I'm very excited to hear that Uniswap may sponsor new tools for Uniswap v4 via this proposal. Based on my personal experience, I think the Uniswap ecosystem benefits greatly from having more tooling options, and Oku is the best I've found. I use Oku's Uniswap v3 tools multiple times per day to monitor pools, trading activity, and orderbook depth. In contrast, I feel blind on Uniswap v4: in my experience Uniswap's official UI often errors out for me and I can hardly ever persuade it to show me correct data. That alone is enough reason for me to urge support for this proposal.

In addition, I find Oku's bridge aggregator frequently useful, and Unichain is one of the most common chains I have been bridging to and from in recent weeks. Oku is always the first place I check when I'm bridging, so if an L2 isn't supported by Oku yet, I have to resort to other annoying means to find a bridge to get my assets moved. Adding Unichain to Oku would be a huge plus and I'm happy to see that's part of this proposal too.

The way I see it, Oku is a key part of what makes Uniswap so great, and has been so for years, and I encourage voters to continue to support Oku with reasonable grants such as this one.

We’re voting in favor of this proposal because it offers a well-scoped and impactful approach to scaling Uniswap V4 while enhancing user experience across multiple chains.

Oku has already established itself as a valuable platform for liquidity providers, traders, and developers, and this upgrade will bring much-needed V4-specific tools, including analytics, routing, and liquidity management features.

The integration of Unichain, combined with the permissionless licensing framework, demonstrates a balance between flexibility and DAO oversight. The proposal outlines a reasonable budget, a clear development plan, and a rapid deployment timeline—with no upfront integration fee, which we view as a strong signal of long-term alignment.

As ITU Blockchain, we support this initiative and believe it will contribute meaningfully to the growth and accessibility of V4.

I'm very excited to hear that Uniswap may sponsor new tools for Uniswap v4 via this proposal. Based on my personal experience, I think the Uniswap ecosystem benefits greatly from having more tooling options, and Oku is the best I've found. I use Oku's Uniswap v3 tools multiple times per day to monitor pools, trading activity, and orderbook depth. In contrast, I feel blind on Uniswap v4: in my experience Uniswap's official UI often errors out for me and I can hardly ever persuade it to show me correct data. That alone is enough reason for me to urge support for this proposal.

In addition, I find Oku's bridge aggregator frequently useful, and Unichain is one of the most common chains I have been bridging to and from in recent weeks. Oku is always the first place I check when I'm bridging, so if an L2 isn't supported by Oku yet, I have to resort to other annoying means to find a bridge to get my assets moved. Adding Unichain to Oku would be a huge plus and I'm happy to see that's part of this proposal too.

The way I see it, Oku is a key part of what makes Uniswap so great, and has been so for years, and I encourage voters to continue to support Oku with reasonable grants such as this one.

We’re voting in favor of this proposal because it offers a well-scoped and impactful approach to scaling Uniswap V4 while enhancing user experience across multiple chains.

Oku has already established itself as a valuable platform for liquidity providers, traders, and developers, and this upgrade will bring much-needed V4-specific tools, including analytics, routing, and liquidity management features.

The integration of Unichain, combined with the permissionless licensing framework, demonstrates a balance between flexibility and DAO oversight. The proposal outlines a reasonable budget, a clear development plan, and a rapid deployment timeline—with no upfront integration fee, which we view as a strong signal of long-term alignment.

As ITU Blockchain, we support this initiative and believe it will contribute meaningfully to the growth and accessibility of V4.

Hey folks, I’m gonna vote no on this one, even though I really like the idea of pushing Uniswap V4 further. The blanket license thing just feels off—it puts a lot of power in GFX Labs’ hands, and since they’re a for-profit company, I’m not sure they’ll prioritize theDIY: The proposal asks for $340,000 ($250,000 for V4 integration, $90,000 for Unichain maintenance), but doesn’t offer any direct financial return to the DAO. Maybe a revenue-sharing deal where some of Oku’s V4 profits go back to the treasury could make it fairer.

Having some kind of independent group, like a rotating delegate team, to keep an eye on things would make me feel better. Skipping the Uniswap Foundation also seems like a weird choice—they’re set up to handle this kind of coordination and could bring a neutral perspective, maybe even working with GFX Labs or other devs.

