I am unable to read through all of the comments, so forgive my digression. I do think the discussion on cryptoeconomics is productive, but I also think we should take a few practical steps to get the threshold vote re-voted on and passed. Until then Uniswap governance is at a standstill.

It seems like one of the initial reasons people voted NO against lowering the thresholds is that the 'quorum threshold' and 'proposal threshold' should be two separate votes.

Furthermore, 'Retroactive Proxy Contract Airdrop — Phase One' has now failed to pass (which seemed to be a major topic of discussion / fear of many in this thread)

Is there a process to re-submit 'quorum threshold' and 'proposal threshold' as two separate votes?

I am unable to read through all of the comments, so forgive my digression. I do think the discussion on cryptoeconomics is productive, but I also think we should take a few practical steps to get the threshold vote re-voted on and passed. Until then Uniswap governance is at a standstill.

It seems like one of the initial reasons people voted NO against lowering the thresholds is that the 'quorum threshold' and 'proposal threshold' should be two separate votes.

Furthermore, 'Retroactive Proxy Contract Airdrop — Phase One' has now failed to pass (which seemed to be a major topic of discussion / fear of many in this thread)

Is there a process to re-submit 'quorum threshold' and 'proposal threshold' as two separate votes?

Holy shit, I just happened across this post today again, and I missed a HUGE point:

You said this, but I'm reiterating for my and anyone else's benefit:

Quorum is % of total supply, but only votes that have been delegated prior to any proposal being submitted (self-delegated, or to someone else) can participate.

This is akin to bullshit voter registration requirements, and even more bullshit party registration requirements, in the United States. Not to mention that delegation incurs a gas fee (not a substantial one, but still... we're already solidly in the plutocratic sphere by making 1 $-denominated shared = 1 vote, so it's kind of insult to injury).

On the flipside, you do want some sort of threshold of the total supply to be involved in the governance process.

But functionally, you have scenarios where it is mathematically impossible to achieve quorum based on the levels of "voter registration".

A couple thoughts on this:

1. Make the quorum threshold a function of the number of delegated votes
2. In tandem with 1.), require some minimum number of delegated votes required for any proposal to be proposed in the first place.
3. Delegation has a sunset provision, ie, lasts only for a given number of votes or a given period of time (I lean towards number of votes)

I'm not super thrilled about point 2, but I'm picturing something with a delegation threshold that was proportional to the amount of votes delegated, ie, if a bunch of votes are delegated, the quorum threshold is high, if not, the quorum threshold is low, with a system minimum established based on the required delegation count. Could borrow from Vitalik's quadratic voting to temper some of the edge cases (ie, get the bare minimum votes delegated to propose, keep the voter participation super low to be able to pass something easily).

I'm not so sure.

From our previous conversations, I think I know what complexity would tell us about this: you can't control every edge case. You can't mitigate every governance risk. Be adaptable instead. And I agree with that, fundamentally, but making quorum a function of the total supply, while large chunks of the supply are locked up, and participation is limited to delegated votes (so some fraction of the fraction)... that limits our ability to adapt substantially.

Good points all around.

Economic incentives are insufficient. Even if you accept the premise in theory (I don't) that market solutions can fix any problem, you have the issue of the human and all the unknown unknowns that humans bring to the table. While we don't have a historical analog for DAOs and decentralized governance, we have numerous examples of the failure of the free market in the face of human ingenuity.

Ultimately, humans (for now) control the system parameters, and that means that a.) a complex system will display emergent behavior, heuristics for which are non-existent and/or ineffable a priori, and b.) in the final analysis, none of those parameters for the system exist in a vacuum.

On a practical note, to address the plutocratic equilibrium that everyone seems to be concerned about--

We can introduce a sunset/expiration date on delegated votes. In another thread, we've been discussing the necessity of allowing "undelegation" at will, but as a check on delegate power, we can find a balance between allowing for delegated/minimal agency voting (ie, individual holders don't have to invest time and energy in following governance minutiae, and simply give their voting power to delegates they trust) and the perverse incentives for delegates towards plutocracy.

