Authors: @Doo_StableLab @PGov @AranaDigital @seedgov
This proposal outlines the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative—Cycle 3, a compensation program designed to improve and sustain the participation quality and dedication among Uniswap delegates following the conclusion of Cycle 1 and 2.
In late February 2024, StableLab proposed the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative. After the GovSwap event in Denver, further research to plan and implement the Delegate Reward Initiative was highlighted, leading to the formation of the Uniswap Delegate Reward Working Group, composed of 8 members from different organizations. After extensive research for more than a month, the Working Group produced several findings, which can be found here: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/findings-from-uniswap-delegate-reward-working-group/23702
Incorporating these findings, the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 1 was proposed and launched in June 2024. Cycle 1 was successful in that the 12 delegates selected maintained 100% voting participation rate for votes during this period. In addition, several new delegates joined the protocol due to the presence of incentives.
With learnings from Cycle 1, including how to make a points system to determine the top delegate applicants in a more fair and objective manner, along with a tier system to incorporate different participation levels of delegates, Cycle 2 was launched.
Application Eligibility
In case there are more than 15 eligible applicants, the top 15 will be chosen by the following objective metrics. The highest number of available points will be 11.
1. Voting Participation
Since a delegate's primary role is to utilize voting power from delegators and vote in Uniswap’s best interest, active participation is essential to ensuring quorums are met and malicious proposals are thwarted. This category carries a total of 7 points, with onchain voting weighted more heavily due to its ability to directly impact governance contracts and direct treasury funds. The voting rate is evaluated based on the past six months.
Offchain Voting (Snapshot)
90% and above: 3 80% to 90% : 2 70% till 80% : 1.5 60% till 70%: 1 50% till 60%: 0.5 50% or below: 0
Onchain Voting
90% and above : 4 80% till 90% : 2.5 70% till 80%: 1.5 60% till 70%: 1 50% till 60%: 0.5 Below 50%: 0
2. Proposal Authorship
Contributing to proposal drafting for Uniswap DAO is valuable, but maintaining quality and preventing malicious proposals is equally important. As a result, only successfully passed votes are counted. This category is worth a total of 3 points, with onchain proposals receiving greater weight once again.
For non-binary proposals, if a "No" equivalent option was available and the final voting outcome was a choice other than "No," the proposal qualifies for points in this category. For example, the Uniswap Treasury Working Group (UTWG) Election would not be eligible, as there was no "No" vote option. However, the [Temp] Uni Onboarding Package - BSC would qualify, since an "Against" option was present, and the final outcome was "$1M."
Authored or Co-authored a proposal that passed offchain (Snapshot) vote before.
Yes, 2 or more: 1 Yes, 1: 0.5 No: 0
Authored or Co authored a proposal that passed onchain vote before
Yes, 2 or more: 2 Yes, 1: 1 No: 0
3. Community Participation
The full point for this category is 1.
Community Calls (attendance for September, October, December 2024 & January - Feb 2025)
Attended at least 80% of calls: 1 Attended at least 50% of calls: 0.5
Tie Breaker
Delegate Reward Eligibility
Once delegates have passed the application process, they must fulfill the following requirements to be eligible for up to $6,000 USD worth of $UNI reward per month.
Requirements
Additional Rewards (the below are only available if the above Requirement of Voting Participation is fulfilled)
2a. Write rationale for the voting on their delegate profile.
2b. Attend Uniswap Community Calls.
Achieving these above will provide an additional up to $3,000 USD worth of $UNI. For 2a and 2b, there will also be proportional payment. For example, if there were 4 votings and 1 community call, and a delegate missed writing a rationale of 2 of the votes, the delegate would be eligible to receive $1800 [3/5 * $3000].
Budget
We are requesting 540,000 [6000 USD *6 Months *15 Delegates ] USD worth of UNI for cycle 3 of the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative.
The total amount, once approved, will be sent to the Accountability Committee, which will be responsible for the monthly distribution of rewards to eligible delegates. Since the total budget of the Delegate Reward WG has not been fully used, administration of this reward program–including the creation of this proposal and the admin work behind verifying monthly delegate participation–will be allotted from that account, with no additional costs to the DAO. Therefore, the total budget request will be solely for the delegate pay.
Authors: @Doo_StableLab @PGov @AranaDigital @seedgov
This proposal outlines the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative—Cycle 3, a compensation program designed to improve and sustain the participation quality and dedication among Uniswap delegates following the conclusion of Cycle 1 and 2.
In late February 2024, StableLab proposed the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative. After the GovSwap event in Denver, further research to plan and implement the Delegate Reward Initiative was highlighted, leading to the formation of the Uniswap Delegate Reward Working Group, composed of 8 members from different organizations. After extensive research for more than a month, the Working Group produced several findings, which can be found here: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/findings-from-uniswap-delegate-reward-working-group/23702
Incorporating these findings, the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 1 was proposed and launched in June 2024. Cycle 1 was successful in that the 12 delegates selected maintained 100% voting participation rate for votes during this period. In addition, several new delegates joined the protocol due to the presence of incentives.
With learnings from Cycle 1, including how to make a points system to determine the top delegate applicants in a more fair and objective manner, along with a tier system to incorporate different participation levels of delegates, Cycle 2 was launched.
Application Eligibility
In case there are more than 15 eligible applicants, the top 15 will be chosen by the following objective metrics. The highest number of available points will be 11.
1. Voting Participation
Since a delegate's primary role is to utilize voting power from delegators and vote in Uniswap’s best interest, active participation is essential to ensuring quorums are met and malicious proposals are thwarted. This category carries a total of 7 points, with onchain voting weighted more heavily due to its ability to directly impact governance contracts and direct treasury funds. The voting rate is evaluated based on the past six months.
Offchain Voting (Snapshot)
90% and above: 3 80% to 90% : 2 70% till 80% : 1.5 60% till 70%: 1 50% till 60%: 0.5 50% or below: 0
Onchain Voting
90% and above : 4 80% till 90% : 2.5 70% till 80%: 1.5 60% till 70%: 1 50% till 60%: 0.5 Below 50%: 0
2. Proposal Authorship
Contributing to proposal drafting for Uniswap DAO is valuable, but maintaining quality and preventing malicious proposals is equally important. As a result, only successfully passed votes are counted. This category is worth a total of 3 points, with onchain proposals receiving greater weight once again.
For non-binary proposals, if a "No" equivalent option was available and the final voting outcome was a choice other than "No," the proposal qualifies for points in this category. For example, the Uniswap Treasury Working Group (UTWG) Election would not be eligible, as there was no "No" vote option. However, the [Temp] Uni Onboarding Package - BSC would qualify, since an "Against" option was present, and the final outcome was "$1M."
Authored or Co-authored a proposal that passed offchain (Snapshot) vote before.
Yes, 2 or more: 1 Yes, 1: 0.5 No: 0
Authored or Co authored a proposal that passed onchain vote before
Yes, 2 or more: 2 Yes, 1: 1 No: 0
3. Community Participation
The full point for this category is 1.
Community Calls (attendance for September, October, December 2024 & January - Feb 2025)
Attended at least 80% of calls: 1 Attended at least 50% of calls: 0.5
Tie Breaker
Delegate Reward Eligibility
Once delegates have passed the application process, they must fulfill the following requirements to be eligible for up to $6,000 USD worth of $UNI reward per month.
Requirements
Additional Rewards (the below are only available if the above Requirement of Voting Participation is fulfilled)
2a. Write rationale for the voting on their delegate profile.
2b. Attend Uniswap Community Calls.
Achieving these above will provide an additional up to $3,000 USD worth of $UNI. For 2a and 2b, there will also be proportional payment. For example, if there were 4 votings and 1 community call, and a delegate missed writing a rationale of 2 of the votes, the delegate would be eligible to receive $1800 [3/5 * $3000].
Budget
We are requesting 540,000 [6000 USD *6 Months *15 Delegates ] USD worth of UNI for cycle 3 of the Uniswap Delegate Reward Initiative.
The total amount, once approved, will be sent to the Accountability Committee, which will be responsible for the monthly distribution of rewards to eligible delegates. Since the total budget of the Delegate Reward WG has not been fully used, administration of this reward program–including the creation of this proposal and the admin work behind verifying monthly delegate participation–will be allotted from that account, with no additional costs to the DAO. Therefore, the total budget request will be solely for the delegate pay.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/24194
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/gfx-labs-delegate-communication-thread/24194
We agree with the continuation of the program. It takes time and labor to run a delegate and it's not sustainable for companies, communities and individuals to run delegates a loss. We like the addition that rationale must be shared, making the delegates to share their opinions and thought process rather than just vote "Yes/No". We believe delegates should take a more active role in growing Uniswap and Uniswap DAO via posting on Twitter, talking about Uniswap at events, etc. We had suggestions around this in the governance forum and will continue to gives suggestions that can hopefully make it into future iterations of the program.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-delegate-reward-initiative-cycle-3/25241/29
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-uniswap-delegate-reward-3-months-cycle-1/23837/41
Voted FOR, excited to see the results of the program.