Plus, the proposal’s super focused on backend stuff like analytics and APIs, but I think it’s light on user-friendly features. Oku’s UI already gets some flak for being tricky to use, and without a clear plan to make V4’s hooks or interface more welcoming for regular traders, I worry we might lose ground to centralized exchanges or other DeFi platforms. I love the vision, but I think we need to tweak this to better fit the DAO’s long-term goals.

Hey folks, I’m gonna vote no on this one, even though I really like the idea of pushing Uniswap V4 further. The blanket license thing just feels off—it puts a lot of power in GFX Labs’ hands, and since they’re a for-profit company, I’m not sure they’ll prioritize theDIY: The proposal asks for $340,000 ($250,000 for V4 integration, $90,000 for Unichain maintenance), but doesn’t offer any direct financial return to the DAO. Maybe a revenue-sharing deal where some of Oku’s V4 profits go back to the treasury could make it fairer.

Having some kind of independent group, like a rotating delegate team, to keep an eye on things would make me feel better. Skipping the Uniswap Foundation also seems like a weird choice—they’re set up to handle this kind of coordination and could bring a neutral perspective, maybe even working with GFX Labs or other devs.

Plus, the proposal’s super focused on backend stuff like analytics and APIs, but I think it’s light on user-friendly features. Oku’s UI already gets some flak for being tricky to use, and without a clear plan to make V4’s hooks or interface more welcoming for regular traders, I worry we might lose ground to centralized exchanges or other DeFi platforms. I love the vision, but I think we need to tweak this to better fit the DAO’s long-term goals.

One significant issue is the current license distribution model. However, an equally important concern is that the Uniswap Foundation (UF) allocated $1.6 million to OKU to develop a no-fee frontend intended to serve as a competitor to the Uniswap Labs frontend.

In practice, this initiative resulted in the creation of yet another privatized, for-profit frontend. Oku appears to be engaging in opaque agreements with various Layer 2 networks; arrangements that benefit OKU while excluding the DAO. Despite this, additional funding requests have been made to the DAO, even though OKU appears to be self-sustaining at this point.

Why is there no revenue-sharing model in place? If the goal of UF was truly to support a public goods frontend, why didn’t it directly launch one itself? A no-fee frontend is already available through GitHub without the need for a for-profit intermediary. Am I missing something fundamental here? Should the DAO be expected to operate as a funding source for private companies without any accountability or revenue return?

Granting UF control over licensing would at least provide them with negotiating power when engaging with entities that intend to build business models around frontend access and licensing.

Concerns Around Proposal Structure, Transparency, and Governance

I completely agree with the concerns that have been raised by @404DAO a seperate entity is needed.

To add to this, the way the proposal is structured—and the model GFX/UAC is using—is a key reason why GFX and UAC are involved in nearly all current deployments. They are basically acting as an unofficial entity. However, while GFX benefits financially, UAC does not appear to bring any monetary value back to the DAO.

I agree; a new, independent entity that can also focus on transparency, value alignment and due diligence for any chain applying for a license. Right now, GFX is bringing license proposals to UAC with little discussion around user metrics from OKU or the true user demand on the licensed L2 chain. This process lacks clarity and accountability.

I also want to highlight a few governance issues that I find troubling:

1. Conflict of Interest: GFX continued to vote on its own proposal, even after concerns were raised about the clear conflict of intrest. @kfx

2. Lack of Public Data: GFX hasn’t made user metric data publicly available. Instead, delegates are expected to schedule one-on-one meetings just to get basic information.

3. Blaming Governance Apathy: When the on-chain vote failed due to low turnout, GFX publicly blamed “governance apathy” rather than acknowledging real issues with the proposal—like its lack of transparency and missing public user metrics.

4. Private Influence: There are concerns that some delegates who are personally close to GFX are not voting against or at all. This reluctance to vote against or challenge proposals may stem more from fear of harming relationships than from genuine support.

Lastly, I reached out to Redbelly Network, which is looking for canonical approval, but they’ve not yet answered basic questions about user data metrics and their financial arrangement with GFX. Blockchain = transparency lets not forget.

@AbdullahUmar, can you clarify what your due diligence process looks like for these canonical approvals? Also, how do these decisions align with your mission to protect the DAO’s value and the Uniswap brand—especially when so much value is going to one private company, and there are growing reputational risks tied to lesser-known chain deployments?

