remit of the grant is to analyse the potential regulatory, civil, and tax liabilities of participants in the Uniswap ecosystem.
Ultimately, the grant will culminate in a blueprint, suggesting various practical and structuring recommendations that should minimise/mitigate participants’ potential liability. The outcomes of this legal exercise are still being finalised and will be shared with the DAO once prepared. Further, these findings will be complementary to the existing legal efforts outlined in this discussion thread.
I hope this helps clarify your questions and obviously we can provide more details when the exercise wraps up!
Hi all, for those of you who do not know me, I am Brian Nistler, the General Counsel of the Uniswap Foundation. While I do not typically post in the forum, I felt it important to make an exception to address the comments regarding the UF’s Board of Directors. I want to note and remind everyone that as the GC of the Foundation, none of the below should be taken as legal advice to any particular delegate or to Uniswap Governance as a whole but is an overview of my concerns regarding the Board comments.
Having Uniswap Governance elect the Board of Directors (referred to as the legal board in some comments) is, from a corporate governance, legal, and regulatory lens, a potentially huge risk for Uniswap Governance, Uniswap delegates, and the Uniswap Foundation that should not be taken lightly.
Hi all, for those of you who do not know me, I am Brian Nistler, the General Counsel of the Uniswap Foundation. While I do not typically post in the forum, I felt it important to make an exception to address the comments regarding the UF’s Board of Directors. I want to note and remind everyone that as the GC of the Foundation, none of the below should be taken as legal advice to any particular delegate or to Uniswap Governance as a whole but is an overview of my concerns regarding the Board comments.
Having Uniswap Governance elect the Board of Directors (referred to as the legal board in some comments) is, from a corporate governance, legal, and regulatory lens, a potentially huge risk for Uniswap Governance, Uniswap delegates, and the Uniswap Foundation that should not be taken lightly.
As you all know, the Uniswap Foundation is distinct and separate from Uniswap Governance. Uniswap Foundation is ultimately accountable to the DAO via our fund request process. Further, as the above proposal outlines we are ensuring that the Uniswap Foundation continues to maintain alignment with the success of the protocol via our committed holdings and employee vesting denominated in UNI. That said, it is imperative that the Uniswap Foundation maintain legal and operational independence, as is typical for similar foundations to maintain from their donors.
If Uniswap Governance were to control the election of the Board of the Uniswap Foundation, this independence and separation would be jeopardized. Plaintiffs’ firms could attempt to exploit some perceived non-independence and hold the DAO liable for the acts of the Uniswap Foundation or vice versa. In several recent private plaintiff litigations in our space, we have seen firms lump all ecosystem participants together to argue a common enterprise (e.g., ongoing class actions regarding Lido and Compound) and use novel and untested theories of liability, securities law, and other state claims to hold DAOs and their respective treasuries liable for certain actions. Implementing the proposal to have Governance elect the Board may make it easier for those firms to make these arguments and place the Uniswap Foundation, delegates, token holders, and other community participants at increased risk.
A federal or state entity could make a similar argument and group Uniswap Foundation and Uniswap Governance together in a regulatory investigation or action. While we have seen a dramatic shift from parts of the new federal administration, we should still tread carefully and continue to be thoughtful in how these proposals will affect the potential expansion of an attack surface for those who wish to take advantage of Governance or the Uniswap Treasury. Several states are still hostile to our industry.
I wanted this post to come directly from me, given the negative legal impact that Governance electing a Board may have. I know that Devin will follow up with her thoughts on how we can ensure the Uniswap Foundation continues to maintain a high level of transparency and input from Uniswap Governance. The Uniswap Foundation clearly understands Governance's desire for increased involvement and is working through ideas to make that happen.
I’m genuinely supporting its vision. The focus on creating a more collaborative regulatory environment, alongside the innovations of Uniswap v4 and the debut of Unichain, lays a solid foundation for transforming digital value transfer.
The four strategic priorities, scaling network supply and demand, activating revenue, and onboarding core contributors, are exactly the kinds of measures we need to drive sustainable, long-term growth. What really stands out is the balanced approach: it’s not just about cutting-edge technology but also about evolving our governance and regulatory strategies to build trust and credibility. By exploring legal entity formation and enhancing off-chain interactions, the proposal smartly tackles the hurdles to institutional adoption.
I’m genuinely supporting its vision. The focus on creating a more collaborative regulatory environment, alongside the innovations of Uniswap v4 and the debut of Unichain, lays a solid foundation for transforming digital value transfer.
The four strategic priorities, scaling network supply and demand, activating revenue, and onboarding core contributors, are exactly the kinds of measures we need to drive sustainable, long-term growth. What really stands out is the balanced approach: it’s not just about cutting-edge technology but also about evolving our governance and regulatory strategies to build trust and credibility. By exploring legal entity formation and enhancing off-chain interactions, the proposal smartly tackles the hurdles to institutional adoption.
From my perspective, aligning technological innovation with proactive regulatory evolution is key to setting a new standard of transparency and maturity in DeFi.
I’m excited to see how these initiatives will shape the future of Uniswap and the broader DeFi landscape.
Thank you @devinwalsh for this comprehensive and insightful post on UF growth plans for the next two years!
As a project that has been the beneficiary of the Uniswap Hook Incubator and the Uniswap Foundation Security Fund, I cannot emphasize enough how important these were to accelerating our development of hooks from both an educational and financial standpoint.
Thank you @devinwalsh for this comprehensive and insightful post on UF growth plans for the next two years!
As a project that has been the beneficiary of the Uniswap Hook Incubator and the Uniswap Foundation Security Fund, I cannot emphasize enough how important these were to accelerating our development of hooks from both an educational and financial standpoint.
Having gone through the incubator, we are also much more aware of the vast potential of V4 due to its gas optimization and limitless flexibility. The potential for groundbreaking innovation is all there, but that potential will be highly dependent on growing the number and quality of hook developers and having the proper routing infrastructure in place.
So I largely agree with the level of investment this proposal places on builders and infrastructure as well as the hiring of more developers and engineers. Best of luck!
Why is Aerodrome team member alt posting in the Uniswap forum 🤣🤣 Hey, bro, this is real DeFi happening here, I don't think you will understand. Don't you have some insider trading to get back to? 🤣🤣🤣
GO UNISWAP! GO Uniswap Foundation! Let's WIN!
Stakers and validators are going to be very seperate entities, one being token holders and the other being hardware and software operators. Both groups have different interests that will be competing for their share of this revenue stream (65% of Unichain net chain revenue will be earned by UVN validators and stakers for their work.)
What is the validator take rate? Is it fixed or is it variable for each validator? If there a maximum, or can a validator set up for a 100% take rate?
Stakers and validators are going to be very seperate entities, one being token holders and the other being hardware and software operators. Both groups have different interests that will be competing for their share of this revenue stream (65% of Unichain net chain revenue will be earned by UVN validators and stakers for their work.)
What is the validator take rate? Is it fixed or is it variable for each validator? If there a maximum, or can a validator set up for a 100% take rate?
This relationship needs to be clarified in the proposal so stakers have a better model to evaluate the proposal.
As Pepo and others have highlighted, we believe there needs to be greater clarity around Unichain’s governance structure under the DAO
As Pepo and others have highlighted, we believe there needs to be greater clarity around Unichain’s governance structure under the DAO
What clarity do you need? Unichain is not govern by the DAO. That is evident on chain, just read the source code.
I think this proposal is okay and I support. The Uniswap Foundation lead all activities for Uniswap development like the Uniswap Hook Incubator and the Uni staking. I would rather give the tokens to a single organization than one-offs to different DAO "professional governance organization" who work for many different DAOs and not just Uniswap DAO.
I’m genuinely supporting its vision. The focus on creating a more collaborative regulatory environment, alongside the innovations of Uniswap v4 and the debut of Unichain, lays a solid foundation for transforming digital value transfer.
The four strategic priorities, scaling network supply and demand, activating revenue, and onboarding core contributors, are exactly the kinds of measures we need to drive sustainable, long-term growth. What really stands out is the balanced approach: it’s not just about cutting-edge technology but also about evolving our governance and regulatory strategies to build trust and credibility. By exploring legal entity formation and enhancing off-chain interactions, the proposal smartly tackles the hurdles to institutional adoption.
I’m genuinely supporting its vision. The focus on creating a more collaborative regulatory environment, alongside the innovations of Uniswap v4 and the debut of Unichain, lays a solid foundation for transforming digital value transfer.
The four strategic priorities, scaling network supply and demand, activating revenue, and onboarding core contributors, are exactly the kinds of measures we need to drive sustainable, long-term growth. What really stands out is the balanced approach: it’s not just about cutting-edge technology but also about evolving our governance and regulatory strategies to build trust and credibility. By exploring legal entity formation and enhancing off-chain interactions, the proposal smartly tackles the hurdles to institutional adoption.
From my perspective, aligning technological innovation with proactive regulatory evolution is key to setting a new standard of transparency and maturity in DeFi.
I’m excited to see how these initiatives will shape the future of Uniswap and the broader DeFi landscape.
Thank you @devinwalsh for this comprehensive and insightful post on UF growth plans for the next two years!
As a project that has been the beneficiary of the Uniswap Hook Incubator and the Uniswap Foundation Security Fund, I cannot emphasize enough how important these were to accelerating our development of hooks from both an educational and financial standpoint.
Thank you @devinwalsh for this comprehensive and insightful post on UF growth plans for the next two years!
As a project that has been the beneficiary of the Uniswap Hook Incubator and the Uniswap Foundation Security Fund, I cannot emphasize enough how important these were to accelerating our development of hooks from both an educational and financial standpoint.
Having gone through the incubator, we are also much more aware of the vast potential of V4 due to its gas optimization and limitless flexibility. The potential for groundbreaking innovation is all there, but that potential will be highly dependent on growing the number and quality of hook developers and having the proper routing infrastructure in place.
So I largely agree with the level of investment this proposal places on builders and infrastructure as well as the hiring of more developers and engineers. Best of luck!
Why is Aerodrome team member alt posting in the Uniswap forum 🤣🤣 Hey, bro, this is real DeFi happening here, I don't think you will understand. Don't you have some insider trading to get back to? 🤣🤣🤣
GO UNISWAP! GO Uniswap Foundation! Let's WIN!
Stakers and validators are going to be very seperate entities, one being token holders and the other being hardware and software operators. Both groups have different interests that will be competing for their share of this revenue stream (65% of Unichain net chain revenue will be earned by UVN validators and stakers for their work.)
What is the validator take rate? Is it fixed or is it variable for each validator? If there a maximum, or can a validator set up for a 100% take rate?
Stakers and validators are going to be very seperate entities, one being token holders and the other being hardware and software operators. Both groups have different interests that will be competing for their share of this revenue stream (65% of Unichain net chain revenue will be earned by UVN validators and stakers for their work.)
What is the validator take rate? Is it fixed or is it variable for each validator? If there a maximum, or can a validator set up for a 100% take rate?
This relationship needs to be clarified in the proposal so stakers have a better model to evaluate the proposal.
As Pepo and others have highlighted, we believe there needs to be greater clarity around Unichain’s governance structure under the DAO
As Pepo and others have highlighted, we believe there needs to be greater clarity around Unichain’s governance structure under the DAO
What clarity do you need? Unichain is not govern by the DAO. That is evident on chain, just read the source code.
I think this proposal is okay and I support. The Uniswap Foundation lead all activities for Uniswap development like the Uniswap Hook Incubator and the Uni staking. I would rather give the tokens to a single organization than one-offs to different DAO "professional governance organization" who work for many different DAOs and not just Uniswap DAO.
As we note above, we plan to maintain approximately 50% of our Treasury in UNI over the short to medium term, and to continue to maintain a portion of our Treasury in UNI over the long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.
As we note above, we plan to maintain approximately 50% of our Treasury in UNI over the short to medium term, and to continue to maintain a portion of our Treasury in UNI over the long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.
The problem I see is ultimately of balancing the books. If the DAO doesn’t have sufficient income from operations, and spends more than the income from yield, the treasury will go to zero.
This is the $2B question on treasury sustainability. For every $1 given to UF, I conjecture up to $10 needs to be liquidated for the stability fund (hypothetical 16% yield less 20% capgain or 8.5% profits tax).
The bigger the ask, the more downward pressure on UNI-fiat conversion. Are there enough opportunities that yield 16% (which is itself highly optimistic) Looking at the UNI price chart (since 2021), will the overhang persist for years?
Whilst I haven't seen the treasury investment statement, I'd note there are alternative diversification strategies:
By more adroit risk-management strategies, can improve capital productivity (without excessive liquidation of UNI) whilst still achieving the benefits UF identified.
The snapshot vote is already live. I’ve always appreciated your feedback on proposals, and the points you’ve raised are very valid. Unfortunately, they will not be addressed. When these types of proposals come to the forum, they are almost guaranteed to pass without change (e.g., the DEFI fund proposal). The direction of these proposals is influenced by the interests of specific groups (VCs, Uniswap Labs, etc.), and the incentives are misaligned. We’ll revisit this proposal in a few months or years and see how it all plays out.
I sympathize with the argument that the DAO itself may not attain direct and explicit benefit from Unichain. Sure, we could stake UNI from the treasury to attain some yield, but that would only reduce the yield towards staking token holders. And if the UF stakes, that would also cut into other token holders’ yield. Sounds like a net negative…even though we could run simulations to find an optimal staking ratio between the DAO/UF and token holders.
I sympathize with the argument that the DAO itself may not attain direct and explicit benefit from Unichain. Sure, we could stake UNI from the treasury to attain some yield, but that would only reduce the yield towards staking token holders. And if the UF stakes, that would also cut into other token holders’ yield. Sounds like a net negative…even though we could run simulations to find an optimal staking ratio between the DAO/UF and token holders.
Slightly off-topic to the scope of this proposal, but I wanted to follow up on UVN being leveraged to gain a direct benefit.
Staking treasury or UF funds doesn't necessarily imply a net negative for the ecosystem. These funds could be delegated to selected third-party validators from the community. This would enable to benefit from the revenue share of UVN, while encouraging community validators and supporting the network. A similar strategy is being implemented by the dYdX community.
I am supportive of the work the foundation has done so far. I also believe the objectives of the proposal are worthwhile and set a new tone moving forward.
With the launch of v4 and Unichain, this feels like a pivotal moment. One of the main points of contention I see within the crypto "X" community is that Uniswap DAO is perceived as a "piggy bank" for incentives and public goods. Meanwhile, Uniswap Labs benefits from front-end (FE) revenues while holding a separate equity stake in the company. I hold Uniswap Labs in high regard, so I tend to disregard this line of thinking in favor of the bigger picture. However, the narrative linger's.
I am supportive of the work the foundation has done so far. I also believe the objectives of the proposal are worthwhile and set a new tone moving forward.
With the launch of v4 and Unichain, this feels like a pivotal moment. One of the main points of contention I see within the crypto "X" community is that Uniswap DAO is perceived as a "piggy bank" for incentives and public goods. Meanwhile, Uniswap Labs benefits from front-end (FE) revenues while holding a separate equity stake in the company. I hold Uniswap Labs in high regard, so I tend to disregard this line of thinking in favor of the bigger picture. However, the narrative linger's.
It would be great to see Uniswap Labs take a more active role in initiatives that drive users to Unichain. I believe that "crypto the game" could be one such effort, although it is more targeted and limited in audience. Additionally, it would be nice to explore other ways to reward Uniswap users for their loyalty to the brand, particularly those whose activity enables Uniswap Labs to generate revenue. If the Uniswap DAO had a clearer understanding of Uniswap Labs' vision for these releases, the incentives could better align with strategic goals that benefit Uniswap DAO and Labs.
Overall, I believe this proposal should pass in some form. However, from my initial read, it feels complex and a bundle of funding incentives to digest.
Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation’s lack of governance.
please clarify/expand ... without details its hard to determine whether it is a) structural b) procedural c) accountable (lines of reporting)
@GFXlabs @sogipec There is $3.5 million worth of unused UNI in the "Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Proposal". Data is showing that this program has failed in its objective of attracting retentive liquidity in its target chains. If UNI holders are going to fund Unichain liquidity incentives; then use this full $3.5million to solely target Unichain. Remove Unichain incentives from this proposal, and redirect the "Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Proposal" to Unichain.
Ethereum address where the "Revitalization and Growth" UNI is held:
@GFXlabs @sogipec There is $3.5 million worth of unused UNI in the "Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Proposal". Data is showing that this program has failed in its objective of attracting retentive liquidity in its target chains. If UNI holders are going to fund Unichain liquidity incentives; then use this full $3.5million to solely target Unichain. Remove Unichain incentives from this proposal, and redirect the "Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Proposal" to Unichain.
Ethereum address where the "Revitalization and Growth" UNI is held:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x3B59C6d0034490093460787566dc5D6cE17F2f9C
As we note above, we plan to maintain approximately 50% of our Treasury in UNI over the short to medium term, and to continue to maintain a portion of our Treasury in UNI over the long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.
As we note above, we plan to maintain approximately 50% of our Treasury in UNI over the short to medium term, and to continue to maintain a portion of our Treasury in UNI over the long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.
The problem I see is ultimately of balancing the books. If the DAO doesn’t have sufficient income from operations, and spends more than the income from yield, the treasury will go to zero.
This is the $2B question on treasury sustainability. For every $1 given to UF, I conjecture up to $10 needs to be liquidated for the stability fund (hypothetical 16% yield less 20% capgain or 8.5% profits tax).
The bigger the ask, the more downward pressure on UNI-fiat conversion. Are there enough opportunities that yield 16% (which is itself highly optimistic) Looking at the UNI price chart (since 2021), will the overhang persist for years?
Whilst I haven't seen the treasury investment statement, I'd note there are alternative diversification strategies:
By more adroit risk-management strategies, can improve capital productivity (without excessive liquidation of UNI) whilst still achieving the benefits UF identified.
The snapshot vote is already live. I’ve always appreciated your feedback on proposals, and the points you’ve raised are very valid. Unfortunately, they will not be addressed. When these types of proposals come to the forum, they are almost guaranteed to pass without change (e.g., the DEFI fund proposal). The direction of these proposals is influenced by the interests of specific groups (VCs, Uniswap Labs, etc.), and the incentives are misaligned. We’ll revisit this proposal in a few months or years and see how it all plays out.
I sympathize with the argument that the DAO itself may not attain direct and explicit benefit from Unichain. Sure, we could stake UNI from the treasury to attain some yield, but that would only reduce the yield towards staking token holders. And if the UF stakes, that would also cut into other token holders’ yield. Sounds like a net negative…even though we could run simulations to find an optimal staking ratio between the DAO/UF and token holders.
I sympathize with the argument that the DAO itself may not attain direct and explicit benefit from Unichain. Sure, we could stake UNI from the treasury to attain some yield, but that would only reduce the yield towards staking token holders. And if the UF stakes, that would also cut into other token holders’ yield. Sounds like a net negative…even though we could run simulations to find an optimal staking ratio between the DAO/UF and token holders.
Slightly off-topic to the scope of this proposal, but I wanted to follow up on UVN being leveraged to gain a direct benefit.
Staking treasury or UF funds doesn't necessarily imply a net negative for the ecosystem. These funds could be delegated to selected third-party validators from the community. This would enable to benefit from the revenue share of UVN, while encouraging community validators and supporting the network. A similar strategy is being implemented by the dYdX community.
I am supportive of the work the foundation has done so far. I also believe the objectives of the proposal are worthwhile and set a new tone moving forward.
With the launch of v4 and Unichain, this feels like a pivotal moment. One of the main points of contention I see within the crypto "X" community is that Uniswap DAO is perceived as a "piggy bank" for incentives and public goods. Meanwhile, Uniswap Labs benefits from front-end (FE) revenues while holding a separate equity stake in the company. I hold Uniswap Labs in high regard, so I tend to disregard this line of thinking in favor of the bigger picture. However, the narrative linger's.