We appreciate everyone for their feedback and comments to create a pilot program to reward delegates for their time and effort
Reward amounts seem reasonable (total yearly cost <$1 million), and should help support a vibrant ecosystem of DAO contributors.
We agree with the continuation of the program. It takes time and labor to run a delegate and it's not sustainable for companies, communities and individuals to run delegates a loss. We like the addition that rationale must be shared, making the delegates to share their opinions and thought process rather than just vote "Yes/No". We believe delegates should take a more active role in growing Uniswap and Uniswap DAO via posting on Twitter, talking about Uniswap at events, etc. We had suggestions around this in the governance forum and will continue to gives suggestions that can hopefully make it into future iterations of the program.
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-delegate-reward-initiative-cycle-3/25241/29
https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temp-check-uniswap-delegate-reward-3-months-cycle-1/23837/41
Voted FOR, excited to see the results of the program.
We appreciate everyone for their feedback and comments to create a pilot program to reward delegates for their time and effort
Reward amounts seem reasonable (total yearly cost <$1 million), and should help support a vibrant ecosystem of DAO contributors.
aluates it according to pre-established parameters and assigns a score. It is still subjective, but it implies that there is a program of other chara
a neutral AI would be perfect for that
aluates it according to pre-established parameters and assigns a score. It is still subjective, but it implies that there is a program of other chara
a neutral AI would be perfect for that
gmgm,
I just joined the community and was checking out the forum when I came across the results of Cycle 3 of the program. I know I’m a bit late to the party, but I thought I’d give it a chance. I have a few question about the initiative, and I’m hoping any delegate can help me out:
gmgm,
I just joined the community and was checking out the forum when I came across the results of Cycle 3 of the program. I know I’m a bit late to the party, but I thought I’d give it a chance. I have a few question about the initiative, and I’m hoping any delegate can help me out:
Also, is there a guide, post, or any resource available for new delegates to get started with the Uniswap DAO? I’m particularly interested in understanding the practices the Uniswap DAO follows, as well as the best practices for a delegate to participate in the DAO and increase the chances of receiving delegation from delegators. I know this might seem like a basic question, but I’d really appreciate any guidance!
In principle, we agree with that, but who defines what is a thoughtful contribution and how? This qualification is subjective. In other DAOs, such as Arbitrum, for example, there is the role of a Program Manager who, on a monthly basis, reviews the contribution of each delegate, evaluates it according to pre-established parameters and assigns a score. It is still subjective, but it implies that there is a program of other characteristics that contemplates an entity that evaluates the delegates according to pre-established parameters and logically assigns a budget to the entity that fulfils this role. Otherwise, I return to my original question: who and how defines what is a thoughtful contribution and what is not?
I do not agree whith that. Requiring UNI holding generates an entry barrier, only entities with economic capacity could be delegates, the same if a long vesting time is established, only teams with saving capacity could be delegates. The small unipersonal delegate is expelled.
On the other hand, the delegator is the one who is most committed to UNI, if the delegate to whom he delegates his tokens votes against his interests, he withdraws the delegation. Therein lies the incentive game that generates commitment for both the delegate and the delegator.
gmgm,
I just joined the community and was checking out the forum when I came across the results of Cycle 3 of the program. I know I’m a bit late to the party, but I thought I’d give it a chance. I have a few question about the initiative, and I’m hoping any delegate can help me out:
gmgm,
I just joined the community and was checking out the forum when I came across the results of Cycle 3 of the program. I know I’m a bit late to the party, but I thought I’d give it a chance. I have a few question about the initiative, and I’m hoping any delegate can help me out:
Also, is there a guide, post, or any resource available for new delegates to get started with the Uniswap DAO? I’m particularly interested in understanding the practices the Uniswap DAO follows, as well as the best practices for a delegate to participate in the DAO and increase the chances of receiving delegation from delegators. I know this might seem like a basic question, but I’d really appreciate any guidance!
In principle, we agree with that, but who defines what is a thoughtful contribution and how? This qualification is subjective. In other DAOs, such as Arbitrum, for example, there is the role of a Program Manager who, on a monthly basis, reviews the contribution of each delegate, evaluates it according to pre-established parameters and assigns a score. It is still subjective, but it implies that there is a program of other characteristics that contemplates an entity that evaluates the delegates according to pre-established parameters and logically assigns a budget to the entity that fulfils this role. Otherwise, I return to my original question: who and how defines what is a thoughtful contribution and what is not?
I do not agree whith that. Requiring UNI holding generates an entry barrier, only entities with economic capacity could be delegates, the same if a long vesting time is established, only teams with saving capacity could be delegates. The small unipersonal delegate is expelled.
On the other hand, the delegator is the one who is most committed to UNI, if the delegate to whom he delegates his tokens votes against his interests, he withdraws the delegation. Therein lies the incentive game that generates commitment for both the delegate and the delegator.
In principle, we agree with that, but who defines what is a thoughtful contribution and how? This qualification is subjective. In other DAOs, such as Arbitrum, for example, there is the role of a Program Manager who, on a monthly basis, reviews the contribution of each delegate, evaluates it according to pre-established parameters and assigns a score. It is still subjective, but it implies that there is a program of other characteristics that contemplates an entity that evaluates the delegates according to pre-established parameters and logically assigns a budget to the entity that fulfils this role. Otherwise, I return to my original question: who and how defines what is a thoughtful contribution and what is not?
what about an ai? if wanted i could write a concept for it?
As a concept I agree, but it can lead to undesirable effects, as large delegate teams can afford to stake part of their income, but not small teams or individual delegates. This could lead to a plutocracy where delegates are only large teams with financial backing, pushing out individuals who want to contribute.
The value of these rationales diminishes significantly if they are submitted long after the vote, potentially becoming justifications crafted in hindsight rather than reflections of the delegate’s thinking at the time of voting.
The value of these rationales diminishes significantly if they are submitted long after the vote, potentially becoming justifications crafted in hindsight rather than reflections of the delegate’s thinking at the time of voting.
We think that the main improvement in this cycle is the emphasis on timely rationale writing. In future cycles we think that delegates should be posting rationale even before the voting period is over to completely eliminate writing rationale in hindsight. Or, at least have the deadline move closer towards the end of the voting period as reward initiative cycles continue.
rewarding delegates purely based on voting participation without considering the quality of engagement is a flaw
I think its a good idea in total but how can we ensure someone is voting with the best interest for the community and not only voting to get elected? The initiative is solid but rewarding delegates purely based on voting participation without considering the quality of engagement is a flaw. Delegates might vote just to stay eligible rather than making thoughtful contributions. Ading a qualitative review could ensure more meaningful governance decisions
In principle, we agree with that, but who defines what is a thoughtful contribution and how? This qualification is subjective. In other DAOs, such as Arbitrum, for example, there is the role of a Program Manager who, on a monthly basis, reviews the contribution of each delegate, evaluates it according to pre-established parameters and assigns a score. It is still subjective, but it implies that there is a program of other characteristics that contemplates an entity that evaluates the delegates according to pre-established parameters and logically assigns a budget to the entity that fulfils this role. Otherwise, I return to my original question: who and how defines what is a thoughtful contribution and what is not?
what about an ai? if wanted i could write a concept for it?
As a concept I agree, but it can lead to undesirable effects, as large delegate teams can afford to stake part of their income, but not small teams or individual delegates. This could lead to a plutocracy where delegates are only large teams with financial backing, pushing out individuals who want to contribute.
The value of these rationales diminishes significantly if they are submitted long after the vote, potentially becoming justifications crafted in hindsight rather than reflections of the delegate’s thinking at the time of voting.
The value of these rationales diminishes significantly if they are submitted long after the vote, potentially becoming justifications crafted in hindsight rather than reflections of the delegate’s thinking at the time of voting.
We think that the main improvement in this cycle is the emphasis on timely rationale writing. In future cycles we think that delegates should be posting rationale even before the voting period is over to completely eliminate writing rationale in hindsight. Or, at least have the deadline move closer towards the end of the voting period as reward initiative cycles continue.
rewarding delegates purely based on voting participation without considering the quality of engagement is a flaw
I think its a good idea in total but how can we ensure someone is voting with the best interest for the community and not only voting to get elected? The initiative is solid but rewarding delegates purely based on voting participation without considering the quality of engagement is a flaw. Delegates might vote just to stay eligible rather than making thoughtful contributions. Ading a qualitative review could ensure more meaningful governance decisions
It’s already a plutocracy. Just take a look at the Notion link @pepo posted above. The majority of the delegates don’t even own UNI, yet they’re steering the ship on behalf of VCs or the UNI DAO allocation. Financial interests are misaligned, and the UNI DAO is bearing the cost of that misalignment.
