We see this proposal as a way to tackle two distinct challenges: developers' engagement in governance and technical reviews.

As @jengajojo highlighted, increasing the technical awareness of the larger delegate cohort is a particularly important and valuable goal — we agree this should be tackled.

That said, we have some reservations about the proposed TAB's current scope and structure. As @AbdullahUmar noted, only 2 out of 29 proposals since the start of 2024 would have benefited from a technical review. With such a limited current workload, there’s a risk that a formal, multi-member board might introduce more overhead than value at this stage.

Instead, we’d like to propose a more intermediate approach that leverages/coordinates with existing efforts funded by the Uniswap Foundation. Specifically, @blockful was recently awarded a grant focused on Governance Security Review. While their current scope doesn’t include technical reviews of governance proposals, this could be extended to do so without requiring the creation of a new structure.

We believe the DAO should extend @blockful's current mandate from the UF, with a matching mandate focusing on the technical review of governance proposals.

We believe @blockful is a strong fit for two main reasons:

1. They are already actively engaged with Uniswap’s governance security, with a scope that closely aligns with what’s envisioned for the TAB;
2. They successfully provide this kind of technical review support for ENS governance.

This would allow us to address the technical assurance gap in a lean, efficient, and immediate way — while leaving room to reassess the need for a more formal advisory body down the line if the proposal volume or complexity increases.

As for developers' engagement in governance, we believe that it is a separate challenge that should be addressed independently.

For L2 governance, as well as for dapps like lending markets, it would make sense to have this type of structure. As you mentioned, Optimism has DAB. DAOs like Compound have OpenZeppelin on retainer. For Uniswap, the criticality for a technical board is comparatively less. Let's look at the proposals over the past year.

Most of these txns are for sending UNI, in other words, they're funding proposals. These don't really require technical analysis. The only time a parameter in the Governor Bravo contract was called was during the lowering of the proposal threshold. The most "complex" proposal from a technical perspective was when fee tiers were added to Base, which simply targeted the Base receiver contract. So, 2/29 proposals were more "critical," if that's how we want to label txns. Anything to do with ENS operations is simply for transparency and operational purposes, not touching any governance contracts or contracts that are associated with fees.

More complicated proposals would include those related to the Franchisers, which have been set up and reviewed by ScopeLift—who also seem to be on this committee, which seems a bit repetitive. Turning on fees is also going to require some in-depth review and care. For those, I'd assume the UF would double and triple check the soundness of those proposals. Am I missing any other types of proposals that would warrant a technical review board?

This is an accurate observation, however there is a difference between responsibility and ability to execute on these tasks. The existing incentive schemes have not found a way to incentivize these without making the evaluation highly subjective. Hence the DAO ends up optimizing for quantitive elements which do not necessarily offer technical feedback.

Another challenge is that many delegates use a team account instead of a personal account to participate in conversations, this disallows the broader community to understand if the feedback is coming from a technical expert or a full-time governance role holder in that team.

We acknowledge that the first iteration of the six member TAB comes as a concrete proposal. This is based on our conversations with various teams, who are already part of the uniswap community by playing various roles such as builders, developers, security experts and researchers. We are open to understanding why specifically any of the suggested team members are underqualified or are in any way not considered part of the DAO.

I agree with this opinion, hence we expect some members to be more active than others not only as a function of time, but also as a function of expertise and role. This does indeed mean that there will be variations in activity based on different factors, not just time. However evaluating each contribution becomes a subjective endeavor which can potentially become equally cumbersome to coordinate. On the other hand working as a team allows members to step in at the right moment and support each other as opposed to competing, with may lead to domination of opinions from people who have more flexible schedules than others to manage with a full-time job.

This is exactly the goal we are trying to achieve and based on the comments so far, it seems that delegates are not opposed to it. We believe that this awareness will be enhanced, not only by educational activities, but also feedback which come directly from experts as well as the ability to voice this opinion via participation in voting.

I think another issue is -Is it really possible to coordinate such a large team to assess and vote on all the proposals without making it quite cumbersome. There are weeks without proposals but there are also weeks that have several proposals and I afraid in practice, there will be some TAB members who are more active than others and yet discouraged because they all get the same budget regardless of whether they are active or not.

I suggest it to make it individually rather than collectively and also compensation to be based on their individual contribution rather than collective.

We have some concerns regarding this proposal:

• Unlike Optimism and its Developer Advisory Board, and as @AbdullahUmar remarked, Uniswap DAO does not regular engage in technical protocol upgrade discussions that would require a dedicated structure with deep development expertise. Regarding integrations and deployments, the UAC already handles these tasks effectively. As for partnerships, the Foundation plays a leading role, along with Alpha.Growth within the DAO. For all these reasons, we do not believe creating a new structure with the proposed characteristics is necessary.

• Regarding the scope of this new proposed structure:

Except for the last point, we believe that the rest of the listed tasks are inherent responsibilities of all delegates. Delegates are compensated to review proposals, provide feedback, raise concerns when misalignments are detected, and vote — as explicitly stated and approved in the Uniswap DAO Principles. Therefore, we do not believe it is necessary to create a new structure whose responsibilities would largely overlap with those of the delegates.

• Regarding the delegation of V.P. to developers: this issue was already discussed in [RFC] Treasury Delegation Round 2 and did not move forward. We do not agree with introducing it now into this proposal with six pre-selected individuals.

• We also disagree with the approach of creating a seven-member structure where all members have already been chosen, preventing other interested candidates from applying and limiting the DAO’s ability to select its members.

• For all the reasons stated above, we fail to see what concrete value this kind of structure would bring to the DAO, which may be necessary in other DAOs with regular deep technicals scopes, but is not the case for UniswapDAO, especially considering that it would cost 41,800 UNI per year.