The core issue is that the demand for the OKU front end is not driven by user interest in utilizing it across other chains. Rather, these chains are compensating OKU primarily for the access it provides to the enshrined Uniswap contracts. GFX can demonstrate its value to users and liquidity providers by providing actual analytics—something it has not addressed in its communications with other stakeholders.

You are correct that similar fees might be charged by other deployers or distributors. However, the fees associated with OKU are higher because it operates for profit. This raises the question: why shouldn’t these Layer 2 networks engage directly with the Uniswap Foundation and pay fees for deployment directly to them? At least in that case, the DAO would directly benefit from the associated revenue.

As always, if you want to understand the outcomes, look to the incentives that drive them.

One significant issue is the current license distribution model. However, an equally important concern is that the Uniswap Foundation (UF) allocated $1.6 million to OKU to develop a no-fee frontend intended to serve as a competitor to the Uniswap Labs frontend.

In practice, this initiative resulted in the creation of yet another privatized, for-profit frontend. Oku appears to be engaging in opaque agreements with various Layer 2 networks; arrangements that benefit OKU while excluding the DAO. Despite this, additional funding requests have been made to the DAO, even though OKU appears to be self-sustaining at this point.

Why is there no revenue-sharing model in place? If the goal of UF was truly to support a public goods frontend, why didn’t it directly launch one itself? A no-fee frontend is already available through GitHub without the need for a for-profit intermediary. Am I missing something fundamental here? Should the DAO be expected to operate as a funding source for private companies without any accountability or revenue return?

Granting UF control over licensing would at least provide them with negotiating power when engaging with entities that intend to build business models around frontend access and licensing.

Concerns Around Proposal Structure, Transparency, and Governance

I completely agree with the concerns that have been raised by @404DAO a seperate entity is needed.

To add to this, the way the proposal is structured—and the model GFX/UAC is using—is a key reason why GFX and UAC are involved in nearly all current deployments. They are basically acting as an unofficial entity. However, while GFX benefits financially, UAC does not appear to bring any monetary value back to the DAO.

I agree; a new, independent entity that can also focus on transparency, value alignment and due diligence for any chain applying for a license. Right now, GFX is bringing license proposals to UAC with little discussion around user metrics from OKU or the true user demand on the licensed L2 chain. This process lacks clarity and accountability.

I also want to highlight a few governance issues that I find troubling:

1. Conflict of Interest: GFX continued to vote on its own proposal, even after concerns were raised about the clear conflict of intrest. @kfx

2. Lack of Public Data: GFX hasn’t made user metric data publicly available. Instead, delegates are expected to schedule one-on-one meetings just to get basic information.

3. Blaming Governance Apathy: When the on-chain vote failed due to low turnout, GFX publicly blamed “governance apathy” rather than acknowledging real issues with the proposal—like its lack of transparency and missing public user metrics.

4. Private Influence: There are concerns that some delegates who are personally close to GFX are not voting against or at all. This reluctance to vote against or challenge proposals may stem more from fear of harming relationships than from genuine support.

Lastly, I reached out to Redbelly Network, which is looking for canonical approval, but they’ve not yet answered basic questions about user data metrics and their financial arrangement with GFX. Blockchain = transparency lets not forget.

@AbdullahUmar, can you clarify what your due diligence process looks like for these canonical approvals? Also, how do these decisions align with your mission to protect the DAO’s value and the Uniswap brand—especially when so much value is going to one private company, and there are growing reputational risks tied to lesser-known chain deployments?

The core issue is that the demand for the OKU front end is not driven by user interest in utilizing it across other chains. Rather, these chains are compensating OKU primarily for the access it provides to the enshrined Uniswap contracts. GFX can demonstrate its value to users and liquidity providers by providing actual analytics—something it has not addressed in its communications with other stakeholders.

You are correct that similar fees might be charged by other deployers or distributors. However, the fees associated with OKU are higher because it operates for profit. This raises the question: why shouldn’t these Layer 2 networks engage directly with the Uniswap Foundation and pay fees for deployment directly to them? At least in that case, the DAO would directly benefit from the associated revenue.

As always, if you want to understand the outcomes, look to the incentives that drive them.