Given the current regulatory climate, VCs might as well start voting directly instead of engaging in this delegation theater. At least that would be a more transparent way of showing how DAOs operate, and it could spark ideas on how to address the issue. For example, VCs could use their significant early-stage allocations to compensate decision-making delegates, rather than the UNI DAO funding it through this initiative.
It’s already a plutocracy. Just take a look at the Notion link @pepo posted above. The majority of the delegates don’t even own UNI, yet they’re steering the ship on behalf of VCs or the UNI DAO allocation. Financial interests are misaligned, and the UNI DAO is bearing the cost of that misalignment.
Given the current regulatory climate, VCs might as well start voting directly instead of engaging in this delegation theater. At least that would be a more transparent way of showing how DAOs operate, and it could spark ideas on how to address the issue. For example, VCs could use their significant early-stage allocations to compensate decision-making delegates, rather than the UNI DAO funding it through this initiative.
If VCs want professional delegates to ease their workload, why is the UNI DAO paying for it?
Require :clap: PAID delegates :clap: to own :clap: a personal stake :clap: of UNI token :clap:
If the DAO is paying delegates for decisions: the delegates should have financial interest in the success or failures of those decisions.
It’s already a plutocracy. Just take a look at the Notion link @pepo posted above. The majority of the delegates don’t even own UNI, yet they’re steering the ship on behalf of VCs or the UNI DAO allocation. Financial interests are misaligned, and the UNI DAO is bearing the cost of that misalignment.
Given the current regulatory climate, VCs might as well start voting directly instead of engaging in this delegation theater. At least that would be a more transparent way of showing how DAOs operate, and it could spark ideas on how to address the issue. For example, VCs could use their significant early-stage allocations to compensate decision-making delegates, rather than the UNI DAO funding it through this initiative.
It’s already a plutocracy. Just take a look at the Notion link @pepo posted above. The majority of the delegates don’t even own UNI, yet they’re steering the ship on behalf of VCs or the UNI DAO allocation. Financial interests are misaligned, and the UNI DAO is bearing the cost of that misalignment.
Given the current regulatory climate, VCs might as well start voting directly instead of engaging in this delegation theater. At least that would be a more transparent way of showing how DAOs operate, and it could spark ideas on how to address the issue. For example, VCs could use their significant early-stage allocations to compensate decision-making delegates, rather than the UNI DAO funding it through this initiative.
If VCs want professional delegates to ease their workload, why is the UNI DAO paying for it?
Require :clap: PAID delegates :clap: to own :clap: a personal stake :clap: of UNI token :clap:
If the DAO is paying delegates for decisions: the delegates should have financial interest in the success or failures of those decisions.
For delegation itself, in practice, it's very difficult for delegates to receive delegation as Delegation remains low and Delegators haven't been re shuffle delegations effectively. For example, there are several top delegates who haven't voted for more than a year and in theory, delegators should re delegate but due to various reasons including legal and logistics, they are not so keen on it.
So most of recent delegations have been from either Uniswap DAO treasury or some from the Uniswap Foundation. There's new cycle of delegation from DAO treasury that's in RFC phase, but this in practice, is likely to require previous voting history. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-treasury-delegation-round-2/25355/10
For delegation itself, in practice, it's very difficult for delegates to receive delegation as Delegation remains low and Delegators haven't been re shuffle delegations effectively. For example, there are several top delegates who haven't voted for more than a year and in theory, delegators should re delegate but due to various reasons including legal and logistics, they are not so keen on it.
So most of recent delegations have been from either Uniswap DAO treasury or some from the Uniswap Foundation. There's new cycle of delegation from DAO treasury that's in RFC phase, but this in practice, is likely to require previous voting history. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-treasury-delegation-round-2/25355/10
Is there a minimum delegation criterion for delegates to participate in the Reward Initiative or to be eligible for the program, apart from the 3 months of participation?
Is there a minimum delegation criterion for delegates to participate in the Reward Initiative or to be eligible for the program, apart from the 3 months of participation?
For Cycle 1, there was 10k $UNI minimum if applicant didn't authored or co-authored a proposal that at least passed the snapshot vote. However, for Cycle 2 and 3, this was removed to be more inclusive. For Cycle 4, this or similar restriction might be re-implemented but we won't know yet.
In terms of practices, would recommend reading Principles for Uniswap DAO, which passed both offchain and onchain vote, and is a good guidance for delegate practices. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-principles-for-uniswap-dao/24724
We are inclined to support this proposal but suggest re-evaluating participation vs. delegation size in future iterations.
Currently, delegate compensation prioritizes reaching a quorum, which in a token-weighted system (e.g., Uniswap DAO) is best achieved by engaging large stakeholders rather than smaller, vocal delegates. It might be worth exploring whether targeting inactive large delegates (or growing stakeholder delegation) is effective alongside paying a broad base of extremely small delegates.
We are inclined to support this proposal but suggest re-evaluating participation vs. delegation size in future iterations.
Currently, delegate compensation prioritizes reaching a quorum, which in a token-weighted system (e.g., Uniswap DAO) is best achieved by engaging large stakeholders rather than smaller, vocal delegates. It might be worth exploring whether targeting inactive large delegates (or growing stakeholder delegation) is effective alongside paying a broad base of extremely small delegates.
Another goal is attracting and retaining high-quality, diverse delegates. While valuable, this is also gameable, and smaller delegates are not necessarily aligned with token holders' interests as larger ones might be. The program should reward outstanding contributions without incentivizing noise.
A better approach could incentivize meaningful evaluation and participation while introducing new models that don’t conflate qualitative feedback with voting power. The program shouldn't over-index on either but should strike a balance.
Ultimately, the program should aim to incentivize meaningful engagement on DAO proposals from as many of the largest and most powerful stakeholders as possible. Ideally, the DAO can also reward newcomers who demonstrate outstanding value with both compensation and a route to receive a delegation from existing investors and UNI whales (diversifying the delegate base).
This program seems a bit overly focused on attracting loud and active participants, regardless of alignment, versus engaging the most aligned stakeholders.
While we have voted in support of this proposal, we'd once again like to reiterate our position that there should be some form of accounting/scoring/eligibility associated with a Delegate's voting power and/or the amount of UNI they hold.
Since a delegate’s primary role is to utilize voting power from delegators and vote in Uniswap’s best interest, active participation is essential to ensuring quorums are met and malicious proposals are thwarted. This category carries a total of 7 points, with onchain voting weighted more heavily due to its ability to directly impact governance contracts and direct treasury funds.
On voting rationale: Requiring the rationale on the delegate profile doesn't really help that much, just makes all the threads unwieldy to read as a lot of talking points are repeated.
We've been posting our rationale on X, and encourage other delegates to do the same. Requiring this would be more effective for education and discovery, as many people are incorrectly starting to think the UNI DAO doesn't do anything as of late.
Thank you @Doo_StableLab @PGov @AranaDigital @seedgov for this proposal and to all the delegates that have provided valuable feedback.
This could have the opposite effect of what you expect. Setting a high entry barrier would make it easier for incumbent delegates to stay in place while providing less value, as they can outcompete others simply by holding tokens. It’s healthier to allow delegates to compete without requiring them to invest large amounts in UNI. Instead, we could require them to vest a percentage of their compensation or even lock it for a year. This would ensure they have skin in the game without creating a barrier for those who don’t have significant funds.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We’re voting ABSTAIN on the onchain vote.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We’re voting ABSTAIN on the onchain vote.
Following our ‘abstain’ vote during the temp-check, we’re also abstaining on the onchain vote. As others have also expressed, some aspects of the program could be improved before the program is renewed. However, we understand the nuances involved and that someone would need to lead this process, which is why we’re abstaining and not voting against it at this time.
Also, we plan on applying to the program, so we’re abstaining due to a conflict of interest.
Is there a minimum delegation criterion for delegates to participate in the Reward Initiative or to be eligible for the program, apart from the 3 months of participation?
Is there a minimum delegation criterion for delegates to participate in the Reward Initiative or to be eligible for the program, apart from the 3 months of participation?
For Cycle 1, there was 10k $UNI minimum if applicant didn't authored or co-authored a proposal that at least passed the snapshot vote. However, for Cycle 2 and 3, this was removed to be more inclusive. For Cycle 4, this or similar restriction might be re-implemented but we won't know yet.