I am supportive of the work the foundation has done so far. I also believe the objectives of the proposal are worthwhile and set a new tone moving forward.
With the launch of v4 and Unichain, this feels like a pivotal moment. One of the main points of contention I see within the crypto "X" community is that Uniswap DAO is perceived as a "piggy bank" for incentives and public goods. Meanwhile, Uniswap Labs benefits from front-end (FE) revenues while holding a separate equity stake in the company. I hold Uniswap Labs in high regard, so I tend to disregard this line of thinking in favor of the bigger picture. However, the narrative linger's.
It would be great to see Uniswap Labs take a more active role in initiatives that drive users to Unichain. I believe that "crypto the game" could be one such effort, although it is more targeted and limited in audience. Additionally, it would be nice to explore other ways to reward Uniswap users for their loyalty to the brand, particularly those whose activity enables Uniswap Labs to generate revenue. If the Uniswap DAO had a clearer understanding of Uniswap Labs' vision for these releases, the incentives could better align with strategic goals that benefit Uniswap DAO and Labs.
Overall, I believe this proposal should pass in some form. However, from my initial read, it feels complex and a bundle of funding incentives to digest.
Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation’s lack of governance.
please clarify/expand ... without details its hard to determine whether it is a) structural b) procedural c) accountable (lines of reporting)
@GFXlabs @sogipec There is $3.5 million worth of unused UNI in the "Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Proposal". Data is showing that this program has failed in its objective of attracting retentive liquidity in its target chains. If UNI holders are going to fund Unichain liquidity incentives; then use this full $3.5million to solely target Unichain. Remove Unichain incentives from this proposal, and redirect the "Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Proposal" to Unichain.
Ethereum address where the "Revitalization and Growth" UNI is held:
@GFXlabs @sogipec There is $3.5 million worth of unused UNI in the "Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Proposal". Data is showing that this program has failed in its objective of attracting retentive liquidity in its target chains. If UNI holders are going to fund Unichain liquidity incentives; then use this full $3.5million to solely target Unichain. Remove Unichain incentives from this proposal, and redirect the "Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Proposal" to Unichain.
Ethereum address where the "Revitalization and Growth" UNI is held:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x3B59C6d0034490093460787566dc5D6cE17F2f9C
Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation’s lack of governance.
please clarify/expand ... without details its hard to determine whether it is a) structural b) procedural c) accountable (lines of reporting)
If it is a sensitive matter, we (as in LexDAO) can set up an anonymous process to protect whistle-blowers by giving authorNyms. However, without substantive evidence, it can easily degenerate into slander
Discussions (ongoing) to improve governance (not exhaustive)
It's great to see Uniswap Foundation prioritizing hook adoption as a major goal for v4! Given that the aim is for 30% of v4 order flow to come from hooks, can we consider using some of the incentives to support this transition? I have made a larger post inside of the RFC on liquidity incentives here https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-unleashed-unichain-and-uniswap-v4-liquidity-incentives/25250/6?u=dakotah
TLDR: -Strategies like Bunni rehypothecation can help make liquidity stickier by boosting organic APY even after incentives are gone. -Bunni's new referral program allows UF to recapture up to 5% of swap fees on referred liquidity, which could help offset initial acquisition costs.
As someone who has had the opportunity to collaborate closely with the Uniswap Foundation in my role as a Uniswap Accountability Committee member, I want to share my perspective on their contributions to the ecosystem.
The UF plays a unique and challenging role—acting as a connector between diverse stakeholders while driving effective initiatives that benefit the protocol, platform, and broader community. Over the past year, their commitment to this mission has been evident in the high-quality initiatives they’ve delivered. Two that stand out to me personally are the Uniswap Foundation Subsidy Fund and the Hooks Incubator, both of which have had a tangible impact on fostering innovation and adoption.
As someone who has had the opportunity to collaborate closely with the Uniswap Foundation in my role as a Uniswap Accountability Committee member, I want to share my perspective on their contributions to the ecosystem.
The UF plays a unique and challenging role—acting as a connector between diverse stakeholders while driving effective initiatives that benefit the protocol, platform, and broader community. Over the past year, their commitment to this mission has been evident in the high-quality initiatives they’ve delivered. Two that stand out to me personally are the Uniswap Foundation Subsidy Fund and the Hooks Incubator, both of which have had a tangible impact on fostering innovation and adoption.
Beyond their programs, I want to highlight the UF’s dedication to inclusive governance and community engagement. A great example is the recent DUNA roundtable, where delegates had a unique opportunity to educate themselves on a critical topic shaping the DAO’s future. Creating spaces for informed and constructive discussions is essential for Uniswap’s evolution, and UF has consistently enabled this.
Another initiative that impressed me was GovSwap. While it may have seemed like just a fun experiment at first, the Futarchy game at GovSwap Devcon proved to be an effective way to break down a complex governance concept, making the first CFM experiment much easier to grasp. This is exactly the kind of creative, hands-on approach that makes governance more accessible and engaging.
Beyond their structured initiatives, the accessibility of the UF team is another aspect I deeply appreciate. Whether it’s discussing DUNA, Uniswap v4, or the UVN, their willingness to engage directly with the community fosters an ecosystem of growth and inclusivity—something that is far from common across DAOs.
In conclusion, I believe the UF is doing an excellent job, and I fully support their funding renewal. Their work has been instrumental in strengthening Uniswap’s ecosystem, and I look forward to seeing their continued impact.
Is it better to wait until Treasury gets formed and they have some clue as to the capital allocation between liquidity (from which your ask gets converted into fiat), stability and growth funds?
According to 3Q24 there's still $25M in grant piggy-bank which if you maintain same spend rate should be 4x$6M good for rest of year.
Is it better to wait until Treasury gets formed and they have some clue as to the capital allocation between liquidity (from which your ask gets converted into fiat), stability and growth funds?
According to 3Q24 there's still $25M in grant piggy-bank which if you maintain same spend rate should be 4x$6M good for rest of year.
In Q3’2024, the Foundation committed $5.32 million in new grants and disbursed $1.49 million in committed grants.
By that time, I would hope treasury (even if not selected subfunds managers) would have some financial model of what safe/sustainable level of conversion from UNI to fiat won't depress the price-levels. This ~$6M/Q is below your ask of $10-15M/quarter but I'd like to hear what treasury working group thinks (eg a loan rather than outright Santa Claus)
In addition to this step, the UF is also validating whether the creation of a legal entity (e.g., a DUNA), would be appropriate for Uniswap Governance. A legal entity may offer benefits to Governance including clarity on legal status, the ability to contract with other entities (like development teams), and more.
There was a grant issued to study the legal options in a prior UF round. If this is the conclusion can someone release the full document. A legal entity for the treasury takes priority over governance as it may need various licenses to operate which is time-consuming (eg no-action letters if using a conditional financing mechanism).
Governance Committee Legal Entity Exploration
Entity structure research and support for the incorporation for two Uniswap governance committees. Grant funded by the Uniswap Arbitrum Grants Program and facilitated by the UF.
Grantees: Cooley, Placehodlr
Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation’s lack of governance.
please clarify/expand ... without details its hard to determine whether it is a) structural b) procedural c) accountable (lines of reporting)
If it is a sensitive matter, we (as in LexDAO) can set up an anonymous process to protect whistle-blowers by giving authorNyms. However, without substantive evidence, it can easily degenerate into slander
Discussions (ongoing) to improve governance (not exhaustive)
It's great to see Uniswap Foundation prioritizing hook adoption as a major goal for v4! Given that the aim is for 30% of v4 order flow to come from hooks, can we consider using some of the incentives to support this transition? I have made a larger post inside of the RFC on liquidity incentives here https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-uniswap-unleashed-unichain-and-uniswap-v4-liquidity-incentives/25250/6?u=dakotah
TLDR: -Strategies like Bunni rehypothecation can help make liquidity stickier by boosting organic APY even after incentives are gone. -Bunni's new referral program allows UF to recapture up to 5% of swap fees on referred liquidity, which could help offset initial acquisition costs.
As someone who has had the opportunity to collaborate closely with the Uniswap Foundation in my role as a Uniswap Accountability Committee member, I want to share my perspective on their contributions to the ecosystem.
The UF plays a unique and challenging role—acting as a connector between diverse stakeholders while driving effective initiatives that benefit the protocol, platform, and broader community. Over the past year, their commitment to this mission has been evident in the high-quality initiatives they’ve delivered. Two that stand out to me personally are the Uniswap Foundation Subsidy Fund and the Hooks Incubator, both of which have had a tangible impact on fostering innovation and adoption.
As someone who has had the opportunity to collaborate closely with the Uniswap Foundation in my role as a Uniswap Accountability Committee member, I want to share my perspective on their contributions to the ecosystem.
The UF plays a unique and challenging role—acting as a connector between diverse stakeholders while driving effective initiatives that benefit the protocol, platform, and broader community. Over the past year, their commitment to this mission has been evident in the high-quality initiatives they’ve delivered. Two that stand out to me personally are the Uniswap Foundation Subsidy Fund and the Hooks Incubator, both of which have had a tangible impact on fostering innovation and adoption.
Beyond their programs, I want to highlight the UF’s dedication to inclusive governance and community engagement. A great example is the recent DUNA roundtable, where delegates had a unique opportunity to educate themselves on a critical topic shaping the DAO’s future. Creating spaces for informed and constructive discussions is essential for Uniswap’s evolution, and UF has consistently enabled this.
Another initiative that impressed me was GovSwap. While it may have seemed like just a fun experiment at first, the Futarchy game at GovSwap Devcon proved to be an effective way to break down a complex governance concept, making the first CFM experiment much easier to grasp. This is exactly the kind of creative, hands-on approach that makes governance more accessible and engaging.
Beyond their structured initiatives, the accessibility of the UF team is another aspect I deeply appreciate. Whether it’s discussing DUNA, Uniswap v4, or the UVN, their willingness to engage directly with the community fosters an ecosystem of growth and inclusivity—something that is far from common across DAOs.
In conclusion, I believe the UF is doing an excellent job, and I fully support their funding renewal. Their work has been instrumental in strengthening Uniswap’s ecosystem, and I look forward to seeing their continued impact.
Is it better to wait until Treasury gets formed and they have some clue as to the capital allocation between liquidity (from which your ask gets converted into fiat), stability and growth funds?
According to 3Q24 there's still $25M in grant piggy-bank which if you maintain same spend rate should be 4x$6M good for rest of year.
Is it better to wait until Treasury gets formed and they have some clue as to the capital allocation between liquidity (from which your ask gets converted into fiat), stability and growth funds?
According to 3Q24 there's still $25M in grant piggy-bank which if you maintain same spend rate should be 4x$6M good for rest of year.
In Q3’2024, the Foundation committed $5.32 million in new grants and disbursed $1.49 million in committed grants.
By that time, I would hope treasury (even if not selected subfunds managers) would have some financial model of what safe/sustainable level of conversion from UNI to fiat won't depress the price-levels. This ~$6M/Q is below your ask of $10-15M/quarter but I'd like to hear what treasury working group thinks (eg a loan rather than outright Santa Claus)
In addition to this step, the UF is also validating whether the creation of a legal entity (e.g., a DUNA), would be appropriate for Uniswap Governance. A legal entity may offer benefits to Governance including clarity on legal status, the ability to contract with other entities (like development teams), and more.
There was a grant issued to study the legal options in a prior UF round. If this is the conclusion can someone release the full document. A legal entity for the treasury takes priority over governance as it may need various licenses to operate which is time-consuming (eg no-action letters if using a conditional financing mechanism).
Governance Committee Legal Entity Exploration
Entity structure research and support for the incorporation for two Uniswap governance committees. Grant funded by the Uniswap Arbitrum Grants Program and facilitated by the UF.
Grantees: Cooley, Placehodlr
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR the proposal.
First and foremost, we want to note that we’ve gone through and understand all the different points and concerns that other delegates have raised regarding the proposal. We, too, find the request to be substantial and we see the need for thorough deliberation before action.
After carefully reviewing the proposal and all associated resources, as well as the discussion beneath the post, we ultimately decided that voting in favor of funding the Uniswap Foundation would be the best net-positive direction the DAO could take.
While we understand that Unichain, its fee distribution, and any other related aspect aren’t under the DAO’s control, we should think of it as an extension of Uniswap and, therefore, support it to the same extent. We believe that the Foundation has done a great job on transparency so far, and we do not have any strong concerns about their continuing to do so.
Ultimately, the DAO is meant to support Uniswap protocol, and the Uniswap Foundation is one of our most substantial assets in doing so, as proven by its track record. We appreciate the communication so far and the additions/clarifications made by @devinwalsh in direct response to delegate feedback and questions.
Lastly, we do want to echo the sentiment from other delegates that there could, and there should, be more initiatives to increase the DAO’s control over the Foundation. However, we do not feel that there are any initiatives at this point that are in a good enough place that postponing UF’s proposal would make sense.
We vote for this proposal. We would like to add some comments on each topic as below:
Uniswap v4 represents a fundamental innovation in the DeFi space, and to realize a future where Uniswap plays an even larger role, significant investment in hook development and user onboarding is necessary.
We vote for this proposal. We would like to add some comments on each topic as below:
Uniswap v4 represents a fundamental innovation in the DeFi space, and to realize a future where Uniswap plays an even larger role, significant investment in hook development and user onboarding is necessary.
We believe that using UNI token stakes as a method for the DAO to recover investment is a feasible approach, so it is not a major issue. The challenges around Unichain are more related to how we exert influence within the governance of Optimism Collective, and on this point, we are eager to contribute actively as a delegate for both of the DAOs.
Of course, the sustainability of the treasury is critical not only for the DAO’s own longevity but also for the interests of UNI token holders. This is an important issue to consider from the perspective of not just cash flow, but also the appreciation of UNI token itself. Modeling this is not easy, which makes strict discussions difficult.
At least for now, even if there is some increase in expenditures, it is a reasonable decision to bet on the expected value increase of UNI tokens in the long term, given the significance of the innovation. While the expenditure is indeed large, based on the current market position of Uniswap as a protocol, its trading volume, and the size of the treasury, this is not an unmanageable investment.
That being said, we share concerns about the transparency and accountability of UF activities, as well as the appropriateness of future grant allocations. However, with communication channels already in place, we believe these can be improved moving forward. This is not a reason to cast a dissenting vote at this point.
In conclusion, there are certainly challenges such as transparency, accountability, and the approach to Unichain governance. However, these are problems that should be solved while moving forward. This proposal is crucial for strengthening Uniswap’s competitive position and, in the long run, we can expect the value of UNI tokens to appreciate.
Hi, thanks for the proposal
Arbitrum and Optimism have already set the bar in this regard.
As laid out in the Foundation's governing documents, the ArbitrumDAO has significant authority over the directors as it may remove or elect The Arbitrum Foundation's directors, or expand or reduce the number of directors at any time pursuant to a Non-Constitutional AIP.
Hi Brian, thanks for the post. If you could clarify a question, that would be helpful.
If Uniswap Governance were to control the election of the Board of the Uniswap Foundation, this independence and separation would be jeopardized. Plaintiffs’ firms could attempt to exploit some perceived non-independence and hold the DAO liable for the acts of the Uniswap Foundation or vice versa.
As it’s a proposal that got additional discussions, here’s StableLab’s voting and rationale on Uniswap Unleashed.
Voted: Abstain
Regarding this proposal, we had several discussions and we thank everyone including Uniswap Foundation members and other delegates for their opinions. We focused on questions regarding assessment criteria and three aspects for our voting decision.
I will vote against the proposals as they stand now. In my view, a request for such an extraordinary funding amount requires extraordinarily strong evidence. I don’t believe that level of proof has been reached yet.
Specifically, I haven’t seen sufficient evidence that spending the funds in the proposed manner is a better alternative for UNI tokenholders than simply allocating them to a Stability Fund for yield. For example, the total gross revenue of a top-5 L2 (Linea) has ranged between $5,000 and $20,000 per day over the past week. If this is the revenue Unichain aims to reach by spending >$30M on Unichain-related incentives and grants (not even including the related budget for ops), it will take a long time to recapture the investment—especially if only 65% of the net revenue goes to tokenholders. We can hope that Unichain’s revenue will be much higher, but’s it’s just that, hop. To be clear Unichain here is just an example, this also applied to other categories.
We voted FOR the Uniswap Unleashed proposal to fund the four identified Uniswap Foundation priorities over the next two years: scaling network supply, scaling network demand, equipping governance and the community by activating revenue, and onboarding protocol core contributors. We believe this proposal represents a significant step toward strengthening Uniswap’s ecosystem, and we trust the Foundation’s ability to execute on its vision effectively.
However, we recognize that certain areas remain unclear and require further refinement. Specifically, there is ongoing uncertainty around the establishment of a legal entity, the timeline and feasibility of activating the fee switch, and broader transparency and accountability measures for the Uniswap Foundation (UF). Additionally, it remains unclear how core contributors' work will align with the DAO’s long-term strategic goals and how value will ultimately flow back to the DAO.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR the proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR the proposal.
First and foremost, we want to note that we’ve gone through and understand all the different points and concerns that other delegates have raised regarding the proposal. We, too, find the request to be substantial and we see the need for thorough deliberation before action.
After carefully reviewing the proposal and all associated resources, as well as the discussion beneath the post, we ultimately decided that voting in favor of funding the Uniswap Foundation would be the best net-positive direction the DAO could take.
While we understand that Unichain, its fee distribution, and any other related aspect aren’t under the DAO’s control, we should think of it as an extension of Uniswap and, therefore, support it to the same extent. We believe that the Foundation has done a great job on transparency so far, and we do not have any strong concerns about their continuing to do so.
Ultimately, the DAO is meant to support Uniswap protocol, and the Uniswap Foundation is one of our most substantial assets in doing so, as proven by its track record. We appreciate the communication so far and the additions/clarifications made by @devinwalsh in direct response to delegate feedback and questions.
Lastly, we do want to echo the sentiment from other delegates that there could, and there should, be more initiatives to increase the DAO’s control over the Foundation. However, we do not feel that there are any initiatives at this point that are in a good enough place that postponing UF’s proposal would make sense.
We vote for this proposal. We would like to add some comments on each topic as below:
Uniswap v4 represents a fundamental innovation in the DeFi space, and to realize a future where Uniswap plays an even larger role, significant investment in hook development and user onboarding is necessary.
We vote for this proposal. We would like to add some comments on each topic as below:
Uniswap v4 represents a fundamental innovation in the DeFi space, and to realize a future where Uniswap plays an even larger role, significant investment in hook development and user onboarding is necessary.
We believe that using UNI token stakes as a method for the DAO to recover investment is a feasible approach, so it is not a major issue. The challenges around Unichain are more related to how we exert influence within the governance of Optimism Collective, and on this point, we are eager to contribute actively as a delegate for both of the DAOs.
Of course, the sustainability of the treasury is critical not only for the DAO’s own longevity but also for the interests of UNI token holders. This is an important issue to consider from the perspective of not just cash flow, but also the appreciation of UNI token itself. Modeling this is not easy, which makes strict discussions difficult.
At least for now, even if there is some increase in expenditures, it is a reasonable decision to bet on the expected value increase of UNI tokens in the long term, given the significance of the innovation. While the expenditure is indeed large, based on the current market position of Uniswap as a protocol, its trading volume, and the size of the treasury, this is not an unmanageable investment.
That being said, we share concerns about the transparency and accountability of UF activities, as well as the appropriateness of future grant allocations. However, with communication channels already in place, we believe these can be improved moving forward. This is not a reason to cast a dissenting vote at this point.