A critical condition must be added: OKU/GFX should only be permitted to launch Uniswap V4 for its own frontend on its target chains. Under no circumstances should they be allowed to charge deployment or maintenance fees to those chains. GFX is currently monetizing the distribution of the V3 license, and this proposal appears to formalize and entrench that position with the BUSL V4 license.

This proposal grants exclusive distribution rights to OKU/GFX, enabling them to profit significantly by monopolizing V4 deployments to miscellaneous L2s. It is imperative to emphasize that Uniswap should not bear deployment or maintenance costs—especially not to support a for-profit entity capitalizing on the V4 software code they did not contribute to developing.

The proposal stands in stark opposition to the principles of open-source software. It enshrines a single private actor with exclusive rights to distribute and profit from public infrastructure. If any such proposal is to be considered, it must include mechanisms to:

• Introduce competition in the monetization and distribution of the V4 license,

• Ensure a percentage of any revenue derived from such distribution is allocated back to the Uniswap DAO.

Additionally, serious questions must be raised:

• Was the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) aware that GFX was profiting from the Uniswap V3 license exception, and V3 integration expertise to other chains? @AbdullahUmar

• Why did the Uniswap Foundation grant $1.6 million to a for-profit company that is generating revenue through exclusive license access/installation? @devinwalsh

If the DAO’s goal is to encourage competition with Uniswap Labs, then grants and license exceptions should be directed toward frontend teams actively building user acquisition and adoption—not companies focused on rent extraction with obscure L2s.

This proposal, if passed, risks diluting the Uniswap brand and raises serious concerns about the potential cartelization of protocol governance by private entities.

Thank you for tagging me. Firstly let me make 2-3 points.

1. A party to contract require legal standing, the recognition of courts to sue and be sued. At the moment this is ambiguous because only the foundation and future treasury will have a legal tether. At best the rest is an unincorp assoc, or worse, a quasi-business partnership having benefits (though may not be monetary). It lacks the traditional ownership/governance/management boundaries and the law has a had time pinning down blame (see Ooki case). The legal risk of fault in case of tort (harm) doesn't change, only. shuffles around. Elsewhere I've posted several structure that the UK consider usable in terms of digitals assets under control of a treasury but I'm awaiting outcome of a foundation grant to see what are other thoughts
2. Uniswap DAO doesn't own the software, if it eventually becomes MIT license then at best it is a waiver. So without express grant from labs to ... something ... it would be hard to enforce any sub/re-license. As such if someone goes ahead and flouts the business delay, what can the DAO do? If you look at say Curve they've cunningly built the use of governance token into the protocol ... but the way hooks implements it, it may be just an option.
3. Upon failure of clear contractual exchange of obligations, courts fall back on customary business practices. However, this is so new that arguable there has been no final concurrence on what is usual. For example if there was no express (re)license but a list of DEXs in good standing (ranked according to good practices and willing to tithe something back into a common-pool for R&D,this might be considered a co-op or trade alliance (since individual members are legal entities in own right).

So given that the entity is ambiguous, no standing (unless there's some secret deal) to sue, and practices are still emerging, what can be done?

1. Decide what should be in the light (doxed) and what should preferably remain in the legal grey zone. So long as not doing anything obviously illegal, immoral or fiscally improper most regulators have bigger fish to hunt
2. Stand up the treasury ASAP ... once there is a legal tether for the digital asset UNI token, a lot of options get reduced ... so long as can relocate (xref Nexxus Mutual) then making a tentative commit is not irreversal, possibly expensive but not fatal.
3. Deciding on the license require unbiasedly considering the relationship with the labs ... as in the case of Bankless, once the IP is yanked or impaired, entropy acelerates. Should the relationship be tighter (eg exclusive right to re/sublicense) with all the risks attached, or looser in the IP foundation is broader than a single firm.

While competition with Uniswap Lab is needed, it must be noted that the UNI token’s only forward-looking utility lies in its role within the UVN on Unichain.

As @Doo_StableLab has highlighted, OKU intends to deploy V4 on competing L2s and charge fees—allowing GFX Labs to profit significantly. GFX was previously mandated to promote and integrate V3 due to its license expiration. V4’s license, however, remains in effect for some time.