Thoughts?

so much to process....

consensus was solved by satoshi at the intersection between cryptography and economics. but consensus of what? "consensus of record" - trust in the integrity of historical events

what a better way to decentralize 'history'. cryptography gives us the tech, and economic incentives through PoW gives us the feedback mechanism that hurts the most - money.

governance is different however. it is forward looking and experimental in nature. the consequences of decisions are unknown a priori. linear causality was taken to the woodshed. governance in this context is the 'extraction of potential future financial rewards'. but is that really true? as a delegate who is responsible for the health of the system they are overseeing, how can they use cryptoeconomics to form good decisions, either as an individual or a cartel? long-term thinking occasionally requires short-term sacrifices, or investments, in order achieve a benefit. 'benefits' often rely on value systems that go far beyond 'financial rewards', and also feature ethical considerations like sustainability, fairness, lawfulness, etc.

i'm barely able to maintain a coherent thread, partially because this exploration into human social design is so new. let's try and simplify. there are 2 modalities here.

1. system of record and proof using decentralized mechanisms (tech and incentives OR cryptoeconomics)
2. system of adaptation or advance and proof of value using retroactive mechanisms of a posteriori observation and study (PDCA)

#2 may very well become perverted if you attach economic incentives, because instead of trying to improve the system, delegates will engage in plutocratic behaviour to improve their economic standing. so instead, we have a voting-delegate system that relies on a different incentive paradigm - that of shared values. so, it's no wonder that it also becomes subject to all the human vices that go with it. :slight_smile:

Cryptoeconomics is not the answer for governance. It can't be. The structure for human social advancement cannot be solved via the lens of economic constraint. in the end i offer no alternative except to encourage frequent experimentation, frequent failure, because the fuel for emergence is change. if agents in the system have the common good in mind, then i remain confident that we will incentivize beneficial adaptations. the essential question is and remains, how to incentivize this behaviour?

we need something new. perhaps cryptoanthroeconomics. the intersection of cryptography, humanity, and economics is likely to offer clues. cryptoeconomics was devised to 'avoid' human tendencies. it has limitations because, unfortunately, you can't design the human out of the system.

I hear you on that front.

The reason I reference mechanism design is that unlike conventional organizations, DAOs are governed by a set of rules that are functionally immutable, so at least some bits of entropy are minimized. In essence, mechanism design is tokenomics crossed with game theory.

Here's a great primer: https://medium.com/blockchannel/a-crash-course-in-mechanism-design-for-cryptoeconomic-applications-a9f06ab6a976

Are you familiar with Aavenomics, Aave's proposed governance and tokenomics framework? I think that's a good synthesis of economics and governance.

I think by combining a cybernetics-oriented and mechanism design informed approach to our governance process, we can do some great things here.

That said, I can't help but mention: I have a knee-jerk response to the "I don't care/want to engage with/know how X is done, I just care that X happens!"

e.g. "We have to stop climate change. Not doing so represents an existential threat to our species. I don't care as much about the specifics of environmental science, I only care that the world move progressively away from destroying the planet."

Your in-depth posts across the forum bely the notion that this is all you're saying, but like a somewhat inept middle manager, that sentiment feels like you're demanding results without feeling any commitment to participating in the work.

In that sense: concretely, what does cultivating resilience look like in our community here? I see you waging the good fight in terms of cultivating a lean, experimental culture. I see references to rapid experimentation as an exploratory methodology and rapid response as a threat mitigation modality.

What does this look like in the context of Uniswap, when balanced against stability of the platform, in the context of a DAO where certain rules are immutable, and their consequences, irreversible-- certain spaghetti that, once thrown, might stick on the wall and rot for eternity?

I'm not sure that I have examples of disastrous governance decisions, but I certainly have examples of poor mechanism design. The idea will be to marry these two--the thoughtful analysis needed to find theoretical future equilibria against a resilient organizational structure.

I'm pretty clear on how one does the mechanism design part, (though I'm just an informed layman) but I'm still struggling to understand what it is you're asking for in regards to achieving resilience. What are the intermediate steps?

Yeah, i read @tarun 's threat modeling treatise. I like it, but i don't think the general approach will work on principle. The foundation of my claim comes from cybernetics and 'law of requisite variety'. Essentially, it says "the internal complexity of the system (uniswap) must match the external complexity it confronts".

Trying to predict all outcomes in a threat analysis is important, but you can't stop there. This is the difference between being robust and resilient. Robust systems end up failing because they cannot possibly keep up with all the threat types and frequency. Resilient systems focus on 'rapid response' mechanisms to address the threat when it happens.

I can't believe i'm saying this, but Uniswap needs to take a page out of Google's resiliency engineering handbook (we have some former google employees here). Google faces hundreds, if not thousands, of threats per day. The user never notices. Why? Because instead of focusing on robustness (threat modeling every possible type of threat), they instead focus on resiliency (isolate, identify, repair, CICD that sucker in seconds, and get it out the door into production before anyone blinks).