In terms of practices, would recommend reading Principles for Uniswap DAO, which passed both offchain and onchain vote, and is a good guidance for delegate practices. https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-principles-for-uniswap-dao/24724
We are inclined to support this proposal but suggest re-evaluating participation vs. delegation size in future iterations.
Currently, delegate compensation prioritizes reaching a quorum, which in a token-weighted system (e.g., Uniswap DAO) is best achieved by engaging large stakeholders rather than smaller, vocal delegates. It might be worth exploring whether targeting inactive large delegates (or growing stakeholder delegation) is effective alongside paying a broad base of extremely small delegates.
We are inclined to support this proposal but suggest re-evaluating participation vs. delegation size in future iterations.
Currently, delegate compensation prioritizes reaching a quorum, which in a token-weighted system (e.g., Uniswap DAO) is best achieved by engaging large stakeholders rather than smaller, vocal delegates. It might be worth exploring whether targeting inactive large delegates (or growing stakeholder delegation) is effective alongside paying a broad base of extremely small delegates.
Another goal is attracting and retaining high-quality, diverse delegates. While valuable, this is also gameable, and smaller delegates are not necessarily aligned with token holders' interests as larger ones might be. The program should reward outstanding contributions without incentivizing noise.
A better approach could incentivize meaningful evaluation and participation while introducing new models that don’t conflate qualitative feedback with voting power. The program shouldn't over-index on either but should strike a balance.
Ultimately, the program should aim to incentivize meaningful engagement on DAO proposals from as many of the largest and most powerful stakeholders as possible. Ideally, the DAO can also reward newcomers who demonstrate outstanding value with both compensation and a route to receive a delegation from existing investors and UNI whales (diversifying the delegate base).
This program seems a bit overly focused on attracting loud and active participants, regardless of alignment, versus engaging the most aligned stakeholders.
While we have voted in support of this proposal, we'd once again like to reiterate our position that there should be some form of accounting/scoring/eligibility associated with a Delegate's voting power and/or the amount of UNI they hold.
Since a delegate’s primary role is to utilize voting power from delegators and vote in Uniswap’s best interest, active participation is essential to ensuring quorums are met and malicious proposals are thwarted. This category carries a total of 7 points, with onchain voting weighted more heavily due to its ability to directly impact governance contracts and direct treasury funds.
On voting rationale: Requiring the rationale on the delegate profile doesn't really help that much, just makes all the threads unwieldy to read as a lot of talking points are repeated.
We've been posting our rationale on X, and encourage other delegates to do the same. Requiring this would be more effective for education and discovery, as many people are incorrectly starting to think the UNI DAO doesn't do anything as of late.
Thank you @Doo_StableLab @PGov @AranaDigital @seedgov for this proposal and to all the delegates that have provided valuable feedback.
This could have the opposite effect of what you expect. Setting a high entry barrier would make it easier for incumbent delegates to stay in place while providing less value, as they can outcompete others simply by holding tokens. It’s healthier to allow delegates to compete without requiring them to invest large amounts in UNI. Instead, we could require them to vest a percentage of their compensation or even lock it for a year. This would ensure they have skin in the game without creating a barrier for those who don’t have significant funds.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We’re voting ABSTAIN on the onchain vote.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We’re voting ABSTAIN on the onchain vote.
Following our ‘abstain’ vote during the temp-check, we’re also abstaining on the onchain vote. As others have also expressed, some aspects of the program could be improved before the program is renewed. However, we understand the nuances involved and that someone would need to lead this process, which is why we’re abstaining and not voting against it at this time.
Also, we plan on applying to the program, so we’re abstaining due to a conflict of interest.
While we have voted in support of this proposal, we'd once again like to reiterate our position that there should be some form of accounting/scoring/eligibility associated with a Delegate's voting power and/or the amount of UNI they hold.
Since a delegate’s primary role is to utilize voting power from delegators and vote in Uniswap’s best interest, active participation is essential to ensuring quorums are met and malicious proposals are thwarted. This category carries a total of 7 points, with onchain voting weighted more heavily due to its ability to directly impact governance contracts and direct treasury funds.
As described above, this proposal places a large emphasis on the importance of onchain/offchain voting and talks about utilising Delegates' voting power. Yet there is no quality control in place for this? A Delegate with 10 UNI VP is valued the same as a Delegate with 2.5M UNI, yet the latter provides significantly more economic security to the DAO.
One major pushback about enforcing eligibility requirements based on VP is that it makes it harder for smaller delegates. This is completely fair and we recognise that contributions to DAOs are more than just VP. But there is currently 0 recognition of VP.
A solution to this is to add another category that awards points to Delegates based on some scoring metric of either VP or the impact of their relative VP. Thus, as a Delegate you can still apply with minimal VP however, you will be less competitive than another Delegate with the same performance yet has a larger VP.
We appreciate the discussion around the learnings and challenges from Cycle 2. We’re encouraged by the feedback already incorporated into Cycle 3, specifically, the introduction of a 7-day window for posting rationales, as it may lead to more deliberate commentary and deeper engagement in governance debates. Since this is the only (current) change in delegate scoring for the upcoming cycle, it provides a clear opportunity to measure its impact on delegate participation in forum discussions. It would be valuable for @StableLab to observe and report on these effects to the DAO. Additionally, as @Sinkas pointed out, considering how to further adapt the program based on delegate feedback would likely lead to stronger delegate engagement.
Furthermore, discussions have emerged around improving delegate alignment in governance, with ideas such as requiring delegates to hold UNI or implementing vesting/streaming mechanisms in the current distribution. Additionally, there have been suggestions on how to better reward delegates who demonstrate consistent engagement, such as attending all calls and maintaining perfect voting participation.
We appreciate the discussion around the learnings and challenges from Cycle 2. We’re encouraged by the feedback already incorporated into Cycle 3, specifically, the introduction of a 7-day window for posting rationales, as it may lead to more deliberate commentary and deeper engagement in governance debates. Since this is the only (current) change in delegate scoring for the upcoming cycle, it provides a clear opportunity to measure its impact on delegate participation in forum discussions. It would be valuable for @StableLab to observe and report on these effects to the DAO. Additionally, as @Sinkas pointed out, considering how to further adapt the program based on delegate feedback would likely lead to stronger delegate engagement.
Furthermore, discussions have emerged around improving delegate alignment in governance, with ideas such as requiring delegates to hold UNI or implementing vesting/streaming mechanisms in the current distribution. Additionally, there have been suggestions on how to better reward delegates who demonstrate consistent engagement, such as attending all calls and maintaining perfect voting participation.
A potential solution is to introduce a monthly delegate bonus reward, designed to increase delegate alignment, incentivize optimal governance activity, and fairly compensate top contributors without placing undue financial pressure on smaller delegates who may need to sell tokens for expenses.
This bonus pool would allocate 1,000 UNI per month, distributed among delegates who meet all three of the following criteria:
- Perfect voting participation - Attendance at all community calls - Providing effective and timely voting rationale
The UNI would be evenly split among eligible delegates. For example, if 10 out of 15 delegates achieve a perfect score, each would receive 100 UNI. This amount would be in addition to the $6,000 USD base compensation but would be subject to a 3-month lockup followed by a 6-month linear vesting schedule (open to different lockup/vesting timeframes) to reinforce long-term alignment.
Adding a bonus pool ensures that governance remains active and well-incentivized while addressing concerns around long-term alignment and rewarding optimal delegate behaviors for a relatively low additional cost(6,000 UNI) to the DAO.
Regarding this point, I agree with Userisky that holding UNI tokens should be more relevant for PAID delegates.
For reference, here is a full list of the active delegates on the DAO and their holdings (either on wallet or self-disclosed): https://uniswapdashboard.notion.site/181c7082cf4d8014853cf8b753a3f548?v=182c7082cf4d808b9176000c4f9a33c8
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote ABSTAIN in this proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote ABSTAIN in this proposal.
While we support the concept of delegate incentives, as we believe delegates should be compensated for their time and effort, we have not seen adequate alterations to the program that address the qualitative aspect of participation (see our previous comment).
At the same time, we understand the difficulty of incorporating qualitative criteria in a manner that’s both fair and practical. For that reason, and because we also stand to benefit as we’ve been receiving rewards in the two previous cycles, we decided to vote abstain.
Application has been posted https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-delegate-reward-initiative-cycle-3-application/25288
After conglomerating and reading through everyone's comments, we have:
After conglomerating and reading through everyone's comments, we have:
Some opinions that were brought up in the forums and through conversations not incorporated that are worth discussing in the future:
In the future, we should start the next cycle discussions sooner so that we can have more time to iterate on new ideas before the 6 month cycle ends (this cycle ends February).