Why should GFX be permitted to monetize early V4 access—funded by UNI holders—for private gain? A more appropriate approach would be to contract a V4-proficient developer, directing any resulting revenue above salary expenses to the treasury etc.

Moreover, GFX has selectively responded to key concerns. The current proposal values V4 blanket access at ZERO—a valuation that demands serious scrutiny.

Thank you for your reply. You do realize that exposing users to 11 different, newly integrated bridges increases the risk of them using one that may not be as secure or reliable as the alternatives? (For example, the Bungee hack in January—you had to issue a warning advising users to revoke approvals for that bridge, if I recall correctly.) The same concern applies to some of the lesser-known L2s—what even is “Corn”? lol.

Also, the pop-up on Oku.trade when you first visit the site is just terrible.

As for the Morpho integration—good job. Now go to AAVE and ask for integration funding so they’re not left out of your UI. Then do the same with Compound, and so on. Why not just offer lending functionality with the safest options under a single, unified interface?

At the end of the day, the OKU business model feels like governance arbitrage in exchange for subscription fees. Comes off as kind of grifty.

I’ll keep using OKU.trade until there’s a viable, safer alternative to avoid the official Universal Navigation front-end fees. I just wish OKU could remain that alternative without making me feel like I’m constantly picking between bridges or aggregators, trying to guess which ones are safer. It’s an approval minefield.

Concerns Regarding Proposal Transparency and Potential Conflicts of Interest

It is imperative to address several transparency concerns and potential conflicts of interest associated with this proposal.

Oku, a project operated by GFX Labs, generates revenue primarily through deployment and ongoing maintenance fees for entities seeking to integrate Uniswap v3. Oku positions itself as an expert in v3 code implementation and appears to derive the vast majority—if not the entirety—of its revenue from this model. This subscription-based structure has demonstrated significant value to Oku itself, while providing limited to no direct benefit to UNI token holders. This mirrors the value capture model historically observed with Uniswap Labs.

The proposed exclusive license exemption of Uniswap v4 for similar purposes would represent a substantial commercial advantage for Oku and GFX Labs. If this integration is indeed as valuable as it is positioned to be, then a compelling question arises: Why is the DAO being asked to fund this effort or subsidize it through grants or paying subscriptions and deployment costs, when the commercial value accrues disproportionately to Oku and GFX Labs?

Further, serious reputational concerns have been raised. Rune Christensen, a founder of MakerDAO and Sky, has publicly accused the GFX Labs delegation of participating in a coordinated governance attack on MKR token holders, allegedly with the objective of acquiring governance control through the forced liquidation of MKR holdings. Rune referred to the actors involved as “a crooked mercenary VC fund” with a track record of extracting value from DeFi protocols without equitable contribution.

In light of these allegations, several critical questions remain unanswered:

1. Who are the venture capital firms currently backing GFX Labs and Oku?

2. Is Phoenix Labs among those investors?

3. What is the source of the funding that has supported Oku beyond the $1.6 million grant provided by the Uniswap DAO?

4. Is there any ongoing or pending litigation involving GFX Labs, Oku, and MakerDAO or Sky?

Additionally, Oku’s intent to commercialize an “enterprise” version of its Uniswap v4 API, while keeping the free version closed-source, suggests further value extraction for private benefit at the expense of broader DAO alignment and open-source principles. @jengajojo

A further concern is an apparent violation of the Uniswap DAO’s stated governance principles. Specifically, the Uniswap Foundation’s published guidelines require that all conflicts of interest be disclosed and that delegates with such conflicts abstain from voting on related proposals. GFX Labs, despite having a direct financial interest in this proposal, has already voted in favor of its own Snapshot proposal. This action appears to be a clear breach of the DAO’s governance principles.

Given the above, I strongly urge all delegates to exercise heightened caution and critical judgment before casting votes in support of this proposal.

I’m a regular user of OKU—primarily to avoid Uniswap Labs' front-end fee and the unfair separation between Universal Navigation Inc. and UNI holders @haydenadams .

A few comments on OKU:

1. OKU is a solid option for bypassing Uniswap’s official front end. It also offers bridging features and supports a broader range of chains for trading.

2. However, there are some drawbacks I’ve noticed over months of usage. For instance, OKU has gated its Discord behind phone number verification, which limits easy feedback loops from users. Part of the reason why I am laying this out here.