This is why i'm insisting on governance progress biasing resiliency and rapid response, rather than the opposite. When a true threat arrives, we will have lost the operational resiliency to address it quickly. That's my fear in a nutshell. As for specifics of governance, i don't care as much. I only care that we move progressively towards a resilient state, and will object to governance proposals that would constrain this essential attribute of all complex adaptive modern organizations.

The irony among crypto-natives is that the best template for navigating change is still outside our domain.

What is mechanism design?

I think we're very much on the same page. Mechanism design is simply the thoughtful consideration for structuring these (crypto)economic incentives.

I like the idea of integrating that with complexity and exaptive systems "design" because one approach is very much in media res and the other is a priori. We can experiment and rapidly iterate our responses to emerging complex problems, while informing ourselves to avoid introducing perverse incentives.

Sounds like you're very much in alignment with this approach!

Ha! Lots to think about. (where to start...)

DAOs are governed by a set of rules that are functionally immutable, so at least some bits of entropy are minimized. In essence, mechanism design is tokenomics crossed with game theory.

I'm essentially a creature of the Santa Fe complexity group. In full disclosure, my philosophical biases are heavily influenced by the belief that complex adaptive systems cannot be measured through mechanistic designs. This is an a priori argument for me, and makes it difficult to evaluate such systems. To be clear, it is not a criticism, but simply the issuance of a point of view, but also helps us understand where we may disagree.

(i read through your link btw - thanks!) The core premise behind much of complexity based research is the evaluation around ontology, or causality. Where many see a mechanistic, Newtonian world that can be understood given enough study and investigation, others, like myself, see only probabilities and dispositionality. These probabilities are distinctly non-predictive in complex systems. The world-view models can be differentiated between 'deterministic and reductionist' and 'non-deterministic'. I'm squarely in the latter camp. It doesn't mean that Mechanism Design doesn't have utility, only that i recognize limitations in how effective its modeling can be in predicting outcomes.

For instance, the mathematical notation used to measure a system's utility and the desire that it exceeds the cost is very troublesome. (in the embedded paper attached to your article link)

1. This doesn't account for hierarchical benefits through multiple systems. A system can never be evaluated within itself, but only in the system harbouring it. A car for example, is a system. It has a goal however, which can 'never' be determined by reductively examining a car. Only when you zoom out to scan transportation systems, supply/demand, commuting, freedom of travel, do you being to understand what a car truly represents. Measurement of this network effect is impossible in a complex system.
2. Humans make everything 'complex', even in a DAO with immutability built into it. This forum, governance discussion around the first proposal, is proof of that. If you widen the system to include economic modeling, threat modeling (SEC coming in and poking around), viability of the crypto-anarchist world view given current political environment, utility of DeFi, general prosperity of crypto natives and non-natives, etc... The point of this list is its length. You begin to see that variables contributing to outcomes are non-deterministic. The problem with attempting to place too much value on modeling is that you restrict the possible outcomes to the number of variables the model can account for. :) This is my fundamental issue with these approaches.
3. Many will claim success when they find a 'use case' to demonstrate that a certain type of modeling worked, but this is when i will fondly recall George Box's quote (famed statistician).. "all models are wrong. some are simply more useful than others". How i interpret this is to concede that modeling the universe or human behaviour is impossible. Worthwhile? Yes! But only when you recognize the limits. As a panacea it becomes a blunt weapon that dulls understanding.

I thank you for giving me the benefit of the doubt with

When i said i didn't care about the 'specific' governance changes, it is only because i care far more about the 'governance engine' itself. I'm always zooming out to evaluate double-loop thinking, or problem dissolution - not resolution. Dissolution is when you 'reframe' the system to ensure the problem never returns. In other words, i am challenging the DAO foundation, and privileging that concern over the individual proposals that operate on top of that framework. So, hopefully you now see elevated concern where you may have seen a lack of it earlier.

I agree with your suggestion to marry the methods of inquiry together (mechanism design with complexity). If i knew exactly how i would be writing papers about it. This helps reveal that what we are doing is fundamentally 'experimental' in nature. Humans simply have never successfully implemented this type of social organization before. If we maintain that perspective on 'experimentation', we are likely to be surprised by 'beneficial' outcomes. However, if we remain mired in trying to make the existing framework function, we limit the variation in responses, and almost ensure our demise. So, a round-a-bout way to answer your question

It's a mindset first and foremost. To accept that we cannot possibly predict outcomes through design, only 'nudge' towards our north star (goals). Once you accept the interminability of outcomes, then we can skillfully use 'mechanism design' to tinker with the gears and pulleys to catalyze change.