For this cycle, we think the proposal captures a good amount of the lessons from prior seasons, and makes the selection criteria more strict compared to last seasons to ultimately find the top delegates at the DAO, with clear tie breaking criteria. We will post a snapshot shortly and look to follow this ideal timeline:
I think its a good idea in total but how can we ensure someone is voting with the best interest for the community and not only voting to get elected? The initiative is solid but rewarding delegates purely based on voting participation without considering the quality of engagement is a flaw. Delegates might vote just to stay eligible rather than making thoughtful contributions. Ading a qualitative review could ensure more meaningful governance decisions
I think its a good idea in total but how can we ensure someone is voting with the best interest for the community and not only voting to get elected? The initiative is solid but rewarding delegates purely based on voting participation without considering the quality of engagement is a flaw. Delegates might vote just to stay eligible rather than making thoughtful contributions. Ading a qualitative review could ensure more meaningful governance decisions
In principle, we agree with that, but who defines what is a thoughtful contribution and how? This qualification is subjective. In other DAOs, such as Arbitrum, for example, there is the role of a Program Manager who, on a monthly basis, reviews the contribution of each delegate, evaluates it according to pre-established parameters and assigns a score. It is still subjective, but it implies that there is a program of other characteristics that contemplates an entity that evaluates the delegates according to pre-established parameters and logically assigns a budget to the entity that fulfils this role. Otherwise, I return to my original question: who and how defines what is a thoughtful contribution and what is not?
Thanks everyone for their comments. And we will continue to reflect the feedback as needed and aim to have the snapshot vote live later this upcoming week.
As community calls attendance isn’t tracked for non-already participants of the delegate program (and backtracking it can potentially be a hassle), I was thinking of a system in which you value the voting participation based on the contribution to the discussions/thought process, something like this:
Thanks everyone for their comments. And we will continue to reflect the feedback as needed and aim to have the snapshot vote live later this upcoming week.
As community calls attendance isn’t tracked for non-already participants of the delegate program (and backtracking it can potentially be a hassle), I was thinking of a system in which you value the voting participation based on the contribution to the discussions/thought process, something like this:
Given these facts, maybe it’s worth considering increasing the number of slots to 20.
Finally, I do recommend giving additional points to delegates who have held on the the UNI which was received as rewards in the previous cycles, this shows a clear commitment to the DAO
We support the inclusion of timely rationale submission, within 7 days of the vote, as a key criterion for the delegate selection in Cycle 3. As @pepo and @Argonaut and others have highlighted, providing rationales is essential for transparency and understanding delegate decision-making.
I was brainstorming with other delegates regarding this, and I came to the conclusion that providing additional points for actually engaging in a timely manner should be recognized for the program.
We support the inclusion of timely rationale submission, within 7 days of the vote, as a key criterion for the delegate selection in Cycle 3. As @pepo and @Argonaut and others have highlighted, providing rationales is essential for transparency and understanding delegate decision-making.
I was brainstorming with other delegates regarding this, and I came to the conclusion that providing additional points for actually engaging in a timely manner should be recognized for the program.
The value of these rationales diminishes significantly if they are submitted long after the vote, potentially becoming justifications crafted in hindsight rather than reflections of the delegate's thinking at the time of voting.
Thus, we support that timely rationale submission be incorporated into the scoring system, ensuring that delegates who prioritize timely communication and accountability are appropriately recognized and prioritized for participation in the Cycle 3.
Glad to see fruitful discussions about cycle 3 in progress. thank you @Doo_StableLab for incorporating learnings from the previous cycles as well as delegate feedback.
In every application cycle, there have been more applicants than slots, infact that DAO had to participate in an extra vote in the last cycle. Many delegate platforms have initiated participation in the DAO since the last cycle. Given these facts, maybe it's worth considering increasing the number of slots to 20.
Glad to see fruitful discussions about cycle 3 in progress. thank you @Doo_StableLab for incorporating learnings from the previous cycles as well as delegate feedback.
In every application cycle, there have been more applicants than slots, infact that DAO had to participate in an extra vote in the last cycle. Many delegate platforms have initiated participation in the DAO since the last cycle. Given these facts, maybe it's worth considering increasing the number of slots to 20.
Several delegates participate in commenting on proposals which helps the author receive valuable feedback on their proposals. This can be a valuable criteria for selecting suitable candidates.
Finally, I do recommend giving additional points to delegates who have held on the the UNI which was received as rewards in the previous cycles, this shows a clear commitment to the DAO
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
Something that's perhaps worth reflecting on and maybe even adapting the program to account for is engagement with proposals in the form of feedback. Right now, a delegate can only 'earn points' either for voting and communicating their rationale, co-authoring a proposal and attending calls. But, as this very thread shows, delegates engaging with a proposal by providing feedback is very valuable and probably something we should encouraging and incentivising more.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
Something that's perhaps worth reflecting on and maybe even adapting the program to account for is engagement with proposals in the form of feedback. Right now, a delegate can only 'earn points' either for voting and communicating their rationale, co-authoring a proposal and attending calls. But, as this very thread shows, delegates engaging with a proposal by providing feedback is very valuable and probably something we should encouraging and incentivising more.
We do not have any strong view of how this can best be achieved without creating unwanted behaviors (e.g. low effort/quality or AI comments) but perhaps it's worth discussing more.
We are voting in favor of this Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 3, while maintaining our stance from previous cycles, particularly on quality vs. quantity, conflict of interest, and vesting mechanisms (see previous discussions: Curia Delegate Platform and Cycle 3 Discussion).
Although we support several proposed improvements—increased emphasis on voting participation points, clearer tie-breakers, and rationale deadlines—we believe the initiative could be more ambitious given the six-month cycle. Our primary concern is maintaining a balance between the quantity and quality of contributions.
Please take a look at @Doo_StableLab's comment and the snapshot that is currently live here: Snapshot.
I believe we should expect more from the delegates, especially since they are compensated for their work. Can’t we set a submission deadline within 10 days of the vote? If we allow delegates to submit their rationale up to a month later, we are essentially rewarding them for providing explanations long after the decision has been made.
Thank you for working on the updated version of this initiative. Before providing feedback on the proposal, we want to express our gratitude for the opportunity granted to us through this program.
We believe this proposal is an improvement over the previous one in several ways:
Thank you for working on the updated version of this initiative. Before providing feedback on the proposal, we want to express our gratitude for the opportunity granted to us through this program.
We believe this proposal is an improvement over the previous one in several ways:
Offchain and Onchain Voting Brackets: These are much more effective than in the previous program, where many delegates received all the points despite relatively low voting participation. The weight assigned to these factors in the overall score is well-balanced, as they are the most critical aspects of a delegate’s role.
Community Call Participation: The new brackets make much more sense compared to the previous program, where delegates could easily earn a point by attending just one community call.
Tie-breaker: This is now clearly defined and is unlikely to create any conflicts.
Removal of Seniority Points: We support the decision to remove the additional point for delegates with six months of seniority, as we felt it provided an unfair advantage.
We think the inclusion of an extra point for delegates who attended all community calls, voted, and provided their rationale for every on-chain and off-chain vote over the past six months would be a very good addition. A bonus point for perfect participation in the second cycle could help recognize those who remained consistent during the 6 months.
We agree that this restriction makes sense. While we have been late once or twice, we will ensure this doesn’t happen again. In our case, our team made the voting decision during a meeting, but the team member responsible for preparing the rationale was a new hire and needed more time. Moving forward, we will make sure to share our rationale promptly after the vote.
2a. Write rationale for the voting on their delegate profile. -Deadline for writing rationale would be 7 days from the end of each vote.
The rationale requirement has been updated to 7 days.
We support this inclusion, even the deadline for justifying the vote could be set at 7 days from the end of each vote.
Agree here; in favor of adding this in and it makes sense.
Hey Juanbug, thanks for the answer!
To point 1, I think it makes sense to add in a section saying all rationale needs to be added in by say the 5th of the month after to be counted for in communication
I have some concerns regarding point 2a, some delegates in Cycle 2 (I haven’t verified Cycle 1 yet) consistently took more than 15 days to provide the rationale for their votes, yet they were still rewarded.
Hey Doo, I wanted to chime in on this matter before applications arrive. I believe the process for the 'additional rewards' section should be reviewed and explicitly stated in the proposal.
2a. Write rationale for the voting on their delegate profile.
While we have voted in support of this proposal, we'd once again like to reiterate our position that there should be some form of accounting/scoring/eligibility associated with a Delegate's voting power and/or the amount of UNI they hold.
Since a delegate’s primary role is to utilize voting power from delegators and vote in Uniswap’s best interest, active participation is essential to ensuring quorums are met and malicious proposals are thwarted. This category carries a total of 7 points, with onchain voting weighted more heavily due to its ability to directly impact governance contracts and direct treasury funds.
