I agree that governance participation is unacceptably low, but activity is not a good measure of competence as a delegate.

Instead I'd suggest a much larger voting "airdrop" to users (meaning a contract that allows them to delegate UNI via Franchiser based on usage of the product), so they have meaningful amounts to delegate. As it stands, the voting power required to pass a proposal is controlled by a small number of entities and their chosen delegates.

You could add a small reward for delegating this airdropped voting power within the first X days.

It doesn't mean much because abstaining is equivalent to not voting, so not voting is the easiest way to abstain. And if abstaining did reduce the quorum requirement, not voting would still be a valid choice.

Delegators will move their delegations if they care about it.

I think giving majority voting power to users via voting airdrop so their vote/delegation actually matters is the only way anyone is going to care about voting. If you spread the reward over time (e.g. users have to reaffirm or change their delegation), you incentivize accountability.

There's the risk that delegates bribe users that receive this voting power airdrop to delegate to them. But this is in practice hard to execute.

I agree that governance participation is unacceptably low, but activity is not a good measure of competence as a delegate.

Instead I'd suggest a much larger voting "airdrop" to users (meaning a contract that allows them to delegate UNI via Franchiser based on usage of the product), so they have meaningful amounts to delegate. As it stands, the voting power required to pass a proposal is controlled by a small number of entities and their chosen delegates.

You could add a small reward for delegating this airdropped voting power within the first X days.

It doesn't mean much because abstaining is equivalent to not voting, so not voting is the easiest way to abstain. And if abstaining did reduce the quorum requirement, not voting would still be a valid choice.

Delegators will move their delegations if they care about it.

I think giving majority voting power to users via voting airdrop so their vote/delegation actually matters is the only way anyone is going to care about voting. If you spread the reward over time (e.g. users have to reaffirm or change their delegation), you incentivize accountability.

There's the risk that delegates bribe users that receive this voting power airdrop to delegate to them. But this is in practice hard to execute.

Thanks for the feedback again.

I agree with you actually, which is the intent of this proposal. We can't force token holders to for example re delegate. But for this initiative, the governance can re delegate or withdraw delegation thus providing accountability to delegates.

Terms like 1 year can make the meta governance more burden because that would mean we would have to keep track of each one based on their term and have to host re election every time one is removed due to their terms. But will explain some changes in the below:

That's a fair concern many leading DeFi DAOs face and the reason for quantity is of course because quality is very difficult to measure. For example, at least for voting participation rate, it's more easily can be checked objectively. Either one has voted or not. Imagine if it's based on subjective factors, it would actually increase meta governance burden significantly. This is why for protocols such as MakerDAO and AAVE, or even recent Optimism delegate reward, the common criteria was based on voting participation rate for delegates. So for simple way (which seems to be the sentiment of the community), this will be a better path.

But,

is very fair. So to be inclusive of both experiment, term and also point about overburdening the meta of the governance, suggesting following changes:

The term will be 1 year from when 2.5 M UNI is delegated. However, If a received delegate is removed without fulling this 1 year term, the role won't be filled.

I believe after a year, we can revisit for improvements and lessons learned.

Thanks Doo. I do just want to push back on a couple of your arguments:

^^ operationally we could delegate the entire treasury balance (but we shouldn't). The Ekubo proposal has passed a Snapshot but has not yet been successful onchain, so I'm not sure it's a valid reference to what we're trying to do here.

^^ this is also unrelated, in my opinion. What token holders choose to do with their voting rights is up to them. We are making decisions about what to do with the Treasury's voting rights, which is a different animal altogether.

^^ missed this above, my bad. I do have some concerns about incentivizing quantity rather than quality, as well as concerns about adding a meta governance burden to delegates whose participation, as you point out, is already dwindling (who wants to vote on who gets to vote?).

Think it's fine to move to a Snapshot but I'd encourage the community to think about these questions both in voting there and then in the run up to any onchain proposals.

Thanks @Doo_StableLab for this proposal. I'm supportive in principle and have been thinking about how we might be able to do something along these lines since @Kydo mentioned it in passing a few months ago.

There are several details that I think are important to consider that haven't really been fleshed out here. I don't have particularly strong feelings one way or the other, but think it's worth discussing:

• how many votes should be delegated to each recipient? You've suggested 2.5m, which make sense because it's the minimum required to post an on-chain proposal. That said, I would think that's the upper bound, and it's potentially worth experimenting with lower numbers first to get this figured out operationally.
• how long are those votes delegated for and what's the process by which they're taken away, either because a term has expired or for cause?
• are there any standards for accountability?