3. OKU has slowly evolved into a more complex platform. It started as a no-fee, unofficial Uniswap front end, but now seems to be pursuing "per month maintenance cost" business deals and incentives from various chains. Its scope has expanded significantly, and it no longer feels like the simple alternative front end it once was.

4. The UI has become unnecessarily complicated, and it seems like the team is struggling to find product-market fit. I had hoped OKU would compete with the sleek trading interfaces of centralized exchanges (CEXs), OKU UI looks and feels dated...its 2025 not 2018. Why hasn’t OKU developed v4 Hooks for leveraged trading or introduced other unique V4 features to set itself apart and be self sustainable?

5. To reiterate, instead of building in-house v4 Hooks, the site increasingly feels like a billboard for web3 partnerships. Where’s the innovation? Does GFX Labs not have the capacity to build truly unique products for traders?

I understand why Uniswap Foundation is taking a cautious approach with OKU, considering it gave them $1 million. What started as a simple, UNI-holder-friendly alternative to avoid front-end fees now feels like a sponsorship platform for struggling web3 L2s, bridges, and other projects looking for a GFX/OKU subscription integration deal. It honestly feels less safe to use then when OKU first launched.

Build for users.

Hi @GFXlabs,

A few questions on OKU's business model:

"have generated a high ROI by accelerating Uniswap adoption across new environments"

How many DAUs does OKU currently have?

How much is a blanket additional use grant worth?

Does OKU leverage this additional use grant to get business dealings with other web3 teams?

Of the $1.6 million granted to OKU from Uniswap DAO, has it all been fully allocated? Do you have financial reports on how the $1.6 million was spent?

Is this the last planned ask for grant money from the UNI DAO from OKU?

The Ethereum Foundation released a blog post today clarifying its role and vision in the ecosytem. I found it insightful for how Uniswap could avoid some of the optic issues that EF experienced, and could be emulated with Uniswap grant's going forward. The main quote that stuck out to me was:

What Ethereum Foundation is not:

• 100 strong teams in education, client development, or organizing events, yet all dependent on EF for funding

A critical condition must be added: OKU/GFX should only be permitted to launch Uniswap V4 for its own frontend on its target chains. Under no circumstances should they be allowed to charge deployment or maintenance fees to those chains. GFX is currently monetizing the distribution of the V3 license, and this proposal appears to formalize and entrench that position with the BUSL V4 license.

This proposal grants exclusive distribution rights to OKU/GFX, enabling them to profit significantly by monopolizing V4 deployments to miscellaneous L2s. It is imperative to emphasize that Uniswap should not bear deployment or maintenance costs—especially not to support a for-profit entity capitalizing on the V4 software code they did not contribute to developing.

The proposal stands in stark opposition to the principles of open-source software. It enshrines a single private actor with exclusive rights to distribute and profit from public infrastructure. If any such proposal is to be considered, it must include mechanisms to:

• Introduce competition in the monetization and distribution of the V4 license,

• Ensure a percentage of any revenue derived from such distribution is allocated back to the Uniswap DAO.

Additionally, serious questions must be raised:

• Was the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) aware that GFX was profiting from the Uniswap V3 license exception, and V3 integration expertise to other chains? @AbdullahUmar

• Why did the Uniswap Foundation grant $1.6 million to a for-profit company that is generating revenue through exclusive license access/installation? @devinwalsh

If the DAO’s goal is to encourage competition with Uniswap Labs, then grants and license exceptions should be directed toward frontend teams actively building user acquisition and adoption—not companies focused on rent extraction with obscure L2s.

This proposal, if passed, risks diluting the Uniswap brand and raises serious concerns about the potential cartelization of protocol governance by private entities.

Thank you for tagging me. Firstly let me make 2-3 points.