In conclusion, there are certainly challenges such as transparency, accountability, and the approach to Unichain governance. However, these are problems that should be solved while moving forward. This proposal is crucial for strengthening Uniswap’s competitive position and, in the long run, we can expect the value of UNI tokens to appreciate.
Hi, thanks for the proposal
Arbitrum and Optimism have already set the bar in this regard.
As laid out in the Foundation's governing documents, the ArbitrumDAO has significant authority over the directors as it may remove or elect The Arbitrum Foundation's directors, or expand or reduce the number of directors at any time pursuant to a Non-Constitutional AIP.
Hi Brian, thanks for the post. If you could clarify a question, that would be helpful.
If Uniswap Governance were to control the election of the Board of the Uniswap Foundation, this independence and separation would be jeopardized. Plaintiffs’ firms could attempt to exploit some perceived non-independence and hold the DAO liable for the acts of the Uniswap Foundation or vice versa.
As it’s a proposal that got additional discussions, here’s StableLab’s voting and rationale on Uniswap Unleashed.
Voted: Abstain
Regarding this proposal, we had several discussions and we thank everyone including Uniswap Foundation members and other delegates for their opinions. We focused on questions regarding assessment criteria and three aspects for our voting decision.
I will vote against the proposals as they stand now. In my view, a request for such an extraordinary funding amount requires extraordinarily strong evidence. I don’t believe that level of proof has been reached yet.
Specifically, I haven’t seen sufficient evidence that spending the funds in the proposed manner is a better alternative for UNI tokenholders than simply allocating them to a Stability Fund for yield. For example, the total gross revenue of a top-5 L2 (Linea) has ranged between $5,000 and $20,000 per day over the past week. If this is the revenue Unichain aims to reach by spending >$30M on Unichain-related incentives and grants (not even including the related budget for ops), it will take a long time to recapture the investment—especially if only 65% of the net revenue goes to tokenholders. We can hope that Unichain’s revenue will be much higher, but’s it’s just that, hop. To be clear Unichain here is just an example, this also applied to other categories.
We voted FOR the Uniswap Unleashed proposal to fund the four identified Uniswap Foundation priorities over the next two years: scaling network supply, scaling network demand, equipping governance and the community by activating revenue, and onboarding protocol core contributors. We believe this proposal represents a significant step toward strengthening Uniswap’s ecosystem, and we trust the Foundation’s ability to execute on its vision effectively.
However, we recognize that certain areas remain unclear and require further refinement. Specifically, there is ongoing uncertainty around the establishment of a legal entity, the timeline and feasibility of activating the fee switch, and broader transparency and accountability measures for the Uniswap Foundation (UF). Additionally, it remains unclear how core contributors' work will align with the DAO’s long-term strategic goals and how value will ultimately flow back to the DAO.
Hi, thanks for the proposal
It seems to me that in order not to slow down the development of the system and the grant program, it is worth dividing this proposal into two parts: grants and operational activities, because there are very big questions about the expenses in the second part.
Arbitrum and Optimism have already set the bar in this regard.
As laid out in the Foundation's governing documents, the ArbitrumDAO has significant authority over the directors as it may remove or elect The Arbitrum Foundation's directors, or expand or reduce the number of directors at any time pursuant to a Non-Constitutional AIP.
All v0.4 governance proposals must fall within one of the following categories:
- Governance Fund (Missions)
- Protocol or Governor Upgrade
- Maintenance Upgrade Proposals
- Inflation Adjustment
- Director Removal
- Treasury Appropriations
- Code of Conduct Violations
- Representative Removal
- Representative Structure Dissolution
- Rights Protections
- Elections
- Ratification
- Reflection Period (Metagovernance)
Hi Brian, thanks for the post. If you could clarify a question, that would be helpful.
If Uniswap Governance were to control the election of the Board of the Uniswap Foundation, this independence and separation would be jeopardized. Plaintiffs’ firms could attempt to exploit some perceived non-independence and hold the DAO liable for the acts of the Uniswap Foundation or vice versa.
Would you say that a plaintiff's firm could not attempt to exploit a perceived non-independence and hold the DAO liable for the acts of the Uniswap Foundation due to the foundation's full funding originating from the DAO?
We realize this proposal, and proposals generally, can increase the risk surface area. This DAO is governed by a collection of individuals and entities regularly tasked with weighing the potential rewards of their actions or non-actions against the risks they are taking, whether those actions be in the role of a Uniswap delegate, Uniswap LP, DeFi participant, or otherwise. The proposals contemplated here are north of a hundred million in funding. That presents a significant risk. We strongly believe that by adopting a new board, the DAO will significantly reduce that risk and may even be able to increase the reward from the current expectations.
As it’s a proposal that got additional discussions, here’s StableLab’s voting and rationale on Uniswap Unleashed.
Voted: Abstain
Regarding this proposal, we had several discussions and we thank everyone including Uniswap Foundation members and other delegates for their opinions. We focused on questions regarding assessment criteria and three aspects for our voting decision.
Whether the proposal should been seen under the different assessment criteria
-The Uniswap Foundation is a steward for Uniswap DAO, which was voted in by DAO vote, and it holds interest and information distinct from other working groups or service providers to Uniswap DAO. For example, legal challenge to Uniswap DAO impacts its participants but the Uniswap Foundation is likely to face bigger challenges compared to others. Several members of the Uniswap Foundation have been contributing to the Uniswap ecosystem before the Foundation’s creation, and their concerns for the ecosystem, driven by both reputation and personal interests (financial and otherwise) are reasonably greater than other Uniswap DAO participants. However, as StableLab recognizes, this is subjective and sets a precedent that could be misguided, so we decided to evaluate the proposal under the usual assessment criteria. Three aspects were evaluated: scope, budget, and impacts.
Scope
-The scope of the proposal is extensive, covering operational cost, marketing, and large grants budgets for research and governance. The Uniswap Foundation has the mandate to request these, as it also has the ability to request funding grants and also distribute it to grantees it decides. We understand the concerns from other DAO participants that new scopes have been created and initiated by the Foundation including Unichain. But for this, as the mandate given to the Uniswap Foundation also covers the ever changing nature of DeFi, we believe that the scope is still valid.
Budget & Impacts
-There are two main compositions of the budget: operational and grants. Regarding the operational budget, while it might be controversial to note, we don’t think it’s necessarily unreasonable. For larger DeFi DAOs like the Sky ecosystem, costs have been around $150 million USD over the past 12 months. Granted, Sky makes sustainable and strong revenue. However, considering Uniswap is a protocol with over $4 billion USD in TVL and market cap above $4.8 billion USD, presence of the Uniswap Foundation was able to generate or defend more than $20 million USD per year in TVL and marketcap is reasonable. This is especially valid in potential extreme situations such as hacks or governance attacks, where the presence of the Foundation helps to coordinate defense, mitigating coordination issues. Therefore, the operations budget is valid.
-The grants budget, which is more than double the budget for Operations, is contentious due to the budget size and question regarding its impacts. While we appreciate the report, such as this, aside from grants spent on audits, which are understandably important, it’s difficult to see actual impacts. For example, the report noted over 400+ new hook developers, which is great, but how much TVL and revenue will they generate? A big portion of the grants are ongoing, we don’t necessarily believe that it would be beneficial to create more burdens for the Foundation team with larger grants to manage. This is also considering there are already large grants specifically for Unichain and V4 migration (which we suggest just incentivizing v4 onboarding to Unichain.)
Suggestion
We strongly recommend the Uniswap Foundation to reconsider how it wants to move forward with grants. One approach could be for the Foundation to present a monthly or quarterly list of grants for DAO approval, with comments explaining the recommendations. Alternatively, a more narrow list and budget for grants might be considered.
Conclusion
Traditionally, Uniswap Governance utilizes Snapshot (offchain voting) for sentiment, allowing onchain proposals to incorporate more details or edits as needed. We voted to abstain at this time, anticipating that the outlined concerns will be addressed in future iterations.
I will vote against the proposals as they stand now. In my view, a request for such an extraordinary funding amount requires extraordinarily strong evidence. I don’t believe that level of proof has been reached yet.
Specifically, I haven’t seen sufficient evidence that spending the funds in the proposed manner is a better alternative for UNI tokenholders than simply allocating them to a Stability Fund for yield. For example, the total gross revenue of a top-5 L2 (Linea) has ranged between $5,000 and $20,000 per day over the past week. If this is the revenue Unichain aims to reach by spending >$30M on Unichain-related incentives and grants (not even including the related budget for ops), it will take a long time to recapture the investment—especially if only 65% of the net revenue goes to tokenholders. We can hope that Unichain’s revenue will be much higher, but’s it’s just that, hop. To be clear Unichain here is just an example, this also applied to other categories.
Another major issue is the lack of alignment and coordination among the key actors (UF, Labs, DAO). Unichain, in particular, is problematic in this regard.
Below are detailed explanations of these proposed changes.
While I and most other delegates support incentives for Unichain’s growth, it’s unclear whether including votes for such incentives within the same proposal as the rest of the UF’s budget is necessary. There are multiple reasons to separate and/or postpone this funding:
We believe the following conditions should be met before the DAO provides incentives to Unichain:
Since v4 hook developers can choose to bypass the protocol fee using hooks with BEFORE_SWAP_RETURNS_DELTA_FLAG or otherwise interfere with the protocol fee, we request that, at a minimum, a legally binding agreement be made with each hook developer receiving a grant. If the developer collects revenue from the hook in any form, the DAO must be entitled to its fair share through protocol fees.
Additionally, we believe other mechanisms should be explored to capture revenue from protocols building on top of Uniswap. For example, grant agreements could stipulate a share in future equity or tokens.
The proposal should clarify which incentives are public goods for the DeFi space and which are aimed at sustainability of the DAO & UF and UNI token appreciation.
The funding of v4 incentives and the operational budget should be conditional on establishing a clear pathway for capturing revenue from the protocol—whether through the protocol fee switch or alternative mechanisms such as frontend fees. The burden of proof lies with the Foundation, not the delegates, as it is unlikely that any bottom-up proposal from the DAO will gain traction while the general understanding remains that the Foundation is still working on its design.
One option to enhance oversight is extending the UF’s Legal Board to include DAO members, as suggested by GFX Labs. However, if this is not possible due to regulatory reasons, other alternatives should be explored. Some options were recommended in response to the previous funding request in 2023, and I’m happy to see that some of them have already been implemented!
The goal should be to reduce potential misalignments (real or perceived) between key stakeholders within the ecosystem and improve transparency.
We voted FOR the Uniswap Unleashed proposal to fund the four identified Uniswap Foundation priorities over the next two years: scaling network supply, scaling network demand, equipping governance and the community by activating revenue, and onboarding protocol core contributors. We believe this proposal represents a significant step toward strengthening Uniswap’s ecosystem, and we trust the Foundation’s ability to execute on its vision effectively.
However, we recognize that certain areas remain unclear and require further refinement. Specifically, there is ongoing uncertainty around the establishment of a legal entity, the timeline and feasibility of activating the fee switch, and broader transparency and accountability measures for the Uniswap Foundation (UF). Additionally, it remains unclear how core contributors' work will align with the DAO’s long-term strategic goals and how value will ultimately flow back to the DAO.
To address these concerns, the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) has already begun tightening feedback loops between the UF and delegates, ensuring that these critical areas receive the necessary attention and oversight. We look forward to continued engagement to refine these structures and enhance transparency and accountability as Uniswap evolves.
Hi all, we appreciate all of your additional comments, and feedback shared in, over the last few days.
Hi all, we appreciate all of your additional comments, and feedback shared in, over the last few days.
Reporting
We have received some questions about how to check in on the status of grants. The best place to go is our 2024 Community Impact Report - it dives into progress and KPIs achieved by every grant we have made in the last year+. To learn more about grantees, you can watch a few of our past Community Calls on our Youtube channel, or sign up for future Community Calls here.
In the coming year, we commit to continuing the cadence of our existing transparency measures: biannual Community Impact Reports, monthly Community Calls, quarterly financial transparency reports, and grant initiative announcement and update blog posts.
UF<>Delegate Feedback Mechanism
We’ve heard constructive feedback on ways to tighten the feedback loop between the UF and Uniswap delegates – one of those ideas was a forum in which delegates can meet with UF leadership to review and give feedback on the UF’s strategy and execution.
For this endeavor to be effective, it must be designed in tandem between the UF and delegates. Erin just posted to kick off discussion on some key parameters for this forum – we are excited to hear your ideas, and to work together to get this set up.
Core Contributor Lifecycle
The long-term goal of our core contributor work is to support Uniswap Governance and community sustainability. This is ultimately a program to arm Governance with the tools and infrastructure required to create value for itself over a long term time period.
Some of the inputs into success here include:
In the future, we envision a culture which attracts top tier DeFi development teams to the Uniswap DAO to raise funds as an alternative to other forms of funding, like VC funding. We envision a process by which these teams may mutually agree to a defined vision or scope with the DAO, and by which the DAO can properly size an allocation of vested UNI to the team over time. We envision multiple teams building complementary protocols, infrastructure, and more, each of which accrues value to the Uniswap community.
Over the coming months, these are the things the UF plans to do to kick us off on this journey.
Growth and Sustainability
Several delegates raised concerns about the size of this budget request through the lens of the UTWG’s report, which included projected expenses. We cited our thoughts on this report in our first comment above.
To expand our thinking: long-term sustainability is of course important, however the Uniswap Protocol, and certainly its developer ecosystem, are in startup mode. Startups require an upfront allocation of resources in order to grow. Without initial support, a startup will flounder – stagnation early in a startups’ life does not lead to long-term sustainability. We believe the programs outlined in these proposals will drive long-term ecosystem value, ultimately ensuring sustainability once growth stabilizes.
Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation’s lack of governance.
Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation’s lack of governance.
please clarify/expand … without details its hard to determine whether it is a) structural b) procedural c) accountable (lines of reporting)
As it currently stands, the Uniswap Foundation has an advisory board established in the first funding proposal, and the legal board of the Uniswap Foundation has two seats (according to publicly available filings), one filled by Devin and the other filled by Ken.
With this operating structure, the Uniswap DAO's only ability to govern the UF is when it requests additional funding. Outside of that, it is a free-standing organization.
Implementing an elected (legal) board with a diverse skill set has the potential to do much more than hold the UF accountable. Most importantly, the board could help guide the foundation toward working on the highest-impact items and formalizing the foundation's operations. In many cases, a great board can be a force multiplier for the organization.
As of early December, the UAC had a surplus of nearly $3M.
The $3.5M in Uniswap Accountability Committee's multi-sig is for a multitude of programs, not just UNI for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth proposal. For example, proposal 74, the prop supporting Tally, was directed to the UAC. Further, proposals are often denominated in dollars but are funded to the UAC in UNI. Between the UAC receiving UNI and distributing it for the approved proposal, the price of UNI can fluctuate, leading to a surplus or deficit.
As of early December, the UAC had a surplus of nearly $3M.
The $3.5M in Uniswap Accountability Committee's multi-sig is for a multitude of programs, not just UNI for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth proposal. For example, proposal 74, the prop supporting Tally, was directed to the UAC. Further, proposals are often denominated in dollars but are funded to the UAC in UNI. Between the UAC receiving UNI and distributing it for the approved proposal, the price of UNI can fluctuate, leading to a surplus or deficit.
Data is showing that this program has failed in its objective of attracting retentive liquidity in its target chains.
Proposal 59 stated, "The goal of this proposal is to take Uniswap on the offensive by actively supporting and incentivizing new deployments of Uniswap v3. If successful, we will be able to grow Uniswap's market share and increase the amount of volume growing through protocol-owned deployments rather than leaving the opportunity for more Uni V3 forks to grab market share."
That said, we are not opposed to directing sizable incentives to Unichain. The sums requested by the Uniswap Foundation are not beyond what we would support. Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation's lack of governance.
In the short term, if the DAO would like, we would be happy to propose allocating sizable incentives to Unichain.
As this proposal currently stands, I hold in two views: Uniswap Foundation needs to be funded, and there needs to be effective oversight and accountability over the utilization of the requested capital.
There doesn’t seem to be a net positive scenario that’ll result from cutting the UF’s funding or reducing it by a significant margin. The landscape of “Uniswap” as a whole has materially transformed just over the past month. V3 and previous iterations, although incredibly impactful and significant, have been baseline protocols—but v4 is a platform, and Unichain is an entire L2. So, a formalized steward is needed to help grow these additions.
As this proposal currently stands, I hold in two views: Uniswap Foundation needs to be funded, and there needs to be effective oversight and accountability over the utilization of the requested capital.
There doesn’t seem to be a net positive scenario that’ll result from cutting the UF’s funding or reducing it by a significant margin. The landscape of “Uniswap” as a whole has materially transformed just over the past month. V3 and previous iterations, although incredibly impactful and significant, have been baseline protocols—but v4 is a platform, and Unichain is an entire L2. So, a formalized steward is needed to help grow these additions.
The landscape is changing from other angles as well. Regulatory developments should lead to the adoption of the DUNA, which will help turn on fees for token holders and allow the DAO to partake in more active treasury management initiatives. The DAO, and the protocol as a whole, has been held back for some time, but these developments should allow for more impactful and creative initiatives to develop. Plus, token holders can finally benefit from trading and sequencer fees. It’s frustrating to see an entity like Labs be the sole benefactor from Uniswap’s growth, while remaining restricted as a token holder. That’s about to change.
So here’s the main question in my mind—given all of these changes, can UF properly execute their mandates?
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I formally request that the Foundation cease all efforts related to Unichain, as it presents a clear conflict of interest with the DAO.
The DAO doesn’t have any ownership over:
the chain
fee distribution
anything related to it (including how they are handling the UVN as the “Uniswap Growth Reserve”)
And because of these reasons, Unichain is NOT a product that will be supported by the DAO.
I sympathize with the argument that the DAO itself may not attain direct and explicit benefit from Unichain. Sure, we could stake UNI from the treasury to attain some yield, but that would only reduce the yield towards staking token holders. And if the UF stakes, that would also cut into other token holders' yield. Sounds like a net negative…even though we could run simulations to find an optimal staking ratio between the DAO/UF and token holders. Regardless, Unichain won’t financially benefit the DAO overtly, and its control—from what I can tell—won’t directly be in delegates’ hands either due to the layer of separation between Uniswap governance and Optimism governance. And if the UF is playing a part in the Optimism security council, how will the UF interface with the DAO in decision making?
Regardless of rights over the UVN fee split, the DAO does not operate on a strictly profit-maximizing basis, so cutting funding for Unichain from this proposal doesn’t make sense. The DAO’s actions haven’t always been in the direct financial interest of itself but for DeFi as a whole. The largest expense for the DAO, apart from UF funding, has been public goods support like the DEF. These are beneficial to both Uniswap and crypto as a whole. This isn’t to say that public goods funding should be our main purpose—I’m actually opposed to most public goods initiatives and think the DAO should start functioning more or less like a business. What we should be focused on is long-term value provision to token holders, and increasing adoption for Unichain by funding the UF helps accomplish that goal. After all, that 65% UVN fee is useless if Unichain activity remains low. So, not funding Unichain partnerships, incentives, etc seems to be a net negative to token holders—even though not funding Unichain would be positive for the DAO’s treasury:
Based on the above, along with the UTWG’s research, expenses for the DAO would eclipse initial projections if this proposal were to pass—and that’s largely based on an underestimation of expenses required to bootstrap v4 (which has had a comparatively slower rate of growth than both v3 and v2) and the introduction of Unichain. From previous conversations, it’s clear that Labs doesn’t want to deal with the DAO. But the success of Unichain, and other Labs-related revenue sources, hinge on DAO-based funding. Labs hasn’t announced that it’ll be recycling a large portion of its revenue to support the growth of its newly developed products. Surely they should commit some of the $100M+ they earned over the past year to bootstrapping the v4/Unichain ecosystems? This was in part the hope when creating the initial expense projections. We request that one of the additional mandates of the Foundation is to more closely work with Labs to attain clarity on economic architecture, like UVN fees, and communicate that to the DAO prior to their institution, thereby more closely advocating token holders’ best interest.