Finally, most people are unaware that evolution (nature's mechanism for adaptation) works mostly through exaptation, which is impossible to model. For example, the wings of a bird are an exaptation. The reason is that feathers were initially evolved to provide warmth - not flight. The subsequent adaptation to flight would only have happened if feathers had evolved a utility for that species. Most of evolution works in this manner. An experiment is not strictly useful because it proves or disproves a hypothesis. An experiment in complexity-based science, is useful because it catalyzes non-predictive changes, many of which may result in a beneficial adaptation. Trying to 'stabilize' Uniswap governance is the equivalent of slowing adaption and removing any possibility of a beneficial exaptation. In my philosophical model, this is deadly.

(we should create a separate post to continue the discussion - i fear we are going well beyond the OPs intent - in Meta-Governance? really enjoy the honest dialog)

Holy shit, I just happened across this post today again, and I missed a HUGE point:

You said this, but I'm reiterating for my and anyone else's benefit:

Quorum is % of total supply, but only votes that have been delegated prior to any proposal being submitted (self-delegated, or to someone else) can participate.

This is akin to bullshit voter registration requirements, and even more bullshit party registration requirements, in the United States. Not to mention that delegation incurs a gas fee (not a substantial one, but still... we're already solidly in the plutocratic sphere by making 1 $-denominated shared = 1 vote, so it's kind of insult to injury).

On the flipside, you do want some sort of threshold of the total supply to be involved in the governance process.

But functionally, you have scenarios where it is mathematically impossible to achieve quorum based on the levels of "voter registration".

A couple thoughts on this:

1. Make the quorum threshold a function of the number of delegated votes
2. In tandem with 1.), require some minimum number of delegated votes required for any proposal to be proposed in the first place.
3. Delegation has a sunset provision, ie, lasts only for a given number of votes or a given period of time (I lean towards number of votes)

I'm not super thrilled about point 2, but I'm picturing something with a delegation threshold that was proportional to the amount of votes delegated, ie, if a bunch of votes are delegated, the quorum threshold is high, if not, the quorum threshold is low, with a system minimum established based on the required delegation count. Could borrow from Vitalik's quadratic voting to temper some of the edge cases (ie, get the bare minimum votes delegated to propose, keep the voter participation super low to be able to pass something easily).

I'm not so sure.

From our previous conversations, I think I know what complexity would tell us about this: you can't control every edge case. You can't mitigate every governance risk. Be adaptable instead. And I agree with that, fundamentally, but making quorum a function of the total supply, while large chunks of the supply are locked up, and participation is limited to delegated votes (so some fraction of the fraction)... that limits our ability to adapt substantially.

Good points all around.

Economic incentives are insufficient. Even if you accept the premise in theory (I don't) that market solutions can fix any problem, you have the issue of the human and all the unknown unknowns that humans bring to the table. While we don't have a historical analog for DAOs and decentralized governance, we have numerous examples of the failure of the free market in the face of human ingenuity.

Ultimately, humans (for now) control the system parameters, and that means that a.) a complex system will display emergent behavior, heuristics for which are non-existent and/or ineffable a priori, and b.) in the final analysis, none of those parameters for the system exist in a vacuum.

On a practical note, to address the plutocratic equilibrium that everyone seems to be concerned about--

We can introduce a sunset/expiration date on delegated votes. In another thread, we've been discussing the necessity of allowing "undelegation" at will, but as a check on delegate power, we can find a balance between allowing for delegated/minimal agency voting (ie, individual holders don't have to invest time and energy in following governance minutiae, and simply give their voting power to delegates they trust) and the perverse incentives for delegates towards plutocracy.

Thoughts?

so much to process....

consensus was solved by satoshi at the intersection between cryptography and economics. but consensus of what? "consensus of record" - trust in the integrity of historical events

what a better way to decentralize 'history'. cryptography gives us the tech, and economic incentives through PoW gives us the feedback mechanism that hurts the most - money.

governance is different however. it is forward looking and experimental in nature. the consequences of decisions are unknown a priori. linear causality was taken to the woodshed. governance in this context is the 'extraction of potential future financial rewards'. but is that really true? as a delegate who is responsible for the health of the system they are overseeing, how can they use cryptoeconomics to form good decisions, either as an individual or a cartel? long-term thinking occasionally requires short-term sacrifices, or investments, in order achieve a benefit. 'benefits' often rely on value systems that go far beyond 'financial rewards', and also feature ethical considerations like sustainability, fairness, lawfulness, etc.

i'm barely able to maintain a coherent thread, partially because this exploration into human social design is so new. let's try and simplify. there are 2 modalities here.