1. A party to contract require legal standing, the recognition of courts to sue and be sued. At the moment this is ambiguous because only the foundation and future treasury will have a legal tether. At best the rest is an unincorp assoc, or worse, a quasi-business partnership having benefits (though may not be monetary). It lacks the traditional ownership/governance/management boundaries and the law has a had time pinning down blame (see Ooki case). The legal risk of fault in case of tort (harm) doesn't change, only. shuffles around. Elsewhere I've posted several structure that the UK consider usable in terms of digitals assets under control of a treasury but I'm awaiting outcome of a foundation grant to see what are other thoughts
2. Uniswap DAO doesn't own the software, if it eventually becomes MIT license then at best it is a waiver. So without express grant from labs to ... something ... it would be hard to enforce any sub/re-license. As such if someone goes ahead and flouts the business delay, what can the DAO do? If you look at say Curve they've cunningly built the use of governance token into the protocol ... but the way hooks implements it, it may be just an option.
3. Upon failure of clear contractual exchange of obligations, courts fall back on customary business practices. However, this is so new that arguable there has been no final concurrence on what is usual. For example if there was no express (re)license but a list of DEXs in good standing (ranked according to good practices and willing to tithe something back into a common-pool for R&D,this might be considered a co-op or trade alliance (since individual members are legal entities in own right).

So given that the entity is ambiguous, no standing (unless there's some secret deal) to sue, and practices are still emerging, what can be done?

1. Decide what should be in the light (doxed) and what should preferably remain in the legal grey zone. So long as not doing anything obviously illegal, immoral or fiscally improper most regulators have bigger fish to hunt
2. Stand up the treasury ASAP ... once there is a legal tether for the digital asset UNI token, a lot of options get reduced ... so long as can relocate (xref Nexxus Mutual) then making a tentative commit is not irreversal, possibly expensive but not fatal.
3. Deciding on the license require unbiasedly considering the relationship with the labs ... as in the case of Bankless, once the IP is yanked or impaired, entropy acelerates. Should the relationship be tighter (eg exclusive right to re/sublicense) with all the risks attached, or looser in the IP foundation is broader than a single firm.

While competition with Uniswap Lab is needed, it must be noted that the UNI token’s only forward-looking utility lies in its role within the UVN on Unichain.

As @Doo_StableLab has highlighted, OKU intends to deploy V4 on competing L2s and charge fees—allowing GFX Labs to profit significantly. GFX was previously mandated to promote and integrate V3 due to its license expiration. V4’s license, however, remains in effect for some time.

Why should GFX be permitted to monetize early V4 access—funded by UNI holders—for private gain? A more appropriate approach would be to contract a V4-proficient developer, directing any resulting revenue above salary expenses to the treasury etc.

Moreover, GFX has selectively responded to key concerns. The current proposal values V4 blanket access at ZERO—a valuation that demands serious scrutiny.

Thank you for your reply. You do realize that exposing users to 11 different, newly integrated bridges increases the risk of them using one that may not be as secure or reliable as the alternatives? (For example, the Bungee hack in January—you had to issue a warning advising users to revoke approvals for that bridge, if I recall correctly.) The same concern applies to some of the lesser-known L2s—what even is “Corn”? lol.

Also, the pop-up on Oku.trade when you first visit the site is just terrible.

As for the Morpho integration—good job. Now go to AAVE and ask for integration funding so they’re not left out of your UI. Then do the same with Compound, and so on. Why not just offer lending functionality with the safest options under a single, unified interface?

At the end of the day, the OKU business model feels like governance arbitrage in exchange for subscription fees. Comes off as kind of grifty.

I’ll keep using OKU.trade until there’s a viable, safer alternative to avoid the official Universal Navigation front-end fees. I just wish OKU could remain that alternative without making me feel like I’m constantly picking between bridges or aggregators, trying to guess which ones are safer. It’s an approval minefield.

Concerns Regarding Proposal Transparency and Potential Conflicts of Interest

It is imperative to address several transparency concerns and potential conflicts of interest associated with this proposal.

Oku, a project operated by GFX Labs, generates revenue primarily through deployment and ongoing maintenance fees for entities seeking to integrate Uniswap v3. Oku positions itself as an expert in v3 code implementation and appears to derive the vast majority—if not the entirety—of its revenue from this model. This subscription-based structure has demonstrated significant value to Oku itself, while providing limited to no direct benefit to UNI token holders. This mirrors the value capture model historically observed with Uniswap Labs.

The proposed exclusive license exemption of Uniswap v4 for similar purposes would represent a substantial commercial advantage for Oku and GFX Labs. If this integration is indeed as valuable as it is positioned to be, then a compelling question arises: Why is the DAO being asked to fund this effort or subsidize it through grants or paying subscriptions and deployment costs, when the commercial value accrues disproportionately to Oku and GFX Labs?