And so, value provision to token holders can either be direct or indirect—the same goes for the DAO. Even if the DAO does not financially benefit from the UVN, even though it could, token holders definitely benefit. To what extent? Well, that largely hinges on how much the DAO supports Unichain—and is fettered by the economic architecture put in place by Labs (maybe the UVN split could’ve been negotiated from 65% to 75%?).
To the previous point of public goods, they often provide indirect value, but these “righteous” endeavors can easily veer into unjustified expenditures. The DAO can fall into this trap—this is bad for token holders. The UF can also fall into this trap, which can be harmful for the DAO and token holders.
So where does the onus lie regarding the UF?
In 2024, the UF engaged informally with staffers of Congress members, the administration, and regulatory agencies, and crypto lobbying groups to advocate for DeFi to push for regulatory clarity, governance certainty, and builder protections. Recognizing the pivot from enforcement to dialogue, UF has engaged with the SEC Crypto Task Force, CFTC, and key Congressional committees to help shape DeFi policy. The UF is well-positioned to expand these efforts and excited to explore opportunities here in the next year.
So how does the DAO ensure that capital is expended in the best interest of the DAO and token holders? Legal frameworks are often the best answer. A potential answer is creating a contract with the DAO and the UF, where upon the execution of the funding request, the UF is legally obligated to uphold certain standards and meet particular KPIs. The currently presented KPIs are rather optimistic. And in an ever-increasing competitive landscape, where Uniswap continues to lose overall market share, the DAO must make sure that expectations are realistically set. The presence of a legal contract between the DAO and UF would ensure that attainable KPIs and objectives are set, which would thereby lead to more prudent spending. The issue is that the DAO cannot enter into legal agreements. Perhaps this is feasible once the DUNA is in place. Therefore, a revamped board would make sense:
We propose the DAO elect five individuals to the board: a DeFi legal expert, a growth/marketing expert, someone with a track record for building high-impact organizations, and two Uniswap delegates. The board would have a total of five seats.
Instead of two Uniswap delegates on the board, perhaps it would be better for a large liquid token holder to be present.
An alternative to the board—or in supplement—is dividing the funding request into two yearly tranches, much like the initial funding request which was divided between 2022 and 2023.
The downside to approving just a single year of funding is:
But it also lends itself to more scrupulous capital management. Less cash on hand would mean that the UF is forced to more prudently give out grants and fund other partners. This would also limit the size of the team. Some of the roles listed could perhaps be rolled up into a single job. I would hope that the Foundation continues functioning like a startup as opposed to a larger bureaucratic organization.
A further alternative would be granting the DAO the ability to clawback a portion of the funds after a given review period. The incentives proposal allows the timelock to have ownership over the funds—a similar setup could be warranted for grants and UF OPEX.
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A very exciting vision proposed in the proposal is the inclusion of core contributors. A big change that should be ushered in over the coming year or two is the incorporation of “in-house” developers and researchers. The UF has agreed with delegates on this vision. That’s why $15M is bucketed for bringing on 3 new core contributors over the next 2 years. This is something that’s been lacking for some time, with Labs acting as the primary R&D entity for Uniswap as a whole. But in order to realize this vision, a stronger pipeline must be created for grantees and future core contributors to become true businesses.
A missing KPI imo is the number of successful, i.e. self-sufficient, businesses that the UF has funded. A salient one is of course Oku, which was funded by a $1.6M grant and has enabled Uni v3 to be safely deployed across dozens of chains. They generate revenue based on these partnerships and are even expanding their FE integration expertise to protocols like Morpho. In other words, Oku started as merely a grantee and is now a growing, revenue-generating business, funded often by the DAO for integrations but primarily directly by target chains. We need more of these success stories. Grantees and incubator participants should eventually graduate from their “seed” phase with the Foundation, at which point, they may come to the DAO for further funding, or raise from more traditional sources like VCs. Incentive-aligned structures can be set up to fund these businesses as well, like being paid in vested UNI. If enough of these businesses graduate from the UF grants launchpad, in a couple of years, Uniswap could supplement—or displace—Labs in a meaningful way.
This brings me back to a previous point: the UF should interface with Labs more to ensure that the DAO’s and token holders’ interests are represented. In a scenario where communications with Labs are entirely severed, a more adversarial environment could brew. If the DAO launches new products via core contributors, would Labs feel threatened? Would this turn into a pvp grudge match between the DAO and Labs? It wouldn’t be a surprise since alternative core contributors would increase Labs’ competition and therefore suppress their margins. If entities aren’t on the same page, then funding core contributors and more grantees may ultimately be fruitless due to Labs’ significant stronghold.
The filings are pretty interesting to dig through and the topic of an advisory board makes sense. Would be nice to hear from the Foundation what the purpose of the board is or does currently; we thought it included independent parties already?
Overall, given the relationship, it makes sense to have some level of DAO or independent involvement and relation for accountability and oversight. Quite a few delegates have asked the Accountability Committee to get involved, but given the current scope of that, it doesn't make sense in our opinion for that entity itself right now to do so. However, an independent board mixed with outside professionals makes a lot of sense. There probably needs to have a good level of recruiting for outside professionals but given the scope and budget, it should be pretty reasonable.
Overall optimistic about the opportunities that lie ahead for Uniswap, and we recognise the important and valuable work that the Foundation has done and continues to do for Uniswap. Most of our questions have already been answered during office hours and in private convos with the UF, but wanted to share our thoughts here nonetheless. We also appreciate the important questions and feedback raised by some of our fellow delegates so far, which we in large agree with.
Imo, the key strategic priorities — scaling network supply (liquidity) and demand (developers), onboarding core contributors, evolving governance, and activating revenue streams — are logically connected and make sense for building network effects. Together with hooks and Unichain, one can imagine where these come together to create real synergies and drive a competitive edge for Uniswap. This is all very exciting stuff.
Overall optimistic about the opportunities that lie ahead for Uniswap, and we recognise the important and valuable work that the Foundation has done and continues to do for Uniswap. Most of our questions have already been answered during office hours and in private convos with the UF, but wanted to share our thoughts here nonetheless. We also appreciate the important questions and feedback raised by some of our fellow delegates so far, which we in large agree with.
Imo, the key strategic priorities — scaling network supply (liquidity) and demand (developers), onboarding core contributors, evolving governance, and activating revenue streams — are logically connected and make sense for building network effects. Together with hooks and Unichain, one can imagine where these come together to create real synergies and drive a competitive edge for Uniswap. This is all very exciting stuff.
Our main concerns involve the heavy reliance on financial incentives to achieve these goals, coupled with significant execution complexity.
Incentive dependency: While these types of incentives can be effective short-term catalysts, as others have noted, it is questionable whether they can form a sustainable strategy for long-term success. The proposal acknowledges the need for "organic demand" but could elaborate further on how this will be achieved through the various builder/hook/partnership initiatives in terms of synergies/network effects.
Execution: The UF proposes to undertake a large number of initiatives simultaneously: managing multiple large grant programs, launching and scaling Unichain, overhauling governance, engaging with regulators, and more. Successfully recruiting 12+ highly qualified individuals in the competitive crypto space is a significant undertaking in itself; delays in hiring, struggle to find the specific expertise required for each initiative, and effectively onboarding these new team members would all directly impact execution.
Would be interested to hear more about how the UF is thinking about mitigating some of these risks, and what if some of these issues get in the way of meeting the year-1 KPIs?
Similarly, we’d be interested to hear how the UF envisions the management of all the specific grant programs for developers, governance, core contributor teams, infra, research etc? Appreciate the recently added milestones/deliverables etc!
Governance: The proposed changes to governance are on a high level ambitious and necessary, but the role of the DAO appears to remain somewhat unclear amongst the community. While this was discussed at Devcon Uniday, we’d encourage the UF to explicitly outline this in plain English and how they see this developing.
As far as understood, the UF's goal for governance in the next year is to facilitate more effective UNI spending, primarily involving core contributors. While the UF will initially manage the core contributors, we understand the goal is to transition management of these relationships to the DAO once it has a legal entity, as well as develop tools to enable the DAO to directly manage said relationships and ultimately eliminate the UF's intermediary role.
We also think the board setup suggested by @GFXlabs could help bridge the perceived gap between Uniswap stakeholders and something we’d be interested to hear more about and explore further, and look forward to seeing what the UF thinks of this idea.
Regarding the budget, the operating expenses are — as expected — significant, but therefore we think also warrants further breakdowns.
Thank you!
I appreciate the improvements done in this section.
I appreciate the improvements done in this section.
The Foundation’s failure to consider the UTWG report at the time of drafting this proposal—whether through negligence or lack of collaboration—raises serious concerns. This is compounded by UTWG committee member Karpatkey’s comment, which demonstrates nothing but bad faith. Their remark fails to raise a single question about the discrepancies between the UTWG’s report and the Foundation’s funding request, which is 2-3 times larger than expected.
Karpatkey has claimed their role on the committee is limited to crafting the framework, after which they will step down to avoid conflicts of interest tied to their willingness to become treasury operators. Yet, their current actions reveal an ongoing conflict that undermines the whole process.
As for the governance of Unichain – Unichain is subject to the Optimism governance process for its technical upgrades, just like every other member of the Superchain. The UF has already laid the groundwork for Uniswap community participation by securing a seat on the OP Security Council. Further, we are excited to lean on the expertise of the Uniswap delegates who are active at Optimism to build a framework for ourselves and our delegates to advocate for our community’s interests in that process.
Unichain stands to create value for our community in a few ways. We believe it is the L2 best suited for all DeFi Protocols, including Uniswap v4. We are excited to see hook developers, swappers, and LPs alike benefit from their usage of Unichain. We also look forward to the deployment of the UVN, upon which the community may choose to run a validator, or stake, in order to earn revenue to support additional initiatives.
Based on the comments made by Devin, I formally request that the Foundation cease all efforts related to Unichain, as it presents a clear conflict of interest with the DAO.
The DAO doesn't have any ownership over:
And because of these reasons, Unichain is NOT a product that will be supported by the DAO.
Regarding the hooks section, I believe the work has been highly effective despite the limited budget allocated. I appreciate the effort put into this, and I’d like to see the Foundation continue supporting teams to successfully launch their hook projects.
Additionally, I think the Foundation should take a more active role in improving routing accessibility for hook developers. While teams can attract users and increase TVL on their hooks, pools without proper routing remain underutilized and struggle to gain traction.
Regarding this section, I note that none of the concerns raised by delegates above have been addressed. I want to emphasize the critical need for transparency here and underscore why the questions posed by colleagues remain highly relevant.
To support us in treasury operations, we have onboarded with three established trading and advisory firms. We are confident we can implement strategies that fund our operational and grants needs while minimizing market impact on an ongoing basis.
It would be helpful if the Foundation could share the names of the firms already engaged. Could you clarify whether these firms will be responsible for managing the sales process?
I support the need for predictability for retaining talent within the Foundation. However, it seems the Foundation struggles with accountability and transparency, which may explain why some are questioning the deal’s timeframe.
First off, thank you to everyone who has engaged with this proposal thus far. We have read through your comments and questions, and are sharing our thoughts and responses below.
First though I want to reiterate that this proposal is about shoring up the Uniswap ecosystem’s long term competitive advantage.
It is not a request for charity, or public goods for public goods’ sake.
First off, thank you to everyone who has engaged with this proposal thus far. We have read through your comments and questions, and are sharing our thoughts and responses below.
First though I want to reiterate that this proposal is about shoring up the Uniswap ecosystem’s long term competitive advantage.
It is not a request for charity, or public goods for public goods’ sake.
This is a strategic investment to sustain Uniswap’s leadership in DeFi for decades to come.
Specifically, we are proposing:
Below, we double-click on some specific topics that have come up over the last week:
We appreciate your comments requesting clearer metrics by which to hold the UF accountable, and by which to track certain grants programs. We have since plugged in 1-year target impact metrics that we aim to achieve in our “Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities” and “Top 10 Largest Grants Allocations” tables.
As we support the four strategic pillars we’ve laid out above, we expect to see growth in market share, TVL, volume (and hook volume), and across our developer community.
We appreciate the work that the Treasury Working Group has done to lay the groundwork for Governance Sustainability – it is a useful precedent involving all delegates. We note that our proposal and the UTWG’s Report share North Star objectives– growth and sustainability. Specifically:
Karpatkey, one of the authors of the UTWG proposal, reiterates these goals in their comment above, and stated “In our view, mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve sustainability, which includes supporting UF funding in the long term.”
As for the governance of Unichain – Unichain is subject to the Optimism governance process for its technical upgrades, just like every other member of the Superchain. The UF has already laid the groundwork for Uniswap community participation by securing a seat on the OP Security Council. Further, we are excited to lean on the expertise of the Uniswap delegates who are active at Optimism to build a framework for ourselves and our delegates to advocate for our community’s interests in that process.
Unichain stands to create value for our community in a few ways. We believe it is the L2 best suited for all DeFi Protocols, including Uniswap v4. We are excited to see hook developers, swappers, and LPs alike benefit from their usage of Unichain. We also look forward to the deployment of the UVN, upon which the community may choose to run a validator, or stake, in order to earn revenue to support additional initiatives.
v4 has the potential to subsume entire categories of DeFi into the Uniswap Protocol via hooks. They are a unique technical differentiator which, if fostered properly, can cement our competitive advantage. To maximize the opportunity presented by hooks, it is integral to support every stage of the development lifecycle:
In addition to our efforts across the developer lifecycle, we also work hand-in-hand with blue chip protocol teams and DAOs across the space to support them in integrating hooks.
Our goals for our liquidation and UF treasury management strategy are threefold:
As we note above, we plan to maintain approximately 50% of our Treasury in UNI over the short to medium term, and to continue to maintain a portion of our Treasury in UNI over the long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.
To support us in treasury operations, we have onboarded with three established trading and advisory firms. We are confident we can implement strategies that fund our operational and grants needs while minimizing market impact on an ongoing basis.
Some of you have asked why we request a two-year budget, rather than a one-year budget.
From an operational perspective, we would not be able to attract and maintain a talented team with less than 1 years’ runway. Startups generally aim to operate with at least 1 years’ runway at any given time.
From a grant-making and ecosystem-building perspective, there are multiple reasons why a two-year term is superior to one year.
This proposal is about positioning the Uniswap ecosystem for long-term leadership. Investing in growth today will allow us to maximize the opportunity this moment presents, and to capture and rechannel value for years to come. We appreciate the engagement and look forward to continued discussion.
Related to my comment on the Incentives proposal:
Related to my comment on the Incentives proposal:
This would allow stakeholders to vote directly on each part, avoiding an all-or-nothing approach. It ensures a clearer, fairer reflection of preferences and reduces potential friction.
To enable delegates to clearly signal their preferences for the Foundation’s strategic focus, I propose adopting an approach similar to the incentives proposal by splitting the vote into four distinct options:
Approve the entire proposal as presented.
Approve only the Uniswap V4 strategy.
Approve only the Unichain strategy.
Reject the proposal in full.
Again, this would allow stakeholders to vote directly on each part, avoiding an all-or-nothing approach. It ensures a clearer, fairer reflection of preferences and reduces potential friction.
There have been a lot of great comments made by fellow delegates. We appreciate everyone who has taken the time to review the proposal and provide feedback. Ultimately, this process will lead to the best outcome for the DAO.
Many of the points we intended to bring up have already been discussed, so rather than reiterating those points, we would like to offer a new view.
There have been a lot of great comments made by fellow delegates. We appreciate everyone who has taken the time to review the proposal and provide feedback. Ultimately, this process will lead to the best outcome for the DAO.
Many of the points we intended to bring up have already been discussed, so rather than reiterating those points, we would like to offer a new view.
We believe it's time to improve the governance of the Uniswap Foundation with their new funding request. The foundation has raised about $60M in funding from the DAO to date, and once the two new funding requests are approved, they will eclipse $200M.
As it currently stands, the Uniswap Foundation has an advisory board established in the first funding proposal, and the legal board of the Uniswap Foundation has two seats (according to publicly available filings), one filled by Devin and the other filled by Ken.
As the foundation scales its footprint and the DAO scales its investment in the foundation, it would be fitting for the DAO to have a more direct role overseeing the UNI invested in the foundation.
We propose the DAO elect five individuals to the board: a DeFi legal expert, a growth/marketing expert, someone with a track record for building high-impact organizations, and two Uniswap delegates. The board would have a total of five seats.
If delegates are receptive to this idea, we are happy to create a new forum thread to discuss the process of nominating board members and holding elections in parallel with the foundation's proposal.
Lastly, GFX Labs feels strongly that this maturing is necessary to approve the funding request. As such, we will withhold our support of the dual requests until it has been indicated that the foundation and delegates support improving the foundation's governance.
EDIT: We have had a few folks message us to voice why updating the advisory board would not be sufficient. We agree. We are proposing changes to the Uniswap Foundation's legal board.
In light of Devin's and karpatkey's replies, let me clarify one point on sustainability, otherwise there's a risk that we're talking past each other.
The problem I see is ultimately of balancing the books. If the DAO doesn't have sufficient income from operations, and spends more than the income from yield, the treasury will go to zero.
The the argument can be spelled out as this:
In light of Devin's and karpatkey's replies, let me clarify one point on sustainability, otherwise there's a risk that we're talking past each other.
The problem I see is ultimately of balancing the books. If the DAO doesn't have sufficient income from operations, and spends more than the income from yield, the treasury will go to zero.
The the argument can be spelled out as this:
The tresaury report divides Operating Income and Non-Operating Income of the DAO. It suggests that relatively small amount of fees can be captured by the DAO and that "the Uniswap DAO will therefore not be sustainable in the long-run by relying on income from operations".
While the report doesn't say this explicitly, the same argument can be made for Unichain's revenue share.
The report also suggests that "it must utilize its current treasury to collect income via alternative methods—likely through yield-bearing strategies and investments".
Collecting revenue from Unichain and Uniswap v2/v3/v4/X are forms of Operating Income.
Spending funds to incentivize Unichain or Uniswap v2/v3/v4/X therefore have the potential to increase the DAO's Operating Income, but not the Non-Operating Income.
Spending any funds from the treasury reduces its size, therefore reduces the future opportunities for Non-Operating Income.
It follows that:
It's not clear if you disagree with some of the premises, or the conclusion? For one, I'm not saying that the TWG's report is the ultimate source of truth. And ecosystem development could increase the UNI token price even if there's no clear plan for the DAO to balance it's budget. Does the protocol need the DAO more than the DAO needs the protocol...?
After attending an office hours, we got a lot of our questions answered; some general thoughts and current opinions.
A lot of our concerns have been voiced above and will be nice to see the revisions in the upcoming days. From our standpoint, the highest level question we're most interested in is with Unichain, how will the UF and DAO relationship going forward work? Maybe more specifically, with this proposal, the UF takes on the role of a normal Chain's foundation team and to us this makes sense. There needs to be someone for this role and it makes most sense for the UF to take on this role. With this assumption, how will the DAO function day to day? Will there be grant requests to the DAO/alternative programs set up, upgrade requests communicated to the DAO, etc.
Given our role in the UTWG, we have received questions about this proposal over the past few days. Below is a clarification of our view on the Uniswap treasury and the UF funding request.
As karpatkey, we firmly believe mobilising the Uniswap treasury would benefit the DAO and its larger ecosystem.