As described above, this proposal places a large emphasis on the importance of onchain/offchain voting and talks about utilising Delegates' voting power. Yet there is no quality control in place for this? A Delegate with 10 UNI VP is valued the same as a Delegate with 2.5M UNI, yet the latter provides significantly more economic security to the DAO.
One major pushback about enforcing eligibility requirements based on VP is that it makes it harder for smaller delegates. This is completely fair and we recognise that contributions to DAOs are more than just VP. But there is currently 0 recognition of VP.
A solution to this is to add another category that awards points to Delegates based on some scoring metric of either VP or the impact of their relative VP. Thus, as a Delegate you can still apply with minimal VP however, you will be less competitive than another Delegate with the same performance yet has a larger VP.
We appreciate the discussion around the learnings and challenges from Cycle 2. We’re encouraged by the feedback already incorporated into Cycle 3, specifically, the introduction of a 7-day window for posting rationales, as it may lead to more deliberate commentary and deeper engagement in governance debates. Since this is the only (current) change in delegate scoring for the upcoming cycle, it provides a clear opportunity to measure its impact on delegate participation in forum discussions. It would be valuable for @StableLab to observe and report on these effects to the DAO. Additionally, as @Sinkas pointed out, considering how to further adapt the program based on delegate feedback would likely lead to stronger delegate engagement.
Furthermore, discussions have emerged around improving delegate alignment in governance, with ideas such as requiring delegates to hold UNI or implementing vesting/streaming mechanisms in the current distribution. Additionally, there have been suggestions on how to better reward delegates who demonstrate consistent engagement, such as attending all calls and maintaining perfect voting participation.
We appreciate the discussion around the learnings and challenges from Cycle 2. We’re encouraged by the feedback already incorporated into Cycle 3, specifically, the introduction of a 7-day window for posting rationales, as it may lead to more deliberate commentary and deeper engagement in governance debates. Since this is the only (current) change in delegate scoring for the upcoming cycle, it provides a clear opportunity to measure its impact on delegate participation in forum discussions. It would be valuable for @StableLab to observe and report on these effects to the DAO. Additionally, as @Sinkas pointed out, considering how to further adapt the program based on delegate feedback would likely lead to stronger delegate engagement.
Furthermore, discussions have emerged around improving delegate alignment in governance, with ideas such as requiring delegates to hold UNI or implementing vesting/streaming mechanisms in the current distribution. Additionally, there have been suggestions on how to better reward delegates who demonstrate consistent engagement, such as attending all calls and maintaining perfect voting participation.
A potential solution is to introduce a monthly delegate bonus reward, designed to increase delegate alignment, incentivize optimal governance activity, and fairly compensate top contributors without placing undue financial pressure on smaller delegates who may need to sell tokens for expenses.
This bonus pool would allocate 1,000 UNI per month, distributed among delegates who meet all three of the following criteria:
- Perfect voting participation - Attendance at all community calls - Providing effective and timely voting rationale
The UNI would be evenly split among eligible delegates. For example, if 10 out of 15 delegates achieve a perfect score, each would receive 100 UNI. This amount would be in addition to the $6,000 USD base compensation but would be subject to a 3-month lockup followed by a 6-month linear vesting schedule (open to different lockup/vesting timeframes) to reinforce long-term alignment.
Adding a bonus pool ensures that governance remains active and well-incentivized while addressing concerns around long-term alignment and rewarding optimal delegate behaviors for a relatively low additional cost(6,000 UNI) to the DAO.
Regarding this point, I agree with Userisky that holding UNI tokens should be more relevant for PAID delegates.
For reference, here is a full list of the active delegates on the DAO and their holdings (either on wallet or self-disclosed): https://uniswapdashboard.notion.site/181c7082cf4d8014853cf8b753a3f548?v=182c7082cf4d808b9176000c4f9a33c8
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote ABSTAIN in this proposal.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
After careful consideration, we’ve decided to vote ABSTAIN in this proposal.
While we support the concept of delegate incentives, as we believe delegates should be compensated for their time and effort, we have not seen adequate alterations to the program that address the qualitative aspect of participation (see our previous comment).
At the same time, we understand the difficulty of incorporating qualitative criteria in a manner that’s both fair and practical. For that reason, and because we also stand to benefit as we’ve been receiving rewards in the two previous cycles, we decided to vote abstain.
Application has been posted https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-delegate-reward-initiative-cycle-3-application/25288
After conglomerating and reading through everyone's comments, we have:
After conglomerating and reading through everyone's comments, we have:
Some opinions that were brought up in the forums and through conversations not incorporated that are worth discussing in the future:
In the future, we should start the next cycle discussions sooner so that we can have more time to iterate on new ideas before the 6 month cycle ends (this cycle ends February).
For this cycle, we think the proposal captures a good amount of the lessons from prior seasons, and makes the selection criteria more strict compared to last seasons to ultimately find the top delegates at the DAO, with clear tie breaking criteria. We will post a snapshot shortly and look to follow this ideal timeline:
I think its a good idea in total but how can we ensure someone is voting with the best interest for the community and not only voting to get elected? The initiative is solid but rewarding delegates purely based on voting participation without considering the quality of engagement is a flaw. Delegates might vote just to stay eligible rather than making thoughtful contributions. Ading a qualitative review could ensure more meaningful governance decisions
I think its a good idea in total but how can we ensure someone is voting with the best interest for the community and not only voting to get elected? The initiative is solid but rewarding delegates purely based on voting participation without considering the quality of engagement is a flaw. Delegates might vote just to stay eligible rather than making thoughtful contributions. Ading a qualitative review could ensure more meaningful governance decisions
In principle, we agree with that, but who defines what is a thoughtful contribution and how? This qualification is subjective. In other DAOs, such as Arbitrum, for example, there is the role of a Program Manager who, on a monthly basis, reviews the contribution of each delegate, evaluates it according to pre-established parameters and assigns a score. It is still subjective, but it implies that there is a program of other characteristics that contemplates an entity that evaluates the delegates according to pre-established parameters and logically assigns a budget to the entity that fulfils this role. Otherwise, I return to my original question: who and how defines what is a thoughtful contribution and what is not?
Thanks everyone for their comments. And we will continue to reflect the feedback as needed and aim to have the snapshot vote live later this upcoming week.
As community calls attendance isn’t tracked for non-already participants of the delegate program (and backtracking it can potentially be a hassle), I was thinking of a system in which you value the voting participation based on the contribution to the discussions/thought process, something like this:
Thanks everyone for their comments. And we will continue to reflect the feedback as needed and aim to have the snapshot vote live later this upcoming week.
As community calls attendance isn’t tracked for non-already participants of the delegate program (and backtracking it can potentially be a hassle), I was thinking of a system in which you value the voting participation based on the contribution to the discussions/thought process, something like this:
Given these facts, maybe it’s worth considering increasing the number of slots to 20.
Finally, I do recommend giving additional points to delegates who have held on the the UNI which was received as rewards in the previous cycles, this shows a clear commitment to the DAO
We support the inclusion of timely rationale submission, within 7 days of the vote, as a key criterion for the delegate selection in Cycle 3. As @pepo and @Argonaut and others have highlighted, providing rationales is essential for transparency and understanding delegate decision-making.
I was brainstorming with other delegates regarding this, and I came to the conclusion that providing additional points for actually engaging in a timely manner should be recognized for the program.
We support the inclusion of timely rationale submission, within 7 days of the vote, as a key criterion for the delegate selection in Cycle 3. As @pepo and @Argonaut and others have highlighted, providing rationales is essential for transparency and understanding delegate decision-making.
I was brainstorming with other delegates regarding this, and I came to the conclusion that providing additional points for actually engaging in a timely manner should be recognized for the program.
The value of these rationales diminishes significantly if they are submitted long after the vote, potentially becoming justifications crafted in hindsight rather than reflections of the delegate's thinking at the time of voting.
Thus, we support that timely rationale submission be incorporated into the scoring system, ensuring that delegates who prioritize timely communication and accountability are appropriately recognized and prioritized for participation in the Cycle 3.
Glad to see fruitful discussions about cycle 3 in progress. thank you @Doo_StableLab for incorporating learnings from the previous cycles as well as delegate feedback.
In every application cycle, there have been more applicants than slots, infact that DAO had to participate in an extra vote in the last cycle. Many delegate platforms have initiated participation in the DAO since the last cycle. Given these facts, maybe it's worth considering increasing the number of slots to 20.
Glad to see fruitful discussions about cycle 3 in progress. thank you @Doo_StableLab for incorporating learnings from the previous cycles as well as delegate feedback.