1. system of record and proof using decentralized mechanisms (tech and incentives OR cryptoeconomics)
2. system of adaptation or advance and proof of value using retroactive mechanisms of a posteriori observation and study (PDCA)

#2 may very well become perverted if you attach economic incentives, because instead of trying to improve the system, delegates will engage in plutocratic behaviour to improve their economic standing. so instead, we have a voting-delegate system that relies on a different incentive paradigm - that of shared values. so, it's no wonder that it also becomes subject to all the human vices that go with it. :slight_smile:

Cryptoeconomics is not the answer for governance. It can't be. The structure for human social advancement cannot be solved via the lens of economic constraint. in the end i offer no alternative except to encourage frequent experimentation, frequent failure, because the fuel for emergence is change. if agents in the system have the common good in mind, then i remain confident that we will incentivize beneficial adaptations. the essential question is and remains, how to incentivize this behaviour?

we need something new. perhaps cryptoanthroeconomics. the intersection of cryptography, humanity, and economics is likely to offer clues. cryptoeconomics was devised to 'avoid' human tendencies. it has limitations because, unfortunately, you can't design the human out of the system.

I hear you on that front.

The reason I reference mechanism design is that unlike conventional organizations, DAOs are governed by a set of rules that are functionally immutable, so at least some bits of entropy are minimized. In essence, mechanism design is tokenomics crossed with game theory.

Here's a great primer: https://medium.com/blockchannel/a-crash-course-in-mechanism-design-for-cryptoeconomic-applications-a9f06ab6a976

Are you familiar with Aavenomics, Aave's proposed governance and tokenomics framework? I think that's a good synthesis of economics and governance.

I think by combining a cybernetics-oriented and mechanism design informed approach to our governance process, we can do some great things here.

That said, I can't help but mention: I have a knee-jerk response to the "I don't care/want to engage with/know how X is done, I just care that X happens!"

e.g. "We have to stop climate change. Not doing so represents an existential threat to our species. I don't care as much about the specifics of environmental science, I only care that the world move progressively away from destroying the planet."

Your in-depth posts across the forum bely the notion that this is all you're saying, but like a somewhat inept middle manager, that sentiment feels like you're demanding results without feeling any commitment to participating in the work.

In that sense: concretely, what does cultivating resilience look like in our community here? I see you waging the good fight in terms of cultivating a lean, experimental culture. I see references to rapid experimentation as an exploratory methodology and rapid response as a threat mitigation modality.

What does this look like in the context of Uniswap, when balanced against stability of the platform, in the context of a DAO where certain rules are immutable, and their consequences, irreversible-- certain spaghetti that, once thrown, might stick on the wall and rot for eternity?

I'm not sure that I have examples of disastrous governance decisions, but I certainly have examples of poor mechanism design. The idea will be to marry these two--the thoughtful analysis needed to find theoretical future equilibria against a resilient organizational structure.

I'm pretty clear on how one does the mechanism design part, (though I'm just an informed layman) but I'm still struggling to understand what it is you're asking for in regards to achieving resilience. What are the intermediate steps?

Yeah, i read @tarun 's threat modeling treatise. I like it, but i don't think the general approach will work on principle. The foundation of my claim comes from cybernetics and 'law of requisite variety'. Essentially, it says "the internal complexity of the system (uniswap) must match the external complexity it confronts".

Trying to predict all outcomes in a threat analysis is important, but you can't stop there. This is the difference between being robust and resilient. Robust systems end up failing because they cannot possibly keep up with all the threat types and frequency. Resilient systems focus on 'rapid response' mechanisms to address the threat when it happens.

I can't believe i'm saying this, but Uniswap needs to take a page out of Google's resiliency engineering handbook (we have some former google employees here). Google faces hundreds, if not thousands, of threats per day. The user never notices. Why? Because instead of focusing on robustness (threat modeling every possible type of threat), they instead focus on resiliency (isolate, identify, repair, CICD that sucker in seconds, and get it out the door into production before anyone blinks).