Given our role in the UTWG, we have received questions about this proposal over the past few days. Below is a clarification of our view on the Uniswap treasury and the UF funding request.
As karpatkey, we firmly believe mobilising the Uniswap treasury would benefit the DAO and its larger ecosystem.
Over the past few years, we collaborated with leading DAOs in the industry to help them optimally leverage their treasuries to support their goals. Often, these goals aren't limited to long-term sustainability but rather include ecosystem growth. The DAO will remain in charge of defining these goals and deciding whether to mobilise the treasury to achieve them. Based on the interviews conducted as part of the UTWG research, two recurring objectives have emerged: growth and sustainability.
We want to reiterate that mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve these goals. For example, implementing a Stability Fund would effectively contribute to the project's long-term sustainability by diversifying the assets and leveraging them for revenue generation.
In parallel, the DAO should ask itself: what do we want to use these funds for? Looking at past proposals, the answer appears to be funding core contributors that positively impact the Uniswap ecosystem.
This is compounded by UTWG committee member Karpatkey’s comment, which demonstrates nothing but bad faith. Their remark fails to raise a single question about the discrepancies between the UTWG’s report and the Foundation’s funding request, which is 2-3 times larger than expected.
To clarify, we would favour supporting any core contributor positively impacting the Uniswap ecosystem. For example, in the Arbitrum DAO, we firmly supported Entropy Advisors despite them not being the official foundation. That said, the UF is currently the main core contributor to the Uniswap DAO, and we believe their previous work positively affected both the DAO and the ecosystem.
Regarding raising questions about their funding request, we believe the proposal explains the discrepancies. Specifically, the UTWG report assumed operating expenses growth of 20% and 12%, respectively, for 2025 and 2026. Similarly, it assumed grant growth of 15% and 11%, respectively, for the two years. This forecast is based on the guidance provided in the UF's second round of funding in 2023, along with their historical expenditures. The present proposal has a larger scope, with additional emphasis on governance, infrastructure and routing. This is reflected in a steeper growth rate for operating expenses and grants in 2025.
Based on the comments made by Devin, I formally request that the Foundation cease all efforts related to Unichain, as it presents a clear conflict of interest with the DAO.
@pepo It seems the questions you are raising are not really about the single expenses and why they are higher than expected but rather about the legitimacy of expanding the scope (e.g., including Unichain). We agree clarity on the relationship between Labs and the DAO needs to be improved. And, we agree Unichain's launch could have benefitted from a closer discussion between these two parties. However, the fact remains that Unichain is now live. The question is: do we want to embrace it or do we want to fight it?
This is one of proposals where I genuinely don't think delegates can, in the short term, properly analyze all details of the the proposal including budgets and works. For now, our question is more on the scope.
Questions
This is one of proposals where I genuinely don't think delegates can, in the short term, properly analyze all details of the the proposal including budgets and works. For now, our question is more on the scope.
Questions
+150 hook prototypes spanning a variety of use cases, in addition to an OpenZeppelin code library for developers to use as a guide
Uniswap v4 has reduced the friction for anyone to innovate upon digital asset market structures. Thus far, our programs have directly taught 1,000+ developers to learn how to build hundreds of hooks. Unichain is similarly optimized for DeFi development, and allows for experimentation at all levels of the stack.
Comment: In terms of overall budget, as leading L2s do have large budgets to be competitive, we recognize that either way the budget will likely to be large.
Hi all - I’ve adjusted our proposal to include more detailed success metrics at both the UF and grants program levels.
Specifically, I’ve expanded the “Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities” chart with clearer metrics and added a “Target Impact” column to our “Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations” chart.
Thanks for outlining this strategic roadmap, I am generally supportive of the direction. However I'd like to suggest a few points of improvement.
As other delegates have already mentioned:
Thanks for outlining this strategic roadmap, I am generally supportive of the direction. However I'd like to suggest a few points of improvement.
As other delegates have already mentioned:
Additionally, the proposal hints at the potential for cross-chain liquidity pools but does not elaborate on the technical or governance challenges involved. How will liquidity be shared across chains? What tools or partnerships will be needed to make this seamless?
Discussion time: First of all, for a budget of $120M plus $45M more to support liquidity incentives, we understand that more time should be given to the discussion, it is a very important amount that cannot be discussed in a short period of time, we need to give all delegates and the community time to analyse and internalise all aspects of the proposal, ask questions to clear up their doubts, read the feedback and comments from other delegates, the responses from the proposer, etc. If we have learned anything from other DAOs, it is that rushing proposals that involve large amounts of money is not the most appropriate, a clear example of this is the GCP in Arbitrum of 200M ARB and the sums of money that have been spent by the OP in Grants. We therefore encourage and request the debate to be extended as long as it needs to be without rushing it or bringing it to a vote prematurely, as there is a lot of money at stake in these proposals.
2 year budget: We would also like to ask why the budget is required for the next 2 years instead of 1 year? Two years is a long time in crypto and many things can change. If there has been any evaluation and analysis to justify requesting a budget for such a long period of time, we would like to know what has been taken into account for that and what is the justification for it. Otherwise, we would really like to see a one year budget with one year targets, and at the end of that period assess whether the targets have been met when requesting and approving another annual budget request.
I have some questions (skip toward the end for those) to clarify my position, as well as initial feedback, while I'm still considering the proposal.
It's impossible to look at such a request in isolation, without looking into previous performance of the UF. My subjective and opinionated view is that the UF, back in 2023, was supported on these main tasks:
Thank you @devinwalsh and the whole Uniswap Foundation team for the comprehensive and exciting proposal!
We support the general direction this proposal outlines, as the Uniswap Foundation has consistently delivered impactful work that elevates the entire ecosystem. The advent of v4, in particular, represents a major innovation capable of pushing the boundaries of what Uniswap can provide. Such significant innovation also calls for further planning and effort from the core contributors including the Foundation, especially as the ecosystem expands to accommodate new area of DeFi. We appreciate the Foundation’s role in fostering these new capabilities and dedication to making the success growth happen with the community and contributors. We want to ensure that, as the ecosystem grows, it remains underpinned by a robust governance structure and clear execution strategies.
I believe that this proposal, with its request of $120.5M as a lump sum plus $45M in incentives, is missing clear, measurable KPIs on which the DAO can base its decision to move forward. The list provided appears to represent high-level priorities rather without specific, actionable performance metrics.
Feedback on the Priorities and how they can be improved by providing KPIs:
I believe that this proposal, with its request of $120.5M as a lump sum plus $45M in incentives, is missing clear, measurable KPIs on which the DAO can base its decision to move forward. The list provided appears to represent high-level priorities rather without specific, actionable performance metrics.
Feedback on the Priorities and how they can be improved by providing KPIs:
Growth in Uniswap Protocol (v2-v4):
Growth in Unichain DEX Volume and DeFi TVL:
Hooks Comprising 30% of Uniswap v4 Orderflow:
Top Hook Development Teams & Unichain Apps/Protocols Being Revenue-Generating:
Governance Vote on Uniswap Protocol Revenue to be Earned by Delegators:
UVN Validator and Staker Network Developed and Supported:
Unichain Top 5 L2 by Chain Revenue:
Overall Recommendation:
While these priorities outline a vision for growth and improvement, they do not serve as actionable KPIs because they lack specific baseline metrics, clear numerical targets, and defined timeframes.
General Concerns:
Staking:
Participating in the Fee Switch:
Delegation of Tokens:
Ownership and Context:
Entitlement of the Unichain Growth Reserve:
Hi, thanks for the proposal
It seems to me that in order not to slow down the development of the system and the grant program, it is worth dividing this proposal into two parts: grants and operational activities, because there are very big questions about the expenses in the second part.
Arbitrum and Optimism have already set the bar in this regard.
As laid out in the Foundation's governing documents, the ArbitrumDAO has significant authority over the directors as it may remove or elect The Arbitrum Foundation's directors, or expand or reduce the number of directors at any time pursuant to a Non-Constitutional AIP.
All v0.4 governance proposals must fall within one of the following categories:
- Governance Fund (Missions)
- Protocol or Governor Upgrade
- Maintenance Upgrade Proposals
- Inflation Adjustment
- Director Removal
- Treasury Appropriations
- Code of Conduct Violations
- Representative Removal
- Representative Structure Dissolution
- Rights Protections
- Elections
- Ratification
- Reflection Period (Metagovernance)
Hi Brian, thanks for the post. If you could clarify a question, that would be helpful.
If Uniswap Governance were to control the election of the Board of the Uniswap Foundation, this independence and separation would be jeopardized. Plaintiffs’ firms could attempt to exploit some perceived non-independence and hold the DAO liable for the acts of the Uniswap Foundation or vice versa.
Would you say that a plaintiff's firm could not attempt to exploit a perceived non-independence and hold the DAO liable for the acts of the Uniswap Foundation due to the foundation's full funding originating from the DAO?
We realize this proposal, and proposals generally, can increase the risk surface area. This DAO is governed by a collection of individuals and entities regularly tasked with weighing the potential rewards of their actions or non-actions against the risks they are taking, whether those actions be in the role of a Uniswap delegate, Uniswap LP, DeFi participant, or otherwise. The proposals contemplated here are north of a hundred million in funding. That presents a significant risk. We strongly believe that by adopting a new board, the DAO will significantly reduce that risk and may even be able to increase the reward from the current expectations.
As it’s a proposal that got additional discussions, here’s StableLab’s voting and rationale on Uniswap Unleashed.
Voted: Abstain
Regarding this proposal, we had several discussions and we thank everyone including Uniswap Foundation members and other delegates for their opinions. We focused on questions regarding assessment criteria and three aspects for our voting decision.
Whether the proposal should been seen under the different assessment criteria
-The Uniswap Foundation is a steward for Uniswap DAO, which was voted in by DAO vote, and it holds interest and information distinct from other working groups or service providers to Uniswap DAO. For example, legal challenge to Uniswap DAO impacts its participants but the Uniswap Foundation is likely to face bigger challenges compared to others. Several members of the Uniswap Foundation have been contributing to the Uniswap ecosystem before the Foundation’s creation, and their concerns for the ecosystem, driven by both reputation and personal interests (financial and otherwise) are reasonably greater than other Uniswap DAO participants. However, as StableLab recognizes, this is subjective and sets a precedent that could be misguided, so we decided to evaluate the proposal under the usual assessment criteria. Three aspects were evaluated: scope, budget, and impacts.
Scope
-The scope of the proposal is extensive, covering operational cost, marketing, and large grants budgets for research and governance. The Uniswap Foundation has the mandate to request these, as it also has the ability to request funding grants and also distribute it to grantees it decides. We understand the concerns from other DAO participants that new scopes have been created and initiated by the Foundation including Unichain. But for this, as the mandate given to the Uniswap Foundation also covers the ever changing nature of DeFi, we believe that the scope is still valid.
Budget & Impacts
-There are two main compositions of the budget: operational and grants. Regarding the operational budget, while it might be controversial to note, we don’t think it’s necessarily unreasonable. For larger DeFi DAOs like the Sky ecosystem, costs have been around $150 million USD over the past 12 months. Granted, Sky makes sustainable and strong revenue. However, considering Uniswap is a protocol with over $4 billion USD in TVL and market cap above $4.8 billion USD, presence of the Uniswap Foundation was able to generate or defend more than $20 million USD per year in TVL and marketcap is reasonable. This is especially valid in potential extreme situations such as hacks or governance attacks, where the presence of the Foundation helps to coordinate defense, mitigating coordination issues. Therefore, the operations budget is valid.
-The grants budget, which is more than double the budget for Operations, is contentious due to the budget size and question regarding its impacts. While we appreciate the report, such as this, aside from grants spent on audits, which are understandably important, it’s difficult to see actual impacts. For example, the report noted over 400+ new hook developers, which is great, but how much TVL and revenue will they generate? A big portion of the grants are ongoing, we don’t necessarily believe that it would be beneficial to create more burdens for the Foundation team with larger grants to manage. This is also considering there are already large grants specifically for Unichain and V4 migration (which we suggest just incentivizing v4 onboarding to Unichain.)
Suggestion
We strongly recommend the Uniswap Foundation to reconsider how it wants to move forward with grants. One approach could be for the Foundation to present a monthly or quarterly list of grants for DAO approval, with comments explaining the recommendations. Alternatively, a more narrow list and budget for grants might be considered.
Conclusion
Traditionally, Uniswap Governance utilizes Snapshot (offchain voting) for sentiment, allowing onchain proposals to incorporate more details or edits as needed. We voted to abstain at this time, anticipating that the outlined concerns will be addressed in future iterations.
I will vote against the proposals as they stand now. In my view, a request for such an extraordinary funding amount requires extraordinarily strong evidence. I don’t believe that level of proof has been reached yet.
Specifically, I haven’t seen sufficient evidence that spending the funds in the proposed manner is a better alternative for UNI tokenholders than simply allocating them to a Stability Fund for yield. For example, the total gross revenue of a top-5 L2 (Linea) has ranged between $5,000 and $20,000 per day over the past week. If this is the revenue Unichain aims to reach by spending >$30M on Unichain-related incentives and grants (not even including the related budget for ops), it will take a long time to recapture the investment—especially if only 65% of the net revenue goes to tokenholders. We can hope that Unichain’s revenue will be much higher, but’s it’s just that, hop. To be clear Unichain here is just an example, this also applied to other categories.
Another major issue is the lack of alignment and coordination among the key actors (UF, Labs, DAO). Unichain, in particular, is problematic in this regard.
Below are detailed explanations of these proposed changes.
While I and most other delegates support incentives for Unichain’s growth, it’s unclear whether including votes for such incentives within the same proposal as the rest of the UF’s budget is necessary. There are multiple reasons to separate and/or postpone this funding:
We believe the following conditions should be met before the DAO provides incentives to Unichain:
Since v4 hook developers can choose to bypass the protocol fee using hooks with BEFORE_SWAP_RETURNS_DELTA_FLAG or otherwise interfere with the protocol fee, we request that, at a minimum, a legally binding agreement be made with each hook developer receiving a grant. If the developer collects revenue from the hook in any form, the DAO must be entitled to its fair share through protocol fees.
Additionally, we believe other mechanisms should be explored to capture revenue from protocols building on top of Uniswap. For example, grant agreements could stipulate a share in future equity or tokens.
The proposal should clarify which incentives are public goods for the DeFi space and which are aimed at sustainability of the DAO & UF and UNI token appreciation.
The funding of v4 incentives and the operational budget should be conditional on establishing a clear pathway for capturing revenue from the protocol—whether through the protocol fee switch or alternative mechanisms such as frontend fees. The burden of proof lies with the Foundation, not the delegates, as it is unlikely that any bottom-up proposal from the DAO will gain traction while the general understanding remains that the Foundation is still working on its design.
One option to enhance oversight is extending the UF’s Legal Board to include DAO members, as suggested by GFX Labs. However, if this is not possible due to regulatory reasons, other alternatives should be explored. Some options were recommended in response to the previous funding request in 2023, and I’m happy to see that some of them have already been implemented!
The goal should be to reduce potential misalignments (real or perceived) between key stakeholders within the ecosystem and improve transparency.
We voted FOR the Uniswap Unleashed proposal to fund the four identified Uniswap Foundation priorities over the next two years: scaling network supply, scaling network demand, equipping governance and the community by activating revenue, and onboarding protocol core contributors. We believe this proposal represents a significant step toward strengthening Uniswap’s ecosystem, and we trust the Foundation’s ability to execute on its vision effectively.
However, we recognize that certain areas remain unclear and require further refinement. Specifically, there is ongoing uncertainty around the establishment of a legal entity, the timeline and feasibility of activating the fee switch, and broader transparency and accountability measures for the Uniswap Foundation (UF). Additionally, it remains unclear how core contributors' work will align with the DAO’s long-term strategic goals and how value will ultimately flow back to the DAO.
To address these concerns, the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) has already begun tightening feedback loops between the UF and delegates, ensuring that these critical areas receive the necessary attention and oversight. We look forward to continued engagement to refine these structures and enhance transparency and accountability as Uniswap evolves.
Hi all, we appreciate all of your additional comments, and feedback shared in, over the last few days.
Hi all, we appreciate all of your additional comments, and feedback shared in, over the last few days.
Reporting
We have received some questions about how to check in on the status of grants. The best place to go is our 2024 Community Impact Report - it dives into progress and KPIs achieved by every grant we have made in the last year+. To learn more about grantees, you can watch a few of our past Community Calls on our Youtube channel, or sign up for future Community Calls here.
In the coming year, we commit to continuing the cadence of our existing transparency measures: biannual Community Impact Reports, monthly Community Calls, quarterly financial transparency reports, and grant initiative announcement and update blog posts.
UF<>Delegate Feedback Mechanism
We’ve heard constructive feedback on ways to tighten the feedback loop between the UF and Uniswap delegates – one of those ideas was a forum in which delegates can meet with UF leadership to review and give feedback on the UF’s strategy and execution.
For this endeavor to be effective, it must be designed in tandem between the UF and delegates. Erin just posted to kick off discussion on some key parameters for this forum – we are excited to hear your ideas, and to work together to get this set up.
Core Contributor Lifecycle
The long-term goal of our core contributor work is to support Uniswap Governance and community sustainability. This is ultimately a program to arm Governance with the tools and infrastructure required to create value for itself over a long term time period.
Some of the inputs into success here include:
In the future, we envision a culture which attracts top tier DeFi development teams to the Uniswap DAO to raise funds as an alternative to other forms of funding, like VC funding. We envision a process by which these teams may mutually agree to a defined vision or scope with the DAO, and by which the DAO can properly size an allocation of vested UNI to the team over time. We envision multiple teams building complementary protocols, infrastructure, and more, each of which accrues value to the Uniswap community.
Over the coming months, these are the things the UF plans to do to kick us off on this journey.
Growth and Sustainability
Several delegates raised concerns about the size of this budget request through the lens of the UTWG’s report, which included projected expenses. We cited our thoughts on this report in our first comment above.
To expand our thinking: long-term sustainability is of course important, however the Uniswap Protocol, and certainly its developer ecosystem, are in startup mode. Startups require an upfront allocation of resources in order to grow. Without initial support, a startup will flounder – stagnation early in a startups’ life does not lead to long-term sustainability. We believe the programs outlined in these proposals will drive long-term ecosystem value, ultimately ensuring sustainability once growth stabilizes.
Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation’s lack of governance.
Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation’s lack of governance.
please clarify/expand … without details its hard to determine whether it is a) structural b) procedural c) accountable (lines of reporting)
As it currently stands, the Uniswap Foundation has an advisory board established in the first funding proposal, and the legal board of the Uniswap Foundation has two seats (according to publicly available filings), one filled by Devin and the other filled by Ken.
With this operating structure, the Uniswap DAO's only ability to govern the UF is when it requests additional funding. Outside of that, it is a free-standing organization.
Implementing an elected (legal) board with a diverse skill set has the potential to do much more than hold the UF accountable. Most importantly, the board could help guide the foundation toward working on the highest-impact items and formalizing the foundation's operations. In many cases, a great board can be a force multiplier for the organization.
As of early December, the UAC had a surplus of nearly $3M.
The $3.5M in Uniswap Accountability Committee's multi-sig is for a multitude of programs, not just UNI for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth proposal. For example, proposal 74, the prop supporting Tally, was directed to the UAC. Further, proposals are often denominated in dollars but are funded to the UAC in UNI. Between the UAC receiving UNI and distributing it for the approved proposal, the price of UNI can fluctuate, leading to a surplus or deficit.
As of early December, the UAC had a surplus of nearly $3M.