In every application cycle, there have been more applicants than slots, infact that DAO had to participate in an extra vote in the last cycle. Many delegate platforms have initiated participation in the DAO since the last cycle. Given these facts, maybe it's worth considering increasing the number of slots to 20.
Several delegates participate in commenting on proposals which helps the author receive valuable feedback on their proposals. This can be a valuable criteria for selecting suitable candidates.
Finally, I do recommend giving additional points to delegates who have held on the the UNI which was received as rewards in the previous cycles, this shows a clear commitment to the DAO
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
Something that's perhaps worth reflecting on and maybe even adapting the program to account for is engagement with proposals in the form of feedback. Right now, a delegate can only 'earn points' either for voting and communicating their rationale, co-authoring a proposal and attending calls. But, as this very thread shows, delegates engaging with a proposal by providing feedback is very valuable and probably something we should encouraging and incentivising more.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas. It’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
Something that's perhaps worth reflecting on and maybe even adapting the program to account for is engagement with proposals in the form of feedback. Right now, a delegate can only 'earn points' either for voting and communicating their rationale, co-authoring a proposal and attending calls. But, as this very thread shows, delegates engaging with a proposal by providing feedback is very valuable and probably something we should encouraging and incentivising more.
We do not have any strong view of how this can best be achieved without creating unwanted behaviors (e.g. low effort/quality or AI comments) but perhaps it's worth discussing more.
We are voting in favor of this Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 3, while maintaining our stance from previous cycles, particularly on quality vs. quantity, conflict of interest, and vesting mechanisms (see previous discussions: Curia Delegate Platform and Cycle 3 Discussion).
Although we support several proposed improvements—increased emphasis on voting participation points, clearer tie-breakers, and rationale deadlines—we believe the initiative could be more ambitious given the six-month cycle. Our primary concern is maintaining a balance between the quantity and quality of contributions.
Please take a look at @Doo_StableLab's comment and the snapshot that is currently live here: Snapshot.
I believe we should expect more from the delegates, especially since they are compensated for their work. Can’t we set a submission deadline within 10 days of the vote? If we allow delegates to submit their rationale up to a month later, we are essentially rewarding them for providing explanations long after the decision has been made.
Thank you for working on the updated version of this initiative. Before providing feedback on the proposal, we want to express our gratitude for the opportunity granted to us through this program.
We believe this proposal is an improvement over the previous one in several ways:
Thank you for working on the updated version of this initiative. Before providing feedback on the proposal, we want to express our gratitude for the opportunity granted to us through this program.
We believe this proposal is an improvement over the previous one in several ways:
Offchain and Onchain Voting Brackets: These are much more effective than in the previous program, where many delegates received all the points despite relatively low voting participation. The weight assigned to these factors in the overall score is well-balanced, as they are the most critical aspects of a delegate’s role.
Community Call Participation: The new brackets make much more sense compared to the previous program, where delegates could easily earn a point by attending just one community call.
Tie-breaker: This is now clearly defined and is unlikely to create any conflicts.
Removal of Seniority Points: We support the decision to remove the additional point for delegates with six months of seniority, as we felt it provided an unfair advantage.
We think the inclusion of an extra point for delegates who attended all community calls, voted, and provided their rationale for every on-chain and off-chain vote over the past six months would be a very good addition. A bonus point for perfect participation in the second cycle could help recognize those who remained consistent during the 6 months.
We agree that this restriction makes sense. While we have been late once or twice, we will ensure this doesn’t happen again. In our case, our team made the voting decision during a meeting, but the team member responsible for preparing the rationale was a new hire and needed more time. Moving forward, we will make sure to share our rationale promptly after the vote.
2a. Write rationale for the voting on their delegate profile. -Deadline for writing rationale would be 7 days from the end of each vote.
The rationale requirement has been updated to 7 days.
We support this inclusion, even the deadline for justifying the vote could be set at 7 days from the end of each vote.
Agree here; in favor of adding this in and it makes sense.
Hey Juanbug, thanks for the answer!
To point 1, I think it makes sense to add in a section saying all rationale needs to be added in by say the 5th of the month after to be counted for in communication
I have some concerns regarding point 2a, some delegates in Cycle 2 (I haven’t verified Cycle 1 yet) consistently took more than 15 days to provide the rationale for their votes, yet they were still rewarded.
Hey Doo, I wanted to chime in on this matter before applications arrive. I believe the process for the 'additional rewards' section should be reviewed and explicitly stated in the proposal.
2a. Write rationale for the voting on their delegate profile.
We think the inclusion of an extra point for delegates who attended all community calls, voted, and provided their rationale for every on-chain and off-chain vote over the past six months would be a very good addition. A bonus point for perfect participation in the second cycle could help recognize those who remained consistent during the 6 months.
I personally agree with this.
I was brainstorming with other delegates regarding this, and I came to the conclusion that providing additional points for actually engaging in a timely manner should be recognized for the program.
As community calls attendance isn't tracked for non-already participants of the delegate program (and backtracking it can potentially be a hassle), I was thinking of a system in which you value the voting participation based on the contribution to the discussions/thought process, something like this:
We are voting in favor of this Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 3, while maintaining our stance from previous cycles, particularly on quality vs. quantity, conflict of interest, and vesting mechanisms (see previous discussions: Curia Delegate Platform and Cycle 3 Discussion).
Although we support several proposed improvements—increased emphasis on voting participation points, clearer tie-breakers, and rationale deadlines—we believe the initiative could be more ambitious given the six-month cycle. Our primary concern is maintaining a balance between the quantity and quality of contributions.
Relying solely on quantitative metrics may not fully capture thoughtful proposal analysis or meaningful contributions. We therefore advocate for more robust mechanisms that reward quality governance participation, where the rationale behind decisions is given greater weight.
Attracting newcomers with meaningful contributions is essential for diversifying opinions and enriching governance. However, if the focus remains predominantly on numbers, it could hinder efforts to challenge delegates who receive monthly payments despite not meeting the higher standards of quality. Others should have the opportunity to challenge delegate decisions based on the quality of their rationale, and we should closely evaluate this cycle's outcomes to understand its full impact.
In the next cycle, we would advocate for having a monthly rewards system that incentivizes full participation. Delegates who achieve 100% participation would receive rewards, while those falling short would incur proportional deductions. Additionally, a quality-based bonus pool would recognize meaningful contributions—we could even experiment further allowing those not eligible for monthly payments to get this bonus as well.
This approach would encourage delegates to consistently provide high-quality rationale and strive for continuous improvement, while still rewarding top performers. For evaluating the quality of contributions, we are keen to adopt a framework similar to Arbitrum’s—as @SEEDGov mentioned—where a Program Manager scores contributions based on predefined parameters. Although this method involves a degree of subjectivity, its structured approach helps ensure that valuable insights are properly recognized.
In summary, we believe striking a balance between quality and quantity is key to enhancing governance and maintaining an engaged, diverse pool of delegates. We also support the proposed vesting approach, but view it as a long-term strategy to align incentives with sustainable, quality contributions.
I believe we should expect more from the delegates, especially since they are compensated for their work. Can’t we set a submission deadline within 10 days of the vote? If we allow delegates to submit their rationale up to a month later, we are essentially rewarding them for providing explanations long after the decision has been made.
We support this inclusion, even the deadline for justifying the vote could be set at 7 days from the end of each vote.
We think the inclusion of an extra point for delegates who attended all community calls, voted, and provided their rationale for every on-chain and off-chain vote over the past six months would be a very good addition. A bonus point for perfect participation in the second cycle could help recognize those who remained consistent during the 6 months.
This is a very interesting suggestion for inclusion.
Hey Juanbug, thanks for the answer!
To point 1, I think it makes sense to add in a section saying all rationale needs to be added in by say the 5th of the month after to be counted for in communication
Regarding this, I believe we should expect more from the delegates, especially since they are compensated for their work. Can't we set a submission deadline within 10 days of the vote? If we allow delegates to submit their rationale up to a month later, we are essentially rewarding them for providing explanations long after the decision has been made.
Ideally, rationales should be submitted along with the on-chain vote to ensure clarity on what the delegate was thinking and feeling at the time of voting. Delaying this process increases the risk that delegates may forget their original reasoning and instead create a rationale that retroactively fits their vote, offering less genuine insight.
And for this point, the meeting itself is recorded and the form is double checked with the actual meeting attendance to prevent exactly this.
Thanks for this insight!
I have some concerns regarding point 2a, some delegates in Cycle 2 (I haven’t verified Cycle 1 yet) consistently took more than 15 days to provide the rationale for their votes, yet they were still rewarded.
Regarding point 2b, I don’t have specific details, but as I understand it, the process is self-reported. A UAC member submits the form for anyone to fill out during the community call, and later, they check whether it has been completed. However, this system seems easy to bypass—someone else could fill it out on your behalf, or it could be shared with others during the call. Is there any safeguard against this? Are cross-checks conducted by the oversight entity?