It could just be the answers to these are:

• 2.5m
• indefinitely, votes taken away by gov vote
• no

Which is potentially fine, and I am biased towards simplicity. But I do think that it's worth discussing the trade offs of this approach so that everyone's on the same page.

Thanks for the feedback again.

I agree with you actually, which is the intent of this proposal. We can't force token holders to for example re delegate. But for this initiative, the governance can re delegate or withdraw delegation thus providing accountability to delegates.

Terms like 1 year can make the meta governance more burden because that would mean we would have to keep track of each one based on their term and have to host re election every time one is removed due to their terms. But will explain some changes in the below:

That's a fair concern many leading DeFi DAOs face and the reason for quantity is of course because quality is very difficult to measure. For example, at least for voting participation rate, it's more easily can be checked objectively. Either one has voted or not. Imagine if it's based on subjective factors, it would actually increase meta governance burden significantly. This is why for protocols such as MakerDAO and AAVE, or even recent Optimism delegate reward, the common criteria was based on voting participation rate for delegates. So for simple way (which seems to be the sentiment of the community), this will be a better path.

But,

is very fair. So to be inclusive of both experiment, term and also point about overburdening the meta of the governance, suggesting following changes:

The term will be 1 year from when 2.5 M UNI is delegated. However, If a received delegate is removed without fulling this 1 year term, the role won't be filled.

I believe after a year, we can revisit for improvements and lessons learned.

Thanks Doo. I do just want to push back on a couple of your arguments:

^^ operationally we could delegate the entire treasury balance (but we shouldn't). The Ekubo proposal has passed a Snapshot but has not yet been successful onchain, so I'm not sure it's a valid reference to what we're trying to do here.

^^ this is also unrelated, in my opinion. What token holders choose to do with their voting rights is up to them. We are making decisions about what to do with the Treasury's voting rights, which is a different animal altogether.

^^ missed this above, my bad. I do have some concerns about incentivizing quantity rather than quality, as well as concerns about adding a meta governance burden to delegates whose participation, as you point out, is already dwindling (who wants to vote on who gets to vote?).

Think it's fine to move to a Snapshot but I'd encourage the community to think about these questions both in voting there and then in the run up to any onchain proposals.

Thanks @Doo_StableLab for this proposal. I'm supportive in principle and have been thinking about how we might be able to do something along these lines since @Kydo mentioned it in passing a few months ago.

There are several details that I think are important to consider that haven't really been fleshed out here. I don't have particularly strong feelings one way or the other, but think it's worth discussing:

• how many votes should be delegated to each recipient? You've suggested 2.5m, which make sense because it's the minimum required to post an on-chain proposal. That said, I would think that's the upper bound, and it's potentially worth experimenting with lower numbers first to get this figured out operationally.
• how long are those votes delegated for and what's the process by which they're taken away, either because a term has expired or for cause?
• are there any standards for accountability?

It could just be the answers to these are:

• 2.5m
• indefinitely, votes taken away by gov vote
• no

Which is potentially fine, and I am biased towards simplicity. But I do think that it's worth discussing the trade offs of this approach so that everyone's on the same page.

But in extreme example, having zero activity wouldn't be an ideal delegate, no? Sure, 100% active delegate is not necessarily better than 90% active delegate but arguely, if delegates don't participate at all or very rarely then it's not ideal.

Another aspect is accountability. If one is delegating, then that's because one believes the delegate is able to represent their interest or at least participate in governance.

Upcoming changes to the proposal before going to Snapshot

1. In terms of the number of delegates for this initiative, though "5 delegates" won the most vote, do understand the desire to keep it simple. But "3 delegates" got zero vote. So will change to 4 Delegates to include both feedback

Before: 3 Delegates After: 4 Delegates

2. In terms of 90% participation rate, there were various feedback. Initially, the proposal meant 90% of onchain and offchain voting. Several have pointed out that onchain voting is not as frequent. Sometimes even less than 10 votes per 3 months. This means that if a delegate literally miss a vote or two onchain, such delegate will be removed. We believe this is a positive step as it will encourage delegates to be vigilant and also enforce accountability, but we also heard feedback that some delegates are less active on voting but more active on forum, which is also contributing to governance. Therefore, We are lowering the requirement to 80%, which will also give more chance for interested delegates to apply.

Before: vote participation rate of 90% for onchain, 90% for offchain for past 3 months After: vote participation rate of 80% for onchain, 80% for offchain for past 3 months

Also adding

The term will be 1 year from when 2.5 M UNI is delegated. However, If a received delegate is removed without fulling this 1 year term, the role won’t be filled.