This is why i'm insisting on governance progress biasing resiliency and rapid response, rather than the opposite. When a true threat arrives, we will have lost the operational resiliency to address it quickly. That's my fear in a nutshell. As for specifics of governance, i don't care as much. I only care that we move progressively towards a resilient state, and will object to governance proposals that would constrain this essential attribute of all complex adaptive modern organizations.

The irony among crypto-natives is that the best template for navigating change is still outside our domain.

What is mechanism design?

I think we're very much on the same page. Mechanism design is simply the thoughtful consideration for structuring these (crypto)economic incentives.

I like the idea of integrating that with complexity and exaptive systems "design" because one approach is very much in media res and the other is a priori. We can experiment and rapidly iterate our responses to emerging complex problems, while informing ourselves to avoid introducing perverse incentives.

Sounds like you're very much in alignment with this approach!

Ha! Lots to think about. (where to start...)

DAOs are governed by a set of rules that are functionally immutable, so at least some bits of entropy are minimized. In essence, mechanism design is tokenomics crossed with game theory.

I'm essentially a creature of the Santa Fe complexity group. In full disclosure, my philosophical biases are heavily influenced by the belief that complex adaptive systems cannot be measured through mechanistic designs. This is an a priori argument for me, and makes it difficult to evaluate such systems. To be clear, it is not a criticism, but simply the issuance of a point of view, but also helps us understand where we may disagree.

(i read through your link btw - thanks!) The core premise behind much of complexity based research is the evaluation around ontology, or causality. Where many see a mechanistic, Newtonian world that can be understood given enough study and investigation, others, like myself, see only probabilities and dispositionality. These probabilities are distinctly non-predictive in complex systems. The world-view models can be differentiated between 'deterministic and reductionist' and 'non-deterministic'. I'm squarely in the latter camp. It doesn't mean that Mechanism Design doesn't have utility, only that i recognize limitations in how effective its modeling can be in predicting outcomes.

For instance, the mathematical notation used to measure a system's utility and the desire that it exceeds the cost is very troublesome. (in the embedded paper attached to your article link)

1. This doesn't account for hierarchical benefits through multiple systems. A system can never be evaluated within itself, but only in the system harbouring it. A car for example, is a system. It has a goal however, which can 'never' be determined by reductively examining a car. Only when you zoom out to scan transportation systems, supply/demand, commuting, freedom of travel, do you being to understand what a car truly represents. Measurement of this network effect is impossible in a complex system.
2. Humans make everything 'complex', even in a DAO with immutability built into it. This forum, governance discussion around the first proposal, is proof of that. If you widen the system to include economic modeling, threat modeling (SEC coming in and poking around), viability of the crypto-anarchist world view given current political environment, utility of DeFi, general prosperity of crypto natives and non-natives, etc... The point of this list is its length. You begin to see that variables contributing to outcomes are non-deterministic. The problem with attempting to place too much value on modeling is that you restrict the possible outcomes to the number of variables the model can account for. :) This is my fundamental issue with these approaches.
3. Many will claim success when they find a 'use case' to demonstrate that a certain type of modeling worked, but this is when i will fondly recall George Box's quote (famed statistician).. "all models are wrong. some are simply more useful than others". How i interpret this is to concede that modeling the universe or human behaviour is impossible. Worthwhile? Yes! But only when you recognize the limits. As a panacea it becomes a blunt weapon that dulls understanding.

I thank you for giving me the benefit of the doubt with

When i said i didn't care about the 'specific' governance changes, it is only because i care far more about the 'governance engine' itself. I'm always zooming out to evaluate double-loop thinking, or problem dissolution - not resolution. Dissolution is when you 'reframe' the system to ensure the problem never returns. In other words, i am challenging the DAO foundation, and privileging that concern over the individual proposals that operate on top of that framework. So, hopefully you now see elevated concern where you may have seen a lack of it earlier.

I agree with your suggestion to marry the methods of inquiry together (mechanism design with complexity). If i knew exactly how i would be writing papers about it. This helps reveal that what we are doing is fundamentally 'experimental' in nature. Humans simply have never successfully implemented this type of social organization before. If we maintain that perspective on 'experimentation', we are likely to be surprised by 'beneficial' outcomes. However, if we remain mired in trying to make the existing framework function, we limit the variation in responses, and almost ensure our demise. So, a round-a-bout way to answer your question

It's a mindset first and foremost. To accept that we cannot possibly predict outcomes through design, only 'nudge' towards our north star (goals). Once you accept the interminability of outcomes, then we can skillfully use 'mechanism design' to tinker with the gears and pulleys to catalyze change.