The $3.5M in Uniswap Accountability Committee's multi-sig is for a multitude of programs, not just UNI for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth proposal. For example, proposal 74, the prop supporting Tally, was directed to the UAC. Further, proposals are often denominated in dollars but are funded to the UAC in UNI. Between the UAC receiving UNI and distributing it for the approved proposal, the price of UNI can fluctuate, leading to a surplus or deficit.
Data is showing that this program has failed in its objective of attracting retentive liquidity in its target chains.
Proposal 59 stated, "The goal of this proposal is to take Uniswap on the offensive by actively supporting and incentivizing new deployments of Uniswap v3. If successful, we will be able to grow Uniswap's market share and increase the amount of volume growing through protocol-owned deployments rather than leaving the opportunity for more Uni V3 forks to grab market share."
That said, we are not opposed to directing sizable incentives to Unichain. The sums requested by the Uniswap Foundation are not beyond what we would support. Our primary concern with the proposal is the foundation's lack of governance.
In the short term, if the DAO would like, we would be happy to propose allocating sizable incentives to Unichain.
As this proposal currently stands, I hold in two views: Uniswap Foundation needs to be funded, and there needs to be effective oversight and accountability over the utilization of the requested capital.
There doesn’t seem to be a net positive scenario that’ll result from cutting the UF’s funding or reducing it by a significant margin. The landscape of “Uniswap” as a whole has materially transformed just over the past month. V3 and previous iterations, although incredibly impactful and significant, have been baseline protocols—but v4 is a platform, and Unichain is an entire L2. So, a formalized steward is needed to help grow these additions.
As this proposal currently stands, I hold in two views: Uniswap Foundation needs to be funded, and there needs to be effective oversight and accountability over the utilization of the requested capital.
There doesn’t seem to be a net positive scenario that’ll result from cutting the UF’s funding or reducing it by a significant margin. The landscape of “Uniswap” as a whole has materially transformed just over the past month. V3 and previous iterations, although incredibly impactful and significant, have been baseline protocols—but v4 is a platform, and Unichain is an entire L2. So, a formalized steward is needed to help grow these additions.
The landscape is changing from other angles as well. Regulatory developments should lead to the adoption of the DUNA, which will help turn on fees for token holders and allow the DAO to partake in more active treasury management initiatives. The DAO, and the protocol as a whole, has been held back for some time, but these developments should allow for more impactful and creative initiatives to develop. Plus, token holders can finally benefit from trading and sequencer fees. It’s frustrating to see an entity like Labs be the sole benefactor from Uniswap’s growth, while remaining restricted as a token holder. That’s about to change.
So here’s the main question in my mind—given all of these changes, can UF properly execute their mandates?
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I formally request that the Foundation cease all efforts related to Unichain, as it presents a clear conflict of interest with the DAO.
The DAO doesn’t have any ownership over:
the chain
fee distribution
anything related to it (including how they are handling the UVN as the “Uniswap Growth Reserve”)
And because of these reasons, Unichain is NOT a product that will be supported by the DAO.
I sympathize with the argument that the DAO itself may not attain direct and explicit benefit from Unichain. Sure, we could stake UNI from the treasury to attain some yield, but that would only reduce the yield towards staking token holders. And if the UF stakes, that would also cut into other token holders' yield. Sounds like a net negative…even though we could run simulations to find an optimal staking ratio between the DAO/UF and token holders. Regardless, Unichain won’t financially benefit the DAO overtly, and its control—from what I can tell—won’t directly be in delegates’ hands either due to the layer of separation between Uniswap governance and Optimism governance. And if the UF is playing a part in the Optimism security council, how will the UF interface with the DAO in decision making?
Regardless of rights over the UVN fee split, the DAO does not operate on a strictly profit-maximizing basis, so cutting funding for Unichain from this proposal doesn’t make sense. The DAO’s actions haven’t always been in the direct financial interest of itself but for DeFi as a whole. The largest expense for the DAO, apart from UF funding, has been public goods support like the DEF. These are beneficial to both Uniswap and crypto as a whole. This isn’t to say that public goods funding should be our main purpose—I’m actually opposed to most public goods initiatives and think the DAO should start functioning more or less like a business. What we should be focused on is long-term value provision to token holders, and increasing adoption for Unichain by funding the UF helps accomplish that goal. After all, that 65% UVN fee is useless if Unichain activity remains low. So, not funding Unichain partnerships, incentives, etc seems to be a net negative to token holders—even though not funding Unichain would be positive for the DAO’s treasury:
Based on the above, along with the UTWG’s research, expenses for the DAO would eclipse initial projections if this proposal were to pass—and that’s largely based on an underestimation of expenses required to bootstrap v4 (which has had a comparatively slower rate of growth than both v3 and v2) and the introduction of Unichain. From previous conversations, it’s clear that Labs doesn’t want to deal with the DAO. But the success of Unichain, and other Labs-related revenue sources, hinge on DAO-based funding. Labs hasn’t announced that it’ll be recycling a large portion of its revenue to support the growth of its newly developed products. Surely they should commit some of the $100M+ they earned over the past year to bootstrapping the v4/Unichain ecosystems? This was in part the hope when creating the initial expense projections. We request that one of the additional mandates of the Foundation is to more closely work with Labs to attain clarity on economic architecture, like UVN fees, and communicate that to the DAO prior to their institution, thereby more closely advocating token holders’ best interest.
And so, value provision to token holders can either be direct or indirect—the same goes for the DAO. Even if the DAO does not financially benefit from the UVN, even though it could, token holders definitely benefit. To what extent? Well, that largely hinges on how much the DAO supports Unichain—and is fettered by the economic architecture put in place by Labs (maybe the UVN split could’ve been negotiated from 65% to 75%?).
To the previous point of public goods, they often provide indirect value, but these “righteous” endeavors can easily veer into unjustified expenditures. The DAO can fall into this trap—this is bad for token holders. The UF can also fall into this trap, which can be harmful for the DAO and token holders.
So where does the onus lie regarding the UF?
In 2024, the UF engaged informally with staffers of Congress members, the administration, and regulatory agencies, and crypto lobbying groups to advocate for DeFi to push for regulatory clarity, governance certainty, and builder protections. Recognizing the pivot from enforcement to dialogue, UF has engaged with the SEC Crypto Task Force, CFTC, and key Congressional committees to help shape DeFi policy. The UF is well-positioned to expand these efforts and excited to explore opportunities here in the next year.
So how does the DAO ensure that capital is expended in the best interest of the DAO and token holders? Legal frameworks are often the best answer. A potential answer is creating a contract with the DAO and the UF, where upon the execution of the funding request, the UF is legally obligated to uphold certain standards and meet particular KPIs. The currently presented KPIs are rather optimistic. And in an ever-increasing competitive landscape, where Uniswap continues to lose overall market share, the DAO must make sure that expectations are realistically set. The presence of a legal contract between the DAO and UF would ensure that attainable KPIs and objectives are set, which would thereby lead to more prudent spending. The issue is that the DAO cannot enter into legal agreements. Perhaps this is feasible once the DUNA is in place. Therefore, a revamped board would make sense:
We propose the DAO elect five individuals to the board: a DeFi legal expert, a growth/marketing expert, someone with a track record for building high-impact organizations, and two Uniswap delegates. The board would have a total of five seats.
Instead of two Uniswap delegates on the board, perhaps it would be better for a large liquid token holder to be present.
An alternative to the board—or in supplement—is dividing the funding request into two yearly tranches, much like the initial funding request which was divided between 2022 and 2023.
The downside to approving just a single year of funding is:
But it also lends itself to more scrupulous capital management. Less cash on hand would mean that the UF is forced to more prudently give out grants and fund other partners. This would also limit the size of the team. Some of the roles listed could perhaps be rolled up into a single job. I would hope that the Foundation continues functioning like a startup as opposed to a larger bureaucratic organization.
A further alternative would be granting the DAO the ability to clawback a portion of the funds after a given review period. The incentives proposal allows the timelock to have ownership over the funds—a similar setup could be warranted for grants and UF OPEX.
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A very exciting vision proposed in the proposal is the inclusion of core contributors. A big change that should be ushered in over the coming year or two is the incorporation of “in-house” developers and researchers. The UF has agreed with delegates on this vision. That’s why $15M is bucketed for bringing on 3 new core contributors over the next 2 years. This is something that’s been lacking for some time, with Labs acting as the primary R&D entity for Uniswap as a whole. But in order to realize this vision, a stronger pipeline must be created for grantees and future core contributors to become true businesses.
A missing KPI imo is the number of successful, i.e. self-sufficient, businesses that the UF has funded. A salient one is of course Oku, which was funded by a $1.6M grant and has enabled Uni v3 to be safely deployed across dozens of chains. They generate revenue based on these partnerships and are even expanding their FE integration expertise to protocols like Morpho. In other words, Oku started as merely a grantee and is now a growing, revenue-generating business, funded often by the DAO for integrations but primarily directly by target chains. We need more of these success stories. Grantees and incubator participants should eventually graduate from their “seed” phase with the Foundation, at which point, they may come to the DAO for further funding, or raise from more traditional sources like VCs. Incentive-aligned structures can be set up to fund these businesses as well, like being paid in vested UNI. If enough of these businesses graduate from the UF grants launchpad, in a couple of years, Uniswap could supplement—or displace—Labs in a meaningful way.
This brings me back to a previous point: the UF should interface with Labs more to ensure that the DAO’s and token holders’ interests are represented. In a scenario where communications with Labs are entirely severed, a more adversarial environment could brew. If the DAO launches new products via core contributors, would Labs feel threatened? Would this turn into a pvp grudge match between the DAO and Labs? It wouldn’t be a surprise since alternative core contributors would increase Labs’ competition and therefore suppress their margins. If entities aren’t on the same page, then funding core contributors and more grantees may ultimately be fruitless due to Labs’ significant stronghold.
The filings are pretty interesting to dig through and the topic of an advisory board makes sense. Would be nice to hear from the Foundation what the purpose of the board is or does currently; we thought it included independent parties already?
Overall, given the relationship, it makes sense to have some level of DAO or independent involvement and relation for accountability and oversight. Quite a few delegates have asked the Accountability Committee to get involved, but given the current scope of that, it doesn't make sense in our opinion for that entity itself right now to do so. However, an independent board mixed with outside professionals makes a lot of sense. There probably needs to have a good level of recruiting for outside professionals but given the scope and budget, it should be pretty reasonable.
Overall optimistic about the opportunities that lie ahead for Uniswap, and we recognise the important and valuable work that the Foundation has done and continues to do for Uniswap. Most of our questions have already been answered during office hours and in private convos with the UF, but wanted to share our thoughts here nonetheless. We also appreciate the important questions and feedback raised by some of our fellow delegates so far, which we in large agree with.
Imo, the key strategic priorities — scaling network supply (liquidity) and demand (developers), onboarding core contributors, evolving governance, and activating revenue streams — are logically connected and make sense for building network effects. Together with hooks and Unichain, one can imagine where these come together to create real synergies and drive a competitive edge for Uniswap. This is all very exciting stuff.
Overall optimistic about the opportunities that lie ahead for Uniswap, and we recognise the important and valuable work that the Foundation has done and continues to do for Uniswap. Most of our questions have already been answered during office hours and in private convos with the UF, but wanted to share our thoughts here nonetheless. We also appreciate the important questions and feedback raised by some of our fellow delegates so far, which we in large agree with.
Imo, the key strategic priorities — scaling network supply (liquidity) and demand (developers), onboarding core contributors, evolving governance, and activating revenue streams — are logically connected and make sense for building network effects. Together with hooks and Unichain, one can imagine where these come together to create real synergies and drive a competitive edge for Uniswap. This is all very exciting stuff.
Our main concerns involve the heavy reliance on financial incentives to achieve these goals, coupled with significant execution complexity.
Incentive dependency: While these types of incentives can be effective short-term catalysts, as others have noted, it is questionable whether they can form a sustainable strategy for long-term success. The proposal acknowledges the need for "organic demand" but could elaborate further on how this will be achieved through the various builder/hook/partnership initiatives in terms of synergies/network effects.
Execution: The UF proposes to undertake a large number of initiatives simultaneously: managing multiple large grant programs, launching and scaling Unichain, overhauling governance, engaging with regulators, and more. Successfully recruiting 12+ highly qualified individuals in the competitive crypto space is a significant undertaking in itself; delays in hiring, struggle to find the specific expertise required for each initiative, and effectively onboarding these new team members would all directly impact execution.
Would be interested to hear more about how the UF is thinking about mitigating some of these risks, and what if some of these issues get in the way of meeting the year-1 KPIs?
Similarly, we’d be interested to hear how the UF envisions the management of all the specific grant programs for developers, governance, core contributor teams, infra, research etc? Appreciate the recently added milestones/deliverables etc!
Governance: The proposed changes to governance are on a high level ambitious and necessary, but the role of the DAO appears to remain somewhat unclear amongst the community. While this was discussed at Devcon Uniday, we’d encourage the UF to explicitly outline this in plain English and how they see this developing.
As far as understood, the UF's goal for governance in the next year is to facilitate more effective UNI spending, primarily involving core contributors. While the UF will initially manage the core contributors, we understand the goal is to transition management of these relationships to the DAO once it has a legal entity, as well as develop tools to enable the DAO to directly manage said relationships and ultimately eliminate the UF's intermediary role.
We also think the board setup suggested by @GFXlabs could help bridge the perceived gap between Uniswap stakeholders and something we’d be interested to hear more about and explore further, and look forward to seeing what the UF thinks of this idea.
Regarding the budget, the operating expenses are — as expected — significant, but therefore we think also warrants further breakdowns.
Thank you!
I appreciate the improvements done in this section.
I appreciate the improvements done in this section.
The Foundation’s failure to consider the UTWG report at the time of drafting this proposal—whether through negligence or lack of collaboration—raises serious concerns. This is compounded by UTWG committee member Karpatkey’s comment, which demonstrates nothing but bad faith. Their remark fails to raise a single question about the discrepancies between the UTWG’s report and the Foundation’s funding request, which is 2-3 times larger than expected.
Karpatkey has claimed their role on the committee is limited to crafting the framework, after which they will step down to avoid conflicts of interest tied to their willingness to become treasury operators. Yet, their current actions reveal an ongoing conflict that undermines the whole process.
As for the governance of Unichain – Unichain is subject to the Optimism governance process for its technical upgrades, just like every other member of the Superchain. The UF has already laid the groundwork for Uniswap community participation by securing a seat on the OP Security Council. Further, we are excited to lean on the expertise of the Uniswap delegates who are active at Optimism to build a framework for ourselves and our delegates to advocate for our community’s interests in that process.
Unichain stands to create value for our community in a few ways. We believe it is the L2 best suited for all DeFi Protocols, including Uniswap v4. We are excited to see hook developers, swappers, and LPs alike benefit from their usage of Unichain. We also look forward to the deployment of the UVN, upon which the community may choose to run a validator, or stake, in order to earn revenue to support additional initiatives.
Based on the comments made by Devin, I formally request that the Foundation cease all efforts related to Unichain, as it presents a clear conflict of interest with the DAO.
The DAO doesn't have any ownership over:
And because of these reasons, Unichain is NOT a product that will be supported by the DAO.
Regarding the hooks section, I believe the work has been highly effective despite the limited budget allocated. I appreciate the effort put into this, and I’d like to see the Foundation continue supporting teams to successfully launch their hook projects.
Additionally, I think the Foundation should take a more active role in improving routing accessibility for hook developers. While teams can attract users and increase TVL on their hooks, pools without proper routing remain underutilized and struggle to gain traction.
Regarding this section, I note that none of the concerns raised by delegates above have been addressed. I want to emphasize the critical need for transparency here and underscore why the questions posed by colleagues remain highly relevant.
To support us in treasury operations, we have onboarded with three established trading and advisory firms. We are confident we can implement strategies that fund our operational and grants needs while minimizing market impact on an ongoing basis.
It would be helpful if the Foundation could share the names of the firms already engaged. Could you clarify whether these firms will be responsible for managing the sales process?
I support the need for predictability for retaining talent within the Foundation. However, it seems the Foundation struggles with accountability and transparency, which may explain why some are questioning the deal’s timeframe.
First off, thank you to everyone who has engaged with this proposal thus far. We have read through your comments and questions, and are sharing our thoughts and responses below.
First though I want to reiterate that this proposal is about shoring up the Uniswap ecosystem’s long term competitive advantage.
It is not a request for charity, or public goods for public goods’ sake.
First off, thank you to everyone who has engaged with this proposal thus far. We have read through your comments and questions, and are sharing our thoughts and responses below.
First though I want to reiterate that this proposal is about shoring up the Uniswap ecosystem’s long term competitive advantage.
It is not a request for charity, or public goods for public goods’ sake.
This is a strategic investment to sustain Uniswap’s leadership in DeFi for decades to come.
Specifically, we are proposing:
Below, we double-click on some specific topics that have come up over the last week:
We appreciate your comments requesting clearer metrics by which to hold the UF accountable, and by which to track certain grants programs. We have since plugged in 1-year target impact metrics that we aim to achieve in our “Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities” and “Top 10 Largest Grants Allocations” tables.
As we support the four strategic pillars we’ve laid out above, we expect to see growth in market share, TVL, volume (and hook volume), and across our developer community.
We appreciate the work that the Treasury Working Group has done to lay the groundwork for Governance Sustainability – it is a useful precedent involving all delegates. We note that our proposal and the UTWG’s Report share North Star objectives– growth and sustainability. Specifically:
Karpatkey, one of the authors of the UTWG proposal, reiterates these goals in their comment above, and stated “In our view, mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve sustainability, which includes supporting UF funding in the long term.”
As for the governance of Unichain – Unichain is subject to the Optimism governance process for its technical upgrades, just like every other member of the Superchain. The UF has already laid the groundwork for Uniswap community participation by securing a seat on the OP Security Council. Further, we are excited to lean on the expertise of the Uniswap delegates who are active at Optimism to build a framework for ourselves and our delegates to advocate for our community’s interests in that process.
Unichain stands to create value for our community in a few ways. We believe it is the L2 best suited for all DeFi Protocols, including Uniswap v4. We are excited to see hook developers, swappers, and LPs alike benefit from their usage of Unichain. We also look forward to the deployment of the UVN, upon which the community may choose to run a validator, or stake, in order to earn revenue to support additional initiatives.
v4 has the potential to subsume entire categories of DeFi into the Uniswap Protocol via hooks. They are a unique technical differentiator which, if fostered properly, can cement our competitive advantage. To maximize the opportunity presented by hooks, it is integral to support every stage of the development lifecycle:
In addition to our efforts across the developer lifecycle, we also work hand-in-hand with blue chip protocol teams and DAOs across the space to support them in integrating hooks.
Our goals for our liquidation and UF treasury management strategy are threefold:
As we note above, we plan to maintain approximately 50% of our Treasury in UNI over the short to medium term, and to continue to maintain a portion of our Treasury in UNI over the long term. We are also exploring the ability to stake a portion of our UNI holdings once staking becomes available.
To support us in treasury operations, we have onboarded with three established trading and advisory firms. We are confident we can implement strategies that fund our operational and grants needs while minimizing market impact on an ongoing basis.
Some of you have asked why we request a two-year budget, rather than a one-year budget.
From an operational perspective, we would not be able to attract and maintain a talented team with less than 1 years’ runway. Startups generally aim to operate with at least 1 years’ runway at any given time.
From a grant-making and ecosystem-building perspective, there are multiple reasons why a two-year term is superior to one year.
This proposal is about positioning the Uniswap ecosystem for long-term leadership. Investing in growth today will allow us to maximize the opportunity this moment presents, and to capture and rechannel value for years to come. We appreciate the engagement and look forward to continued discussion.
Related to my comment on the Incentives proposal:
Related to my comment on the Incentives proposal:
This would allow stakeholders to vote directly on each part, avoiding an all-or-nothing approach. It ensures a clearer, fairer reflection of preferences and reduces potential friction.