Further, serious reputational concerns have been raised. Rune Christensen, a founder of MakerDAO and Sky, has publicly accused the GFX Labs delegation of participating in a coordinated governance attack on MKR token holders, allegedly with the objective of acquiring governance control through the forced liquidation of MKR holdings. Rune referred to the actors involved as “a crooked mercenary VC fund” with a track record of extracting value from DeFi protocols without equitable contribution.

In light of these allegations, several critical questions remain unanswered:

1. Who are the venture capital firms currently backing GFX Labs and Oku?

2. Is Phoenix Labs among those investors?

3. What is the source of the funding that has supported Oku beyond the $1.6 million grant provided by the Uniswap DAO?

4. Is there any ongoing or pending litigation involving GFX Labs, Oku, and MakerDAO or Sky?

Additionally, Oku’s intent to commercialize an “enterprise” version of its Uniswap v4 API, while keeping the free version closed-source, suggests further value extraction for private benefit at the expense of broader DAO alignment and open-source principles. @jengajojo

A further concern is an apparent violation of the Uniswap DAO’s stated governance principles. Specifically, the Uniswap Foundation’s published guidelines require that all conflicts of interest be disclosed and that delegates with such conflicts abstain from voting on related proposals. GFX Labs, despite having a direct financial interest in this proposal, has already voted in favor of its own Snapshot proposal. This action appears to be a clear breach of the DAO’s governance principles.

Given the above, I strongly urge all delegates to exercise heightened caution and critical judgment before casting votes in support of this proposal.

I’m a regular user of OKU—primarily to avoid Uniswap Labs' front-end fee and the unfair separation between Universal Navigation Inc. and UNI holders @haydenadams .

A few comments on OKU:

1. OKU is a solid option for bypassing Uniswap’s official front end. It also offers bridging features and supports a broader range of chains for trading.

2. However, there are some drawbacks I’ve noticed over months of usage. For instance, OKU has gated its Discord behind phone number verification, which limits easy feedback loops from users. Part of the reason why I am laying this out here.

3. OKU has slowly evolved into a more complex platform. It started as a no-fee, unofficial Uniswap front end, but now seems to be pursuing "per month maintenance cost" business deals and incentives from various chains. Its scope has expanded significantly, and it no longer feels like the simple alternative front end it once was.

4. The UI has become unnecessarily complicated, and it seems like the team is struggling to find product-market fit. I had hoped OKU would compete with the sleek trading interfaces of centralized exchanges (CEXs), OKU UI looks and feels dated...its 2025 not 2018. Why hasn’t OKU developed v4 Hooks for leveraged trading or introduced other unique V4 features to set itself apart and be self sustainable?

5. To reiterate, instead of building in-house v4 Hooks, the site increasingly feels like a billboard for web3 partnerships. Where’s the innovation? Does GFX Labs not have the capacity to build truly unique products for traders?

I understand why Uniswap Foundation is taking a cautious approach with OKU, considering it gave them $1 million. What started as a simple, UNI-holder-friendly alternative to avoid front-end fees now feels like a sponsorship platform for struggling web3 L2s, bridges, and other projects looking for a GFX/OKU subscription integration deal. It honestly feels less safe to use then when OKU first launched.

Build for users.

Hi @GFXlabs,

A few questions on OKU's business model:

"have generated a high ROI by accelerating Uniswap adoption across new environments"

How many DAUs does OKU currently have?

How much is a blanket additional use grant worth?

Does OKU leverage this additional use grant to get business dealings with other web3 teams?

Of the $1.6 million granted to OKU from Uniswap DAO, has it all been fully allocated? Do you have financial reports on how the $1.6 million was spent?

Is this the last planned ask for grant money from the UNI DAO from OKU?

The Ethereum Foundation released a blog post today clarifying its role and vision in the ecosytem. I found it insightful for how Uniswap could avoid some of the optic issues that EF experienced, and could be emulated with Uniswap grant's going forward. The main quote that stuck out to me was:

What Ethereum Foundation is not:

• 100 strong teams in education, client development, or organizing events, yet all dependent on EF for funding