Finally, most people are unaware that evolution (nature's mechanism for adaptation) works mostly through exaptation, which is impossible to model. For example, the wings of a bird are an exaptation. The reason is that feathers were initially evolved to provide warmth - not flight. The subsequent adaptation to flight would only have happened if feathers had evolved a utility for that species. Most of evolution works in this manner. An experiment is not strictly useful because it proves or disproves a hypothesis. An experiment in complexity-based science, is useful because it catalyzes non-predictive changes, many of which may result in a beneficial adaptation. Trying to 'stabilize' Uniswap governance is the equivalent of slowing adaption and removing any possibility of a beneficial exaptation. In my philosophical model, this is deadly.

(we should create a separate post to continue the discussion - i fear we are going well beyond the OPs intent - in Meta-Governance? really enjoy the honest dialog)

As a relatively small UNI holder, I am glad this happened. This governance proposal has inspired me to delegate my votes to myself for whatever proposals come next (I didn't realize the stakes would be so high so quickly) and to also become much more active in this community.

The fact is, not your keys, not your coins. Downside of using a middleman like Dharma. They should probably be more up-front about the downsides to letting them hold your keys. The customers should consider it a free lesson. Crypto isn't fair. Redistributing from the community treasury is theft, and this proposal is lube.

It's hard to kill a Unicorn but it should be harder.

I agree with the other user that remarked that this whole situation makes me question the merits of being a uni holder. Currently it's only function is governance, and regardless of whether this passes or not - the discussions here and the votes are not representative. The large disparity between For and Against implies that we are not being heard as a community and are largely being controlled by large users (potentially with malicious intentions).

It's quite worrying and doesn't bode well for the future.

Just my two cents.

These things are a priority over reducing proposal threshold and quorum threshold:

• Ability to revoke delegated votes at any time (especially during a vote).

• Ability to delegate/self-delegate at any time.

• Ability to vote with LP tokens that represent their share of UNI.

Adding this functionality is paramount to fair and active governance. These need to take priority. Lowering required quorum before these issues are addressed just gives the largest holders even more power. Passing this current vote will damage the Uniswap reputation in a great way, along with the reputation of the organizations/people that are pushing this through (Dharma, Gauntlet, and Andre).

If Dharma, Gauntlet, and @AndreCronjeTech want to move this proposal forward in an ethical way, they should re-propose it after the governance design flaws are fixed.

This is my counter proposal for proposal #1, I know I should make a standalone post but I don't have the power yet. I am looking for feedback:

• Code a new contract that allows to update each parameter individually, deploy it with the exact parameters as the one we currently have

• Pay a 3rd party to audit the contract

Then, we can move forward into two more proposals

• Lower the min required to make a proposal

• Lower the required quorum

That way we would have 0 riders, and people can better cast their votes and audited contracts are a must, I know changes are small, but the gov contract is super critical

As a relatively small UNI holder, I am glad this happened. This governance proposal has inspired me to delegate my votes to myself for whatever proposals come next (I didn't realize the stakes would be so high so quickly) and to also become much more active in this community.

The fact is, not your keys, not your coins. Downside of using a middleman like Dharma. They should probably be more up-front about the downsides to letting them hold your keys. The customers should consider it a free lesson. Crypto isn't fair. Redistributing from the community treasury is theft, and this proposal is lube.

It's hard to kill a Unicorn but it should be harder.

I agree with the other user that remarked that this whole situation makes me question the merits of being a uni holder. Currently it's only function is governance, and regardless of whether this passes or not - the discussions here and the votes are not representative. The large disparity between For and Against implies that we are not being heard as a community and are largely being controlled by large users (potentially with malicious intentions).

It's quite worrying and doesn't bode well for the future.

Just my two cents.

These things are a priority over reducing proposal threshold and quorum threshold:

• Ability to revoke delegated votes at any time (especially during a vote).

• Ability to delegate/self-delegate at any time.

• Ability to vote with LP tokens that represent their share of UNI.

Adding this functionality is paramount to fair and active governance. These need to take priority. Lowering required quorum before these issues are addressed just gives the largest holders even more power. Passing this current vote will damage the Uniswap reputation in a great way, along with the reputation of the organizations/people that are pushing this through (Dharma, Gauntlet, and Andre).

If Dharma, Gauntlet, and @AndreCronjeTech want to move this proposal forward in an ethical way, they should re-propose it after the governance design flaws are fixed.