To enable delegates to clearly signal their preferences for the Foundation’s strategic focus, I propose adopting an approach similar to the incentives proposal by splitting the vote into four distinct options:
Approve the entire proposal as presented.
Approve only the Uniswap V4 strategy.
Approve only the Unichain strategy.
Reject the proposal in full.
Again, this would allow stakeholders to vote directly on each part, avoiding an all-or-nothing approach. It ensures a clearer, fairer reflection of preferences and reduces potential friction.
There have been a lot of great comments made by fellow delegates. We appreciate everyone who has taken the time to review the proposal and provide feedback. Ultimately, this process will lead to the best outcome for the DAO.
Many of the points we intended to bring up have already been discussed, so rather than reiterating those points, we would like to offer a new view.
There have been a lot of great comments made by fellow delegates. We appreciate everyone who has taken the time to review the proposal and provide feedback. Ultimately, this process will lead to the best outcome for the DAO.
Many of the points we intended to bring up have already been discussed, so rather than reiterating those points, we would like to offer a new view.
We believe it's time to improve the governance of the Uniswap Foundation with their new funding request. The foundation has raised about $60M in funding from the DAO to date, and once the two new funding requests are approved, they will eclipse $200M.
As it currently stands, the Uniswap Foundation has an advisory board established in the first funding proposal, and the legal board of the Uniswap Foundation has two seats (according to publicly available filings), one filled by Devin and the other filled by Ken.
As the foundation scales its footprint and the DAO scales its investment in the foundation, it would be fitting for the DAO to have a more direct role overseeing the UNI invested in the foundation.
We propose the DAO elect five individuals to the board: a DeFi legal expert, a growth/marketing expert, someone with a track record for building high-impact organizations, and two Uniswap delegates. The board would have a total of five seats.
If delegates are receptive to this idea, we are happy to create a new forum thread to discuss the process of nominating board members and holding elections in parallel with the foundation's proposal.
Lastly, GFX Labs feels strongly that this maturing is necessary to approve the funding request. As such, we will withhold our support of the dual requests until it has been indicated that the foundation and delegates support improving the foundation's governance.
EDIT: We have had a few folks message us to voice why updating the advisory board would not be sufficient. We agree. We are proposing changes to the Uniswap Foundation's legal board.
In light of Devin's and karpatkey's replies, let me clarify one point on sustainability, otherwise there's a risk that we're talking past each other.
The problem I see is ultimately of balancing the books. If the DAO doesn't have sufficient income from operations, and spends more than the income from yield, the treasury will go to zero.
The the argument can be spelled out as this:
In light of Devin's and karpatkey's replies, let me clarify one point on sustainability, otherwise there's a risk that we're talking past each other.
The problem I see is ultimately of balancing the books. If the DAO doesn't have sufficient income from operations, and spends more than the income from yield, the treasury will go to zero.
The the argument can be spelled out as this:
The tresaury report divides Operating Income and Non-Operating Income of the DAO. It suggests that relatively small amount of fees can be captured by the DAO and that "the Uniswap DAO will therefore not be sustainable in the long-run by relying on income from operations".
While the report doesn't say this explicitly, the same argument can be made for Unichain's revenue share.
The report also suggests that "it must utilize its current treasury to collect income via alternative methods—likely through yield-bearing strategies and investments".
Collecting revenue from Unichain and Uniswap v2/v3/v4/X are forms of Operating Income.
Spending funds to incentivize Unichain or Uniswap v2/v3/v4/X therefore have the potential to increase the DAO's Operating Income, but not the Non-Operating Income.
Spending any funds from the treasury reduces its size, therefore reduces the future opportunities for Non-Operating Income.
It follows that:
It's not clear if you disagree with some of the premises, or the conclusion? For one, I'm not saying that the TWG's report is the ultimate source of truth. And ecosystem development could increase the UNI token price even if there's no clear plan for the DAO to balance it's budget. Does the protocol need the DAO more than the DAO needs the protocol...?
After attending an office hours, we got a lot of our questions answered; some general thoughts and current opinions.
A lot of our concerns have been voiced above and will be nice to see the revisions in the upcoming days. From our standpoint, the highest level question we're most interested in is with Unichain, how will the UF and DAO relationship going forward work? Maybe more specifically, with this proposal, the UF takes on the role of a normal Chain's foundation team and to us this makes sense. There needs to be someone for this role and it makes most sense for the UF to take on this role. With this assumption, how will the DAO function day to day? Will there be grant requests to the DAO/alternative programs set up, upgrade requests communicated to the DAO, etc.
Given our role in the UTWG, we have received questions about this proposal over the past few days. Below is a clarification of our view on the Uniswap treasury and the UF funding request.
As karpatkey, we firmly believe mobilising the Uniswap treasury would benefit the DAO and its larger ecosystem.
Given our role in the UTWG, we have received questions about this proposal over the past few days. Below is a clarification of our view on the Uniswap treasury and the UF funding request.
As karpatkey, we firmly believe mobilising the Uniswap treasury would benefit the DAO and its larger ecosystem.
Over the past few years, we collaborated with leading DAOs in the industry to help them optimally leverage their treasuries to support their goals. Often, these goals aren't limited to long-term sustainability but rather include ecosystem growth. The DAO will remain in charge of defining these goals and deciding whether to mobilise the treasury to achieve them. Based on the interviews conducted as part of the UTWG research, two recurring objectives have emerged: growth and sustainability.
We want to reiterate that mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve these goals. For example, implementing a Stability Fund would effectively contribute to the project's long-term sustainability by diversifying the assets and leveraging them for revenue generation.
In parallel, the DAO should ask itself: what do we want to use these funds for? Looking at past proposals, the answer appears to be funding core contributors that positively impact the Uniswap ecosystem.
This is compounded by UTWG committee member Karpatkey’s comment, which demonstrates nothing but bad faith. Their remark fails to raise a single question about the discrepancies between the UTWG’s report and the Foundation’s funding request, which is 2-3 times larger than expected.
To clarify, we would favour supporting any core contributor positively impacting the Uniswap ecosystem. For example, in the Arbitrum DAO, we firmly supported Entropy Advisors despite them not being the official foundation. That said, the UF is currently the main core contributor to the Uniswap DAO, and we believe their previous work positively affected both the DAO and the ecosystem.
Regarding raising questions about their funding request, we believe the proposal explains the discrepancies. Specifically, the UTWG report assumed operating expenses growth of 20% and 12%, respectively, for 2025 and 2026. Similarly, it assumed grant growth of 15% and 11%, respectively, for the two years. This forecast is based on the guidance provided in the UF's second round of funding in 2023, along with their historical expenditures. The present proposal has a larger scope, with additional emphasis on governance, infrastructure and routing. This is reflected in a steeper growth rate for operating expenses and grants in 2025.
Based on the comments made by Devin, I formally request that the Foundation cease all efforts related to Unichain, as it presents a clear conflict of interest with the DAO.
@pepo It seems the questions you are raising are not really about the single expenses and why they are higher than expected but rather about the legitimacy of expanding the scope (e.g., including Unichain). We agree clarity on the relationship between Labs and the DAO needs to be improved. And, we agree Unichain's launch could have benefitted from a closer discussion between these two parties. However, the fact remains that Unichain is now live. The question is: do we want to embrace it or do we want to fight it?
This is one of proposals where I genuinely don't think delegates can, in the short term, properly analyze all details of the the proposal including budgets and works. For now, our question is more on the scope.
Questions
This is one of proposals where I genuinely don't think delegates can, in the short term, properly analyze all details of the the proposal including budgets and works. For now, our question is more on the scope.
Questions
+150 hook prototypes spanning a variety of use cases, in addition to an OpenZeppelin code library for developers to use as a guide
Uniswap v4 has reduced the friction for anyone to innovate upon digital asset market structures. Thus far, our programs have directly taught 1,000+ developers to learn how to build hundreds of hooks. Unichain is similarly optimized for DeFi development, and allows for experimentation at all levels of the stack.
Comment: In terms of overall budget, as leading L2s do have large budgets to be competitive, we recognize that either way the budget will likely to be large.
Hi all - I’ve adjusted our proposal to include more detailed success metrics at both the UF and grants program levels.
Specifically, I’ve expanded the “Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities” chart with clearer metrics and added a “Target Impact” column to our “Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations” chart.
Thanks for outlining this strategic roadmap, I am generally supportive of the direction. However I'd like to suggest a few points of improvement.
As other delegates have already mentioned:
Thanks for outlining this strategic roadmap, I am generally supportive of the direction. However I'd like to suggest a few points of improvement.
As other delegates have already mentioned:
Additionally, the proposal hints at the potential for cross-chain liquidity pools but does not elaborate on the technical or governance challenges involved. How will liquidity be shared across chains? What tools or partnerships will be needed to make this seamless?
Discussion time: First of all, for a budget of $120M plus $45M more to support liquidity incentives, we understand that more time should be given to the discussion, it is a very important amount that cannot be discussed in a short period of time, we need to give all delegates and the community time to analyse and internalise all aspects of the proposal, ask questions to clear up their doubts, read the feedback and comments from other delegates, the responses from the proposer, etc. If we have learned anything from other DAOs, it is that rushing proposals that involve large amounts of money is not the most appropriate, a clear example of this is the GCP in Arbitrum of 200M ARB and the sums of money that have been spent by the OP in Grants. We therefore encourage and request the debate to be extended as long as it needs to be without rushing it or bringing it to a vote prematurely, as there is a lot of money at stake in these proposals.
2 year budget: We would also like to ask why the budget is required for the next 2 years instead of 1 year? Two years is a long time in crypto and many things can change. If there has been any evaluation and analysis to justify requesting a budget for such a long period of time, we would like to know what has been taken into account for that and what is the justification for it. Otherwise, we would really like to see a one year budget with one year targets, and at the end of that period assess whether the targets have been met when requesting and approving another annual budget request.
I have some questions (skip toward the end for those) to clarify my position, as well as initial feedback, while I'm still considering the proposal.
It's impossible to look at such a request in isolation, without looking into previous performance of the UF. My subjective and opinionated view is that the UF, back in 2023, was supported on these main tasks:
Thank you @devinwalsh and the whole Uniswap Foundation team for the comprehensive and exciting proposal!
We support the general direction this proposal outlines, as the Uniswap Foundation has consistently delivered impactful work that elevates the entire ecosystem. The advent of v4, in particular, represents a major innovation capable of pushing the boundaries of what Uniswap can provide. Such significant innovation also calls for further planning and effort from the core contributors including the Foundation, especially as the ecosystem expands to accommodate new area of DeFi. We appreciate the Foundation’s role in fostering these new capabilities and dedication to making the success growth happen with the community and contributors. We want to ensure that, as the ecosystem grows, it remains underpinned by a robust governance structure and clear execution strategies.
I believe that this proposal, with its request of $120.5M as a lump sum plus $45M in incentives, is missing clear, measurable KPIs on which the DAO can base its decision to move forward. The list provided appears to represent high-level priorities rather without specific, actionable performance metrics.
Feedback on the Priorities and how they can be improved by providing KPIs:
I believe that this proposal, with its request of $120.5M as a lump sum plus $45M in incentives, is missing clear, measurable KPIs on which the DAO can base its decision to move forward. The list provided appears to represent high-level priorities rather without specific, actionable performance metrics.
Feedback on the Priorities and how they can be improved by providing KPIs:
Growth in Uniswap Protocol (v2-v4):
Growth in Unichain DEX Volume and DeFi TVL:
Hooks Comprising 30% of Uniswap v4 Orderflow:
Top Hook Development Teams & Unichain Apps/Protocols Being Revenue-Generating:
Governance Vote on Uniswap Protocol Revenue to be Earned by Delegators:
UVN Validator and Staker Network Developed and Supported:
Unichain Top 5 L2 by Chain Revenue:
Overall Recommendation:
While these priorities outline a vision for growth and improvement, they do not serve as actionable KPIs because they lack specific baseline metrics, clear numerical targets, and defined timeframes.
General Concerns:
Staking:
Participating in the Fee Switch:
Delegation of Tokens:
Ownership and Context:
Entitlement of the Unichain Growth Reserve:
After attending an office hours, we got a lot of our questions answered; some general thoughts and current opinions.
A lot of our concerns have been voiced above and will be nice to see the revisions in the upcoming days. From our standpoint, the highest level question we're most interested in is with Unichain, how will the UF and DAO relationship going forward work? Maybe more specifically, with this proposal, the UF takes on the role of a normal Chain's foundation team and to us this makes sense. There needs to be someone for this role and it makes most sense for the UF to take on this role. With this assumption, how will the DAO function day to day? Will there be grant requests to the DAO/alternative programs set up, upgrade requests communicated to the DAO, etc.
It will definitely be interesting to see where this progresses over the next few months as the DAO maintains the role of treasury allocator and preserver.
Hi all - I’ve adjusted our proposal to include more detailed success metrics at both the UF and grants program levels.
Specifically, I’ve expanded the “Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities” chart with clearer metrics and added a “Target Impact” column to our “Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations” chart.
We’ve intentionally set ambitious, high-impact targets. Some we will exceed, and some we may fall short on despite best efforts. However, they will serve as our team’s benchmarks for success and accountability as we drive forward.
Discussion time: First of all, for a budget of $120M plus $45M more to support liquidity incentives, we understand that more time should be given to the discussion, it is a very important amount that cannot be discussed in a short period of time, we need to give all delegates and the community time to analyse and internalise all aspects of the proposal, ask questions to clear up their doubts, read the feedback and comments from other delegates, the responses from the proposer, etc. If we have learned anything from other DAOs, it is that rushing proposals that involve large amounts of money is not the most appropriate, a clear example of this is the GCP in Arbitrum of 200M ARB and the sums of money that have been spent by the OP in Grants. We therefore encourage and request the debate to be extended as long as it needs to be without rushing it or bringing it to a vote prematurely, as there is a lot of money at stake in these proposals.
2 year budget: We would also like to ask why the budget is required for the next 2 years instead of 1 year? Two years is a long time in crypto and many things can change. If there has been any evaluation and analysis to justify requesting a budget for such a long period of time, we would like to know what has been taken into account for that and what is the justification for it. Otherwise, we would really like to see a one year budget with one year targets, and at the end of that period assess whether the targets have been met when requesting and approving another annual budget request.
KPIs: Regarding the KPIs that several delegates consulted on, we see that you added a ‘Target Impact’ column to our ‘Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations’ chart, but those are final KPIs, i.e. targets to be met for the entire 2-year budget requirement. Given that the budget requirement is for 2 years, we understand that better defined and intermediate targets should be added to allow us to assess whether the funds are having the impact that justifies them.
Payments subject to KPIs: Related to the above, we do not believe that it would be prudent to release the required $120M in one single payment, but that it should be included that the funds would be released on a regular basis, e.g. every 6 months or every year, following the presentation and evaluation of the compliance with the interim KPIs.
Reports: Regarding the reports, we understand that it is not enough to commit to "regular reports" and to meet with a small group of representative delegates whom we do not know who they are or how they were selected, but for transparency and accountability reasons, an obligation on your part to submit regular reports should be included in the proposal, clarifying the frequency of their presentation, e.g. bi-monthly, quarterly, etc.
Governance Scope:
Looking into 2025, its scope will expand (or in some cases has already expanded) to include Optimism governance, Conditional Funding Markets, the Core Contributor Program, as governance activities related to Uniswap v4 and Unichain. Our hiring to build our Governance team reflects that.
We're pleased to see the Foundation considering a potential expansion of the governance scope, as this was a concern raised by several delegates during Devcon. However, it's still unclear how this will be implemented and what the DAO’s specific role and level of involvement will be in these matters. If the DAO (i.e. tokenholers, delegates, SP, and other stakeholders) is expected to "invest" in this and continue to support the Foundation in all these areas, its participation should be more clearly defined.
I have some questions (skip toward the end for those) to clarify my position, as well as initial feedback, while I'm still considering the proposal.
It's impossible to look at such a request in isolation, without looking into previous performance of the UF. My subjective and opinionated view is that the UF, back in 2023, was supported on these main tasks:
With v4 and Unichain out, I'd say the first task has been successful. In contrast, while nice work was done on the fee switch—and it's not exactly the UF's fault that it didn't happen—the fact is the fee switch is still not here. I believe the UF also did a lot of good behind the scenes on the third task. With the changes after the US election, that task has lost much of its urgency compared to back then. Even so, we still don't have the Uniswap DUNA, and we don't have regulatory clarity yet. The ecosystem support has been a mixed bag too. While I realize that many or most of the grants handed out since 2023 are still in progress, there's often limited information on how they're going and on their evaluation criteria and KPIs. This is disappointing because I was hoping for more transparency on those aspects.
EDIT: I was pointed out that the 2024 Community Impact Report shared by Devin in the opening post includes details on previously issued grants (their status and main achievements). My bad for missing that. The situation is better than I was assuming.
Going forward, subjectively I would put these as the current priorities:
In my view, the UF's plans shared here score highly on the first point, okay on the second, but mostly gloss over the last one.
I'll share feedback on the liquidity incentive programs under that post, and focus on the remaining two points here.
The Uniswap Treasury Report assumed these numbers:
Summing up 2025 and 2026, we get $87M in total predicted expenditure. These numbers include not just UF's budget and grants but also the DAO's own spending (e.g., incentives, service provider fees, delegate compensation), which is substantial. Optimistically, let's say the DAO cuts its expenses to $3.5M per year, leaving $80M for the rest.
In contrast, the current UF request is:
This is more than double the expenditure predicted in the report.
Moreover, even with the assumed $87M figure, the treasury report argues that:
The fund is assumed to yield 10% APR in the base case, and Uniswap is assumed to retain its share of market volume. Both assumptions are not exactly conservative.
This brings me to the next point: the prediction of Uniswap’s continued market share may be too optimistic. There is a clear trend of DEX volume moving away from Ethereum and its L2s. For the first time in the chains' history, Solana DEX volumes have started to dominate. While we can hope this will reverse and that v4 and Unichain will help, it's not guaranteed. This seems like the time to be conservative and double down on what works, as well as think of how to leverage Uniswap’s specific strengths, rather than ignore the risks and expand. (One can argue that Solana’s volume is “faked” and thus not relevant. However, a much higher proportion of Ethereum’s volume comes from arbitrage than on Solana, due to Ethereum’s much larger TVL, so the argument can cut both ways.)
Core Contributor program. Uniswap has existed for six years with just a single core contributor (Labs) who has done an excellent job creating value for the ecosystem and, so far, has been self-sustaining. Bringing in three more during the next two years, funded by the DAO, is a significant shift. Perhaps I don't see all the details, but based on the information provided, there isn't enough justification to spend $15M on this.
Public Good hooks. I fully support this, even if the size is debatable. Many useful hooks will be hard to turn into businesses; funding them will bring a lot of value to the ecosystem.
Chain-specific hooks. If these hooks are not public goods and can be monetized, it might be better to do VC-style investing and ask for future equity or tokens instead of just handing out grants.
v4 Infra. I support this; the only question is the size.
Router Incentives. Similarly, I support this if there's the budget.
Unichain Infra. This is less clear. Ideally, Unichain should be self-supporting from the fees it generates.
UF Subsidy fund. I support allocating budget for hook audits.
Conditional funding. Earmarking $4.5M for “experimentation” seems excessive. Why not experiment with $45k or $450k instead? Moreover, if the CFM experiment turns out to work well, then the other grants and DAO incentives can be distributed through it. There's no clear justification for spending an additional $4.5M just to test the mechanism itself.
Unichain DeFi partners. I can see the benefit, but the comments from points 3 and 6 also apply.