But happy to hear further feedback. Thank you. And for proposals that are very different from this idea such as airdropping to holders, such seems more fitting for their own proposals and posts as the structure and planning will be very different.

This is a great initiative @Doo_StableLab thanks!

This is an awesome opportunity for the DAO to directly empower their community and give existing delegates a goal and reward to work towards, in exchange for improving their participation rate.

We have voted for the program to elect 4 delegates for a total of 10M UNI to be delegated. Looking at the recent on-chain voting turnout, 10M should be credible enough to reach the voting quorum and therefore, require large delegates to vote instead of abstaining; knowing that the quorum will likely not be met.

We’re very much in support of this proposal.

Enabling healthy governance participation in one of the biggest DAOs and recognising the ones that remain consistently active should be a no-brainer. Those delegations can enable participants to be proactive rather than reactive.

The Uniswap delegation race back in May 2023 was a great enabler of fuelling new & existing participants but there has been a clear drop off.

We believe this proposal is a great reminder for all existing delegates to aim for better participation and compete for this campaign in the future as well.

As it will be measured over the last 3 months as of the date when this proposal is passed on Snapshot, the date will take place around 11 days from now (if it passes). So there are factors that will influence (as there will be more votes in that 11 days).

But if the 90% participation requirement was taken at current time, from my understanding, at least 10 delegates would qualify.

Stickiness of Delegation is an issue if despite delegation, delegates are not active in governance, therefore, such will help to ensure accountability.

But in extreme example, having zero activity wouldn't be an ideal delegate, no? Sure, 100% active delegate is not necessarily better than 90% active delegate but arguely, if delegates don't participate at all or very rarely then it's not ideal.

Another aspect is accountability. If one is delegating, then that's because one believes the delegate is able to represent their interest or at least participate in governance.

Upcoming changes to the proposal before going to Snapshot

1. In terms of the number of delegates for this initiative, though "5 delegates" won the most vote, do understand the desire to keep it simple. But "3 delegates" got zero vote. So will change to 4 Delegates to include both feedback

Before: 3 Delegates After: 4 Delegates

2. In terms of 90% participation rate, there were various feedback. Initially, the proposal meant 90% of onchain and offchain voting. Several have pointed out that onchain voting is not as frequent. Sometimes even less than 10 votes per 3 months. This means that if a delegate literally miss a vote or two onchain, such delegate will be removed. We believe this is a positive step as it will encourage delegates to be vigilant and also enforce accountability, but we also heard feedback that some delegates are less active on voting but more active on forum, which is also contributing to governance. Therefore, We are lowering the requirement to 80%, which will also give more chance for interested delegates to apply.

Before: vote participation rate of 90% for onchain, 90% for offchain for past 3 months After: vote participation rate of 80% for onchain, 80% for offchain for past 3 months

Also adding

The term will be 1 year from when 2.5 M UNI is delegated. However, If a received delegate is removed without fulling this 1 year term, the role won’t be filled.

But happy to hear further feedback. Thank you. And for proposals that are very different from this idea such as airdropping to holders, such seems more fitting for their own proposals and posts as the structure and planning will be very different.

This is a great initiative @Doo_StableLab thanks!

This is an awesome opportunity for the DAO to directly empower their community and give existing delegates a goal and reward to work towards, in exchange for improving their participation rate.

We have voted for the program to elect 4 delegates for a total of 10M UNI to be delegated. Looking at the recent on-chain voting turnout, 10M should be credible enough to reach the voting quorum and therefore, require large delegates to vote instead of abstaining; knowing that the quorum will likely not be met.

We’re very much in support of this proposal.

Enabling healthy governance participation in one of the biggest DAOs and recognising the ones that remain consistently active should be a no-brainer. Those delegations can enable participants to be proactive rather than reactive.

The Uniswap delegation race back in May 2023 was a great enabler of fuelling new & existing participants but there has been a clear drop off.

We believe this proposal is a great reminder for all existing delegates to aim for better participation and compete for this campaign in the future as well.

As it will be measured over the last 3 months as of the date when this proposal is passed on Snapshot, the date will take place around 11 days from now (if it passes). So there are factors that will influence (as there will be more votes in that 11 days).

But if the 90% participation requirement was taken at current time, from my understanding, at least 10 delegates would qualify.

Stickiness of Delegation is an issue if despite delegation, delegates are not active in governance, therefore, such will help to ensure accountability.