And for this point, the meeting itself is recorded and the form is double checked with the actual meeting attendance to prevent exactly this.
Hey Doo, I wanted to chime in on this matter before applications arrive. I believe the process for the 'additional rewards' section should be reviewed and explicitly stated in the proposal.
2a. Write rationale for the voting on their delegate profile.
I have some concerns regarding point 2a, some delegates in Cycle 2 (I haven’t verified Cycle 1 yet) consistently took more than 15 days to provide the rationale for their votes, yet they were still rewarded.
Regarding point 2b, I don’t have specific details, but as I understand it, the process is self-reported. A UAC member submits the form for anyone to fill out during the community call, and later, they check whether it has been completed. However, this system seems easy to bypass—someone else could fill it out on your behalf, or it could be shared with others during the call. Is there any safeguard against this? Are cross-checks conducted by the oversight entity?
Thank you for the feedback. We assumed attendance was tracked for all delegates since it’s a requirement of the new program:
Attended at least 80% of calls: 1 Attended at least 50% of calls: 0.5
Thank you for the feedback. We assumed attendance was tracked for all delegates since it’s a requirement of the new program:
Attended at least 80% of calls: 1 Attended at least 50% of calls: 0.5
So if they can determine that a delegate attended 80% of the calls, they should also be able to determine if they attended 100%.
We also like your suggestion:
Providing a rationale for all votes should earn an additional half point, in our opinion. This is tricky because if we include it now, delegates could still submit their rationale retroactively. So for the second bullet point, we would also apply a 30-day cutoff window.
The third point might be a bit controversial, as some delegates could argue that submitting a rationale at the end of the month (before the payment calculation) was allowed. However, we agree it would be a good addition. I’d suggest including it as a replacement for the third tie-breaker:
In the event that the tie persists further, the final decision will favor the delegate who was first to present their delegation platform—hence, priority will be given to the individual/entity who first publicly declared their intention to become a delegate.
It could be something like this:
- In the event that the tie persists further, priority will be given to the delegate who has provided the most voting rationales in a timely manner, within 10 days after the vote ends.
We think the inclusion of an extra point for delegates who attended all community calls, voted, and provided their rationale for every on-chain and off-chain vote over the past six months would be a very good addition. A bonus point for perfect participation in the second cycle could help recognize those who remained consistent during the 6 months.
I personally agree with this.
I was brainstorming with other delegates regarding this, and I came to the conclusion that providing additional points for actually engaging in a timely manner should be recognized for the program.
As community calls attendance isn't tracked for non-already participants of the delegate program (and backtracking it can potentially be a hassle), I was thinking of a system in which you value the voting participation based on the contribution to the discussions/thought process, something like this:
We are voting in favor of this Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 3, while maintaining our stance from previous cycles, particularly on quality vs. quantity, conflict of interest, and vesting mechanisms (see previous discussions: Curia Delegate Platform and Cycle 3 Discussion).
Although we support several proposed improvements—increased emphasis on voting participation points, clearer tie-breakers, and rationale deadlines—we believe the initiative could be more ambitious given the six-month cycle. Our primary concern is maintaining a balance between the quantity and quality of contributions.
Relying solely on quantitative metrics may not fully capture thoughtful proposal analysis or meaningful contributions. We therefore advocate for more robust mechanisms that reward quality governance participation, where the rationale behind decisions is given greater weight.
Attracting newcomers with meaningful contributions is essential for diversifying opinions and enriching governance. However, if the focus remains predominantly on numbers, it could hinder efforts to challenge delegates who receive monthly payments despite not meeting the higher standards of quality. Others should have the opportunity to challenge delegate decisions based on the quality of their rationale, and we should closely evaluate this cycle's outcomes to understand its full impact.
In the next cycle, we would advocate for having a monthly rewards system that incentivizes full participation. Delegates who achieve 100% participation would receive rewards, while those falling short would incur proportional deductions. Additionally, a quality-based bonus pool would recognize meaningful contributions—we could even experiment further allowing those not eligible for monthly payments to get this bonus as well.
This approach would encourage delegates to consistently provide high-quality rationale and strive for continuous improvement, while still rewarding top performers. For evaluating the quality of contributions, we are keen to adopt a framework similar to Arbitrum’s—as @SEEDGov mentioned—where a Program Manager scores contributions based on predefined parameters. Although this method involves a degree of subjectivity, its structured approach helps ensure that valuable insights are properly recognized.
In summary, we believe striking a balance between quality and quantity is key to enhancing governance and maintaining an engaged, diverse pool of delegates. We also support the proposed vesting approach, but view it as a long-term strategy to align incentives with sustainable, quality contributions.
I believe we should expect more from the delegates, especially since they are compensated for their work. Can’t we set a submission deadline within 10 days of the vote? If we allow delegates to submit their rationale up to a month later, we are essentially rewarding them for providing explanations long after the decision has been made.
We support this inclusion, even the deadline for justifying the vote could be set at 7 days from the end of each vote.
We think the inclusion of an extra point for delegates who attended all community calls, voted, and provided their rationale for every on-chain and off-chain vote over the past six months would be a very good addition. A bonus point for perfect participation in the second cycle could help recognize those who remained consistent during the 6 months.
This is a very interesting suggestion for inclusion.
Hey Juanbug, thanks for the answer!
To point 1, I think it makes sense to add in a section saying all rationale needs to be added in by say the 5th of the month after to be counted for in communication
Regarding this, I believe we should expect more from the delegates, especially since they are compensated for their work. Can't we set a submission deadline within 10 days of the vote? If we allow delegates to submit their rationale up to a month later, we are essentially rewarding them for providing explanations long after the decision has been made.
Ideally, rationales should be submitted along with the on-chain vote to ensure clarity on what the delegate was thinking and feeling at the time of voting. Delaying this process increases the risk that delegates may forget their original reasoning and instead create a rationale that retroactively fits their vote, offering less genuine insight.
And for this point, the meeting itself is recorded and the form is double checked with the actual meeting attendance to prevent exactly this.
Thanks for this insight!
I have some concerns regarding point 2a, some delegates in Cycle 2 (I haven’t verified Cycle 1 yet) consistently took more than 15 days to provide the rationale for their votes, yet they were still rewarded.
Regarding point 2b, I don’t have specific details, but as I understand it, the process is self-reported. A UAC member submits the form for anyone to fill out during the community call, and later, they check whether it has been completed. However, this system seems easy to bypass—someone else could fill it out on your behalf, or it could be shared with others during the call. Is there any safeguard against this? Are cross-checks conducted by the oversight entity?
And for this point, the meeting itself is recorded and the form is double checked with the actual meeting attendance to prevent exactly this.
Hey Doo, I wanted to chime in on this matter before applications arrive. I believe the process for the 'additional rewards' section should be reviewed and explicitly stated in the proposal.
2a. Write rationale for the voting on their delegate profile.
I have some concerns regarding point 2a, some delegates in Cycle 2 (I haven’t verified Cycle 1 yet) consistently took more than 15 days to provide the rationale for their votes, yet they were still rewarded.
Regarding point 2b, I don’t have specific details, but as I understand it, the process is self-reported. A UAC member submits the form for anyone to fill out during the community call, and later, they check whether it has been completed. However, this system seems easy to bypass—someone else could fill it out on your behalf, or it could be shared with others during the call. Is there any safeguard against this? Are cross-checks conducted by the oversight entity?
Thank you for the feedback. We assumed attendance was tracked for all delegates since it’s a requirement of the new program:
Attended at least 80% of calls: 1 Attended at least 50% of calls: 0.5
Thank you for the feedback. We assumed attendance was tracked for all delegates since it’s a requirement of the new program:
Attended at least 80% of calls: 1 Attended at least 50% of calls: 0.5
So if they can determine that a delegate attended 80% of the calls, they should also be able to determine if they attended 100%.
We also like your suggestion:
Providing a rationale for all votes should earn an additional half point, in our opinion. This is tricky because if we include it now, delegates could still submit their rationale retroactively. So for the second bullet point, we would also apply a 30-day cutoff window.
The third point might be a bit controversial, as some delegates could argue that submitting a rationale at the end of the month (before the payment calculation) was allowed. However, we agree it would be a good addition. I’d suggest including it as a replacement for the third tie-breaker:
In the event that the tie persists further, the final decision will favor the delegate who was first to present their delegation platform—hence, priority will be given to the individual/entity who first publicly declared their intention to become a delegate.
It could be something like this:
- In the event that the tie persists further, priority will be given to the delegate who has provided the most voting rationales in a timely manner, within 10 days after the vote ends.