University Research. While I support this and $4M is not large for universities, it may still be too high. The Ethereum Academic Grants Rounds used to be only $1M per year.
I would be more supportive if the UF had an excellent track record on grant allocation, publicity, and accountability. At the moment, it feels like the UF hasn't fully done its homework before returning to ask for more funding. Many of the grants listed under “2024 Allocation Memos & Grant Announcements” have limited or unknown success. Meanwhile, obvious community needs sometimes don't get funded. For example, my go-to research on empirical performance of Uniswap AMMs includes papers from universities and external orgs like Ambient, the former zkSync research team, Flashbots, the Bank for International Settlements—but none from UF-funded grants. Incentives such as TLDR have funded general DeFi research that's not always connected with Uniswap.
EDIT: As mentioned above, the 2024 Community Impact Report includes some details on previously issued grants (their status and main achievements). I retract some of the criticism above.
In my view, there are signs of scope creep. I cannot support nearly doubling the team size to take on additional tasks that were not in the original mandate. While I see how getting involved in, for example, Optimism governance could be helpful for Unichain, it shouldn't be a core part of the UF's responsibilities in my view.
Thank you @devinwalsh and the whole Uniswap Foundation team for the comprehensive and exciting proposal!
We support the general direction this proposal outlines, as the Uniswap Foundation has consistently delivered impactful work that elevates the entire ecosystem. The advent of v4, in particular, represents a major innovation capable of pushing the boundaries of what Uniswap can provide. Such significant innovation also calls for further planning and effort from the core contributors including the Foundation, especially as the ecosystem expands to accommodate new area of DeFi. We appreciate the Foundation’s role in fostering these new capabilities and dedication to making the success growth happen with the community and contributors. We want to ensure that, as the ecosystem grows, it remains underpinned by a robust governance structure and clear execution strategies.
We'd like to share the following feedback and request clarifications:
with its request of $120.5M as a lump sum plus $45M in incentives, is missing clear, measurable KPIs on which the DAO can base its decision to move forward.
We agree with this perspective and believe that setting clear, measurable, and objective goals along with KPIs is essential for the DAO to accurately assess initiatives and achievements for each prioritized objective. As @Pepo mentioned, some initiatives are missing baselines and/or defined KPIs, and we’re also interested in understanding the north star metric for the overall initiative.
Concern: It is unclear if Unichain is owned by the DAO, and there is insufficient context regarding its functionality.
As Pepo and others have highlighted, we believe there needs to be greater clarity around Unichain’s governance structure under the DAO, especially given that its initial launch appeared to proceed independently. We would like more information on whether Unichain will be placed under the DAO’s control, how resources will be allocated, and what the longer-term plan is for its operational oversight.
We also question why the proposal requests funding for a full two-year period and whether a more incremental or milestone-driven structure might be preferable. While we recognize that multi-year funding can provide stability for long-term initiatives, a phased or check-in based process could improve accountability, encourage iterative feedback, and help align with the rapidly evolving needs of the ecosystem. If the two-year scope is essential, it would be helpful to see more details on how success will be measured, on what cadence progress will be reviewed, and how the community can stay involved in guiding the Foundation’s priorities.
karpatkey is supportive of the work the Uniswap Foundation has been doing over the past few years. The UF has consistently delivered high-quality outcomes while fostering a welcoming and engaging environment for governance participation. Their efforts have played a crucial role in shaping Uniswap’s ecosystem, ensuring it remains both innovative and inclusive.
With the introduction of Uniswap v4 and Unichain, we are already witnessing a key transformation in Uniswap, evolving from a protocol to a full-fledged developer platform. This shift has major implications for how we, as a DAO, steward Uniswap’s growth. Over the past year, the UF has demonstrated a deep and forward-thinking understanding of this transformation, proactively positioning Uniswap for long-term success. With the official launch of both Uniswap v4 and Unichain, the need to pursue multiple goals simultaneously—protocol growth, developer adoption, and ecosystem expansion—has never been clearer (or more challenging). The vision outlined for 2025 and 2026 aligns with this shift, and we believe it is a necessary and strategic step in Uniswap’s continued evolution.
karpatkey is supportive of the work the Uniswap Foundation has been doing over the past few years. The UF has consistently delivered high-quality outcomes while fostering a welcoming and engaging environment for governance participation. Their efforts have played a crucial role in shaping Uniswap’s ecosystem, ensuring it remains both innovative and inclusive.
With the introduction of Uniswap v4 and Unichain, we are already witnessing a key transformation in Uniswap, evolving from a protocol to a full-fledged developer platform. This shift has major implications for how we, as a DAO, steward Uniswap’s growth. Over the past year, the UF has demonstrated a deep and forward-thinking understanding of this transformation, proactively positioning Uniswap for long-term success. With the official launch of both Uniswap v4 and Unichain, the need to pursue multiple goals simultaneously—protocol growth, developer adoption, and ecosystem expansion—has never been clearer (or more challenging). The vision outlined for 2025 and 2026 aligns with this shift, and we believe it is a necessary and strategic step in Uniswap’s continued evolution.
Is it better to wait until Treasury gets formed and they have some clue as to the capital allocation between liquidity (from which your ask gets converted into fiat), stability and growth funds?
We acknowledge that this funding proposal is a significant ask. The UF currently represents the largest expense for the DAO treasury, and this request further expands the DAO’s investment in the Foundation. We believe it is important to carefully evaluate the trade-offs of such an investment in the context of Uniswap’s long-term strategy.
Uniswap has one of the largest treasuries in the industry. At karpatkey, we strongly advocate for long-term sustainability and encourage our partners to leverage their resources with that perspective in mind. However, our primary goal remains scaling DeFi. While we agree that treasury mobilisation would be beneficial for the Uniswap DAO, we also believe it should be approached in tandem with growth. The Mobilizing a DAO’s Treasury report identified two north stars for the DAO: growth and sustainability. In our view, mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve sustainability, which includes supporting UF funding in the long term.
A key to achieving our other north star—growth—is identifying valuable contributors, fostering innovation, and encouraging high-quality contributions. We believe the Uniswap Foundation exemplifies this role. For this reason, we extend our support for their continued work and are in favour of funding them for the longer term.
After attending an office hours, we got a lot of our questions answered; some general thoughts and current opinions.
A lot of our concerns have been voiced above and will be nice to see the revisions in the upcoming days. From our standpoint, the highest level question we're most interested in is with Unichain, how will the UF and DAO relationship going forward work? Maybe more specifically, with this proposal, the UF takes on the role of a normal Chain's foundation team and to us this makes sense. There needs to be someone for this role and it makes most sense for the UF to take on this role. With this assumption, how will the DAO function day to day? Will there be grant requests to the DAO/alternative programs set up, upgrade requests communicated to the DAO, etc.
It will definitely be interesting to see where this progresses over the next few months as the DAO maintains the role of treasury allocator and preserver.
Hi all - I’ve adjusted our proposal to include more detailed success metrics at both the UF and grants program levels.
Specifically, I’ve expanded the “Uniswap Foundation 2025 Priorities” chart with clearer metrics and added a “Target Impact” column to our “Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations” chart.
We’ve intentionally set ambitious, high-impact targets. Some we will exceed, and some we may fall short on despite best efforts. However, they will serve as our team’s benchmarks for success and accountability as we drive forward.
Discussion time: First of all, for a budget of $120M plus $45M more to support liquidity incentives, we understand that more time should be given to the discussion, it is a very important amount that cannot be discussed in a short period of time, we need to give all delegates and the community time to analyse and internalise all aspects of the proposal, ask questions to clear up their doubts, read the feedback and comments from other delegates, the responses from the proposer, etc. If we have learned anything from other DAOs, it is that rushing proposals that involve large amounts of money is not the most appropriate, a clear example of this is the GCP in Arbitrum of 200M ARB and the sums of money that have been spent by the OP in Grants. We therefore encourage and request the debate to be extended as long as it needs to be without rushing it or bringing it to a vote prematurely, as there is a lot of money at stake in these proposals.
2 year budget: We would also like to ask why the budget is required for the next 2 years instead of 1 year? Two years is a long time in crypto and many things can change. If there has been any evaluation and analysis to justify requesting a budget for such a long period of time, we would like to know what has been taken into account for that and what is the justification for it. Otherwise, we would really like to see a one year budget with one year targets, and at the end of that period assess whether the targets have been met when requesting and approving another annual budget request.
KPIs: Regarding the KPIs that several delegates consulted on, we see that you added a ‘Target Impact’ column to our ‘Top 10 Largest Projected Grants Allocations’ chart, but those are final KPIs, i.e. targets to be met for the entire 2-year budget requirement. Given that the budget requirement is for 2 years, we understand that better defined and intermediate targets should be added to allow us to assess whether the funds are having the impact that justifies them.
Payments subject to KPIs: Related to the above, we do not believe that it would be prudent to release the required $120M in one single payment, but that it should be included that the funds would be released on a regular basis, e.g. every 6 months or every year, following the presentation and evaluation of the compliance with the interim KPIs.
Reports: Regarding the reports, we understand that it is not enough to commit to "regular reports" and to meet with a small group of representative delegates whom we do not know who they are or how they were selected, but for transparency and accountability reasons, an obligation on your part to submit regular reports should be included in the proposal, clarifying the frequency of their presentation, e.g. bi-monthly, quarterly, etc.
Governance Scope:
Looking into 2025, its scope will expand (or in some cases has already expanded) to include Optimism governance, Conditional Funding Markets, the Core Contributor Program, as governance activities related to Uniswap v4 and Unichain. Our hiring to build our Governance team reflects that.
We're pleased to see the Foundation considering a potential expansion of the governance scope, as this was a concern raised by several delegates during Devcon. However, it's still unclear how this will be implemented and what the DAO’s specific role and level of involvement will be in these matters. If the DAO (i.e. tokenholers, delegates, SP, and other stakeholders) is expected to "invest" in this and continue to support the Foundation in all these areas, its participation should be more clearly defined.
I have some questions (skip toward the end for those) to clarify my position, as well as initial feedback, while I'm still considering the proposal.
It's impossible to look at such a request in isolation, without looking into previous performance of the UF. My subjective and opinionated view is that the UF, back in 2023, was supported on these main tasks:
With v4 and Unichain out, I'd say the first task has been successful. In contrast, while nice work was done on the fee switch—and it's not exactly the UF's fault that it didn't happen—the fact is the fee switch is still not here. I believe the UF also did a lot of good behind the scenes on the third task. With the changes after the US election, that task has lost much of its urgency compared to back then. Even so, we still don't have the Uniswap DUNA, and we don't have regulatory clarity yet. The ecosystem support has been a mixed bag too. While I realize that many or most of the grants handed out since 2023 are still in progress, there's often limited information on how they're going and on their evaluation criteria and KPIs. This is disappointing because I was hoping for more transparency on those aspects.
EDIT: I was pointed out that the 2024 Community Impact Report shared by Devin in the opening post includes details on previously issued grants (their status and main achievements). My bad for missing that. The situation is better than I was assuming.
Going forward, subjectively I would put these as the current priorities:
In my view, the UF's plans shared here score highly on the first point, okay on the second, but mostly gloss over the last one.
I'll share feedback on the liquidity incentive programs under that post, and focus on the remaining two points here.
The Uniswap Treasury Report assumed these numbers:
Summing up 2025 and 2026, we get $87M in total predicted expenditure. These numbers include not just UF's budget and grants but also the DAO's own spending (e.g., incentives, service provider fees, delegate compensation), which is substantial. Optimistically, let's say the DAO cuts its expenses to $3.5M per year, leaving $80M for the rest.
In contrast, the current UF request is:
This is more than double the expenditure predicted in the report.
Moreover, even with the assumed $87M figure, the treasury report argues that:
The fund is assumed to yield 10% APR in the base case, and Uniswap is assumed to retain its share of market volume. Both assumptions are not exactly conservative.
This brings me to the next point: the prediction of Uniswap’s continued market share may be too optimistic. There is a clear trend of DEX volume moving away from Ethereum and its L2s. For the first time in the chains' history, Solana DEX volumes have started to dominate. While we can hope this will reverse and that v4 and Unichain will help, it's not guaranteed. This seems like the time to be conservative and double down on what works, as well as think of how to leverage Uniswap’s specific strengths, rather than ignore the risks and expand. (One can argue that Solana’s volume is “faked” and thus not relevant. However, a much higher proportion of Ethereum’s volume comes from arbitrage than on Solana, due to Ethereum’s much larger TVL, so the argument can cut both ways.)
Core Contributor program. Uniswap has existed for six years with just a single core contributor (Labs) who has done an excellent job creating value for the ecosystem and, so far, has been self-sustaining. Bringing in three more during the next two years, funded by the DAO, is a significant shift. Perhaps I don't see all the details, but based on the information provided, there isn't enough justification to spend $15M on this.
Public Good hooks. I fully support this, even if the size is debatable. Many useful hooks will be hard to turn into businesses; funding them will bring a lot of value to the ecosystem.
Chain-specific hooks. If these hooks are not public goods and can be monetized, it might be better to do VC-style investing and ask for future equity or tokens instead of just handing out grants.
v4 Infra. I support this; the only question is the size.
Router Incentives. Similarly, I support this if there's the budget.
Unichain Infra. This is less clear. Ideally, Unichain should be self-supporting from the fees it generates.
UF Subsidy fund. I support allocating budget for hook audits.
Conditional funding. Earmarking $4.5M for “experimentation” seems excessive. Why not experiment with $45k or $450k instead? Moreover, if the CFM experiment turns out to work well, then the other grants and DAO incentives can be distributed through it. There's no clear justification for spending an additional $4.5M just to test the mechanism itself.
Unichain DeFi partners. I can see the benefit, but the comments from points 3 and 6 also apply.
University Research. While I support this and $4M is not large for universities, it may still be too high. The Ethereum Academic Grants Rounds used to be only $1M per year.
I would be more supportive if the UF had an excellent track record on grant allocation, publicity, and accountability. At the moment, it feels like the UF hasn't fully done its homework before returning to ask for more funding. Many of the grants listed under “2024 Allocation Memos & Grant Announcements” have limited or unknown success. Meanwhile, obvious community needs sometimes don't get funded. For example, my go-to research on empirical performance of Uniswap AMMs includes papers from universities and external orgs like Ambient, the former zkSync research team, Flashbots, the Bank for International Settlements—but none from UF-funded grants. Incentives such as TLDR have funded general DeFi research that's not always connected with Uniswap.
EDIT: As mentioned above, the 2024 Community Impact Report includes some details on previously issued grants (their status and main achievements). I retract some of the criticism above.
In my view, there are signs of scope creep. I cannot support nearly doubling the team size to take on additional tasks that were not in the original mandate. While I see how getting involved in, for example, Optimism governance could be helpful for Unichain, it shouldn't be a core part of the UF's responsibilities in my view.
Thank you @devinwalsh and the whole Uniswap Foundation team for the comprehensive and exciting proposal!
We support the general direction this proposal outlines, as the Uniswap Foundation has consistently delivered impactful work that elevates the entire ecosystem. The advent of v4, in particular, represents a major innovation capable of pushing the boundaries of what Uniswap can provide. Such significant innovation also calls for further planning and effort from the core contributors including the Foundation, especially as the ecosystem expands to accommodate new area of DeFi. We appreciate the Foundation’s role in fostering these new capabilities and dedication to making the success growth happen with the community and contributors. We want to ensure that, as the ecosystem grows, it remains underpinned by a robust governance structure and clear execution strategies.
We'd like to share the following feedback and request clarifications:
with its request of $120.5M as a lump sum plus $45M in incentives, is missing clear, measurable KPIs on which the DAO can base its decision to move forward.
We agree with this perspective and believe that setting clear, measurable, and objective goals along with KPIs is essential for the DAO to accurately assess initiatives and achievements for each prioritized objective. As @Pepo mentioned, some initiatives are missing baselines and/or defined KPIs, and we’re also interested in understanding the north star metric for the overall initiative.
Concern: It is unclear if Unichain is owned by the DAO, and there is insufficient context regarding its functionality.
As Pepo and others have highlighted, we believe there needs to be greater clarity around Unichain’s governance structure under the DAO, especially given that its initial launch appeared to proceed independently. We would like more information on whether Unichain will be placed under the DAO’s control, how resources will be allocated, and what the longer-term plan is for its operational oversight.
We also question why the proposal requests funding for a full two-year period and whether a more incremental or milestone-driven structure might be preferable. While we recognize that multi-year funding can provide stability for long-term initiatives, a phased or check-in based process could improve accountability, encourage iterative feedback, and help align with the rapidly evolving needs of the ecosystem. If the two-year scope is essential, it would be helpful to see more details on how success will be measured, on what cadence progress will be reviewed, and how the community can stay involved in guiding the Foundation’s priorities.
karpatkey is supportive of the work the Uniswap Foundation has been doing over the past few years. The UF has consistently delivered high-quality outcomes while fostering a welcoming and engaging environment for governance participation. Their efforts have played a crucial role in shaping Uniswap’s ecosystem, ensuring it remains both innovative and inclusive.
With the introduction of Uniswap v4 and Unichain, we are already witnessing a key transformation in Uniswap, evolving from a protocol to a full-fledged developer platform. This shift has major implications for how we, as a DAO, steward Uniswap’s growth. Over the past year, the UF has demonstrated a deep and forward-thinking understanding of this transformation, proactively positioning Uniswap for long-term success. With the official launch of both Uniswap v4 and Unichain, the need to pursue multiple goals simultaneously—protocol growth, developer adoption, and ecosystem expansion—has never been clearer (or more challenging). The vision outlined for 2025 and 2026 aligns with this shift, and we believe it is a necessary and strategic step in Uniswap’s continued evolution.
karpatkey is supportive of the work the Uniswap Foundation has been doing over the past few years. The UF has consistently delivered high-quality outcomes while fostering a welcoming and engaging environment for governance participation. Their efforts have played a crucial role in shaping Uniswap’s ecosystem, ensuring it remains both innovative and inclusive.
With the introduction of Uniswap v4 and Unichain, we are already witnessing a key transformation in Uniswap, evolving from a protocol to a full-fledged developer platform. This shift has major implications for how we, as a DAO, steward Uniswap’s growth. Over the past year, the UF has demonstrated a deep and forward-thinking understanding of this transformation, proactively positioning Uniswap for long-term success. With the official launch of both Uniswap v4 and Unichain, the need to pursue multiple goals simultaneously—protocol growth, developer adoption, and ecosystem expansion—has never been clearer (or more challenging). The vision outlined for 2025 and 2026 aligns with this shift, and we believe it is a necessary and strategic step in Uniswap’s continued evolution.
Is it better to wait until Treasury gets formed and they have some clue as to the capital allocation between liquidity (from which your ask gets converted into fiat), stability and growth funds?
We acknowledge that this funding proposal is a significant ask. The UF currently represents the largest expense for the DAO treasury, and this request further expands the DAO’s investment in the Foundation. We believe it is important to carefully evaluate the trade-offs of such an investment in the context of Uniswap’s long-term strategy.
Uniswap has one of the largest treasuries in the industry. At karpatkey, we strongly advocate for long-term sustainability and encourage our partners to leverage their resources with that perspective in mind. However, our primary goal remains scaling DeFi. While we agree that treasury mobilisation would be beneficial for the Uniswap DAO, we also believe it should be approached in tandem with growth. The Mobilizing a DAO’s Treasury report identified two north stars for the DAO: growth and sustainability. In our view, mobilising the treasury is an effective way to achieve sustainability, which includes supporting UF funding in the long term.
A key to achieving our other north star—growth—is identifying valuable contributors, fostering innovation, and encouraging high-quality contributions. We believe the Uniswap Foundation exemplifies this role. For this reason, we extend our support for their continued work and are in favour of funding them for the longer term.