This is my counter proposal for proposal #1, I know I should make a standalone post but I don't have the power yet. I am looking for feedback:

• Code a new contract that allows to update each parameter individually, deploy it with the exact parameters as the one we currently have

• Pay a 3rd party to audit the contract

Then, we can move forward into two more proposals

• Lower the min required to make a proposal

• Lower the required quorum

That way we would have 0 riders, and people can better cast their votes and audited contracts are a must, I know changes are small, but the gov contract is super critical

Speaking of DeFi, I was a Dharma app user and in the spirit of full decentralization, I expected the app to work the same way. However, it appears that their system kicks in some sort of KYC and there have been reports of users having their funds locked for no apparent reason. I see that Dharma delegates here are touting governance, when their own app is not supporting any principles of decentralization.

If Dharma wants this, they should pay something in return to the Uniswap community. Their surge fees is a price gouging scheme and hurts users more, despite claims made to the contrary i.e. friendly user interface.

As usual, assume positive intent in this dialogue.

There doesnt appear to be any benefit for a smallish holder to actually vote no here. My small holdings arent going to make any significant change to the ratio. The proposal will pass or fail on whether it reaches quorum, so rather than persuading people to vote no, its more a case of persuading them to not vote yes (and not delegating to those who may).

I'm a soft no to this proposal, because as the OP points out, its two different things and should be seperated and its also too soon to start making very significant governance changes proposed by a high level holder which gives them additional power.

I dont see anything necessarily nefarious in it, but I'm very aware that blockchain governance is in its infancy and my concern is that it may transpire that there is no way to reverse it, as it becomes easier for large holder to shut down reversal routes.

There is a low level awareness among ordinary uni holders (and for many of them, this will be the first time that they have held a governance token) about their responsibilities. Even although I have some familiarity with governance, I dont know how to delegate my votes responsibly, because I dont really have a feel for the ethos and values of those who I may delegate to, and the gas fees for voting directly with such a small holding are an inhibitory factor

Speaking of DeFi, I was a Dharma app user and in the spirit of full decentralization, I expected the app to work the same way. However, it appears that their system kicks in some sort of KYC and there have been reports of users having their funds locked for no apparent reason. I see that Dharma delegates here are touting governance, when their own app is not supporting any principles of decentralization.

If Dharma wants this, they should pay something in return to the Uniswap community. Their surge fees is a price gouging scheme and hurts users more, despite claims made to the contrary i.e. friendly user interface.

As usual, assume positive intent in this dialogue.

There doesnt appear to be any benefit for a smallish holder to actually vote no here. My small holdings arent going to make any significant change to the ratio. The proposal will pass or fail on whether it reaches quorum, so rather than persuading people to vote no, its more a case of persuading them to not vote yes (and not delegating to those who may).

I'm a soft no to this proposal, because as the OP points out, its two different things and should be seperated and its also too soon to start making very significant governance changes proposed by a high level holder which gives them additional power.

I dont see anything necessarily nefarious in it, but I'm very aware that blockchain governance is in its infancy and my concern is that it may transpire that there is no way to reverse it, as it becomes easier for large holder to shut down reversal routes.

There is a low level awareness among ordinary uni holders (and for many of them, this will be the first time that they have held a governance token) about their responsibilities. Even although I have some familiarity with governance, I dont know how to delegate my votes responsibly, because I dont really have a feel for the ethos and values of those who I may delegate to, and the gas fees for voting directly with such a small holding are an inhibitory factor

But Dharma doesn't really hold any UNI. It's not a "bagholder", as Decrypt argued. There are some investors, who are not invested in Dharma, who have delegated to Dharma for this proposal. But this delegation is revokable, and is just a vote of trust. If it looks like Dharma is doing anything that is misaligned with the UNI community's best interests, that delegation will be removed, and Dharma will have absolutely no ability to propose or pass anything -- regardless of whether the threshold decreases significantly.

I think there's a more realistic concern about whether large exchanges may acquire enough UNI to affect proposals - for example, a large exchange like Binance. But I think the current proposal is conservative enough to avoid that scenario.

My argument for passing the proposal is that I think we should prove that UNI governance can work, in the same way that Compound governance has proven to work and be effective. Dharma played a large role in Compound's governance so far, which has been positive in terms of showing that it is a decentralized protocol. I believe proving that the token can create effective governance should be a priority for the community, and to show that it isn't just the UNI team, or elite investors, who control the protocol. Dharma is neither of those things, and retroactive distribution brings more people into the community of token holders. So I view it as a perfect opportunity to show how well decentralized governance can work.